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“The relationship between empire and nation was among the thorniest of questions in the late Russian Em-
pire, and the complications proved most acute in the country’s western regions. This volume assembles a 
truly international team of scholars to explore these matters in a range of different contexts, from education 
and religion to censorship, tourism, and right-wing political mobilization. The chapters reveal an exception-
al set of challenges that statesmen, reformers, and imperial subjects of diverse nationalities and confessions 
faced in conceptualizing and actualizing their projects in the context of new forms of association and al-
tered political frameworks. As the authors reveal, the greatest casualty for imperial policy was consistency. 
Full of new research and compelling insights, The Tsar, the Empire, and the Nation represents the latest 
word on this important problem in Russian and East European history.”
—Paul W. Werth, Professor of History, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
“By investigating western borderlands from the Baltic provinces in the north to Ukraine in the south, this 
volume creates a meso-level between the macro-perspective on the Russian empire as a whole and the mi-
cro-perspective on a single region, paving the ground for comparative insights into the empire’s responses 
to national questions. What I admire the most about this book is its very balanced discussion of national 
questions which still bear the potential to become politicized.”













This book addresses the challenge of modern nationalism to the tsarist Russian Empire that first ap-peared on the empire’s western periphery. It was most prevalent in the twelve provinces extending 
from the Ukrainian lands in the south to the Baltic provinces in the north, and in the Kingdom of Poland. 
Did the late Russian Empire enter World War I as a multiethnic state with many of its age-old mechanisms 
run by a multiethnic elite, or as a Russian state predominantly managed by ethnic Russians? The studies 
seek to answer this main question while covering diverse issues such as native language education, intercon-
fessional rivalry, the “Jewish question,” and the emergence of Russian nationalist attitudes in the aftermath 
of the first Russian revolution. The overall finding of the contributors is that although the imperial gov-
ernment did not really identify with popular Russian nationalism, it sometimes ended up implementing 
policies promoted by Russian nationalist proponents. 
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Introduction
Among the several monuments that the tsarist government chose to erect 
in Vil’na, the capital of its Northwest region at the turn of the century, 
two were especially prominent. The first, unveiled in 1898, was dedicated 
to the Vil’na governor-general in 1863–65, Mikhail Murav’ev; the second, 
unveiled in 1904, honored Catherine the Great, Russia’s empress between 
1762 and 1796.1 The two edifices in fact symbolized two different visions 
of the Romanov Empire. In government circles, Murav’ev earned praise for 
his role in quashing the uprising of 1863 and as a statesman who played a 
key role in efforts to reestablish the region’s Russianness. The monument’s 
construction and unveiling unfolded principally as a Russian affair in Rus-
sian discourse, and indeed, government representatives’ anti-Polish senti-
ments were evident without ever having to be stated explicitly.2 Thus, the 
monument’s appearance illustrates how the Romanov Empire acquired el-
ements of a national (Russian) monarchy in its later decades.3 Yet by 1904, 
The editors would like to thank Paul W. Werth for his assistance in preparing this volume. We would also 
like to thank the two peer reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. The research of Darius 
Staliūnas, Vilma Žaltauskaitė, Olga Mastinaica, Vytautas Petronis, Yoko Aoshima, Kimitaka Matsuzato, and 
Chiho Fukushima was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Grant-in-Aid for Scien-
tific Research (15H01898, 15K02939, 18H00729), and the Research Council of Lithuania (No. S-LJB-17-3).
1  Official nineteenth-century place names are used throughout the book (for example, Vil’na and not Vil-
nius) and only in those cases where these names are radically different from the current ones is the name 
used today included in parentheses (for example, Novoaleksandrovsk [Zarasai]).
2  Darius Staliūnas, “Poland or Russia? Lithuania on the Russian Mental Map,” in Spatial Concepts of Lithua-
nia in the Long Nineteenth Century, edited by Darius Staliūnas (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2016), 78–
82. Theodore R. Weeks argued that the initiators for the unveiling of this monument did not demonstrate any 
anti-Polish sentiments: Theodore R. Weeks, “Monuments and Memory: Immortalizing Count M. N. Mura-
viev in Vilna, 1898,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 27, no. 4 (1999): 551–64.
3   Richard Wortman, “The Tsar and the Empire. Representation of the Monarchy and Symbolic Integration 
in Imperial Russia,” in Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century, edit-
ed by Jörn Leonhard and Ulrike von Hirschhausen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 266–86.
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the city’s governor-general Petr Sviatopolk-Mirskii contended that the un-
veiling needed to involve not only Russians but also people of other nation-
alities, above all the Polish-speaking social elite.4 His position on the mat-
ter reflected his approach to nationality issues in the region more generally. 
He moreover proposed easing elements of discrimination against non-Rus-
sians, believing that their commitments to non-Russian national identifica-
tion did not necessarily undermine their loyalty to the emperor.5 In short, 
the two visions of the Romanov Empire embedded in the monuments were 
these: one perceived the empire as primarily an ethnic Russian (russkii) 
state, where the interests of Russians were promoted at the expense of non-
Russians; the other embraced the idea of imperial heterogeneity, whereby 
political elites sought to ensure the loyalty of non-Russians by tolerating 
rather than suppressing their diverse cultures. 
Historians now broadly agree that non-Russian nationalisms were not 
the primary cause of the fall of the Russian Empire in the World War I.6 
Indeed, scholars have recently made significant efforts to show that the Ro-
manov Empire and similar multiethnic states actually proved quite effec-
tive in coping with the challenges of nationalism. In their path-breaking 
book Nationalizing Empires, Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller turn atten-
tion to the processes of national consolidation unfolding at the core of em-
pires—processes that they regard as having been quite successful. Those 
processes, they contend, were aimed at “the preservation and extension of 
empires rather than at the dissolution of empires or the transformations of 
entire empires into nation-states.”7 Writing specifically about Russia, Mill-
er assesses the monarchy’s deployment of nationalism as a source of legiti-
mization and evidence of its quest for common cause with popular Russian 
4  Rasa Antanavičiūtė, Menas ir politika Vilniaus viešosiose erdvėse. XX a. pirmoji pusė (unpublished manu-
script).
5  Witold Rodkiewicz, Russian Nationality Policy in the Western Provinces of the Empire (1863–1905) (Lub-
lin: Scientic Society of Lublin, 1998), 225–33.
6  Dominic Lieven, The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 
2002), 284.
7  Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller, “Introduction: Building Nations in and with Empires—A Reassess-
ment,” Nationalizing Empires, edited by Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest, New York: CEU 
Press, 2015), 3.
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nationalism.8 Other researchers, such as Theodore R. Weeks, likewise con-
tend that “after 1905 official nationalism and popular nationalism became 
closer than ever,” despite “constant tension” between them.9
There is undoubtedly truth to the claims that national consolidation pro-
cess at the core of the Romanov Empire was successful to some extent, yet 
we are still left to contemplate the effects of imperial nationality policy on 
the integration of non-Russians, i.e., the ways in which that policy sought 
to create institutional spaces and a language of inclusion that could generate 
sentiments of unity and belonging among those who did not happen to be 
Russian. Here, the consensus appears broadly pessimistic. A collective mono-
graph edited by the aforementioned Miller and Mikhail Dolbilov notes that, 
for all intents and purposes, the imperial government in 1907 rejected the in-
tegration of non-Russians into the imperial political system with an altera-
tion to the parliament’s electoral law that was specifically designed to reduce 
their representation.10 The authors of a volume released by the journal Ab Im-
perio concur that the empire’s nationalizing policy was essentially anti-im-
perial in that it envisioned no space for non-Russians in the country’s polit-
ical body.11 In a study of identities and nationalism in Right-bank Ukraine, 
Faith Hillis offers a rather categorical conclusion along the same lines: “Rus-
sian tsars, bureaucrats, and intellectuals thus proved unable to reach a con-
sensus about how the empire should respond to the national challenges that 
it faced. They could neither grant ethnonational considerations a leading role 
in imperial governance nor guide the empire toward civic nationhood with-
out undermining the foundations of the entire autocratic system.” For Hill-
is, this failure “weakened the empire’s internal stability.”12 Other historians, 
  8 Alexei Miller, “The Romanov Empire and the Russian Nation,” in Nationalizing Empires, edited by Ste-
fan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2015), 309–68. 
  9 Theodore R. Weeks, “Official and Popular Nationalisms: Imperial Russia 1863–1914,” Nationalismen in 
Europa: West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich, edited by Ulrike v. Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonard (Göttin-
gen: Wallstein Verlag, 2001), 412, 432.
10 Mikhail Dolbilov and Alexei Miller, Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe 
obozrenie, 2006), 367. 
11 Il’ia Gerasimov et al., eds., Novaia imperskaia istoriia Severnoi Evrazii, vol. 2: Balansirovanie imperskoi 
situ atsii XVIII–XX vv. (Kazan’: Ab Imperio, 2017), 286–87. 
12 Faith Hillis, Children of Rus’. Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation (Ithaca, NY and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2013), 7. 
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too, have noted the lack of a coherent nationality policy, ascribing this fact to 
both the diversity of worldviews among different political elites and inade-
quate coordination among government authorities.13 Thus, historians arrive 
at different conclusions with regard to the question of how successful the Ro-
manov Empire was in adapting to challenges of nationalism depending on 
whether they concentrate on interaction between imperial government and 
popular Russian nationalism or on the effects of tsarist nationality policy on 
non-Russians.
The subject of the present volume is precisely the response of the em-
pire’s ruling elite to the challenges of nationalism in the tsarist regime’s 
last decades. While there are reasons to acknowledge the compatibility of 
empire and nationalism, there were clearly substantial challenges in com-
bining the two in a coherent, long-term policy. Whereas earlier explora-
tions of these issues have tended to encompass either the empire as a whole 
or smaller administrative units, the present volume adopts an intermedi-
ate geographic scope by focusing on Russia’s western peripheries collective-
ly. We understand this region as including the twelve provinces extending 
from Ukrainian lands in the south to the Baltic provinces in the north, as 
well as the Kingdom of Poland.14 It was precisely in these western periph-
eries, as Hillis writes, that “Russia first encountered the challenge of mod-
ern nationalism.”15 This was also one of the Romanov empire’s geopoliti-
cally sensitive regions and the one where the challenge of nationalism was 
both the greatest and the most complicated. Control over Poland meant 
that Russia could exert greater influence over European affairs, but that ter-
ritory simultaneously created a host of problems. As Dominic Lieven suc-
cinctly remarked, “Poland was too big to absorb easily, and its elites were 
too numerous, too self-confident and too wedded to heroic memories of the 
old independent Polish Commonwealth.”16 Although from time to time 
13 Lieven, The Russian Empire and Its Rivals, 274–75.
14 These twelve provinces were Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Vil’na, Kovna, Grodna, Minsk, Vitebsk, Mogilev, 
Kurland, Livland, and Estland.
15 Hillis, Children of Rus’, 3.
16 Lieven, The Russian Empire and Its Rivals, 272.
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ideas about abandoning the Kingdom of Poland circulated among the im-
perial intellectuals and ruling elites, such a solution was never seriously con-
sidered by the tsarist government.17 Not only was it unthinkable for a great 
power to dispense with such an important territory; it was also crystal clear 
that Polish claims to the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
and Right-bank Ukraine would not disappear if the Kingdom of Poland 
became independent. Western borderlands were also the site of the larg-
est concentration of Jews, and in the late imperial period, many tsarist offi-
cials regarded Jews as a serious threat if not an outright enemy. From their 
incorporation into the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, the Bal-
tic provinces were also highly sensitive in a geopolitical sense. Following 
the German unification in 1870–71 they became a target of “Russification” 
policy, although that policy was not that harsh as in the Western region.18 
Strife there peaked in 1905, when the region saw the eruption of one of its 
fiercest social conflicts, which also overlapped with the national crises (Es-
tonian and Latvian peasants against the Baltic German nobility).
Separate parts of the empire’s western peripheries had different statuses 
on the Russian mental map. The Grand Duchy of Finland and most of the 
Kingdom of Poland (then officially called the Vistula Region) were under-
stood as territory under Romanov rule but not Russian “national territory.”19 
Nor were the Baltic provinces of Estland, Livland, and Kurland typically 
construed as part of that “national territory,” since there were comparative-
ly few ethnic Russians residing there, with Estonian and Latvian peasants 
constituting the absolute majority under a social elite of Baltic Germans. 
17 On such ideas see, for example, Henryk Głębocki, Fatalna sprawa: Kwestia polska w rosyjskiej myśli 
politycz nej (1856–1866) (Cracow: Arcana, 2000), 304.
18 On tsarist policy in the Baltic provinces, see Edward C. Thaden, Russia’s Western Borderlands, 1710–1870 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Michael Haltzel, Der Abbau der deutschen ständischen 
Selbstverwaltung in den Ostseeprovinzen Rußlands: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der russischen Unifizierings-
politik 1855–1905 (Marburg–Lahn: J. G. Herder-Institut, 1977).
19 On the distinction between Russian Empire and Russian “national territory,” see Alexei Miller, The Ro-
manov Empire and Nationalism: Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research (Budapest–New York: 
CEU Press, 2008), 32, 163–67; Alexei Miller, “The Romanov Empire and the Russian Nation,” in Nation-
alizing Empires, edited by Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2015), 338–
47. Two parts of the Kingdom of Poland—Chelm and Suwalki—represent an exception because they were 
regarded in certain circles as Russian and Lithuanian territory respectively.
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But as Karsten Brüggemann shows in his chapter, the second half of the 
nineteenth century nonetheless saw a partial symbolic appropriation of the 
region in Russian national discourse on the basis of historic and confession-
al criteria—something revealed even in geographic nomenclature: initially 
labeled Ostzeiskii krai (from Ostsee, the German for “Baltic”), the provinc-
es later became Pribaltiiskii krai (“Baltic region” in Russian). The provinc-
es further south—at the center of attention in this book—were in most cas-
es very much conceptualized as a Russian “national territory”; indeed, they 
were often identified quite purposefully as Western Rus’, with reference to 
the medieval polity that Russian discourse interpreted as homogenous east-
ern Slavic territory and the foundation of Russia in its more modern form.20 
The one principal exception in the region was Kovna and a portion of Vil’na 
province, which featured a compact Lithuanian population and, in certain 
contexts, was identified as “belonging” to Lithuanians.21
The chapters below are divided into four sections based on their prima-
ry analytical focus. The first section explores transformations in nationality 
policy and the impact of nationalist ideology on bureaucratic thinking. The 
second focuses more closely on the specific matters of religion, the third on 
education, while the fourth analyzes interrelationships between the tsarist 
government and popular Russian nationalism.
Transformations of Imperial Nationality Policy
Competing policy strategies and the influence of regime liberalization on 
possibilities of effective rule are the focus of the studies written by Anton 
20 The Western region consisted of the Southwest region (the provinces of Kiev, Volhynia, and Podolia) 
and the Northwest region (the provinces of Vil’na, Kovna, Grodna, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Mogilev), even 
though sometimes in the early twentieth century, the term “Northwest region” was applied only to the so-
called Lithuanian provinces (Vil’na, Kovna, and Grodna), but not to the remaining three “Belorussian” 
ones. This region does not even appear among the borderlands analyzed in Alfred J. Rieber’s book, The 
Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
21 Darius Staliūnas, “Poland or Russia? Lithuania on the Russian Mental Map,” in Spatial Concepts of Lith-
uania in the Long Nineteenth Century, edited by Darius Staliūnas (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2016), 
23–95.
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Kotenko, Darius Staliūnas, and Malte Rolf. These chapters probe the di-
versity of imperial visions promoted by tsarist officials, focusing in partic-
ular on the tension between visions that, on the one hand, promoted priv-
ileges for the East Slavic population and the discrimination or segregation 
for non-Russians and, on the other, stood ready to tolerate non-Russian de-
mands in the sphere of culture and education in order to ensure their loy-
alty to the Romanov Empire. Those investigations reveal that while one 
or the other vision might emerge predominant at a particular moment or 
in a specific context, neither was able to conquer the other entirely, which 
left policy inconsistent even at the conceptual level. Kotenko analyzes the 
imperial government’s actions in the Southwest region in relation to both 
Russian and Ukrainian nationalism. If the region represented Russian “na-
tional territory,” then its Little Russian, or Ukrainian, inhabitants were 
construed as part of the tripartite Russian nation, along with Belorussians 
and Great Russians.22 Although some government officials—for example, 
in censoring agencies—promoted a strict assimilationist policy towards 
Little Russians, Kotenko shows how the Revolution of 1905 legalized pub-
lications in the Ukrainian language, which made it impossible to ban such 
works solely on the basis of language. Other local officials were more inter-
ested in securing social stability than in any policies of cultural homoge-
nization. Kotenko proposes that a combination of different visions of em-
pire and nationality policy, along with important changes to the political 
regime after 1905, blocked proponents of a strict assimilation policy from 
fully realizing their plans. In a fruitful formulation, Anton Kotenko calls 
the tsarist state an inconsistently nationalizing empire. Indeed, collectively 
we argue that inconsistency represents the main characteristic of nationali-
ty policy in the late imperial period.
Darius Staliūnas continues this theme of inconsistency by focusing on 
two competing strategies of nationality policy in the Northwest region: an 
imperial nationality policy, which proposed that the satisfaction of non-
22 As the focus of this book is the imperial government and popular Russian nationalism, we use the term 
used at the time in Russian discourse: “Belorussians,” rather than the modern “Belarusians.” This choice 
has no ideological connotations.
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Russians’ cultural demands would guarantee their loyalty to the empire; 
and a nationalist policy, which prioritized the tasks associated with assimila-
tion for the East Slavic population and segregation with regard to Jews and 
Poles, and sometimes even all Catholics. Proponents of the second strate-
gy often recommended the continuation of policies in the post-1863 period, 
even though the more liberal political regime and stronger non-Russian na-
tional movements after 1905 made such policies substantially more difficult 
to pursue. Staliūnas also shows that even tsarist officials themselves conced-
ed that neither of these strategies could guarantee the loyalty of non-Rus-
sians in the longer term.
Rolf deals with the dilemmas of imperial nationality policies in the 
Kingdom of Poland. He shows how local Russian nationalists promoted 
policies of strengthening Russian influence in the kingdom, and how they 
were supported by some among the empire’s political elite who were infil-
trated with a degree of ethnic Russo-centrism. But, as Rolf argues, Warsaw’s 
governor-general Georgii Skalon, the principal tsarist statesman in the re-
gion, pursued this policy only to a limited degree. Of Baltic German origin, 
Skalon embraced estate-orientated concepts of social order that would have 
been undermined by the proposals that radical Russian nationalists sought 
to implement in the empire’s borderlands. Thus, Rolf argues, tsarist officials 
in the Kingdom found themselves in double isolation: they were perceived 
as foreign by the largest of the local nationalities, Poles and Jews; and they 
were simultaneously alienated from Russian nationalists. Exploring this 
complicated situation, Rolf concludes that tsarist government had no long-
term vision of how to manage the empire’s multiethnic borderlands.
 
Confessions in the Crossfire
Another core issue involved religious groups and their status in the after-
math of 1905. Several of our authors correspondingly focus on this ques-
tion. Chiho Fukushima and Vilma Žaltauskaitė show how repressive meth-
ods in confessional policy eventually led not only to homogenization (the 
acculturation of the Orthodox East Slavic population into Russian society) 
staulinas_book.indb   8 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:20
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but also to differentiation (the acculturation of East Slavs into Polish soci-
ety of those who converted to Catholicism). Fukushima discusses the im-
pact of the 1905 Decree of Tolerance, which allowed people to leave the 
Orthodox faith, on nation-building processes. The strongest players in the 
Chełm-Podlasian region were the imperial government and the Orthodox 
Church, on the one hand, and Polish nationalists in collaboration with the 
Catholic Church, on the other. After the decree’s issuance, former Uni-
ates—Greek Catholics who had been forcibly converted to Orthodoxy in 
a large campaign of 1875—converted to Roman Catholicism on a massive 
scale, and thus became even more strongly acculturated into the Polish so-
ciety. At the same time, it is likely that those who remained Orthodox ac-
culturated into the Russian nation. 
Like the Kingdom of Poland in Fukushima’s chapter, so too in the 
Northwest region there was a spate of mass conversions from Orthodoxy to 
Catholicism after the toleration decree, as Žaltauskaitė’s chapter reveals. But 
here a majority of the so-called recalcitrants who had resisted their inclusion 
in Orthodoxy in the decades before 1905 were not Uniates but the descen-
dants of Belorussian Roman Catholics who had been forced to covert to Or-
thodoxy by the government between 1863 and 1868 (though notably some of 
those converts remained in Orthodoxy even after 1905). Žaltauskaitė shows 
that the confrontation between the Orthodox and Catholic communities, 
between Orthodox and Catholic clergy, and between the imperial govern-
ment and non-Russian nationalisms had a long prehistory and did not begin 
with the decree of 1905, as some of the earlier historiography has proposed. 
Žaltauskaitė also notices a rise in discriminatory measures in confessional 
policy from around 1908. This policy shift did not serve to increase loyalty 
to the empire among Catholics in the Northwest region. 
Transformations in Education
The 1905 Revolution also brought significant changes to educational policy. 
Yoko Aoshima argues that in contrast to earlier decades, the central govern-
ment after 1905 began to discuss education policy matters on an empire-wide 
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scale, rather than addressing each region separately. Even so, the position of 
different regions on the Russian mental map remained quite varied, with 
the result that the scale and scope of native language use also differed as it 
had before the revolution. Focusing mostly on the Baltic  provinces and the 
Kingdom of Poland, Aoshima asserts that discussions of the use of non-Rus-
sian languages in schooling around 1905 began with only a regional focus, 
although the government actually permitted a slightly wider range of rights 
for non-Russian languages within an arrangement that asserted the basic 
predominance of the Russian language as the state language. However, the 
discussions taking place in the imperial center provoked demands from non-
Russian populations more than earlier in the empire’s history, which in turn 
caused the government to try to protect Russian interests. 
After 1905, the imperial government initiated plans for the creation of a 
universal primary education system. Kimitaka Matsuzato analyzes the ten-
sions that emerged in this project in the Southwest region, where the Minis-
try of Education sought to expand the school network as evenly as possible so 
every child would have the opportunity to receive a basic primary education. 
However, the lack of resources compelled the government to rely on the fi-
nancial input of local communities, who often prioritized the higher prima-
ry schools. Beyond the goal of increasing access to education, the tsarist bu-
reaucracy had another motive for maximizing the number of schools  under 
the jurisdiction of the ministry or the zemstvos in relation to parish schools: 
it hoped to counter illegal Polish schools, whose numbers surged after 1905.23 
Two further chapters focus principally on the content of educational pol-
icy. Olga Mastianica and Jolita Mulevičiūtė analyze how officials sought to 
promote imperial loyalty in the Northwest region through the education 
system, paying particular attention to various instructional practices, pri-
marily excursions. Mastianica highlights continuity: after 1905, the Russian 
education system continued to implement the historical narrative conceived 
back in the 1830s, which declared the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to be a 
23 The zemstvo was an institution of self-government introduced in most of the Romanov Empire in 1864. 
For more on the introduction of the zemstvo system, see chapter 2, p. 44 in this book.
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Russian state, and thus construed the Northwest region as being composed 
of historically Russian lands. Mulevičiūtė notes a concept that began to ap-
pear in school reports following excursions, whereby the Russian nation as 
a supra-ethnic community was portrayed as an alternative to the homoge-
neous Russian nation. Both authors stress that despite the Northwest re-
gion’s ostensible status as Russian “national territory,” uncertainty over its 
actual Russianness became clearly evident in the various actions of state in-
stitutions.  Mastianica notes that while teachers and other activists frequently 
called for more attention to the history and geography of the region in their 
lessons, the tsarist government did little in this regard. Mulevičiūtė shows 
how this region was marginalized as an excursion destination. Both authors 
admit the difficulty of finding sources that can reveal the influence of these 
lessons and excursions on pupils, though they hypothesize that this indoc-
trination could have had the “side effect” of fostering non-Russian loyalties. 
The Problem of the Russian Right
Relations between the imperial government and Russian rightist organi-
zations in different western peripheries of the empire varied significantly 
even as they also had certain common characteristics. In the Northwest 
region, as Vytautas Petronis shows, rightist organizations of different ori-
entations—both moderate (nationalist) and extreme (radical and monar-
chist)—appeared in the early twentieth century. The first were more in-
fluential in the so-called Lithuanian provinces, the second in Belorussian 
lands. However, according to Petronis, none of them had a specific ideol-
ogy or strategy that “would have encompassed other—the non-Russian —
nationalisms within the general framework of the empire.” The imperial 
government backed all these organizations between 1905 and 1907, though 
subsequently it sometimes used them only instrumentally, without provid-
ing support that was either constant or complete; after 1910, government 
backing weakened. Petronis indicates that the rightists feared the delega-
tion of more power to society, yet at the same time we should not forget 
that many members of these organizations were state employees, bureau-
staulinas_book.indb   11 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:20
Introduction
12
crats, school teachers—that is, a constituent part of imperial institutions. 
As many of the studies in this volume show (see Staliūnas, Žaltauskaitė, 
and Aoshima), from 1908 onward, imperial nationality policy in the west-
ern peripheries became increasingly discriminatory towards non-Russians, 
which is what a majority of these Russian rightists wanted.24 However, this 
does not mean that this shift happened in all the empire’s peripheries, or 
did so simultaneously.25 In this volume Rolf argues that on the one hand, 
Warsaw governor-general Skalon renewed the policy of strengthening Rus-
sian influence in the Kingdom of Poland after 1910 but, on the other, he 
still looked for moderate reconciliation with Polish society.
In the Baltic provinces, Russian rightists’ situation was more compli-
cated than in the Northwest region, as here Russians made up a very small 
percentage of the population. That is why such right-wing activists recom-
mended more drastic solutions designed to increase the influence of eth-
nic Russians in the region (for example, government-backed colonization 
by Russian peasants and the creation of incentives for Estonians and Lat-
vians to depart voluntarily). When discussing the political visions of Rus-
sian rightists in the Baltic region, Brüggemann emphasizes their utopian 
character. Much like Petronis and Kotenko, he argues that the rightists’ 
plans for the region appeared too radical to tsarist government officials and 
threatened to destabilize ethno-confessional relations in the region. They, 
therefore, did not earn the government’s support. 
As the chapter by Vladimir Levin shows, there were no serious disagree-
ments between the imperial government and Russian rightists on the “Jewish 
question.” With a few exceptions, neither side intended to grant Jews equal 
rights. Yet, there was a kind of dynamism in both bureaucratic attitudes to-
24 A shift towards policy restricting autonomy occured at a similar time in the Grand Duchy of Finland: Ed-
ward C. Thaden. “Administrative Russification in Finland, 1881–1914,” in Russification in the Baltic Prov-
inces and Finland, 1855–1914, edited by Edward C. Thaden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1981), 84–88. 
25 In the Caucasus, Viceroy I. Vorontsov-Dashkov managed to uphold a consistent policy until 1915, avoid-
ing any openly discriminatory policies aimed at non-Russians: Stephen Badalyan Riegg, “Neotraditional-
ist Rule to the Rescue of the Empire? Viceroy I. Vorontsov-Dashkov amid Crises in the Caucasus, 1905–
1915,” Ab Imperio 3 (2018): 115–39.
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wards Jews and the visions of Russian rightists. If during the Revolution of 
1905 Jews occupied the top position in the empire’s “hierarchy of enemies,” 
then in subsequent years, their demonization decreased, and by 1914, their 
place in the enemy rankings had been taken by Germans. Still, Jews acquired 
equal rights to the other subjects of the empire only after the February Revo-
lution in 1917, and the continuation of their status as second-class subjects be-
fore then prevented the formation of rightist Jewish political organizations. 
Although there were some individual conservative and loyalist Jews who 
tried to gather into rightist organizations or cooperate with Russian right-
ists, Levin shows that they were largely unsuccessful in these efforts.
Thus, the inconsistency of imperial policy, emphasized by many contrib-
utors to this volume, did not mean inconsequentiality. As shown not only in 
Levin’s but also in Fukushima, Matsuzato, Mulevičiūtė, and Žaltauskaitė’s 
papers, the empire’s policy in this arena—despite and even because of its 
very inconsistency—shaped the loyalties and attitudes of non-Russians.
* * *
So, which of the two visions identified at the start of this introduction actu-
ally predominated the empire’s last decade? The answer must be “neither.” 
At any given moment and in any particular context, one or the other might 
gain the upper hand. But in the end, the regime could commit itself com-
pletely to neither of them. As an imperial formation, it could not identi-
fy fully with Russian nationalism, even though it sometimes implemented 
things that Russian nationalists advocated. A focus on loyalty over nation-
alization, meanwhile, could not address the general tendency of non-Rus-
sian claims to escalate. The altered political context—new civil rights, a par-
liament with real legislative power, a burgeoning press, etc.—rendered the 
execution of any policy originating before 1905 much more difficult after-
ward. The result was a dilemma that was never resolved. If tsarist Russia in 
its last decade represented a nationalizing empire, it was only  inconsistently 
and reluctantly so.
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An Inconsistently Nationalizing State: The Romanov Empire 
and the Ukrainian National Movement, 1906–1917
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Introduction
The southwestern provinces of Kiev, Volhynia, and Podolia posed a chal-
lenge for the nationality policy of the Romanov Empire. During half a cen-
tury after its acquisition from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, 
Russian emperors and the central imperial bureaucracy conceived this re-
gion, which was populated by numerous ethnic and religious groups, as 
quite an exotic Polish territory, occasionally even “associating it with some-
thing similar to the overseas colonies of Western European empires.”1 Even 
though the indifference of the emperors toward the national composition 
of the formerly Polish terra incognita had already started to change during 
the last weeks of Nicholas I’s life,2 it was definitely bound to change after 
the January Uprising of 1863–64. It turned out that the area was main-
ly populated by peasants, the majority of whom were defined by ethnogra-
phers not as Poles, but as Orthodox and Catholic Little Russians/Ukraini-
Research for this paper was carried out in the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National 
Research University “Higher School of Economics” as part of the project: “Transformation of Regimes of 
Governing Diversity.” I thank Darius Staliūnas for his comments as well as the participants of the confer-
ence “Protecting the Empire: Imperial Government and the Russian Nationalist Alliance in the Western 
Borderlands during the Late Imperial Period” for their questions and comments.
1  Mikhail Dolbilov, “Poliak v imperskom politicheskom leksikone,” in Poniatiia o Rossii. K istoricheskoi se-
mantike imperskogo perioda, vol. 2, edited by Alexei Miller et al. (Moscow: NLO, 2012), 320.
2  Mikhail Dolbilov, Russkii krai, chuzhaia vera: etnokonfessional’naia politika imperii v Litve i Belorussii pri 
Aleksandre II (Moscow: NLO, 2010), 164, 169.
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ans.3 As Little Russians, they were declared to be members of the tripartite 
Russian nation who potentially could be relied upon by the government in 
its new nationality policy in the region. At the same time, their Russianness 
was problematized by the emerging Ukrainian national movement and its 
activists. The latter clearly argued that the southwest of the empire was pop-
ulated not by Little Russians, but by Ukrainians who were distinct from 
both Russians and Poles. No wonder that both visions dramatically collid-
ed after the emergence of the public sphere in the Romanov Empire in 1906.
The history of Russian nationalism in the Romanov Empire and, in par-
ticular, its southwestern provinces, has recently become fashionable in his-
toriography. It has been discussed not just in scholarly literature, but even 
in popular historical monographs and edited collections.4 The general ar-
gument suggested by historians to explain the emergence of Russian na-
tionalism since Hugh Seton-Watson’s idea of “official nationalism” (and its 
popularization by Benedict Anderson) is that since the 1830s, the empire 
required a new ideological foundation to preserve its stability.5  
3  The major breakthrough in this imagination was a result of an expedition organized by the Russian Geo-
graphical Society and conducted by Kievan Ukrainophiles under the leadership of Pavlo Chubynsky in 
1869–70. The organizers and executors interpreted the results of the expedition differently. For more on 
the expedition, see Anton Kotenko, “Etnohrafichno-statystychna ekspedytsiia P. Chubyns’koho v Piv-
denno-Zakhidnyi Krai,” Ukraїns’ kyi istorychnyi zhurnal 3 (2014): 128–51; and Anton Kotenko, “‘Eto stoi-
lo by obshchestvu deshevle gribov’: Lystuvannia Pavla Chubyns’koho z Rosiis’kym heohrafichnym tova-
rystvom,” Spadshchyna 10 (2015): 267–343.
4  For examples of scholarly works, see Klymentii K. Fedevych and Klymentii I. Fedevych, Za viru, tsar-
ia i Kobzaria: malorosiis’ ki monarkhisty i ukraïns’ kyi natsional’nyi rukh (1905–1917 roky) (Kiev: Krytyka, 
2017); Faith Hillis, Children of Rus’: Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2013); Timur Kalchenko, Kievskii klub russkikh natsionalistov (Kiev: Ki-
evskie vedomosti, 2008); Alexei Miller, “The Romanov Empire and the Russian Nation,” in Nationaliz-
ing Empires, edited by Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2014), 309–68; 
Igor’ Omel’ianchuk, Chernosotennoe dvizhenie na territorii Ukrainy, 1904–1914 (Kiev: NIURO, 2000); 
David Rowley, “Imperial Versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia,” Nations and Nationalism 6, no. 
1 (2000): 23–42. Robert Edelman’s, Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist 
Party, 1907–1917 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980) remains a classical exploration of 
the problem. Examples of popular historical works include Serhii Plokhy, Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Em-
pire and the Making of the Russian Nation, From 1470 to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 2017); and 
Andrei Teslia, Pervyi russkii natsionalism... i drugie (Moscow: Ievropa, 2014).
5  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Lon-
don: Verso, 2006), 86. Seton-Watson defined “official nationalism” as a doctrine, that appeared in the 
Habsburg and Romanov empires in the second half of the nineteenth century, according to which the 
leaders of the empires “considered it their task, and indeed their moral duty, to impose their nationality 
on all their subjects—of whatever religion, language or culture. As they saw it, by drawing these people 
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Thus, it was the state and its officials who cautiously began to practice 
some elements of Russian nationalism by attempting to integrate the empire 
around the Russian nation. By the 1860s, the idea spread among the Russian 
intellectuals, some of whom, like Iurii Samarin, argued that “we, the Rus-
sians, must now become what the French are in the French Empire, and the 
English in the British Empire.”6 The empire actively embraced Russian na-
tionalism during the reign of Alexander III and his successor Nicholas II. In 
December 1905, for instance, the latter famously and symbolically accepted 
the badge of the most popular Russian nationalist organization of the time, 
the Union of Russian People (Soiuz Russkogo Naroda, hereafter SRN). 
The SRN was particularly active in the Southwestern region of the em-
pire. According to contemporary estimates, the region was a stronghold of 
nationalists: in 1907, around half of the SRN’s members (197,636) came from 
the territory of modern-day Ukraine; half of them (99,336) resided on the 
territory of Volhynia, where they were led by the priests of the local Pochaev 
Monastery.7 Among the socially deprived peasantry living in the Ukraini-
an province, the Union vigorously campaigned against the “conspiracy” of 
Ukrainian nationalists, Polish landowners, and Jewish merchants, present-
ing all of them (as well as state bureaucracy, but never the emperor) as the 
main reasons for local social and economic troubles. Another major regional 
Russian nationalist organization—more elitist in comparison to the SRN—
was the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists, which was created in April 1908. 
During the first year of its existence, it had 329 members, men and women.8
Still, the question of how connected all of these organizations were to 
the government of the empire has remained open. One argument put for-
ward by Alexei Miller and Ricarda Vulpius suggests that in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, there was a project in the Romanov Empire to cre-
 upwards into their own superior culture, they were conferring benefits on them; while at the same time 
they were strengthening their state by creating within it a single homogeneous nation.” Hugh Seton-Wat-
son, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1977), 148.
6  As quoted in Miller, “The Romanov Empire and the Russian Nation,” 332.
7  Omel’ianchuk, Chernosotennoe dvizhenie, 139–43. 
8  Edelman, Gentry Politics, 70.
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ate a Russian nation out of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians.9  Another 
 argument was proposed by Theodore Weeks, who stated that there “the word 
‘policy’ seems far too definite a term for the confused, disparate and unco-
ordinated actions of the Russian administration vis-à-vis its non-Russian 
subjects.” According to Weeks, Russian “official” nationalism was first and 
foremost aimed not at building the Russian nation, but at preserving the 
Romanov Empire.10 Recently, Valerie Kivelson and Ronald Suny suggested 
uniting these positions by distinguishing four programs for saving the empire 
on the eve of the World War I: building an imperial civic nation; turning the 
empire’s Eastern Slavs into the ruling nation; relying on the estate principle; 
transforming the empire into a federation of different nations.11
In this paper, I would like to approach the problem of relations between 
the imperial government and Russian nationalism from the point of view 
of the censorship of Ukrainian language texts from 1905 to 1914. I argue 
that the proposition of the empire’s gradual but consistent Russian nation-
alization from above since the 1830s to the World War I is not accurate. 
Not only should we make a distinction between popular and state nation-
alisms; we should also question the coherent nature of the latter. In particu-
lar, despite all the limitations of and prohibitions on Ukrainian activity, the 
imperial authorities on the eve of the Great War neither pursued a system-
atic plan of turning the peasants of empire’s southwestern provinces into 
Russians, nor promoted a coherent anti-Ukrainian policy. Not only did not 
all state officials endorse the project of turning the Romanov Empire into 
a Russian one, it also seems that there was no coherent project or a “master 
plan” (as Weeks suggested12) of this kind.
Moreover, post-1906 developments in the state’s regulation of Ukraini-
an-language publications show that contrary to the development of Rus-
 9 Alexei Miller, The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Centu-
ry (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2003), 4–5; Ricarda Vulpius, “Slova i liudi v imperii,” Ab Imperio 1 
(2006): 354–55.
10 Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western 
Frontier, 1863–1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 5, 9.
11 Valerie Kivelson and Ronald Suny, Russia’s Empires (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 250–52.
12 Weeks, Nation and State, 12.
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sian public nationalism, which indeed was on the rise, the empire curious-
ly became less nationalist than before. It became less anti-Ukrainian and, 
thus, less pro-Russian than it had been during the period when the Val-
uev Circular and Ems Edict remained in force. Yes, many state officials fa-
vored the project of turning the Romanov Empire into a Russian Empire; 
they also supported Russian nationalist organizations and did their best 
to suppress Ukrainian nationalists. However, even those bureaucrats who 
argued against Ukrainian nationalism had to comply with existing laws, 
which provided Ukrainians with many more opportunities to disseminate 
their ideas than those in force between 1863 and 1906.
Imperial Authorities and Russian Nationalists 
 Against Ukrainian Nationalists
Until 1906, a Ukrainian public sphere in the Romanov Empire did not 
exist;13 it was impossible to publish a text in the Ukrainian language and 
orthography even, for instance, on such an apolitical subject as the Sahara 
Desert. According to the stipulations of the emperor’s edict (vysochaishego 
poveleniia) of May 18, 1876 and its amendment from October 8, 1881, the 
only texts that were allowed to be published in the “Little Russian dialect” 
were historical documents which including the preservation of the origi-
nal orthography, dictionaries, and original fiction (translations were for-
bidden) following the rules of Russian orthography. Thus, the abovemen-
tioned brochure on the Sahara by Borys Hrinchenko was banned because 
even though it “did not contain anything opposite the censorship rules, it 
13 Technically one might date the appearance of Ukrainian public sphere in the empire by 1905, when the 
Ems Edict, which was never formally repealed, lost its power after the October Manifesto granted freedom 
of speech to the population of the empire. From then on, the Ukrainian press could be published with-
out asking for prior permission from the censorship committee. On December 31, 1905, the first issue of 
the first Ukrainian daily newspaper, Hromads’ ka Dumka, was published. However, I argue for dating the 
emergence of a fully-fledged Ukrainian public sphere in 1906 because until the spring of 1906, the St. Pe-
tersburg Committee for censorship still banned Ukrainian publications with references to the Ems Edict. 
The last such prohibition seems to have taken place in April: RGIA, f. 777, op. 7, №2 (Po malorossiiskim 
izdaniiam), 73, 76. The prohibited text was “What school do we need” (Iakoї nam treba shkoly) by Borys 
Hrinchenko, a reprint from Hromads’ ka Dumka.
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did not belong to belles lettres.”14 The only way for Ukrainians to dissem-
inate their ideas via print was, thus, to publish them in Galicia and later 
smuggle them into the Russian Empire.15
This situation changed immensely in 1906, when after the liberalization 
of publishing rules, Ukrainian activists immediately used the opportunity 
to popularize their views via print media. Even though Ukrainian did not 
become a language of administration, the courts, and, most importantly 
for Ukrainian nationalists, schools,16 it was still used for publishing books, 
newspapers, and journals. Thus, according to official data, in 1909, nine pe-
riodicals were published in Ukrainian in Kiev with an average general print 
run (srednii obshchii tirazh) of 11,300 copies; in 1910, there were ten periodi-
cals with an average general print run of 15,985 copies; in 1911, it was twelve 
periodicals with an average general print run of 14,800 copies; in 1913, there 
were fourteen periodicals with an average general print run of 17,320 cop-
ies.17 None of these was suppressed by the authorities for being a Ukraini-
an periodical. Thus, in 1915, when thirty members of the State Duma asked 
the ministers of internal affairs and war for the reasons why the majority of 
Ukrainian publications were closed, they received the response that out of 
the fifteen publications mentioned in the inquiry, only four had been closed 
by the authorities (three by the military and one by the general-governor), 
whereas eight of them ceased publication on their own and two were still 
being published.18 What concerned the most important Ukrainian publi-
cation of the time, Rada, after it was closed, its publisher never even applied 
for permission to reopen the newspaper, which, according to the officials, 
probably would have been supported.19
14 RGIA, f. 777, op. 5–1897, №7 (Po rassmotreniiu sochinenii na malorossiiskom narechii), 127–28.
15 According to the 1876 edict, books published in Ukrainian abroad could legally circulate in the empire 
only after the permission of the Main Department for Press. See Dmytro Doroshenko’s memoirs about the 
Ukrainian usage of Finland as a window to smuggle books in Ukrainian into the empire: Dmytro Doro-
shenko, Moï spomyny pro davne my nule (1901–1914 roky) (Winnipeg, 1949), 48–49.
16 More on this see in: Ricarda Vulpius, “Ukrainskii iazyk i shkol’noe obuchenie v pozdneimperskii period,” 
Ab Imperio 2 (2005): 321–30. 
17 TsDIAK, f. 295, op. 1, № 438 (Otchety o rabote Kievskogo vremennogo komiteta po delam pechati), 56–309.
18 RGIA, f. 776, op. 17, № 447 (Zapros, vnesennyi za podpis’ iu 30 chlenov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy…), 1–2.
19 In fact, by 1914 the publisher, Ievhen Chykalenko, accumulated many debts and thus could not  continue 
publishing Rada. Thus, as he mentioned it in a number of his letters to different people, the decision 
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Instead of repressing the Ukrainian press, the government shored up 
some Russian nationalist periodicals published in the Southwestern region. 
For instance, in 1913–15, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (hereafter MVD) 
provided annual subsidies to the newspaper Kiev. However, even though 
over three years the amount of these subsidies reached sixty-five thousand 
roubles, by the end of 1916, Kiev, “the only newspaper in the region with a 
steady national-Russian tendency,” still carried a deficit of twenty thousand 
roubles.20 Another project, which was supported by the MVD in 1916, were 
newspapers published by the Kievan “Society of the Double-Headed Eagle” 
(Kievskaia kopeika and Dvuglavyi orel). In 1916, the Minister of Internal Af-
fairs allocated each of them a monthly allowance of one thousand roubles.21
It was Russian nationalists and not the government who clearly attacked 
the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Activists of the latter were accused of 
political separatism and the desire to break apart the Russian nation and em-
pire. In the opinion of Russian nationalists, Ukrainian was not a separate 
language and Ukrainians were not a separate nation, but rather the Little 
Russian part of the Russian tripartite nation. Even their name, “Ukrainians,” 
was a “fabrication”: “There are no Ukrainians here,” stated one of the Kievan 
Russians in his 1913 talk. “There are no Ukrainians here either alive or in the 
cemeteries: neither on the ground, nor under it.”22 A specially coined word 
designated Ukrainian activists as Mazepists after the Cossack hetman Ivan 
Mazepa, who “betrayed” Peter I by siding with Charles XII in 1708. 
Except for fighting Ukrainian activists in the press, southwestern Rus-
sian nationalists tried to combat their Ukrainian rivals by denouncing 
of military authorities to close Rada actually made him happy: Ievhen Chykalenko and Serhii Iefre-
mov,  Lystuvannia 1903—1928 rr. (Kiev: Tempora, 2010), 111; Ievhen Chykalenko and Petro Stebnytsky, 
 lystuvannia 1901—1922 rr. (Kiev: Tempora, 2008), 403.
20 RGIA, f. 776, op. 33, № 397 (O vydache subsidii gazete “Kiev”), 1–13.
21 RGIA, f. 776, op. 33, № 407 (O vydache subsidii kievskomu obshchestvu “Dvuglavyi orel”), 1–32. In their ap-
peal to the authorities, members of Dvuglavyi orel argued that contrary to Kiev their newspapers target not 
the intellectuals, but soldiers and peasants, who cannot comprehend the materials published by Kiev.
22 Ivan Sikorskii, Russkie i ukraintsy (Kiev: Klub russkikh natsionalistov, 1913), 12. Three years later, in May 
1916, the same rhetoric was used, for instance, by the mayor of Moscow, who allowed the founding of a so-
ciety of mutual aid for Moscow’s Ukrainian students but stressed that the society should be named “Lit-
tle Russian” instead of “Ukrainian” because “there are no Ukrainians in Russia at all”: RGIA, f. 1284, op. 
187–1916, № 48 (Ob utverzhdenii proekta-ustava obshchestva), 7.
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them to the authorities, alerting the latter of the growing “Ukrainian men-
ace.” An example of this approach might be the famous case of the so-called 
Stolypin circular issued by the minister in 1910, which closed the Ukrai-
nian “Prosvita” society in Kiev as an “alien society.”23 The initial propos-
al to close “Prosvita” came to St. Petersburg from the Kievan governor-gen-
eral Fedor Trepov. However, Trepov’s correspondence with St. Petersburg 
contains a newspaper clipping from a St. Petersburg newspaper, which ac-
cused Kievan regional authorities of heeding the requests of a local Russian 
nationalist newspaper Kievlianin. On the margins of this clipping, some-
one from the MVD demanded that the abovementioned article from Kiev-
lianin be found; it turned out to be an op-ed by Anatoly Savenko.24 Its 
author argued that despite the authorities’ 1909 decision to forbid the ac-
tivity of Polish “Oświata,” Kiev still had many other organizations pursu-
ing similar separatist aims such as the Ukrainian “Prosvita”; Savenko per-
sistently suggested the government continue its repressive policy and close 
the Ukrainian associations as well.25 Stolypin followed this suggestion.
Sometimes Russian nationalists tried to influence even the conceptual 
apparatus of state officials. It seems that high-ranking officials like the Ki-
evan governors, not to mention authorities in St. Petersburg, did not care 
much about which word—“Ukrainian” or “Little Russian”—to use to des-
ignate the population of the southwestern part of the empire and its lan-
23 RGIA, f. 1284, op. 187–1910, № 21 (O zakrytii obshchestv), 66–68. At the moment, this “alienation” of 
Ukrainians seems to have been a simple mistake, which was corrected in a few months. The new version of 
the circular stated that only “Ukrainian societies, which deny the unity of the Russian nation and prop-
agate Ukrainian separatism and independence” should be closed. See Petr Stolypin, Perepiska (Moscow: 
Rosspen, 2007), 361; Hillis, Children of Rus’, 238; RGIA, f. 1284, op. 187–1909, №260 (Po tsirkuliaru 20 
ianvaria sego goda), 50.
24 Anatoliy Savenko, “Zametki. DCCCLXVIII,” Kievlianin 38 (7 February 1910): 3.
25 The Kiev governor and local journalists were not the only ones, however, who could have inspired 
Stolypin’s circular. Two years before, the St. Petersburg Department of Police received another similar re-
quest, this time coming from the mayor of Odessa. The latter notified authorities in the capital of subver-
sive gatherings of the local “Prosvita,” whose members cursed Bogdan Khmelnitski for the unification of 
Ukraine with the Russian Empire. The mayor asked St. Petersburg to close “Prosvita.” RGIA, f. 1284, op. 
188–1908, № 159 (Ob ukrainskikh obshchestvakh “Prosveta”), 4. Valentyna Shandra suggests that the cir-
cular was inspired by a report by a Kievan censor, Sergei Shchegolev, which was submitted to St. Peters-
burg by the Kievan governor Alexei Girs: Valentyna Shandra, “Mova iak zasib formuvannia natsional’noї 
identychnosti,” in Ukraїns’ ka identychnist’ i movne pytannia v Rosiis’ kii imperiї: sproba derzhavnoho rehu-
liuvannia, edited by Hennadii Boriak (Kiev: Instytut istoriї NANU, 2013), xxxvi.
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guage. For instance, in 1913, the Kievan governor sent a request to the Ki-
evan Temporary Committee for Print asking for data on a prospective 
publisher for a journal in the “Ukrainian language.” However, a member of 
the committee left a note on the margins of this request so as not to forget 
to “inform the governor that official terminology recognizes only the Lit-
tle Russian dialect, whereas the term ‘Ukrainian language’ was introduced 
without preliminary permission (iavochnym poriadkom).”26 In 1914, the 
same committee received a request from the head of the Kiev gendarmerie 
about a number of books and journals in the “Little Russian language” that 
were approved for publication . In its reply, the Committee informed the 
gendarmes of books and journals written in the “Little Russian dialect.”27
Occasionally some state officials, like Petr Stolypin, backed up the Rus-
sian nationalists, as happened, for instance, during the elections to the 
western zemstvos in 1911. At the same time, many other state officials re-
mained “either indifferent or opposed to them.” Even the new head of the 
Council of Ministers, Vladimir Kokovtsev, was far less sympathetic to-
wards Russian nationalists as opposed to Stolypin, his predecessor. Thus, 
during the fourth Duma elections, despite all the nationalists’ desire for 
governmental help, the state’s assistance to them became less consistent.28 
The same was true at the local level. If the governors of Kiev and Podolia 
provinces,  Alexei Girs and Aleksandr Eiler respectively, supported the Rus-
sian nationalists and were considered allies by them, “[the Russian nation-
alists] were extremely mistrustful of the governor general of the southwest, 
F.F. Trepov.”29 Another governor of Volhynia, Aleksandr Kutaisov, also op-
posed them (and in 1912 he was removed from the office by the MVD).30
The Kievan Temporary Committee for Print seems to be the only im-
perial institution of the time that consistently opposed the Ukrainian na-
tional movement, and in this way, it could have carried out the project 
26 TsDIAK, f. 295, op. 1, № 440 (Perepiska o vyiasnenii dopustimosti k obraschcheniiu razlichnykh izdanii), 
99–100.
27 Ibid., 193.
28 Edelman, Gentry Politics, 148–49.
29 Ibid., 150.
30 Ibid., 128, 130–36.
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of nationalizing the Russian Empire. Between 1909 and 1917, it was led 
by Timofei Florinski, a historian and philologist who seems to be one of 
the few imperial officials who did not hide his Russian nationalist bias, 
and, since the end of the 1890s, actively and consistently fought against 
Ukrainian national activists. In addition to his published brochures,31 this 
was revealed by his annual secret reports to the Main Department for the 
Press. There, Florinski made a clear distinction between the “Little Rus-
sian dialect” of the Russian language and the “Little Russian bookish di-
alect of the newest type (the so-called Ukrainian language).” Florinski al-
ways used the latter in quotation marks to underline its artificiality and 
difference from the language spoken by “Little Russians.”32 “Ukrainians,” 
according to Florinski, were not a separate nation but a political party aim-
ing at political separatism from the Russian Empire. Therefore, the Kievan 
Temporary Committee for Print used any pretext to ban Ukrainian pub-
lications.33
Imperial Authorities Oppose Russian Nationalists
At the same time, despite governmental subsidies to Russian nationalist 
newspapers and the related activity of some imperial officials, one still can-
not argue that the officials of the late Romanov Empire pursued a coherent 
state-directed nationalizing project.
First, except for the subsidies, local Russian nationalist newspapers were 
also read, fined, and banned by the censors and courts. For example, when 
the lobbyist of Dvuglavyi orel asked the Minister of Internal Affairs for a 
grant, he included a note that his paper was repeatedly subjected to both ju-
dicial and administrative penalties for its articles criticizing state officials 
and accusing the latter of “betraying the fatherland.”34 
31 Timofei Florinskii, Malorusskii iazyk i “ukrainsko-russkii” literaturnyi separatizm (St. Petersburg, 1900).
32 TsDIAK, f. 295, op. 1, № 438 (Otchety o rabote Kievskogo vremennogo komiteta po delam pechati), 56, 116, 
179, 298).
33 See Chykalenko and Iefremov, Lystuvannia, 85.
34 RGIA, f. 776, op. 33, № 407, 16.
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In addition, a number of local officials tried to curb the antisemitic pub-
lications of Russian nationalists by informal means. Thus, in 1912, the Ki-
evan governor asked the Minister of Internal Affairs, Aleksandr Makarov, 
to use his connections and stop Dvuglavyi Orel from publishing articles 
that promoted a “hostile attitude among its readers towards governmental 
agents and diminishing governmental prestige.”35 However, despite all his 
efforts, even in 1914, the general-governor had to state that the newspaper 
continued to publish articles “discrediting not only local officials, but even 
the representatives of the higher central government.”36
Similarly, regional imperial authorities tried to control and regulate the 
activity of Russian nationalists in the Volhynia province. For instance, in 
1905, its governor informed the Kievan general-governor that he received 
a copy of Troitskie listki, the dissemination of which he considered unde-
sirable for his province because of its texts, which could have “caused un-
acceptable discord and a mutual distrust among the native Russian pop-
ulation and numerous non-Orthodox people who live in the Volhynia 
province. In particular this unrest can be directed against Jews, who are 
treated by the local Christian population, predominantly the low class, in 
an unfriendly way.”37
Both the Volhynian governor and the Kievan general-governor tried to 
restrain the Pochaev monks, Iliodor and Vitalii, whose sermons and publica-
tions in a local newspaper entitled Pochaevskie izvestiia were characterized by 
an “extreme intolerance towards local Jews and Poles.” Thus, in 1907, the Ki-
evan general-governor secretly wrote to Prime Minister Petr Stolypin asking 
him to contact the Synod and use it to help stop the activities of Iliodor and 
Vitalii.38 However, in 1908, the Volhynian governor again secretly informed 
the MVD that despite all of the useful patriotic activity of Vitalii, some of 
his actions deviated from the law and were very undesirable from the point 
35 RGIA, f. 776, op. 16–2, № 905 (Ob izdanii v Kieve gazety pod nazvaniem “Dvuglavyi orel”), 20.
36 Ibid., 103.
37 TsDIAK, f. 442, op. 855, № 359 (Po raznoi perepiske, kasaiushcheisia vyborov v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu), 
1–4.
38 TsDIAK, f. 442, op. 857, № 312 (O vrednoi deiatel’nosti ieromonakha Pochaevskoi lavry Iliodora…), 2–4.
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of view of preserving state order, and in particular those who call for vio-
lence against local Polish landlords.39 At the end of 1908, one of them, Roman 
Sangushko, even complained to Stolypin about Pochaevskie izvestiia, which 
“instigates hatred towards all non-Orthodox (inovertsam) and aliens (inoro-
dtsam), Polish landlords, Jews, and even the local administration, whose rep-
resentatives are accused of being revolutionaries or bribe-takers, bought by 
the enemies of Russia.”40 Even though it seems that the efforts of the author-
ities did not attain their desired result, the correspondence between the Vol-
hynian governor, the Kievan general-governor, and the MVD on this subject, 
which lasted until 1910, at least indicates the hesitation of imperial authori-
ties concerning their wholehearted embrace of local nationalists.
Similarly, the story of the Ukrainian media attests to the fact that the at-
titudes of state institutions and Ukrainian activists were not shaped by con-
stant repressions and bans. Even Timofei Florinski, with all his hatred for the 
Ukrainian press, not only had to disguise his actions through some formal 
procedures, but also had to act in a framework of existing law. Thus, the only 
way for him to suppress the Ukrainian media was to follow the law as strictly 
as possible and hope that the Kiev judicial chamber would support his resolu-
tions. However, quite often, even this was not the case. For instance, in 1909, 
Hnat Hotkevych complained to the Main Department for Press that the Ki-
evan Committee for Print refused to review his “Album of Historical Por-
traits,” adding that “in principle, some actions of the Kievan censor belong to 
the area of lawlessness (prinadlezhat k oblasti proizvola).” St. Petersburg de-
manded explanations from Florinski, who submitted a report arguing that 
Hotkevych had not followed the formal requirements. But this clarification 
did not convince the Main Department for the Press, which allowed the al-
bum to be published even without asking the Kievan censors to review it.41
39 Ibid., 23. The reason why such articles could appear at all was that Pochaevskie izvestiia was published in 
town, which did not have a separate censor. Thus, each issue of the newspaper had to be checked by a po-
liceman in Kremenets, 25 verst (about 25 km or 17 miles) far from Pochaev, which meant that even when 
the policeman decided to arrest the issue, it would have already reached the subscribers.
40 Ibid., 34.
41 RGIA, f. 776, op. 16 p.2, № 187 (Po zhalobe inzhener-tekhnologa na Vremennyi komitet po delam pechati), 
1–19.
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In a number of other cases, Florinski failed to ban Ukrainian publica-
tions because of the local judicial chamber. For instance, in March 1909, 
this institution refused to confirm a block on Volodymyr Samiilenko’s po-
etry, “To Ukraine” (Ukraїni), which was accused by the Kievan censors of 
having a “separatist-Little Russian tendency” and instigating “hatred to-
ward the contemporary system of government and Russians.”42 In another 
case from 1910, the same chamber refused to confirm a ban on a tear-off cal-
endar whose publishers, according to Florinski’s Committee, committed a 
host of crimes. One of them was not simply the calendar’s mention of the 
deaths of Karl Marx and Alexander II on the same page because they both 
occurred on the same day, March 1, but the sequence in which they appeared 
on the page: Marx’s death preceded the emperor’s despite the fact that even 
pure chronology demanded the contrary.43
Probably the best-known instance of the Kievan judicial chamber’s re-
fusal to support Florinski in his crusade against Ukrainians took place dur-
ing the same year, 1910. It was related to the decision of the Kievan Tempo-
rary Committee for Print to confiscate the fourth issue of the newspaper 
Selo and its calendar supplement, which contained a map of Ukraine. Flo-
rinski argued that the map and the accompanying article advanced an idea 
of Ukrainian separatism and threatened the unity of the Russian nation. 
One of the ways it did so, according to Florinski, was the calendar’s con-
sistent usage of the terms “Ukraine,” “Ukrainians,” “Ukrainian nation,” 
“Austrian Ukraine,” and “Russian Ukraine.” According to him, “This arbi-
trary renaming of one branch of our Russian nation (russkogo naroda) aims 
at asserting to the masses, which the calendar targets, a wrong and criminal 
idea that the ‘Ukrainian nation,’ which is created anew, constitutes a sep-
arate nation.”44 Kievan Ukrainians celebrated the judicial chamber’s deci-
sion to revoke the prohibition as “a slap to Florinski.”45
42 RGIA, f. 776, op. 16 p.2, № 195 (О nalozhenii aresta na knigu pod zaglaviem Volodymyr Samiilenko 
“Ukraini”), 1–4.
43 Alexander II was killed in 1881, whereas Marx died in 1883: RGIA, f. 776, op. 16 p. 2, № 357 (О vozbuzh-
denii sudebnogo presledovaniia po “Otryvnomu kalendariu” na malorossiiskom narechii), 1–5.
44 TsDIAK, f. 295, op. 1, № 259 (Vypiski iz zhurnalov zasedanii komiteta), 8–17.
45 Ol’ha Mel’nyk, “Lysty Leopolda Budaia iak dzherelo do vyvchennia naukovo-orhanizatsiinoї ta 
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Thus, in 1912, Florinski complained to his St. Petersburg superiors that 
all “attempts of the Committee to fight the dissemination of these ideas 
by addressing the criminal court had never achieved this aim. The judicial 
chamber did not find anything illegal about propagandizing these ideas, 
which could have been punished by criminal laws.”46 He continued to 
grumble in a similar way in 1914: 
As far as our Criminal Code does not have laws that would protect the na-
tional and cultural unity of the Russian nation, even during the current 
year, the Committee, as I have explained many times earlier, did not have 
the objective means to fight the harmful and extremely dangerous direc-
tion of the “Ukrainian” press. The activity of this party developed without 
any obstacles. […] I found it possible to institute only two proceedings […] 
One was not yet discussed. And in the first case the editor was fined 200 
roubles. “Ukrainian” periodicals cannot complain about “repressions.”47
Conclusion
It has been suggested in historiography that one should distinguish “Rus-
sian nationalism as a public sentiment, and the ‘official nationalism’ of the 
autocracy” as “closely connected yet independent phenomena, sometimes 
going on side by side, but no less often entering into conflict with each 
other.”48 This study proposes complementing this argument with a revision 
of the idea of Russian “official nationalism.”
In May 1910, Kievan Ukrainians buried one of their leaders, Borys 
Hrinchenko. According to contemporaries, no less than 3,000 people at-
vydavnychoї diialnosti Mykhaila Hrushevskoho (1907–1912),” Ukraїns’ kyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorich-
nyk 10/11 (2006): 604. By no means was this story a model one; in 1913 another censor successfully ordered 
the sellers of a book on Ukrainian art to cut out the accompanying map of Ukraine: TsDIAK, f. 295, op. 1, 
№ 477, p. 24ob–25; M.P., “Shche pro ‘Ukraїns’ke mystetstvo’ (‘L’Art d’Ukraine’) V. Shcherbakivs’koho,” 
Rada 244 (25 October 1913): 4.
46 TsDIAK, f. 295, op. 1, № 438 (Otchety o rabote Kievskogo vremennogo komiteta po delam pechati), 188.
47 Ibid., 308.
48 Miller, Ukrainian Question, 5.
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tended the funeral. Those who remembered the passage of Taras Shevchen-
ko’s body through Kiev in 1861 could easily notice the contrast: accord-
ing to Oleksandr Rusov, back then, Shevchenko’s coffin was accompanied 
by only eighty people. Rusov’s interlocutor, Martyrii Halyn, explained the 
difference: “All of this was achieved by the press. If the administration 
was smarter, first of all, it would have closed Rada because it was [Rada] 
that laid the foundation for such a pompous funeral.”49 Even if Russian 
nationalists from the southwestern provinces of the empire energetically 
argued that Ukrainian activists were breaking the Russian national body, 
and thus should be suppressed, it seems that the imperial government nev-
er embraced Russian nationalism as its regular policy at all levels; it nev-
er “became smarter” about suppressing them. Meanwhile, those imperial 
bureaucrats, like Timofei Florinski, who definitely tried to undermine the 
Ukrainian national movement were not part of a centralized state-led ef-
fort that would encompass all branches of the imperial government. If one 
imperial institution did not allow the usage of the Ukrainian language in 
schools, another institution still permitted thousands of people of different 
classes to read Ukrainian publications.
Thus, instead of being considered a modern nationalizing state that con-
ducts a nationalizing policy from above, or an outstanding example of the 
application of Seton-Watson’s doctrine of “official nationalism,” the Ro-
manov Empire should be viewed as an inconsistently nationalizing empire 
that did not pursue a coherent program of making the empire more Rus-
sian from reigns of Nicholas I to Nicholas II. One of the examples of this 
inconsistency, which was recognized even at the time, was the legalization 
of the Ukrainian press in 1906. So long as publishers stuck to existing laws, 
they would be able to see their texts printed and sold and, maybe, even read.
49 Ievhen Chykalenko, Shchodennyk. Vol. 1 (Kiev: Tempora, 2011), 104.
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Challenges to Imperial Authorities’ Nationality Policy  
in the Northwest Region, 1905–15
D a r i u s  S t a l i ū n a s
There are different approaches toward the longevity of the Russian Empire 
in historiography. Some researchers claim that the Romanovs’ recipe for 
success lay in the effective integration of the peripheries (primarily their 
elites) into imperial ruling structures, and that the state collapsed in 1917 
due to the particular circumstances created by the war.1 Others argue that 
the Russian Empire did not collapse earlier thanks to its military power.2 
Only a small part of this fundamental debate will be analyzed here. The 
question raised in this study is whether the tsarist government had a clear 
nationality policy concept in the Northwest region in the late imperial pe-
riod, that is, one that in its own view could produce results, at least to en-
sure the loyalty of non-dominant national groups.3 I argue that tsarist offi-
cials had problems finding this kind of strategy, and essentially reconciled 
themselves to the disloyalty of the non-dominant national groups (or at 
least their elites) in the Romanov Empire.4 
  This research was funded by a grant (No. S-LJB-17-3) from the Research Council of Lithuania. I would like 
to express my appreciation to all members of the Michigan university kruzhok, especially to Valerie Kivel-
son and Ronald Grigor Suny for the lively intellectual discussion of this paper.
1  This idea prevailed at the conference “Russia between Reforms and Revolutions, 1906–16,” held at the Eu-
ropean University in St. Petersburg on May 26–28, 2017.
2  This approach dominates among historians of Central and Eastern Europe. 
3  The Northwest region consisted of the Vil’na, Kovna, Grodna, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Mogilev provinces, 
even though the term was sometimes applied to only three provinces: Vil’na, Kovna, and Grodna, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
4  Imperial nationality policy regarding Poles, Lithuanians, and Belorussian Catholics will be analyzed in this 
chapter. These are the most significant national groups that are either not recognized as part of the Russian 
category, or their Russianness was controversial (as in the case of Catholic Belorussians). The “Jewish ques-
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The policies of the tsarist government on the western periphery of the 
Russian Empire following the 1905 Revolution have received much less at-
tention than the period after the quelling of the 1863–64 uprising.5 This is 
because in the post-1905 period, the imperial government did not experi-
ment much in terms of politics, passing only a few decrees based on nation-
ality policy motives (for example, the creation of Cholm [Chełm] province 
and the introduction of the zemstvo system in six of the Western region’s 
provinces), while public life was significantly more active, consequent-
ly drawing greater interest from researchers. Additionally, between 1905 
and 1915 as compared with the post-1863 era, the centers of power changed 
somewhat.6 During the earlier period, especially between 1863 and 1865 
when Mikhail Murav’ev was the governor-general of Vil’na, many nation-
ality policy innovations were implemented at the initiative and through 
the efforts of local authorities (banning the Lithuanian press in the tradi-
tional script, the introduction of Russian into supplementary services in 
the Catholic Church, the mass conversion of Belorussian Catholics to Or-
thodoxy, etc.), while at the beginning of the twentieth century, the pow-
ers of the Vil’na governor-general were much less extensive. The reduced 
influence of the Vil’na governor-general was related to numerous develop-
tion” will not be discussed here both because of the limited scope of this study, and because this problem 
had obviously become a prerogative of the central government in the early twentieth century, and local of-
ficials showed little initiative on this issue. Nationality policy toward these non-dominant national groups 
will be revealed through an analysis of debates among tsarist bureaucrats, decisions made by imperial au-
thorities, and, only to a very limited degree, through an examination of how that policy was implemented.
5  The following works are worth mentioning here. Malte Rolf ’s research on the Kingdom of Poland; see: 
Malte Rolf, Imperiale Herrschaft im Weichselland. Das Königreich Polen im Russischen Imperium (1864–
1915) (Oldenburg: De Gruyter, 2015); the summative study by Mikhail Dolbilov and Alexei Miller, Za-
padnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006); works dedicated to con-
fessional policies: Vytautas Merkys, Tautiniai santykiai Vilniaus vyskupijoje 1798–1918 m. (Vilnius: Versus 
Aureus, 2006); Aleksandr Bendin, Problemy veroterpimosti v Severo-zapadnom krae Rossiiskoi imperii 
(1863–1914 gg.) (Minsk: BGU, 2010); and the monograph by Theodore R. Weeks in which the following 
questions are analyzed in greater detail: local self-government, the separation of the Chełm province from 
the Kingdom of Poland: Theodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and 
Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 1996). See also a mono-
graph on the Chełm problem by Polish historian Andrzej Szabaciuk, ‘Rosyjski Ulster’: Kwestia Chełmska 
w polityce imperialnej Rosji w latach 1863–1915 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2013).
6  This research spans the period up to 1915, as after this time, a larger part of the Northwest region came un-
der German military occupation.
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ments: the officials who took up these posts, Alexander Freze (1904–1905) 
and Konstantin Krshivitskii (1905–1909), did not have the same authori-
ty as, for example, Murav’ev. The jurisdiction of the Vil’na governor-gener-
al at the beginning of the twentieth century spanned only three provinces: 
Vil’na, Kovna, and Grodna, whereas in the 1860s, it also extended to the 
“Belorussian” provinces of Minsk, Vitebsk and Mogilev, where the govern-
ment often applied the same anti-Polish measures. Furthermore, starting at 
the end of the nineteenth century, there was increasingly more discussion 
among bureaucrats about the need to abolish general-governorships on the 
empire’s peripheries, which is what happened in the case of Vil’na in 1912.7 
There were even more differences between these two epochs that are 
noteworthy. Starting in 1905, Russia was a constitutional monarchy, and 
all decrees had to be approved by the parliament (Duma). Even though the 
first two Dumas opposed to the government were dissolved and the third 
and fourth Dumas in effect supported the government’s policies, this new 
government institution limited the ability of tsarist authorities to experi-
ment in the field of nationalities policy. At the same time, there were nu-
merous situations where members of non-dominant ethnic or confessional 
groups participated at the discussion stage on certain measures in the fields 
of education, local self-governance, and religion. This also reduced the po-
tential for drastic discriminatory measures. 
Nevertheless, this approximately ten-year period was important in the evo-
lution of the tsarist government’s nationalities policy in the Northwest region. 
It is important for our understanding of how the imperial government tried 
to manage old and new challenges: growing nationalism among Russians and 
non-Russians; the strengthening of the revolutionary movement; the (at least 
formally) legalized constitutional regime; and the influence of the interna-
tional situation on the empire’s domestic affairs. Although the focus of this 
chapter is on the post-1905 period, tsarist nationalities policy in the last de-
cade of the Empire cannot be analyzed without at least briefly discussing the 
changes that took place in nationalities policy in the early twentieth century.
7  The post of the Vil’na governor-general had been vacant since 1909. 
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Until the end of the nineteenth century, the government’s main ene-
my on the empire’s western periphery was without doubt the Poles. How-
ever, at around the turn of the twentieth century, influential imperial offi-
cials emerged, such as the Vil’na governor-general Petr Sviatopolk-Mirskii 
(1902–1904; also minister for internal affairs in 1904–1905), who imagined 
the empire’s “hierarchy of enemies” quite differently.8 In May 1904, while 
summing up his activities throughout his tenure as the governor-general of 
Vil’na, he recommended differentiating between different sectors of Polish 
society despite practically admitting that the government must continue 
fighting against Polish influence and, in particular, stop the Polonization 
of non-Polish Catholics (Belorussians and Lithuanians). Sviatopolk-Mirskii 
only considered Poles living in cities to be disloyal, while the Polish gentry 
were “a calmer, [politically] more lucid group and were a great support to 
the government.”9 Even at this stage, the senior official stated that it was no 
longer the Poles’ anti-government activities that posed the greatest prob-
lem, but the “workers question,” which was closely associated with the “Jew-
ish question”; that is, the main challenge to the maintenance of political sta-
bility came from the participation by Jews in the revolutionary movement.10 
Some of the empire’s political elites also changed their attitude toward the 
empire’s Polish subjects in response to the political conjuncture. At the 
end of the nineteenth century when Germany, Austria-Hungary and Ita-
ly formed the Triple Alliance, the negative policy against Poland that had 
been in place since the beginning of the eighteenth century disintegrated.11 
Thus, some senior officials in Russia such as, for example, the Warsaw gov-
ernor-general Pavel Shuvalov, alleged that discrimination against Poles in 
the Romanov Empire would make them politically loyal to the Triple Al-
8  On his program, see also: Witold Rodkiewicz, Russian Nationality Policy in the Western Provinces of the 
Empire (1863–1905) (Lublin: Scientific Society of Lublin, 1998), 225–42.
9  Rimantas Vėbra, ed., Lietuvių klausimas Rusijos imperijoje XIX a.–XX a. pradžioje (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 
2001), 158–85, quote on 168.
10 Ibid., 241.
11 This was, first of all, the goal of Prussia and Russia not to allow the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth to 
grow strong in the eighteenth century, and to stop it from re-establishing itself in the nineteenth century: 
Martin Schulze Wessel, Russlads Blick auf Preussen: Die polnische Frage in der Diplomatie und der politi-
schen Öffentlichkeit des Zarenreiches und des Sowjetstaates 1697–1947 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cota, 1995).
staulinas_book.indb   36 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:22
37
Challenges to Imperial Authorities’ Nationality Policy in the Northwest Region, 1905–15
liance, which was why policies relating to Poles had to be changed.12 These 
changes to the empire’s imagined “hierarchy of enemies” became even more 
pronounced during the period of the 1905 revolution.13
The altered informal “hierarchy of enemies” was an important, but not 
the only reason for least part of the empire’s ruling elite’s changes in their 
periphery integration strategies. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, some bureaucrats admitted that the “Russification” policy not 
only failed to bring the anticipated benefits, but even produced results that 
directly opposed the imperial government’s expectations. Officials noted 
the ineffectiveness of earlier policies not just with regard to Poles, but also, 
for example, in their policy on the publication of the Lithuanian press in 
the traditional script. Some senior officials admitted that this prohibition 
had worsened relations between the government and the Lithuanians: “The 
population, usually quite calm and compliant, was pushed to the verge of 
revolt.”14 Furthermore, in the view of imperial officials, the policy of Cyril-
lization did not reduce the Polonization of Lithuanians but increased it. It 
was no great secret to imperial officials that Lithuanians had devised a way 
of printing Lithuanian books and, later on, newspapers in the Latin script 
in Prussia (from 1870–1871 in the German Empire), and then smuggled 
them into the Russian Empire. Lithuanian historians have identified as 
 many as 2,854 individuals who were caught with illegal Lithuanian print-
ed material. It was obvious to the Kovna governor-general Alexei Rogov-
ich that: “It was impossible to force a million-strong tribe to forget their na-
tionality or language, which it had preserved completely intact during the 
entire history of Poland and Russia, and at the same time it was impossi-
ble to destroy the ‘Lithuanian movement.’”15 The enormous amount of il-
legal literature was also dangerous to the government, not only because it 
was printed in a prohibited script, but also because of its content. In other 
12 Petr Shuvalov, Overview of the Situation in the Northwest region (1896), Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiis-
koi Federatsii (GARF), f. 543, op. 1, d. 466, l. 7.
13 Dolbilov and Miller, Zapadnye okrainy, 343.
14 Quoted from: Vytautas Merkys, Knygnešių laikai 1864–1904 (Vilnius: Valstybinis leidybos centras, 1994), 
368.
15 Ibid., 364.
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words, some officials maintained that a legal Lithuanian press in the Latin 
script would be more advantageous to the government as then it could be 
shaped by censorship.16 Also, an unquestionable incentive was the general 
liberalization of the regime, which resulted from both the defeat in the war 
against Japan and the revolution of 1905. 
Probably the first complex attempt to recommend an alternative to 
“Russification” was the aforementioned report by Sviatopolk-Mirskii, 
from which we learn that the Vil’na governor-general at the time suggested 
changing policies affecting non-Russians. There was no reason the exclude 
the Polish gentry from various organizations and state institutions; rather 
they should be invited to join, and thus encouraged to cooperate with Rus-
sians. In other words, the imperial government had to move from a policy of 
segregation to one of integration. These joint efforts by Poles and Russians 
would contribute to the integration of the region into the Russian Empire.17 
He also acknowledged that the policy carried out against Lithuanians—
which in analytical terms could be described as acculturation, and which 
had to be followed by assimilation—was counter-productive, and that the 
Russian authorities had to come to terms with the Lithuanian ethno-cul-
tural community’s existence in principle.18 But in the case of Belorussian 
Catholics, the ultimate goal had to remain conversion to Orthodoxy, or, as 
we would put it, complete assimilation. However, the methods here had to 
be completely different. One of the most important principles was to stop 
discriminating against the Catholic Church, because that kind of policy 
“would only distance Catholic Belorussians from the government, and, in 
retreating from the Russians, they would ultimately join the Poles, doing so 
entirely consciously and in great numbers.”19 Guided by this particular log-
ic of nationality policy, in 1905, numerous legal acts were changed in the 
Russian Empire in order to regulate non-Russians’ education, religious life, 
and the acquisition of land.
16 For more on this issue, see ibid., 358–86.
17 Vėbra, Lietuvių klausimas, 168–85. 
18 Ibid., 200–22.
19 Ibid., 93.
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In this research, I make the distinction between the imperial or prag-
matic nationality policy and nationalist nationality policy strategies, which 
are understood here as ideal types. The first strategy’s main aim was to en-
sure stability in the empire, so that the demands of non-Russians could be 
met if it helped to achieve tranquility within the society. At the same time, 
acculturation or even assimilation methods could be employed here too, 
as long as they did not increase opposition among imperial subjects. The 
second strategy, meanwhile, was defined by the idea that political loyalty 
could only be achieved through cultural homogenization; that is, the po-
litical loyalty of non-Russians had to be secured by applying assimilation 
or acculturation policies, and in cases where that was impossible, or if such 
policies failed, segregationist political measures were applied, and ethnic 
Russians protected. Proponents of this strategy perceived any concession to 
non-Russian nationalities as dangers to the wellbeing of the empire.20 
“The Polish Question”
On March 15, 22 and 23, 1905, the Committee of Ministers considered the 
abolition of discriminatory measures against Poles, basing their judgment 
on the report by Sviatopolk-Mirskii already cited here.21 The participants 
in these meetings noted that the Poles’ attitude to the Russian Empire had 
changed. They no longer exhibited separatist tendencies, and they could 
prove to be quite useful as a conservative element in the struggle against 
the new main enemy: “dangerous teaching, seeking the social equality of 
20 Witold Rodkiewicz has defined the empire’s different nationality policy strategies in a little bit different 
way. He writes that bureaucratic Nationalism sought to transform the empire into a Russian nation-state, 
and understood integration as “a full linguistic and cultural Russification of non-Russians,” while nation-
hood within the framework of imperial Strategy was taken to be political loyalty, supporting Lithuanians, 
Belorussians, and Ukrainians as a counterforce against the Poles, etc.: Rodkiewicz, Russian Nationality 
Policy, 13–16. For a slightly different conceptualization of different approaches towards nationality issues 
in the late imperial period, see Valerie A. Kivelson and Ronald Grigor Suny, Russia’s Empires (New York–
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 250–52. Out of the four “visions for the empire” identified by Kiv-
elson and Suny, that of the “true Russian’ nationalists” is actually the same as the nationalist one described 
above.
21 The Committee of Ministers was charged with preparing point 7 of the tsarist decree of December 12, 
1904, which foresaw the implementation of eliminating discrimination against non-Russians.
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all classes, and extreme democracy.”22 We can also see such changes in the 
empire’s imagined “hierarchy of enemies” on its western periphery. Summa-
rizing the experience of the 1905 revolution that had just taken place, the 
governor of Grodna thought the activities of Jewish revolutionary organi-
zations, which he went so far as to call “a terrible threat,” were a much more 
serious problem, despite noting that Poles had not abandoned their aim to 
Polonize the Belorussians.23 
In the meetings of the Council of Ministers held in March 1905, se-
nior officials demonstrated that they were going to take into account at 
least some of the demands of non-Russians, primarily of Poles, so that 
“they could improve their economic situation and develop their religious 
strength.” As was written in the meeting’s minutes, this kind of attitude 
“would inspire love and respect by the incorporated nations for the dom-
inating [nation], and eliminate, or at least minimize, ethnic tensions and 
dissatisfaction.”24 This kind of approach can be attributed more to meth-
ods of imperial (or pragmatic) nationality policy than nationalist nation-
ality policy. The imperial decree of May 1, 1905 confirmed the resolutions 
passed at these meetings, which abolished certain anti-Polish discriminato-
ry measures that had been introduced after 1863 (many of the prohibitions 
on purchasing or renting land, it planned to revive the self-governing activ-
ities of the gentry; teaching subjects in Lithuanian and Polish at various lev-
els in state schools was also permitted).25 
Like other legal acts that eased discrimination against “persons of Pol-
ish origin,” this decree did not change the perception of the Western region 
as a Russian national territory in official discourse, nor were the convictions 
of the imperial ruling elite changed so that other ethnic groups (first of all 
22 Minutes of the Committee of Ministers’ meetings, March 15, 22, 23, 1905, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 1, d. 106, 
l. 407.
23 Report for the Grodna province, 1907, RGIA. Chital’nyi zal, papka No 2820, doc. no. 20, l. 1.
24 Minutes of the Committee of Ministers’ meetings, March 15, 22, 23, 1905, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 1, d. 106, 
l. 404.
25 Decree of May 1, 1905, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 1, d. 106, l. 423. The prohibition on buying land from Russians 
remained in place. Even though it was the cancellation of anti-Polish prohibitions that was formally being 
deliberated, some discriminatory measures against Lithuanians were also revoked. 
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Lithuanians and “Russians”) had to be protected from Polish influence.26 
This position was very clearly elucidated by Krshivitskii, the Vil’na gover-
nor-general: “Any external oppression of the Polish element is deeply wrong 
and naturally opposes the sentiments of Russians; [in addition], as experi-
ence has shown [this kind of policy of oppression] brings the opposite re-
sults, which simply strengthens the oppressed element and morally weak-
ens the dominant [element].” However, this kind of approach, according to 
the governor-general, was acceptable only within the “ethnographic bound-
aries of the Polish nation,” while in Belorussia, the government had to see 
to the survival of the Belorussians under the influence of Russian culture.27
Ivan Tolstoi, who had been appointed education minister in October 
1905, suggested making radical changes to policies concerning the Poles. 
His credo declared that schooling cannot “Russify” non-Russians, that is, 
change their collective identification, which is why schools had to be made 
attractive to these nationalities. One of the first measures in reaching this 
goal had to be the introduction of “local languages” as part of the curricu-
lum.28 The minister suggested particularly radical changes to the education 
policy in the Kingdom of Poland.29 As he himself wrote in his memoirs, he 
recommended a reform program practically repeating word-for-word the 
recommendations made by Leon Petrażycki, a Polish professor at St. Pe-
tersburg University. Besides other recommendations, this program foresaw 
the introduction of Polish as the language of instruction not only in state 
primary schools, but also in secondary schools. However, not only Russian 
and Russian literature, but also Russian history and geography had to be 
taught in Russian. Russian gymnasiums were to operate in the same way 
26 Minutes of the Committee of Ministers’ meetings, March 15, 22, 23, 1905, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 1, d. 106, 
l. 403. On the Russian mental map, only Kovna province and the northwest part of Vil’na province 
within the Western region with a majority Lithuanian population were not perceived as Russian 
 “national territory.”
27 Draft report from the Vil’na governor-general to P. Stolypin, August 20, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, 1906 m., 
b. 412, l. 4. Similar ideas appear in a report prepared by the head of the Common Affairs Department of 
the Interior Ministry at the end of 1905, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 250, d. 220, l. 114–6.
28 Ivan Tolstoi, Zametki o narodnom obrazovanii v Rosii (St. Petersburg, 1907), 12–15.
29 Tolstoi also dismissed the Vil’na educational district overseer Vasilii Popov, whose “Russification” policy 
I will discuss later in this chapter. See Popov, Memuary grafa I. I. Tolstogo (Moscow: Indrik, 2002), 66.
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in that Polish and Polish literature had to be taught.30 However, Georgii 
Skalon, the governor-general of Warsaw, did not approve of such radical 
changes, and it was decided in St. Petersburg that this kind of reform was 
“not for these times.”31 
The conditions for teaching “local languages” (Polish and Lithuanian) as 
subjects in the Northwest region were also revised while Tolstoi was educa-
tion minister. If the resolutions passed in 1905 in St. Petersburg (the decree 
of May 1 and the resolution from the Education Committee at the Ministry 
of Education issued on September 22) foresaw that these languages could be 
taught as non-compulsory subjects in state schools only if “the majority of 
the pupils were of Lithuanian or Polish nationality” (the first document re-
ferred to a majority in a certain locality, the second meant a specific school); 
then, by January 21, 1906, the Ministry of Education allowed the introduc-
tion of this subject even where a specific national group did not make up 
the majority.32 Thus, Polish as a subject was introduced in certain second-
ary, higher primary and two-year primary schools in the Northwest region.33 
However, soon enough, at the end of April 1906, Tolstoi and Sergei Vitte, 
the chairman of the Council of Ministers, were dismissed from their posi-
tions, which symbolized the end of the more liberal era. 
Even though the tsarist decree of April 22, 1906 foresaw that the teach-
ing of the Polish language as a subject could be introduced in primary 
schools in the part of Grodna province where Poles lived in a rather com-
30 Memuary Tolstogo, 164–72. In the Manuscript Department of the Russian National Library, the Tol-
stoi collection has a document “Note about languages of instruction in state education institutions in the 
Kingdom of Poland” (Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi natsional’noi biblioteki v Sankt Peterburge, f. 781, d. 118), 
whose authorship has been attributed to the minister, although in his memoirs he wrote that he did not 
keep this document and only had the recommendations made by Petrażycki at hand when he was writing 
them. Memuary Tolstogo, 165. 
31 Memuary Tolstogo, 165, 172. The Polish language basically only received these kinds of rights in private 
schools from 1905, which Tolstoi recommended granting to state schools in the Kingdom of Poland.  
32 Report from the Vil’na educational district overseer to the minister of education, March 9, 1908, LVIA, f. 
567, ap. 26, b. 800a, l. 15. For earlier regulations, see: Excerpt from the Vil’na educational district Circular 
No. 9 (1905), LVIA, f. 378, BS, 1904 m., 316, l. 181.
33 In 1908, out of the forty-one state secondary schools in the Northwest region, Polish was only taught as 
a subject in twenty-one, and in just a few primary schools in the cities. Out of the 117 private Christian 
schools, Polish was taught as a subject in only twenty: report from the Vil’na educational district overseer 
to the minister of education, March 9, 1908, LVIA, f. 567, ap. 26, b. 800a, l. 15.  
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pact area, this resolution was never implemented, regardless of the four 
meetings of the senior local officials in Vil’na and Grodna that took place 
in 1906, during which a “Polish territory” in Grodna was designated. In 
the years to come, senior local officials questioned the reliability of the re-
search conducted in 1906.34 It is likely that some of them did not even want 
to see this resolution carried out, and their critique of the collection of the 
data was only a pretext for failing to introduce Polish in primary schools 
in Grodna province. In the post-1905 period, imperial nationality policy 
changed yet again, and some tsarist bureaucrats no longer wanted to grant 
“privileges” to Poles any more.
The non-Russian elites on the empire’s peripheries did not abide by the 
“rules of the game” envisaged by the imperial government. Take, for ex-
ample, the case of the implementation of the April decree (April 17, 1905), 
whereby non-Orthodox clergy, first of all from the Catholic Church, took 
advantage of the fact that the government had not set down procedures for 
conversion, and initiated mass conversions of Orthodox believers to Ca-
tholicism.35 In other words, it became clear to officials that the concessions 
the government was prepared to make could not satisfy the demands of the 
non-Russian elite. The change in direction in policy was also determined by 
the suppression of the revolution, which meant that the government had to 
take less notice of the demands made by opposition forces.
Gradually, in the perception of at least some tsarist officials, Poles recov-
ered their status as the Empire’s main enemies on its western periphery. This 
change is also evident in the reports by the Grodna governor Nikolai Nev-
erovich. Discussing the situation in 1907, he devoted a lot of attention to the 
threat coming from Jewish revolutionaries, and even noted that the Russians 
and the Poles had temporarily become united in the face of this threat in the 
province. In later years, the governor highlighted the dangerous activities by 
34 See: “Ob upotreblenii mestnykh iazykov v nachal’nykh shkolakh Severo-Zapadnago kraia (Vysochaishee 
povelenie ot 22 aprelia 1906 goda),” LVIA, f. 378, BS, 1906 m., b. 378; “Ob ustanovlenii etnograficheskikh 
granits primeneniia Vysochaishego poveleniia 22-go aprelia 1906 goda o dopushchenii pol’skogo iazyka v 
nachal’nykh uchilishchakh Grodnenskoi gub.,” LVIA, f. 567, ap. 13, b. 1301.
35 See also Žaltauskaitė’s chapter in this volume.
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Poles somewhat more, even though his reports still contained negative as-
sessments of Jewish activities.36 Thus, we should not be surprised by the fact 
that some of the points in the decree of May 1, 1905, such as the one con-
cerning elections to the self-governing institutions of the gentry, were never 
realized, and, if we believe Aleksander Meysztowicz, Konstanty Skirmuntt 
and Stanisław Lopaciński, all Polish members of the State Council, then the 
decree was only followed in the first two years after its announcement, after 
which administrative practices changed, and local officials made it difficult 
for Poles to make use of the newly granted rights. Governor-generals were 
said to be stalling the issue of permits to Poles wanting to buy plots of land 
in order to eliminate land strips (domains sandwiched into other land hold-
ings). In 1911, the Cassation Department of the Governing Senate explained 
that Poles could not buy land from legal entities, etc.37
The trend whereby the imperial government treated Poles in corpore as an 
enemy element whose influence could not be allowed to affect other national 
groups, primarily “Russians,” is illustrated very well in the story of the intro-
duction of the zemstvo in the Western region. This local self-governing insti-
tution was introduced in the Russian Empire in 1864, although not in all of 
its peripheries. It was not introduced in the Western region because the rul-
ing regime feared that the Poles would dominate these institutions. The bu-
reaucratic correspondence that began at the end of the nineteenth century re-
garding the introduction of the zemstvo in the Western region ended in 1911, 
when Nicholas II confirmed the law on creating zemstvos in six of the prov-
inces of the Western region.38 They were not introduced in the “Lithuanian” 
provinces (Vil’na, Kovna, Grodna). The Vil’na and Kovna provinces were ex-
cluded from the area where the law applied because the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs believed that “zemstvo meetings in most of the districts in the Kov-
na and Vil’na provinces [...] would not have a Russian character at all, and [...] 
36 Report for the Grodna province, 1907, 1908, 1910, RGIA. Chital’nyi zal, papka no. 2820.
37 Report by the State Council members Meysztowicz, Skirmuntt and Lopaciński “On the situation of Poles 
in the Western region,” RGIA, f. 821, op. 128, d. 1407, l. 20.
38 The details surrounding the preparation of this law have been discussed in historiography: Aron Avrekh, 
“Vopros o zapdnom zemstve i bankrotstvo Stolypina,” Istoricheskie zapiski 70 (1961): 61–112; Weeks, Na-
tion and State, 131–51; Dolbilov and Miller, Zapadnye okrainy, 271–75, 378–81. 
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would be completely undesirable in terms of the state’s interests, and com-
pletely impermissible in terms of the domination of the Russian idea in the 
land.”39 The imperial government’s greatest fear was that local self-govern-
ing institutions would be taken over by Poles. One dimension of this con-
text which has received less attention in historiography is that the zemstvo 
system was  never introduced in Grodna province either. Based on the offi-
cial version, tsarist officials decided not to apply this reform in Grodna prov-
ince because it would have proven inconvenient to administer the Vil’na gov-
ernor-generalship if the zemstvo existed in only one of its provinces.40 This 
could actually have been an important motive for tsarist bureaucrats, but it 
might not have been the only one. The abolition of the institution of Vil’na 
governor-general was deliberated extensively in imperial government institu-
tions basically from the post-1863 period on, and the post was vacant alto-
gether starting in 1909. The resolution for the abolition of the institution was 
finally passed at the beginning of 1911.41 In other words, in 1909–10, bureau-
crats might have suspected that the institution of the Vil’na governor-gener-
al would soon be non-existent. Therefore, it is likely that the imperial ruling 
elite also looked suspiciously on Grodna province as a territory overly influ-
enced by the Poles, where there were quite a few Catholic Belorussians, and 
for this reason were “undoubtedly under the influence of Polonization.”42
Meanwhile, in the remaining six provinces of the Western region, elec-
tions to zemstvo self-governing institutions had to take place according to 
the national curia system, so that Russians would have the majority. This 
decision is a clear illustration of the government’s nationality policy pri-
orities. It was passed regardless of the fact that some of the participants in 
the discussions that took place in government offices warned of the nega-
39 Official letter from the Interior Ministry to the State Duma on the introduction of zemstvos in the West-
ern Region, January 20, 1910, RGIA, f. 1288, op. 4, 3e deloproizvodstvo, 1909 god, d. 38a, l. 171.
40 Ibid., l. 172; Avrekh, “Vopros o zapadnom zemstve,” 69.
41 Darius Staliūnas, “An Awkward City: Vilnius as a Regional Centre in Russian Nationality Policy (ca 
1860–1914),” in Russia and Eastern Europe: Applied ‘Imperiology’, edited by Andrzej Nowak (Warsaw: In-
stytut Historii PAN, 2006), 222–43. 
42 Official letter from the Interior Ministry to the State Duma on the introduction of zemstvos in the West-
ern region, January 20, 1910, RGIA, f. 1288, op. 4, 3e deloproizvodstvo, 1909 god, d. 38a, l. 172.
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tive impact of national curiae on integration processes: this kind of elec-
tion procedure would only transform the Poles into representatives of Pol-
ish national groups, and instead of seeing various national groups unite, 
they would work more for the benefit of their own national group.43 The 
imperial ruling elite’s priority was the defense of Russian interests, while 
the integration of non-dominant national groups, first of all Poles, was less 
critical, and in actual fact, was not quite feasible from the point of view of 
the elites. This is precisely the kind of policy direction we see in the meeting 
of senior tsarist officials held in St. Petersburg in April 1914 “On the Fight 
against Polonization in the Northwest region.”44
At these meetings, senior officials expressed their concern over the re-
cent intimacy between the “Polish aristocracy and intelligentsia” and the 
common people, which could be very dangerous to the integrity of the em-
pire.45 There was no discussion of the possibility of making Poles loyal sub-
jects of the emperor, or to exerting some kind of influence over their cul-
tural identification. We get the impression that senior tsarist officials had 
reconciled themselves with the idea that Poles would have anti-Russian 
views, and that this was something they could not hope to change. A dis-
cussion recorded in the meeting journal on April 18 1914 mentioned that 
a German should not be appointed as the Catholic Archbishop of Mogilev 
because the Poles would treat this as a challenge.46 Discussions like this, in 
which we find the high-ranking officials meeting in St. Petersburg actually 
cared about the feedback from Poles, were rare and exceptional. All atten-
tion in these discussions was focused on measures meant to protect “Rus-
sians” and Lithuanians from Polish influence. The participants in the meet-
ing decided to approach the Interior Ministry with suggestions to reduce 
Polish influence in the Catholic Church: for example, attempts to ensure 
43 Avrekh, “Vopros o zapadnom zemstve,” 92–93.
44 The Northwest region is understood here in a narrower sense, as the Vil’na, Kovna, and Grodna provinces, 
and perhaps also the Minsk, provinces. The governors of the first three provinces participated in the meet-
ing. The Minsk governor was also invited to the meeting, but he could not attend. 
45 Copy of the minutes of a meeting of senior officials in St. Petersburg, April 17, 1914, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, 
d. 172, l. 88.
46 Ibid.
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that Lithuanians were appointed as bishops in Vil’na and Tel’shi [Samogi-
tia], and that a Latvian should hold this post in Mogilev; a reduction in the 
number of Poles in chapters and in staff collectives at consistories and re-
ligious seminaries; holding additional Catholic prayers and the teaching 
of religion to Belorussians only in Russian; restricting the influence of the 
Catholic Church using various other means; strengthening the position of 
the Orthodox Church; taking up a whole range of other measures further 
complicating the purchase of land for Poles, and improving the economic 
situation of Russians, etc.47
Even with the outbreak of the Great War, when some of the western 
borderlands were occupied by the German army and when rivalry broke 
out between the warring sides over trying to win over the Poles, only some 
of the more senior imperial officials (such as the minister for war, Alexei 
 Polivanov) were prepared to abolish legal acts discriminating against “per-
sons of Polish origin.” Others (the interior minister Alexei Khvostov and 
the minister of agriculture Aleksandr Naumov) suggested not hurrying, 
and still others (the minister of education Pavel Ignat’ev) proposed making 
only partial concessions; there were also some (the minister of justice Alek-
sandr Khvostov), who, in the event that the Kingdom of Poland receive au-
tonomy, would have suggested introducing new prohibitions aimed at Poles 
in the Western region.48
What to Do with the Lithuanians?
In the view of most tsarist officials, unlike “the Polish question,” Lithua-
nians did not pose any immediate threat to the integrity of the Empire. But 
the tsarist government still had trouble finding a clear and consistent na-
tionality policy with regard to Lithuanians.
47  The plan for counteracting Polonisation prepared by the meeting of senior officials in St. Petersburg, April 
17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25 and 26, 1914, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 172, l. 70–72. Many of these ideas had already 
been discussed after the suppression of the 1863–64 uprising. 
48 See the file: “O vvedenii prepodavaniia na inorodcheskikh iazykakh v chastnykh srednikh uchebnykh za-
vedeniiakh,” RGIA, f. 733, op. 196, 1915 g., d. 1003.
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Despite the increasing liberalization of the political regime, which be-
gan in 1904, and the obvious consolidation of the Lithuanian national 
movement, even in the revolutionary 1905 period, there were officials in the 
Northwest region who essentially suggested continuing a nationalist policy 
that had been introduced after 1863. The most prominent adherents of this 
policy were Vil’na educational district officials, with overseer Vasilii Popov 
(1899–1906) at the fore of such efforts. In the spring of 1905, local educa-
tion agency officials tried to convince both the Vil’na governor-general and 
the central government that religion could only be taught in Lithuanian in 
the first year, as previously.49 They also sought to limit the presence of Lith-
uanian in schools as much as possible at the beginning of 1906 (they agreed 
to the use of Lithuanian in primary schools when teaching arithmetic in 
the first year of school, but only alternating it with Russian).50 Northwest 
region officials based these nationality policy recommendations on sever-
al arguments. They argued that the Lithuanian national movement was an-
ti-government: revolutionaries were said to play an important role in this 
movement. Some activists used the slogan “Lithuania for Lithuanians” and 
sought to bring down the tsarist government. In Kovna province, the inter-
ests of these activists and Polish estate owners coincided. In addition, Pop-
ov and his subordinates repeated images about the Lithuanian language 
from the post-1863 period. They asserted that there was no such literary 
language, while the Samogitians could not understand Lithuanian. None-
theless, during the period of the 1905 revolution, this was not the only ap-
proach to nationality policy that existed. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, from 1905 the local gov-
ernment had much less power to determine the selection and implemen-
49 For more on this, see the following files: “Po voprosu ob uregulirovanii narodnogo obrazovaniia v guber-
niiakh Severo-Zapadnago Kraia, tut zhe i perepiska po voprosu o prepodavanii Zakona Bozh’ego w ucheb-
nykh zavedeniiakh na prirodnom iazyke uchashchikhsia,” LVIA, f. 378, BS, 1904 m., b. 316, l. 16–35; and 
“Po prosheniiu krest’ian-litovtsev o vvedenii v nachal’nykh narodnykh uchilishchakh prepodavaniia za-
kona Bozhiia r.[imsko]-katolicheskogo ispovedaniia na litovskom iazyke,” LVIA, f. 567, ap. 12, b. 7453. 
50 Official report by the Vil’na educational district overseer and an overview prepared by the overseer’s assis-
tant A. Beletskii on the situation in the Kovna province at the end of 1905, RGIA, f. 733, op. 173, d. 27, l. 
52–61, quoted from l. 53.
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tation of specific nationality policy measures compared to the post-1863 
period. The liberalization of the tsarist regime that occurred in 1905 un-
avoidably had to offer more rights to Lithuanian social activities and the 
status of the Lithuanian language in the public sphere. Even though the 
language rights of non-dominant national groups were regulated separate-
ly in each region (for example, opportunities to use “local languages” in the 
educational institutions in the Baltic provinces and the Kingdom of Poland 
were expanded earlier and were more wide-ranging than in the Western 
region), the empire-wide liberalization of the political regime affected the 
Western region as well. Furthermore, the imperial government could no 
longer ignore the collective demands of Lithuanians, especially with regard 
to the rather dramatic situation that unfolded in Kovna province at the end 
of 1905, when Russian officials and teachers were driven out from rural ar-
eas en masse. Ultimately, some imperial officials admitted that the earlier 
policy was fruitless: “When the government implemented certain Russi-
fication measures towards Lithuanians in the mid-1860s, after it had sub-
dued the Polish revolt, the Lithuanians were, in a political sense, an indif-
ferent mass, lacking any national consciousness, and the government could 
expect that Lithuanians, feeling the effects of the measures implemented, 
would go along with unification with the real Russia. However, the out-
comes [of this policy] did not meet these expectations.”51 In the end, re-
gardless of all the repeated claims coming from various government institu-
tions and separate officials that after 1905 “this language [Lithuanian] does 
not actually exist, as Lithuanian today is still just a language of the com-
mon folk and is split into numerous dialects, which sometimes differ great-
ly from one another,” gradually, both in the imperial bureaucracy and in 
public discourse, a different approach to the existence of Lithuanian liter-
ary language began to take shape.52 A good illustration of this were the de-
bates in the Third Russian State Duma, during which constitutional dem-
51 Official letter from the interior minister to the Committee of Ministers, September 10, 1905, RGIA, f. 472, 
op. 60, d. 2137, l. 5. 
52 Kazys Žukauskas, Iš Lietuvos mokyklos istorijos. 1905–1907 metai (Kaunas: Valstybinė pedagoginės 
literatūros leidykla, 1960), 63.
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ocrats identified eight non-Russian languages in the Empire that should be 
taught for four years. Alongside Polish, German, Tartar, Estonian, Latvian, 
Georgian and Armenian, Lithuanian was also mentioned.53
All of the mentioned circumstances led to the situation whereby after 
the April decree (April 17, 1905), Lithuanians could study Catholicism in 
Lithuanian during the whole teaching period; after the extended bureau-
cratic correspondence between Kovna, Vil’na, and St. Petersburg in 1905–
1906, Lithuanian could be taught as a subject in state secondary and pri-
mary schools, and the language could be used in primary schools when 
teaching arithmetic.54 Lithuanians were the first to receive permission to 
publish periodicals in the region, and starting in 1906, they could study 
at the Ponevezh Teacher Training College and work as teachers in the 
Northwest region. One Lithuanian society could establish private primary 
schools in Kovna province although the government placed greater restric-
tions on the activities of these particular schools in 1908–15.55 In the Kovna 
province, the government allowed societies to keep their documentation in 
“local languages” (i.e., in Lithuanian and Polish). There were other reforms 
to the position of Lithuanians as well.
Additionally, during the revolution of 1905 as well as in later years, im-
perial officials of various ranks deliberated over whether it would be benefi-
cial to support the Lithuanian national movement, and thereby weaken the 
position of the Poles in the Northwest region. Petr Verevkin, who served as 
Kovna governor in 1904–1912 and Vil’na governor in 1912–1916, is often 
presented in historical scholarship as a tsarist official who was “favorable to-
ward the Lithuanians,” and who “always backed the Lithuanian side in ar-
guments between the Poles and Lithuanians.”56
53 Wayne Dowler, “The Politics of Language in Non-Russian Elementary Schools in the Eastern Empire, 
1865–1914,” The Russian Review 54, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 536n90. These debates did not affect the situation 
in the Grand Duchy of Finland. 
54 Magdalena Karčiauskienė, Pradinio švietimo raida Lietuvoje XIX a. antrojoje pusėje ir XX a. pradžioje 
(Kaunas; Šviesa, 1989), 126–37; Olga Mastianica, “Lietuvių kalba Vilniaus švietimo apygardos vidurinėse 
mokyklose 1906–1914 m.,” Lituanistica 2, 104 (2016): 77–90.
55 Vladas Pupšys, Lietuvos mokykla: Atgimimo metai (1905–1918) (Klaipėda: Klaipėdos universitetas, 
1995), 58.
56 Martynas Yčas, Atsiminimai. Nepriklausomybės keliais, vol. 1 (Kaunas, 1935), 22; K. Giedraitis, “Guber-
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At first glance, certain circumstances appear to support the aforemen-
tioned historiographical thesis. Verevkin made suggestions numerous times 
to Sviatopolk-Mirskii, the Vil’na governor-general, to support the Lithua-
nian periodical press financially.57 He backed some Lithuanian demands, 
such as the appointment of Lithuanian teachers to primary state schools in 
Kovna province in 1906.58 In 1906, the governor-general recommended al-
lowing the establishment of private schools where Lithuanian (and not Pol-
ish) would be the language of instruction.59 In 1909, Verevkin suggested 
that once the zemstvo system was introduced, elections in Kovna province 
would be organized for groups of large and small landowners separately, 
thereby ensuring the proportional representation of Lithuanians.60 How-
ever, having analyzed other suggestions made by the governor, especially 
those formulated in his later years in the office, we see that this tsarist of-
ficial’s concept of nationality policy was rather more complex. Verevkin’s 
actual approach to the educational and cultural activities of Lithuanians 
is illustrated quite well in the discussion that took place in 1910–1911 be-
tween local and central government agencies over the future of the Saulė 
(the Sun), a Lithuanian Catholic education society.61
This kind of discussion could not have taken place without the Kovna 
governor’s involvement, especially because it was none other than he who 
confirmed the society’s by-laws in 1906, and later, without consulting the 
leadership of the Vil’na educational district, confirmed a new edition of 
these by-laws. At first, Verevkin highlighted the positive aspects of the so-
ciety’s activities: the society was led by the priest Konstantinas Olšauskas, 
natorius, kurio bloguoju nemini,” Bangos 33 (1932): 835; Laima Laučkaitė, Ekspresionizmo raitelė Mariana 
Veriovkina (Vilnius: Kultūros, filosofijos ir meno institutas, 2007), 121.
57 Copy of the minutes of a meeting of senior officials in St. Petersburg, April 17, 1914, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, 
d. 172, l. 79. The Kovna governor suggested this kind of measure so that the “government’s aims” would be 
reached, but he received a negative response because there was a “shortage of funds.”
58 Minutes of the meeting discussing the implementation of the April 22, 1906 decree (May 5, 1906), LVIA, 
f. 378, BS, 1906 m., b. 378, l. 65.
59 Minutes of an official meeting regarding schools, February 8, 1906, LVIA, f. 378, BS, 1906 m., b. 378, l. 46.
60 Journal of the commission which discussed the introduction of zemstvos in the Western region, dated Oc-
tober 10, 1909, RGIA, Pechatnye zapiski, No. 2512, p. 1.
61 For more on Lithuanian educational societies, see Vida Pukienė, Lietuvių švietimo draugijos XX amžiaus 
pradžioje (1906–1915 metais) (Vilnius: A. Varno personalinė įmonė, 1994).
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who tried to arouse “feelings of national consciousness” in Lithuanians; 
was a “harsh opponent of Polish influence,” and believed that the Lithu-
anian nation was “historically closely associated with Russia, and had to 
maintain a permanent connection with Russia for a peaceful future and 
for its own benefit.” In addition, Olšauskas was said to have served the 
government’s interests in numerous ways during the revolution of 1905. 
Thus, in the governor’s view, the society’s president should not be consid-
ered a dangerous person, and his oppositional stance toward Poles, “from 
the government’s point of view, had a rather positive aspect, as the reduc-
tion of the influence of the Poles among the Lithuanians was always one 
of the main objectives of the local government, and from a general policy 
point of view in the borderlands as a whole, [it] juxtaposes [Polish] influ-
ence with a certain degree of growth in the Lithuanian national conscious-
ness that was completely justifiable.”62 However, Verevkin’s positive stance 
toward the cultural demands of Lithuanians had some clear boundaries. 
Since the task of any school was to prepare “future subjects’ of the Russian 
Empire, as many state schools as possible had to be opened, thereby push-
ing out any private schools, especially those for non-Russians. Therefore, 
it would be best if Saulė did not open separate schools, but rather collect-
ed funds and contributed to the establishment of state schools. Further, 
so that these schools would be attractive to Lithuanians, future Russian 
teachers had to be able to speak Lithuanian as well as they could.”63 On 
other occasions as well, Verevkin expressed a similar opinion regarding 
Saulė and other Lithuanian educational societies, and about education 
policy in general: their activities expressed certain anti-government signs, 
primary education should be controlled by the government, Lithuanians 
should work only as supplementary (auxiliary) teachers in state primary 
schools, and after the introduction of zemstvos, education should be re-
62 Secret report by the Kovna governor to the minister of education, December 14, 1911, RGIA, f. 733, op. 
177, 1910 g., d. 273, l. 22. 
63 Ibid., l. 23–24. The overseer of the Vil’na educational district was even less approving of Saulė and recom-
mended that it be closed. Report by the overseer of the Vil’na educational district to the minister of edu-
cation, May 17, 1911, RGIA, f. 733, op. 177, 1910 g., d. 273, l. 72–73.
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moved from their field of competency, so that “primary schools would not 
serve any separatist-nationalist goals.”64
There is no doubt that Verevkin’s political views were quite different 
from those of most tsarist officials who worked in the Northwest region 
in the second half of the nineteenth and even the early twentieth centu-
ry. Some local officials like Nikolai Griazev, the vice-governor of Kovna 
(1905–1910) who later became the Kovna governor (1912–1917), suggested 
biding by a strict, nationalist nationality policy strategy because he consid-
ered non-Russians to be “natural enemies of Russian statehood,” and saw 
“the goal of complete separatism and the creation of Lithuanian autono-
my” in the activities of Lithuanian educational societies, thus recommend-
ing they be closed.65 Verevkin’s reaction to most situations shows that his 
nationality policy featured more elements of imperial nationality policy 
than nationalist nationality policy. In his view, the government had to sup-
port Lithuanians’ cultural demands only to the extent that they protect-
ed this non-dominant group from Polish influence, but no more. As far as 
we can gather from the information available, the Polish community also 
had a positive view of this governor’s activities, which would imply that he 
had not earned the status of a supporter of the Lithuanians in the eyes of 
the Poles. In 1912, the Kovna City Municipality, where the Poles were the 
strongest group, decided to make Verevkin an honorary citizen of Kovna, 
stressing his “care shown to city dwellers of all religions and nationalities.”66
Verevkin also participated in the mentioned meeting in St. Petersburg in 
1914, in which anti-Polish policy measures were discussed. The only prob-
lem is that the surviving documentation just has a summarized account of 
the opinions of a majority or a minority of the participants in the meeting 
and does not specifically identify which officials were in favor of one or an-
other position. The opinions of the participants over policy regarding the 
64 Draft report for the Kovna province, 1908, Lietuvos nacionalinės Martyno Mažvydo bibliotekos Rankraščių 
skyrius (LNB RS), 19-76, l. 6–7, 10, 26–7; draft report for the Kovna province (1908–1911), LNB RS, f. 19-
82, l. 17–19.
65 Confidential letter from the Kovna governor to the interior minister, April 28, 1913, RGIA, f. 821, op. 128, 
d. 44, l. 633–34.
66 Astramskas, Kauno gubernijos miestų savivalda, 177.
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Lithuanians were divided. A minority thought that, generally speaking, the 
government “should not support non-Russians,” and this should also apply 
in the case of Lithuanians because that kind of assistance “to the Latvian 
movement” in the Baltic provinces was not justified, as once the movement 
strengthened, it became not only anti-German but also anti-Russian.67 In 
the opinion of a minority of the participants, the same would happen with 
the Lithuanian movement, which would seek to “give the Lithuanian nation 
a position of independence from Russian statehood, and they would most 
probably be drawn, along with the Polish nation, into a struggle against the 
government.”68 Many tsarist officials thought it was quite realistic that the 
Lithuanians were actually cooperating with the Poles. For example,  Griazev 
suspected that the Lithuanians were just pretending to be opposed to the 
Poles in order to confuse the government.69 But in the opinion of most of the 
participants in the meeting, the Lithuanians did not pose this kind of threat 
because they were Catholic, and the Catholic Church was “one of the harsh-
est opponents of socialism.” In addition, the Latvians were fighting against 
Germans who were loyal to the empire, while the Lithuanians were fight-
ing Poles, who were disloyal to the emperor, and who had proven their dis-
loyalty both in the past, when they rose up against the Russian government, 
and the present, when they were preparing to back Austria-Hungary in the 
coming war.70 Importantly, surrounded by Poles and Russians, Lithuanians 
had no chance of securing political independence, while “the Russian state 
was their main protection against Polonization.” Ultimately, a majority ar-
gued that “the Russification of Lithuanians would result in difficulties, and 
would ignite dissatisfaction among the masses,” which is why the govern-
ment “should not create obstacles for the development of the Lithuanian na-
67 Even though imperial officials looked rather favorably upon the Latvian national movement (until around 
1883), much like in the Lithuanian case, it would be hard to identify any specific measures it took that 
would have promoted Latvian nationalism. For more on this, see: Staliūnas, “Affirmative Action in the 
Western Borderlands of the Late Russian Empire?” Slavic Review (Winter 2018): 995–97.
68 Copy of the minutes of a meeting of senior officials in St. Petersburg, April 25, 1914, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, 
d. 172, l. 180.
69 Report for the Kovna Province, 1913, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 194, 1914 g., d. 35, l. 14.
70 Interestingly, with the conflict with Austria-Hungary and Germany approaching, senior tsarist officials 
did not question the loyalty of the Germans. 
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tional movement, and had no grounds to make a negative assessment of its 
leaders just because they participated in the movement.”71
Judging from the opinions of most of the participants in the meeting, 
the measures devised by these senior officials in April 1914 featured sev-
eral points that can be regarded as protective measures on behalf of Lith-
uanians: government institutions had to try to ensure that the Catholic 
bishops in both Tel’shi and Vil’na were Lithuanians, to “de-Polonize” the 
chapters of Catholic Dioceses, that is, increase the number of non-Poles in 
the structure; determine quotas based on nationalities in Catholic seminar-
ies; and to give the Lithuanians the opportunity to take up secondary posi-
tions in state public service structures.72
The idea of supporting a Lithuanian’s candidacy for Bishop of Vil’na 
was not a new one. It had been raised in the bureaucracy in 1907, when 
Bishop Edward von der Ropp was dismissed from his post. Taking into ac-
count the small percentage of Lithuanians in the Vil’na diocese and the re-
quest of the Holy See to find a suitable Polish candidate, the prime minis-
ter and interior minister Petr Stolypin thought that a Lithuanian would be 
suitable to serve as suffragan bishop.73 Since the late nineteenth century, 
the local and central government had been closely following Polish–Lith-
uanian conflicts in the Catholic Church over the language of additional 
prayers, and they constantly received complaints from Lithuanians over the 
inappropriate appointments of priests to parishes (with Lithuanians being 
sent to Slavic parishes, and Poles to Lithuanian parishes). In most cases, 
the main concern of officials was to guarantee social stability, and the easi-
est way of achieving this was to ensure that additional prayers should take 
71 Copy of the minutes of a meeting of senior officials in St. Petersburg, April 25, 1914, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, 
d. 172, l. 181–82.
72 The plan for counteracting Polonization prepared by the meeting of senior officials in St. Petersburg, April 
17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25 and 26, 1914, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 172, l. 70. When selecting a Lithuanian candi-
date for the post of Vil’na bishop, the participants in the meeting suggested taking into account the opin-
ion of The Union to Return the Right to Use Lithuanian in Roman Catholic Churches in Lithuania, al-
though we should not take this at face value. Copy of the minutes of a meeting of senior officials in St. 
Petersburg, April 18, 1914, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 172, l. 99. This union, which had gathered rightist Lith-
uanian public figures under its umbrella, was noted for its radical anti-Polish policy.
73 For more on this, see Staliūnas, “Affirmative Action”, 992; official letter from the interior minister to the 
minister of foreign affairs, January 27, 1908, LVIA, f. 378, bs, 1908, b. 334, l. 3–4.
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place in the language of the majority of parishioners, and in mixed parishes, 
in the languages of the majority and the minority. But a more sympathetic 
position towards Lithuanians can often be detected in officials’ reports. In 
1912, the Kovna governor Verevkin informed the central government nu-
merous times that a bad trend was becoming evident in the province: a rise 
in additional prayers in Polish, which could be explained by the “goal of 
Poles to Polonize the Lithuanian peasants.”74 The constant sending of let-
ters by various officials to Catholic hierarchs obviously served as a form of 
pressure. However, as has already been mentioned, the concern of the gov-
ernment was to protect the Lithuanians and Belorussians from Poloniza-
tion and not to create any special conditions for the Lithuanians. 
In the context of the government’s approach towards the situation in the 
Catholic Church, the points in the plan devised at the 1914 meeting about 
support for Lithuanians comes across as something exceptional. However, 
we have no knowledge of any further bureaucratic moves that led to their 
actual implementation. Some of these measures might have been intro-
duced only with the approval of the Holy See, and this was a field in which 
the tsarist government had no illusions about its success. In addition, some 
more senior officials feared the popularization of socialist ideas and Lithua-
nians’ “dreams about the introduction of autonomy in Lithuania.”75
The “Belorussian National Feeling Development” Program
In the late imperial period, the status of Belorussians as an ethnic group in 
Russian official and public discourse did not really change when compared 
to the earlier period. As before, it was conceptualized as a constituent part of 
the tripartite Russian nation. Members of the imperial government  treated 
the status of the Belorussian language accordingly: “In reality, the Belorus-
sian dialect is not an independent language at all, but only a debased Russian 
74 Reports from the Kovna governor to the Department of Foreign Confessions, February 15 and May 13, 
1912, RGIA, f. 821, op. 128, d. 699, l. 12, 58.
75 Copy of the minutes of a meeting of senior officials in St. Petersburg, April 13, 1914, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, 
d. 172, l. 79.
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language with Polish impurities, and, incidentally, it has not been debased so 
much that Russians cannot understand it or that Belorussians are not able to 
understand Russian.“76 Just like Yiddish, Belorussian was often referred to 
in the Russian discourse as jargon.77 This kind of approach to Belorussians 
was typical even of rather liberal-minded imperial officials, such as the ed-
ucation minister Tolstoi, for example. Tolstoi called Belorussians and Little 
Russians “branches” of the Russian tribe (plemia).78
However, at least during the period of the 1905 revolution, many senior 
tsarist officials recommended searching for means of influence other than 
those used prior to the revolution. Tolstoi believed that the prohibition on 
printing books in the Little Russian and Belorussian languages incited “au-
tonomous-separatist goals” in these communities.79 The Vil’na governor-
general Krshivitskii (1905–1909) explained that under the new conditions, 
the government could only rely on “cultural measures.” Even though the 
governor-general admitted that, because “Lithuania and White Rus’” were 
part of one state with Poland, “based on their language and customs,” Be-
lorussians were “a kind of mixture of real Russians and Poles,” and could 
“just as easily become Russians or Poles.” Yet, the “cultural struggle” at the 
time “had almost ended in favor of the Russian element.” Nonetheless, 
in Krshivitskii’s opinion, in order for Belorussians to “become nationally 
aware,” i.e., identify themselves with Russians, a whole swathe of measures 
had to be implemented: “to ensure as quickly as possible” that additional 
Catholic prayers be held in Belorussian; to open primary schools where Be-
lorussian is taught; to contribute to the formation of a clergy of local origin; 
to create better conditions for Belorussian peasants to buy land; to create 
a network of consumer societies; and to publish cheap books in the “local 
dialect” for the common folk. Krshivitskii believed that in this field, the 
government needed assistance from the public, which is why he supported 
76 Copy of the minutes of a meeting of senior officials in St. Petersburg, April 25, 1914, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, 
d. 172, l.179.
77 Aleksandr Milovidov, O iazyke prepodavaniia v narodnykh shkolakh Severo-Zapadnogo Kraia (Po povodu 
zaprosa v Gosud: Dumu) (Vilnius: Tipografiia ‘Russkii Pochin,’ 1912), 12–13.
78 Memuary Tolstogo, 154–55. 
79 Ibid., 155.
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right-wing organizations that had become established in the region, such 
as the Northwest region Russian Veche (Severo-zapadnoe russkoe veche) 
and The Peasant (Krest’ianin). He also believed that these efforts would be-
come easier to realize when zemstvos were introduced in the region.80
In many respects, Krshivitskii’s program was reminiscent of the mea-
sures recommended by certain tsarist bureaucrats in the early 1860s. Then, 
exactly as in 1906, some members of the imperial political elite searched for 
“cultural measures” in the fight against Polish influence among Belorus-
sians. However, much as in the mid-nineteenth century, toward the end of 
the empire’s existence, the tsarist government hesitated to support the in-
stitutionalization of this language, even at the primary school level; and 
there is not much information to suggest that there was broad support for 
publications in the Belorussian language. In fact, Krshivitskii’s suggestions 
regarding Belorussian as a language taught in primary schools were com-
pletely unacceptable to the absolute majority of officials because they were 
considered dangerous to the integrity of the Russian nation.
The idea concerning the use of Belorussian in additional Catholic prayers 
was deliberated many times in various government institutions in the lead-
up to the World War I.81 We may suspect that tsarist officials would often 
have treated the introduction of Belorussian simply as a transitional stage 
in adopting Russian. In addition, some Orthodox bishops feared that addi-
tional prayers in Belorussian might attract Orthodox believers to the Cath-
olic church, who could eventually convert to Catholicism.82
Officials did not harbor such fears over the introduction of Russian in 
supplementary Catholic services in the early twentieth century, and the cen-
tral government went to great lengths to see the Holy See revoke the pro-
hibition of 1877 regarding the use of the language in the Catholic Church. 
The Holy See did not lift the prohibition of 1877, but issued a new interpre-
80 A draft report from the Vil’na governor-general to P. Stolypin, August 20, 1906, LVIA, f. 378, BS, 1906 m., 
b. 412, l. 4–5. For more on this topic, see also Vytautas Petronis’s chapter in this volume.
81 Report from the Vil’na governor-general (Freze) to the interior minister, June 27, 1905, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 
190, d. 84а, l. 63; Merkys, Tautiniai santykiai, 226, 297; Bendin, Problemy veroterpimosti, 357–58.
82 Copy of the minutes of a meeting of senior officials in St. Petersburg, April 18, 1914, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, 
d. 172, l. 108.
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tation: it allowed ethnic Russians who had converted from Orthodoxy to 
Catholicism to use Russian; while in 1907, it allowed the use of Russian di-
alects in the historic Polish–Lithuanian lands, including, therefore, Belo-
russian.83 During negotiations between the Russian government and the 
Holy See, correspondence began between government offices in St. Peters-
burg and Vil’na over the publication of prayer books and other religious 
books in Belorussian. An expert commission had to be established in Vil’na 
especially for this matter.84 However, local Catholic hierarchs, such as the 
bishop of Vil’na Ropp, believed that Belorussian would only be a tempo-
rary measure before the introduction of Russian.85 Even in later years, vari-
ous imperial officials believed that the introduction of Russian in addition-
al Catholic prayers would be a suitable means of fighting “Polonization.”86 
But this move did not win support among the Catholic clergy or laity. One 
of the factors that encouraged Catholics to oppose the introduction of Rus-
sian in additional prayers (just as in the teaching of the Catholic faith in 
state schools, which will still be discussed in this chapter) was the fear that 
events from half a century ago—when the imperial government introduced 
Russian in additional Catholic prayers to convert Catholic Belorussians to 
Orthodoxy—would be repeated.87 So the tsarist government was forced to 
83 Translation into Russian of the letter from the papal nuncio to the Catholic bishops in the Russian Em-
pire, RGIA, f. 733, op. 196, d. 54, l. 4–5; Merkys, Tautiniai santykiai, 294–302.
84 See the file: “Po voprosu o sostavlenii i izdanii katolicheskikh molitvennikov i drugikh bogosluzhebnykh 
knig na razlichnykh belorusskikh govorakh,” RGIA, f. 733, op. 196, d. 54. So far, no information has been 
found that would suggest the formation of a commission like this. 
85 Merkys, Tautiniai santykiai, 302. 
86 Official letter from the interior minister to the Vil’na and Grodna governors, June 13, 1912, RGIA, f. 821, 
op. 128, d. 697, l. 11; “Zapiska ministra vnutrennikh del o deiatel’nosti katolicheskogo dukhovenstva, 
napravlennoi na podchinenie naseleniia zapadnago kraia pol’skomu vliianiiu, i o merakh bor’by s etimi 
vliianiiami,” RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 150, l. 8, 14–5.
87 A request from peasants of the Ialovskii (Volkovysk district) Catholic parish to the administrator of the 
Vil’na Catholic diocese, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2811, l. 235–6; report from the administrator of the Vil’na 
educational district to the Ministry of Education, October 19, 1911, RGIA, f. 733, op. 173, d. 30, l. 103. 
On the introduction of the Russian language into supplementary services in the Catholic Church, see 
Darius Staliūnas, Making Russians: Meaning and Practice of Russification in Lithuania and Belarus af-
ter 1863 (Amsterdam–New York: Rodopi, 2007), 164–70; Mikhail Dolbilov, Russkii krai, chuzhaia vera: 
Etnokonfessional’naia politika imperii v Litve i Belorussii pri Aleksandre II (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe 
obozrenie, 2010), 471–77. Theodore R. Weeks, who was not as closely acquainted with the documentation 
from this experiment, thought that when implementing this measure, imperial officials were not seeking 
to convert Catholic Belorussians to Orthodox believers: Theodore R. Weeks, “Religion and Russification: 
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accept that Catholic Belorussians were being “Polonized” in the Catholic 
Church. Yet, there was another area closely related to additional prayers 
where the tsarist government could have an impact on Catholic Belorus-
sians: the teaching of religion courses in state schools. 
 Until the revolution of 1905, Belorussians had to learn about the Catho-
lic religion in Russian, but the April decree foresaw that this subject had to be 
taught in the “native language.” A fierce struggle broke out immediately on the 
western borderlands of the Empire between tsarist officials and the Catholic 
Church over what the “native language” meant, and how it should be deter-
mined. The Catholic clergy consistently took the position that religion should 
be taught to Belorussians in the language in which they prayed, i.e., in Polish. 
At the initial stage, it would be possible to use Belorussian. The government in 
the Northwest region, however, maintained a strict position, arguing that re-
ligion had to be taught to Belorussians in Russian, and that the final decision 
about a specific pupil’s “native language” had to be made by officials.88
However, the regulation of non-Orthodox religious education had to 
be applied across the whole Empire, so final decisions regarding this mat-
ter were made by the central government. At the beginning of September 
1905, the Education Committee of the Ministry of Education prepared a 
draft of its Provisional Rules, which stated that non-Orthodox religious ed-
ucation in secondary and primary schools was not compulsory. If religion 
was offered, it would be taught in the “native language” of the pupils, which 
would be determined by a written or oral request by parents or guardians, 
while the school leadership was obliged to check that pupils actually under-
stood that language.89 However, the Ministry of Education confirmed the 
Russian language in the Catholic Churches of the ‘Northwest Provinces after 1863,” Kritika: Explorations 
in Russian and Eurasian History 2, no. 1 (2001): 93.
88 This theme is not completely new in historiography. The main legal acts regulating the teaching of religion 
to non-Orthodox believers have been discussed by Bendin and Merkys. However, neither of them tried 
to analyze in greater detail the existence of different nationality policy concepts among the imperial rul-
ing elite, or to explain the changes in regulations concerning religion that took place. What is even worse 
in Bendin’s case is that his writings focus mainly on tsarist policy apologetics. Bendin, Problemy veroterpi-
mosti, 344–56; Merkys, Tautiniai santykiai, 221–32.
89 Excerpt from the minutes of the Scientific Committee of the Ministry of Education meeting held on Sep-
tember 7, 1905, RGIA, f. 733, op. 195, d. 710, l. 18; See also: RGIA, f. 764, op. 3, d. 109, l. 581–601.
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Provisional Rules only on February 22, 1906. The process took so long be-
cause the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was also involved in the pro-
cess of preparing the document, decided to ask the opinion of represen-
tatives from non-Orthodox churches. Most of the Evangelical Lutheran, 
Evangelical Reformed, and Catholic hierarchs criticized the point in the 
Provisional Rules about the participation of school officials in procedures 
to determine pupils’ “native language.”90 The latter point also earned criti-
cism from Petr Durnovo, the Minister of Internal Affairs, who noted that 
in most cases, people working in educational agencies would not be able to 
check whether pupils actually knew the language they were declaring as 
their native language because these officials simply did not know the local 
languages.91 By this time, Tolstoi had recently been appointed education 
minister, and, as has already been mentioned in this chapter, he believed 
that state schools had to be attractive to non-Russians, that they should 
not have any “political aims,” and that they should allow students to learn 
in their native language.92 In addition, prime minister Sergei Vitte main-
tained that religion had to be taught to non-Orthodox pupils in the lan-
guage “they had been accustomed to praying in since childhood.”93 Thus, it 
is no wonder that the Ministry of Education took the comments of Cath-
olics, Lutherans, and Reformed clergy into consideration and indicated in 
the Provisional Rules of February 22, 1906 that religion would be taught to 
pupils in their “native language,” which would be determined at the request 
of parents or guardians.94
90 All feedback: RGIA, f. 821, op. 10, d. 514, l. 40–49, 52–54, 57–80.
91 Official letter from the interior minister to the education minister, February 7, 1906, RGIA, f. 733, op. 195, 
d. 710, l. 23. There were members of the Scientific Committee of the Ministry of Education such as  Henrijs 
Visendorfs, a Latvian activist and publicist of folklore, who said that learning religion was a matter of per-
sonal conscience, so no outside examiners needed to participate in the process. Excerpt from the minutes 
of the Scientific Committee of the Ministry of Education meeting held on September 7, 1905, RGIA, f. 
733, op. 195, d. 710, l. 9.
92 Tolstoi, Zametki o narodnom obrazovanii, 12–5.
93 Official letter from the chairman of the Council of Ministers to the minister of war, February 6, 1906, 
RGIA, f. 821, op. 10, d. 514, l. 154. 
94 Provisional Rules, confirmed by the education minister on February 22, 1906, on the teaching of religion 
to non-Orthodox Christians and the supervision of the teaching of this subject by clergymen at education-
al institutions of the Ministry of Education, LVIA, f. 567, ap. 12, b. 6385, l. 339–40. Religious instruction 
lessons were never made compulsory. 
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The Catholic clergy exploited these Provisional Rules very successfully, 
achieving their aim that the Catholic religion be taught in Polish to Belo-
russians in state schools, if it was taught at all in a given school. The overseer 
of the Vil’na educational district reported to St. Petersburg in 1908 that, 
within the boundaries of the region, Belorussian Catholics were not being 
taught religion in Russian anywhere, only in Polish.95 This had happened 
because priests had a much greater influence on this ethno-confession-
al group that government officials or teachers. In addition, officials com-
plained that the members of this ethno-confessional group considered their 
dialect and the Russian language to be “peasant,” or “common” languages, 
whereas Polish was the language of the “lords,” and a respected Church lan-
guage.96 Often, people who professed the Catholic faith and spoke one of 
the Belorussian dialects at home would answer questions about their na-
tionality by saying they belonged to the “Catholic nation,” or the “Catholic 
nationality,” adding that they were Catholics; some asked to have religion 
taught to them in the “Roman language” (rimskii yazyk).97 The imperial 
government naturally blamed Catholic priests for this kind of identifica-
tion of nationality with faith.
Some members of the local government thought this situation was not 
all bad. Baron Boris Vol’f, the overseer of the Vil’na educational district, 
was one such local official, who believed that the will of the people had to 
be considered, as that was the only way of ensuring they would send their 
children to state schools.98 Officials like this prioritized the loyalty of a sub-
95 Report from the Vil’na educational district overseer to the Ministry of Education, December 18, 1908, 
RGIA, f. 733, op. 173, d. 29, l. 72–73.
96 Report from the head of the directorate of the Grodna people’s schools to the Vil’na educational district 
overseer, March 2, 1909, LVIA, f. 567, ap. 13, b. 1301, l. 52; report for the Vil’na province, 1910, RGIA, f. 
1284, op. 194, 1911g., d. 66, l. 7–8. 
97 “O predstavlenii svedenii o rodnom iazyke uchenikov uchebnykh zavedenii,” LVIA, f. 567, ap. 1, b. 1948; 
“Po khodataistvu krest’ian der. Krazhina o razreshenii im obuchat’ detei gramote na russkom i rimskom 
iazykakh,” LVIA, f. 567, ap. 23, b. 487. Roman from Roman Catholic Church.
98 Official letter from the overseer of the Vil’na educational district to the head of the chancellery of the 
Vil’na governor-general, April 3, 1907, LVIA, f. 378, BS, 1906 m., b. 378, l. 202–04; report from the over-
seer of the Vil’na educational district to the Ministry of Education, January 29, 1908, LVIA, f. 567, ap. 13, 
b. 1301, l. 49–50. For a similar approach: the report sent by G.O. Freitakh von-Loringofen (an official from 
the Ministry of Education) to the Vil’na educational district for an inspection, RGIA, f. 733, op. 172, d. 16, 
l. 226–31. 
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ject of the empire over cultural identification. The fact that Vol’f, a Baltic 
German, took this approach should not surprise us.99 However, when he 
left the post in 1908, officials from the region again began to jointly pres-
sure the central government about the provision concerning the responsi-
bility of educational agency staff for determining the “native language” of 
students. They finally succeeded in this effort in 1912: a circular issued by 
the education minister on October 27, 1912 on the matter transferred the 
decision to school officials.100 However, this victory by Northwest region 
officials was rather deceptive, for in many cases, priests would not attend 
schools at all in order to avoid teaching religion in Russian.101 In addition, 
most Catholic children generally did not attend state schools, which meant 
that Belorussian Catholic children were being taught religion in Polish at 
secret or semi-secret schools.102
The efforts of the tsarist government to exert an influence on Catholic Be-
lorussians, and even to an extent, Orthodox believers as well, was also com-
plicated by the fact that newspapers were being published in the Belorussian 
language starting in 1906. This press, primarily the newspaper Nasha niva, ex-
perienced repressive censorship of its publications, which were alleged to raise 
issues of social injustice, while other government institutions feared negative 
political consequences of these policies. Sometimes officials were afraid that 
the Belorussian press, especially when it was published in the Latin script, 
would only encourage Belorussians and Poles to become closer. But tsarist of-
ficials with a deeper knowledge of the situation saw that, for example, Nasha 
niva was not pro-Polish but was dangerous for its Belorussian separatist fla-
vor; that is, it popularized ideas about an independent Belorussian nation.103
99 Vol’f became the overseer quite accidentally. The minister of education Tolstoi had already received ap-
proval from the tsar to appoint him as overseer of the Riga educational district. However, dissatisfaction 
arose in the Russian press over the fact that a Baltic German was being appointed to an educational dis-
trict that was already dominated by Germans, whereupon the minister immediately found another posi-
tion for him. Memuary Tolstogo, 263–64. 
100 Merkys, Tautiniai santykiai, 232.
101 For example, the Vitebsk governor reported that in this province, “in a majority of places, priests were 
no longer teaching Catholic instruction”: excerpts from governors’ reports, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 172, 
l. 225–6.
102 Merkys, Tautiniai santykiai, 232.
103 “O nabliudenii za belorusskoiu gazetoiu ‘Nasha niva’,” RGIA, f. 821, op. 10, d. 1154; an official letter from 
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The unsuccessful attempts to introduce Belorussian or Russian in sup-
plementary Catholic services and in the religion curriculum taught in state 
schools, and the existence of the periodical press in Belorussian at the begin-
ning of the 1910s, again prompted the imperial government to devote special 
attention to Belorussians. In 1912, the minister of the interior started to think 
about a complex “Belorussian national feeling development” program, which 
involved the governors of the region. Everything was summarized at the meet-
ing of senior officials in St. Petersburg in April 1914 discussed earlier. First, as 
before, senior tsarist officials suggested decreasing the “Polonization” of Belo-
russians through the Catholic Church: the national composition of Catholic 
seminaries had to correlate (percentagewise) with the national composition of 
the population, Russian had to be introduced in additional Catholic prayers, 
and officials had to check that religion was being taught to Belorussian Cath-
olics in Russian in schools, etc. Second, government institutions had to ensure 
the “nationalization” of Belorussians through state schools (for example, by 
strengthening patriotic education in teacher training colleges), and other cul-
tural-educational activities like opening Russian libraries and reading centers, 
organizing agricultural shows and lectures, etc. An intense discussion about 
the government’s potential funding of a periodical publication aimed at Belo-
russians also took place at the meeting in 1914. Even though one of the partic-
ipants in the meeting suggested allocating this kind of funding to Belorussian 
publications, the majority decided that the subsidy should be given to publica-
tions in Russian, because “less attention should be given to the idea that Belo-
russians are a unit separate from the Russian nation.”104 
the provisional administrator of the Interior Ministry to the Vil’na governor, January 26, 1913, RGIA, f. 
821, op. 128, d. 977, l. 2; Andrei Unuchak, “‘Nasha niva’ i belaruski natsyanal’ny rukh (1906–1915 gg.)” 
(PhD dissertation, Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus), 121–38. The 
press aimed at Belorussian Orthodox believers was published in Cyrillic, and in the Latin script for Cath-
olics. Nasha niva was initially printed in both scripts, but in 1912, due to financial difficulties, the edito-
rial board decided that the newspaper would be published in only one script, Cyrillic, as there were more 
Belorussian Orthodox believers than Catholics. 
104 “Ob opoliachenii belorussov i o merakh k vozrozhdeniiu v belorusskom naselenii natsional’nogo  russkogo 
samosoznaniia,” RGIA, f. 821, op. 128, d. 697; “Delo (sekretnoe) o merakh bor’by s pol’skim vliianiem 
na belorusskoe naselenie,” RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 167; “Ob usilivshimsia v poslednee vremia stremlenii 
pol’skoi narodno-demokraticheskoi partii k opoliacheniiu belorusskogo naseleniia,” LVIA, f. 567, op. 26, 
d. 999.
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Conclusions
During the period of 1905–1915 in the Northwestern provinces, we observe 
a collision of different nationality policies. In the proposals made by some 
tsarist officials (Minister of Education Count Tolstoi, Governor of Kovna 
province Verevkin, and Overseer of the Vil’na educational district Vol’f), 
especially between 1905 and 1907, there were many elements of imperial 
nationality policy, which demonstrated a belief that fullfilling the cultural 
aspirations of the non-Russian population would guarantee their loyalty to 
the empire. Likewise, Stephen Badalyan Riegg has found a similar concept 
of nationality policy in the activities of the Viceroy of the Caucasus, Illar-
ion Vorontsov-Dashkov between 1905 and 1915.105 However, as the events 
of the revolution of 1905 revealed, the empire could not rely on non-Rus-
sians: the Poles—primarily the Catholic clergy—did not follow the imag-
ined “rules of the game” and according to imperial officials, they quickly ad-
vanced the “Polonization” of Belorussians and Lithuanians. 
During the time of the revolution, the Lithuanian inhabitants of rural ar-
eas forced large numbers of Russian teachers and local bureaucracy out of their 
country and demanded territorial autonomy. Such demands, however, were 
unacceptable not only to the governing imperial elite, but to Russian liber-
als too. Besides, the tsarist bureaucracy understood well that even if they sup-
ported Lithuanians against the Poles, this would not have produced the de-
sired results: “By giving Lithuanians certain forms of support, the department 
[of Foreign Confessions] also understands that expecting total solidarity [from 
Lithuanians] with the government is unlikely.”106 Therefore, the strategy of em-
ploying imperial nationality policy in the Northwestern provinces could not 
have provided the means to secure the loyalty of local non-Russian population.
The policy that was promoted and, to some extent, implemented by the 
overseer of Vil’na educational district, Popov, and the governor of Kovna prov-
105 Stephen Badalyan Riegg, “Neotraditionalist Rule to the Rescue of the Empire? Viceroy I. Vorontsov-
Dashkov amid Crises in the Caucasus, 1905–1915,” Ab Imperio 3 (2018): 115–39.
106 Official letter from the Department of Foreign Confessions to the head of the Department of the Local 
Economy, June 30, 1913, RGIA, f. 821, op. 128, d. 44, l. 654–5.
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ince, Griazev, had more aspects of nationalist nationality policy, which became 
prevalent starting around 1908 and continued to intensify during the 1910s. It 
provided somewhat better results when dealing with the Orthodox Belorus-
sian population, but it was not consistent (i.e., in the sense of aiming at com-
plete assimilation) because starting from 1905, Belorussian-language publica-
tions (including periodicals) were legally printed in the empire. At the same 
time, Belorussian Catholics’ submission to imperial integration was problem-
atic: whenever they could choose the language of religious education in state 
schools, they opted for the Polish, not Russian; when the choice was removed, 
Catholic priests refused to teach, and catechism classes were moved outside of 
state schools. Lithuanians did not succumb to the attempts at cultural homog-
enization after 1863; hence the imperial government did not have illusions 
about the success of such policies during the first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. After the suppression of the revolution of 1905, the Poles once again be-
came the main enemies of the empire in this region. Because the imperial gov-
ernment was quite sure about their disloyalty and the fact that nothing could 
have been done to change the situation, it considered the implementation of 
the policy of segregation. After 1905, tsarist officials frequently proposed the 
same discriminatory or subtle social engineering-oriented schemes to be in-
cluded in nationality policies, which were first discussed after the suppression 
of the uprising of 1863–64. However, because of the more liberal political re-
gime, the gradual centralization and strengthening of the national movements 
of non-Russians, their implementation before World War I was even less feasi-
ble than during the second half of the nineteenth century.
The challenge of non-Russian nationalisms discussed in this chapter do 
not imply that these nationalisms were capable of destroying the Romanov 
Empire anytime soon. Yet, at the same time, tsarist officials did not have a 
clear-cut strategy for enacting nationality policies, which, in their under-
standing, could have guaranteed the loyalty of the imperial subjects in the 
Northwest region, just as in other western borderlands.107
107 For the same argument with regard to the Baltic provinces, see Brüggemann’s chapter in this volume. For 
the Kingdom of Poland, see Rolf, Imperiale Herrschaft im Weichselland, 427.
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In the summer of 1908, a letter from Warsaw reached the Interior Minis-
try in St. Petersburg. The message conveyed a bitter complaint about the 
local governor-general Georgii Skalon. The lament’s anonymous authors 
blamed the official of betraying the “Russian cause” (Russkoe delo) in the 
Polish provinces. In their eyes, Skalon had failed to “venerate the Russian 
name” (podniat’ russkoe imia) and protect the “national interests near the 
Vistula.” The authors—who introduced themselves as “Russians from War-
saw”—made clear that the Kingdom was “held tightly in the hands of the 
enemies of Russia.”1 While the denunciation made it explicit that the Poles 
needed to be seen as “the enemies of Russia,” it also indicated that Skalon’s 
lack of vigilance may be explained by his non-Russian origins and his Bal-
tic-German family background.2 To make matters worse, those who were 
willing to fight for the “Russian cause” would be stigmatized as “Russifiers” 
(obrusiteli). No wonder, the letter concluded, that the situation of the “Rus-
sian community” (russkoe obshchestvo) in the Kingdom was desperate. This 
is why the central institutions and the minister in St. Petersburg should in-
tervene and rescue the “dying Russian cause in Poland” (gibnushchee russ-
koe delo v Pol’she).3
1  Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 215, op. 1, d. 156, ll. 25–27 (Minister of the In-
terior on an anonymous letter, 26 July 1908), l. 25.
2  GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 156, l. 25–26.
3  GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 156, l. 27.
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This fiery accusation may have been more drastic in its rhetoric than 
other complaints, but it was the only anonymous letter. During the last de-
cade before World War I, the imperial ministries and politicians were fre-
quently addressed with such “voices of concern” who discredited local im-
perial authorities and accused them of a lack of will to defend the “Russian 
cause” in the western borderlands. Skalon as the most powerful figure in 
the tsarist state machinery at the Vistula was especially vulnerable to accu-
sations of giving in to Polish interests and “retreating” from the protection 
of “positions already held by Russians.”4
Why did members of the “Russian community” feel stripped of their 
protections by an imperial bureaucracy that, after the January Uprising of 
1863–64, had pledged to forever “defend” the “Russian cause” in the King-
dom? How can we explain the emergence of obvious frictions between lo-
cal state authorities and the diaspora representing the “imperial nation” at 
the Vistula?5 What kind of different notions of the “Russian cause” sur-
faced in these conflicts, and why did advocates of the “Russian commu-
nity” place their hopes on these central institutions while simultaneously 
losing trust in the regional branches of tsarist power? Finally, what dy-
namics were linked with these new tensions, and how did they contrib-
ute to the constraints that shaped the political landscape in post-revolu-
tionary Russia?
This chapter will explore these questions. In the first part, it will dis-
cuss how the Revolution of 1905 led to a fundamental shift in imperial pol-
icies in the Kingdom of Poland. In the course of a strategic readjustment, 
tsarist authorities strove to create new alliances in order to undermine rev-
4  In the denunciation of 1908, it sounded like this: Skalon was “handing over Russian positions to the en-
emies of Russia” (ustupat’ zaniatye russkimi v krae pozitsii vragam Rossii). GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 156, l. 
27. For similar letters from that time, see, e.g., Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (AGAD), KGGW, sygn. 
1893, kart. 1–89v (Report by the governor of Piotrków, April 15, 1906), l. 68ob; GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 156, 
l. 25–27 (Commentary on denunciations directed at the chief of the chancellery of the Warsaw governor-
general, July 26, 1908).
5  On “imperial nations” and projects of “imperial nation”-building within the framework of the empire, see 
Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller, “Introduction: Building Nations in and with Empires; A Reassessment,” 
in Nationalizing Empires, ed. Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2015), 
1–30, in particular, 2–7.
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olutionary unrest, thereby facilitating novel approaches to Polish political 
forces and their representatives. This contribution will elaborate the depth 
of imperial-Polish collaboration and the continuing tensions inscribed in it. 
In the second part, the chapter turns to the deterioration of the re-
lationship between imperial authorities and the Russian community in 
the western borderlands. It will focus on the dynamics that turned cru-
cial questions, such as how to define the “Russian cause” and distinguish 
groups identified with it, into much disputed issues. Here, the emanci-
pation process of the Russian diaspora from older imperial-bureaucratic 
domination is taken up. The study will elaborate on how the changing po-
litical framework, including the creation of a public sphere that evolved on 
grounds of the Fundamental Laws of 1906, empowered the Russian com-
munity, and how it equipped its members with new options to pressure 
state authorities. This essay will discuss how arguments in favor of “na-
tionalizing” the empire or even for consistent “Russification” policies con-
tested concepts of supra-ethnic imperial management. Different notions 
of imperial rule within the local and central institutions of the state bu-
reaucracy will surface here. 
Finally, the chapter reflects on the means the imperial administration 
had available for effectively managing the conflict-ridden situation in the 
Kingdom. It examines to what extent tsarist officials were, in fact, able to 
shape the political landscape in the borderlands, and to which vision of fu-
ture imperial rule they subscribed. Did they have a long-term vision of how 
to “defend” the “Russian cause” in the peripheries? To what extend were 
concepts of “nationalizing” the empire part of the authorities’ agenda that 
targeted at “upholding” the “Russian name” at the Vistula? These are ques-
tions tackled in the last section of the chapter.
In posing these questions this contribution significantly differs from 
earlier scholarship due to its focus on the interaction of the imperial ad-
ministration and the local Russian community. Taking a closer look at the 
chronology of tensions and frictions after 1905 helps us better understand 
the unfolding processes of radicalization. Earlier research has neglected 
such dynamics that, as we will see, had severe effects not only on the situa-
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tion in the Empire’s peripheries, but on the political landscape in the capi-
tal as well. This chapter will, thus, address the “feedback loop” between Po-
land and Russia that facilitated processes of “provincializing the center” in 
a time of rising nationalism.
Imperial Rule in the Kingdom of Poland Before 1905
To understand the dynamics of the post-revolutionary period, it is neces-
sary to provide a short survey of the long history of Russian hegemony in 
the Kingdom of Poland. Many of the tensions between 1905 and 1914 were 
connected to the conflicts that had shaped this part of the Empire for al-
most a century.
After the partitions of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 
eighteenth century, Russia successfully defended its claims on the East-
ern territories of the former Rzeczpospolita at the Congress of Vienna. Ad-
ditionally, in 1815, Alexander I also managed to expand Russian control 
over the core provinces of the old Polish monarchy. By creating a de jure 
independent Kingdom of Poland, St. Petersburg ensured its domination 
over this new state. Moving forward, all Russian Tsars were to be crowned 
Kings of Poland, and their viceroys in Warsaw would intervene in internal 
Polish affairs if necessary. After the 1830–31 Uprising, Russian troops were 
sent there, and much stricter surveillance over the Kingdom was enforced. 
Still, the 1863–64 January Uprising marked a clear caesura in the history of 
Russian hegemony in Poland. After crushing the revolt, St. Petersburg in-
troduced a wide range of punitive and administrative measures to “pacify” 
the region and to intensify imperial influence. 
Around 240,000 soldiers from Russia were stationed in the Kingdom, 
more than 40,000 of them in Warsaw alone. Local autonomy was banned 
in the Polish provinces, many existing legal peculiarities were abolished, 
and a military-bureaucratic command was enforced for the conflict-ridden 
borderland. The former Kingdom was to become nothing but a mere ad-
ministrative district, tightly bound to the rest of the Empire. This blow was 
also reflected in the terminology used: after 1864 the territory was  widely 
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called “Vistula Land” (Privislinskii krai), eradicating all traces of former 
Polish statehood.6
After the January Uprising, tsarist authorities also began reforming 
the region’s state administration. They transferred the Russian governor-
ate system to the Kingdom, and filled the most influential positions in the 
bureaucracy with external officials. With very few exceptions, Catholics 
(Poles) were barred from the higher ranks of the local administration. In ef-
fect, after 1863–64, the upper levels of officialdom were dominated by non-
local civil servants imported from the core territories of the empire, who for 
the most part, were Russian and Orthodox.7
Although this system remained almost unchanged until World War I, 
certain periods were characterized by different modes of enforcement. In 
particular, during the reign of Alexander III and his highest representa-
tive in Warsaw—the polonophobic governor-general Iosif Gurko—much 
effort was directed toward the goal of further eliminating existing differ-
ences between the western periphery of the empire and Russia’s internal 
provinces. During these “dark years,” as Polish contemporaries called it, ad-
ministrative interference reached all cultural and social spheres and affect-
ed educational institutions in particular. Teaching in institutions of high-
er learning as well as intermediate and advanced school classes was to be 
6  Sbornik administrativnykh postanovlenii Tsarstva Pol’skogo. Vedomstvo vnutrennykh i dukhovnykh del, 
vol. 1, Warsaw 1866. GARF, f. 102, op. 254, d. 1 (Obozrenie mer pravitel’stva, priniatykh po Tsarstvu 
Pol’skomu posle 1863 goda, 1880); Nikolai M. Reinke, Ocherk zakonodatel’stva Tsarstva Pol’skogo (St. Pe-
tersburg, 1902). See also: Werner Benecke, Militär, Reform und Gesellschaft im Zarenreich. Die Wehr-
pflicht in Russland 1874–1914 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), 63–68; Kristof Gumb, “Ugrozhat’ i nakazy-
vat’: Russkaia armiia v Varshave v 1904–1906gg.,” Ab Imperio, no. 3 (2008): 157–94; Malte Rolf, Imperiale 
Herrschaft im Weichselland: Das Königreich Polen im Russischen Imperium (1864–1915) (Munich: Olden-
bourg, 2015), chap. 4; Theodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Rus-
sification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), chap. 5.
7  See also: Andrzej Chwalba, Polacy w służbie Moskali (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1999), 
40; L. E. Gorizontov, Paradoksy imperskoi politiki: Poliaki v Rossii i Russkie v Pol’she (XIX–nachalo XX v.) 
(Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Indrik, 1999), in particular, 170–85; Malte Rolf, Rządy imperialne w Kraju Nadwi-
ślańskim: Królestwo Polskie i cesarstwo rosyjskie (1864–1915) (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu War-
szawskiego, 2016), chap. 2; Katya Vladimirov, The World of Provincial Bureaucracy in Late 19th and 20th 
Century Russian Poland (Lewiston: Mellen Press, 2004), 51–55; Stanisław Wiech, Społeczeństwo Króle-
stwa Polskiego w oczach carskiej policji politycznej (1866–1896) (Kielce: Wydawnictwo Akademii Święto-
krzyskiej, 2002), 223.
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conducted in Russian, and programs to introduce the Russian language in 
primary schools were launched.8
Traditionally, these administrative measures have been labeled as poli-
cies of “Russification.” However, it is worth dwelling on this issue in more 
length. New research has questioned this terminology and has pointed to-
ward the absence of a coherent program of Russification pushed by St. Pe-
tersburg and its representatives in the peripheries.9 In the Polish provinces, 
Russificatory policies can hardly be seen as the principal guidelines of lo-
cal imperial officials over the decades.10 Despite all efforts to further tie this 
periphery to the greater empire, all state representatives agreed on the fun-
damental differences that separated the Kingdom from the Russian core 
lands. In contrast to a perception of the “Western provinces” that Russian 
authorities considered “national territory,” officials perceived the Kingdom 
of Poland as a quite distinct entity with its own history and population, 
which legitimatized a certain degree of local “distinctiveness” (osobennosti 
or obosoblennosti). The Kingdom was described as a “borderland” (okraina) 
or as a part of “historic Poland”; sometimes it was even identified as a “for-
eign country” (chuzhaia strana).11 In fact administrative policies—like the 
   8 GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 76, ll. 16ob–20 (Report of the governor-general Al’bedinskii to Alexander II., De-
cember 27, 1880); GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 94, l. 56ob (Decisions of the Committee of Ministers, February 
17, 1898).
   9 See Mikhail Dolbilov, “Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the Russian Empire’s Northwestern 
Region in the 1860s,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, no. 2 (2004): 245–72, in 
particular 245–49; Andreas Kappeler, “The Ambiguities of Russification,” Kritika: Explorations in Rus-
sian and Eurasian History 5, no. 2 (2004): 291–97; Alexei Miller, The Romanov Empire and Nationalism: 
Essay in the Methodology of Historical Research (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2008), 45–65; Alexei 
Miller, “Between Local and Inter-Imperial: Russian Imperial History in Search of Scope and Paradigm,” 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, no. 1 (2004): 7–26; Darius Staliūnas, Making 
Russians: Meaning and Practices of Russification in Lithuania and Belarus after 1863 (Amsterdam: Rodo-
pi, 2007), in particular 57–70; Darius Staliūnas, “Did the Government Seek to Russify Lithuanians and 
Poles in the Northwest Region after the Uprising of 1863–64?,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eur-
asian History 5, no. 2 (2004): 273–89; Theodore R. Weeks, “Russification. Word and Practice 1863–1914,” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 148, no. 4 (2004): 471–89.
10 See in more detail in Malte Rolf, “Russifizierung, Depolonisierung oder innerer Staatsaufbau? Konzepte 
imperialer Herrschaft im Königreich Polen (1863–1915),” in Kampf um Wort und Schrift: Russifizierung 
in Osteuropa im 19.–20. Jahrhundert, ed. Zaur Gasimov (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2012), 
51–88.
11 GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 97, ll. 30–45 (Letter of the Warsaw governor-general to the Ministry of Interi-
or, March 12, 1902), l. 32ob; Archiwum Państwowe m. st. Warszawy (APW), t. 151, cz. 3 (KGW), sygn. 
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non-extension of zemstvo- and Duma-institutions—even deepened the gap 
between Russia “proper” and the Kingdom.
To be sure, most imperial representatives avoided the term 
“Russification.”12 Instead, they described themselves as “defenders” of the 
“Russian cause” at the western border of the empire. Before 1900, they 
sought to extend and protect “Russian statehood” (Russkaia gosudarstven-
nost’), a statehood that in historical perspective was identified as  clearly 
“Russian,” but was not understood as Russian in a narrow ethnic sense.13 
Still, most imperial authorities did privilege the Russian-Orthodox com-
munity—with Gurko in the forefront—because they saw local Russians 
as the most reliable group the empire could rely on in the borderlands. 
Iosif Gurko frankly praised their “wholehearted devotion to the Russian 
cause” (bezzavytnaia predannost’ russkomu delu).14 The exemplary erection 
of the gigantic Orthodox Alexander Nevskii Cathedral in Warsaw shows 
this most clearly: symbolic representations of the empire’s hegemony and 
the privileges for the Russian-Orthodox parish were fused together in one 
common cause.15
543, kart. 3–6 (Report of the chief of Warsaw district administration, August 29, 1897), kart. 3; AGAD, 
KGGW, sygn. 1767, kart. 3–5v (Letter of the minister of the interior to the Warsaw governor-general, 
June 28, 1881).
12 For an explicit criticism, see Konstantin Pobedonostsev’s comment during a meeting of the Committee of 
Ministers: GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 94, ll. 55ob–58ob (Proceedings of the Committee of Ministers, Febru-
ary 17, 1898), l. 55.
13 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGIA), f. 1284, 1898, op. 185, d. 55, l. 8 (Letter of the War-
saw governor-general Imeretinskii to the minister of the interior, January 4, 1899); GARF, f. 215, op. 1, 
d. 97, ll. 30–45 (Letter of the Warsaw governor-general Chertkov to the Ministry of Interior, March 12, 
1902), here ll. 32ob–34. E.g., Warsaw Governor-general Imeretinskii called all imperial officials serving in 
the Polish provinces “istinnye pionery russkogo dela na okrainakh gosudarstva.” GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 97, 
ll. 25–27 (Notes of the Warsaw governor-general Imeretinskii, January 12, 1899), here l. 26ob.
14 AGAD, KGGW, Sygn. 1773, kart. 19-53ob (Report of Warsaw governor-general Iosif Gurko, 25 De-
cember 1883), here kart. 19. Konstantin Pobedonostsev expressed quite explicitly: “Russian state power 
(russkaia gosudarstvennaia vlast’) should understand itself as the representative of the ruling national-
ity (gospodstvuiushchaia narodnost’). It should take care to establish correct opinions on [...] the rights 
of the Russian people, their past and present, among all imperial subjects regardless of their descent.“ 
GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 94, ll. 55ob–58ob (Proceedings of the Committee of Ministers, February 17, 
1898), here l. 57.
15 See Piotr Paszkiewicz, Pod berłem Romanowów: Sztuka rosyjska w Warszawie 1815–1915 (Warsaw: Insti-
tut Sztuki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1991), 114–37; Piotr Paszkiewicz, “The Russian Orthodox Cathedral 
of Saint Alexander Nevsky in Warsaw: From the History of Polish–Russian Relations,” Polish Art Stud-
ies 14 (1992): 64–71; Piotr Paszkiewicz, W służbie Imperium Rosyjskiego 1721–1917: Funkcje i treści ideowe 
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Although this general approach remained unquestioned until 1905, the 
political atmosphere changed considerably after Gurko was forced into re-
tirement in 1894. The succeeding governor-generals Pavel Shuvalov (1894–
96) and Aleksandr Imeretinskii (1896–1900) strove to come to terms with 
Polish society. With a series of symbolic concessions, they inaugurated what 
contemporaries called a “time of change.”16 Nicholas II’s visit to Warsaw in 
1897, the opening of a Polytechnic Institute, the erection of a monument 
dedicated to the Polish national poet and supporter of independent Pol-
ish statehood Adam Mickiewicz, the approval of a large exhibition hall for 
Warsaw’s Society of Fine Arts: all of these arrangements seemed to point at 
a serious reevaluation of imperial policies.17
The international situation at the end of the nineteenth century and the 
threat of an anti-Russian Triple Alliance fueled this reassessment of nega-
tive policies toward Poles because they directed Polish loyalties to the neigh-
boring empires. In addition, domestic social developments such as rapid in-
dustrialization and urban growth stimulated the overburdened authorities 
to look for new forms of cooperation with the local population.18
rosyjskiej architektury sakralnej na zachodnich rubieżach Cesarstwa i poza jego granicami (Warsaw: Institut 
Sztuki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1999); Paweł Przeciszewski, Warszawa: Prawosławie i rosyjskie dziedzic-
two (Warsaw: Agencja Wydawnicza Egros, 2012), 121–44; Robert L. Przygrodzki, “Russians in Warsaw: 
Imperialism and National Identities, 1863–1915” (PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 2007), 206–
31; Malte Rolf, “Russische Herrschaft in Warschau. Die Aleksandr-Nevskij-Kathedrale im Konfliktraum 
politischer Kommunikation,” in Jenseits der Zarenmacht: Dimensionen des Politischen im Russischen Reich 
1800–1917, ed. Walter Sperling (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2008), 163–89.
16 See Erazm I. Pil’ts, Povorotnyi moment v russko–pol’skikh otnosheniiakh (St. Petersburg, 1897), 5–12.
17 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 7031, kart. 38–39 (Letter of the minister of the interior to the Warsaw governor-
general, June 13, 1912); APW, t. 151, cz. 3 (KGW), sygn. 543, kart. 24–29v (Report of the chief of the War-
saw district, November 10, 1897). F. F. Orlov, Russkoe delo na Visle (1795–1895) (St. Petersburg, 1898). See 
also Malte Rolf, “Der Zar an der Weichsel: Repräsentationen von Herrschaft und Imperium im fin de 
 siècle,” in Imperiale Herrschaft in der Provinz: Repräsentationen politischer Macht im späten Zarenreich, ed. 
Jörg Baberowski, David Feest, and Christoph Gumb (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2008), 145–71; Andrzej 
Szwarc, “Manewry polityczne wokół odsłonięcia pomnika Mickiewicza w Warszawie: Raport Generał-
Gubernatora Królestwa Polskiego Alexandra Imeretyńskiego do Mikołaja II z stycznia 1899,” in Gos-
podarka: Ludzie: Władza, ed. Michał Kopczyński and Antoni Mączak (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krup-
ski i S–ka, 1998), 265–76; Janina Wiercińska, Towarzystwo Zachęty Sztuk Pięknych w Warszawie. Zarys 
działalności (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, 1968); Katarzyna Beylin, W Warszawie 
w latach 1900–1914 (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1972), 29–39.
18 See, e.g., Ute Caumanns, “Mietskasernen und ‘Gläserne Häuser’: Soziales Wohnen in Warschau  zwischen 
Philanthropie und Genossenschaft 1900–1939,” in Wohnen in der Großstadt 1900–1939: Wohnsituation 
und Modernisierung im europäischen Vergleich, ed. Alena Janatková and Hanna Kozińska-Witt (Stuttgart: 
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This noticeable wind of change may have provided grounds for less con-
straint in the imperial–Polish encounter in the 1890s though it did not lead 
toward a general questioning of the authorities’ basic self-perception as “de-
fenders of the Russian cause.” This became evident in an internal report is-
sued by Imeretinskii on the political situation in the Kingdom, which was 
soon leaked by PPS-socialists. This report frustrated many Polish contem-
poraries who had hoped for a significant improvement in imperial–Polish 
relations. It became just as apparent in the ongoing policies of granting spe-
cial privileges to the Russian community in the Kingdom.19
Indeed, the Russian-Orthodox population increased significantly dur-
ing this decade, particularly in Warsaw. Now, contemporaries saw a “Russ-
kaia Varshava” on the rise. This “Russian Warsaw” gradually transformed in 
terms of its social and professional structure. While around 1900, a large share 
of Russians living in Warsaw was still employed by the government, the size 
of the raznochintsy-milieu grew, and many of these people followed occupa-
tions outside the imperial bureaucracy. Nonetheless, until the turn of the cen-
tury, “defending” the “Russian cause” remained a common denominator that 
encompassed very different notions of what the “Russkoe delo” would stand 
for. Shortly before the revolution, imperial authorities and members of Russ-
kaia Varshava still subscribed to a concept of concordia in which the Russian 
community and the imperial state were seen as mostly overlapping spheres.20
It would be misleading, though, to characterize imperial policies at this 
point as “nationalizing.” It is worthwhile noting that neither Shuvalov nor 
Franz Steiner, 2006), 205–24; Malte Rolf, “Imperiale Herrschaft im städtischen Raum: Zarische Beamte 
und urbane Öffentlichkeit in Warschau (1870–1914),” in Russlands imperiale Macht: Integrationsstrat-
egien und ihre Reichweite in transnationaler Perspektive, ed. Bianka Pietrow-Ennker (Cologne: Böhlau, 
2012), 123–53. On the German view of Polish loyalties, see John C. G. Röhl, Wilhelm II. Der Aufbau der 
Persönlichen Monarchie 1888–1900 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001), 557–65. I thank Jan Markert for drawing 
my attention to this.
19 See Tainy nashei gosudarstvennoi politiki v Pol’she. Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov, published by the Rus-
sian Free Press Fund (London 1899). On censorship policies privileging the Russian community, see Malte 
Rolf, “‘Approved by the Censor’: Tsarist Censorship and the Public Sphere in Imperial Russia and the 
Kingdom of Poland (1860–1914),” in Underground Publishing and the Public Sphere: Transnational Per-
spectives, ed. Jan C. Behrends and Thomas Lindenberger (Vienna: LIT, 2014), 31–74.
20 See Dvizhenie naseleniia goroda Varshavy, ed. Varshavskii magistrate (Warsaw 1902); “Russkoe delo v Priv-
islinskom krae,” in Privislinskii kalendar’ (Warsaw 1898), 18; Alexei A. Sidorov, Russkie i russkaia zhizn’ v 
Varshave (Warsaw, 1900).
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Imeretinskii followed Gurko’s plan of further “Russifying” the Kingdom’s 
culture or educational system. Both were undecided on how far political 
concessions to the Poles should go, but they were both trying to come to 
terms at least with those segments of Polish aristocracy and bourgeois so-
ciety willing to cooperate. Facing new challenges like the rise of socialism 
and nationalism and the increasing illegal activities of more radical groups 
among the younger generation, tsarist officials were offering a modus viven-
di to groups like the Warsaw Positivists or the Ugodowcy.21
The Revolution of 1905 radically changed this political situation. The 
social and political turmoil of the years 1905–1906 confronted the tsarist 
administration with hitherto unknown threats and, in the longer run, fa-
cilitated new concepts of imperial management. 
The Revolution of 1905 and the Reinvention of Imperial Policies 
in the Kingdom of Poland
Hardly any other region of the empire reached the scale and intensity of 
revolutionary upheaval and violence as the Kingdom. Dead bodies in the 
streets in Warsaw or Lodz; assassinations of policemen and other officials; 
bloody clashes between army units and protestors; a deadly vendetta be-
21 On the Polish Ugodowcy—a milieu of conservatives willing to cooperate with tsarist officials—see Pil’ts, 
Povorotnyi moment v russko–pol’skikh otnosheniiakh; Vladimir D. Spasovich and Erazm I. Pil’ts, 
Ocherednye voprosy v Tsarstve Pol’skom, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1902). On Warsaw Positivism, see Sta-
nislaus A. Blejwas, “Warsaw Positivism—Patriotism Misunderstood,” The Polish Review 27, nos. 1–2 
(1982): 47–54; Peter Salden, “Puškin und Polen 1899: Die Petersburger Feier der polnischen Zeitung 
‘Kraj’ zu Puškins 100. Geburtstag,” Zeitschrift für Slawistik 53, no. 3 (2008): 281–304; Denis Sdvižkov, 
Das Zeitalter der Intelligenz: Zur vergleichenden Geschichte der Gebildeten in Europa bis zum Ersten 
Weltkrieg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 120–23; Tadeusz Stegner, “Polskie partie li-
beralne na mapie politycznej Królestwa Polskiego na początku XX wieku,” in Tradycje liberalne w Pol-
sce: Sympozjum historyczne, Materiały i Rozprawy do Teorii, Dziejów i Współczesności Liberalizmu, vol. 
1, ed. Roman Benedykciuk and Ryszard Kołodziejczyk (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo DiG, 2004), 49–67. 
On the growing socialist and national forces, see Robert E. Blobaum, Feliks Dzierżyński and the SD-
KPiL: A Study of the Origins of Polish Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Pe-
ter Hetherington, Unvanquished: Joseph Pilsudski, Resurrected Poland, and the Struggle for Eastern 
Europe (Houston: Pingora Press, 2012); Norman M. Naimark, The History of the “Proletariat”: The 
Emergence of Marxism in the Kingdom of Poland, 1870–1887 (Boulder, CO: Columbia University Press, 
1979); Brian A. Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-
Century Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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tween rival political factions, and a brutal enforcement of martial law and 
field court justice with more than 1,000 death sentences constituted “nor-
mality” in these tumultuous times. Only after martial law was declared in 
December 1905 were imperial authorities able to regain control over the 
Polish provinces.22
Nevertheless, the revolution was not a closed chapter by the end of 1905. 
The unrest, bloodshed, and anarchy persisted for more than two years. The 
tsarist administration kept the Kingdom of Poland in a state of emergency 
until 1909; officials and the local population alike were shaped, sometimes 
traumatized, by the revolution. The revolution left its imprint on the new 
political and legal order and the new political culture.23 
In this moment of the Empire’s ultimate crisis, state officials started to 
reconsider some of the key features of imperial management and nation-
ality policies. As a lesson of 1905, tsarist authorities reevaluated the tradi-
tional hierarchy ranking foes in which Poles, struggling for any sort of na-
tional emancipation, ranked at the top. During 1905–06, officials started 
22 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 2573, kart. 50–50v (Letter of the minister of interior to the Warsaw governor-gen-
eral, August 17, 1905); AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 2585, kart. 22 (Letter of the minister of interior to the War-
saw governor-general, December 30, 1906). See Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Dis-
array (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), passim; Jörg Baberowski, Autokratie und Justiz: 
Zum Verhältnis von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Rückständigkeit im ausgehenden Zarenreich 1864–1914 (Frank-
furt/Main: V. Klostermann, 1996), 764–68; Robert E. Blobaum, Rewolucja: Russian Poland, 1904–1907 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); William C. Fuller, Civil–Military Conflict in Imperial Rus-
sia, 1881–1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 169–91; Anna Geifman, Though Shalt 
Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 
226–27; Don C. Rawson, “The Death Penalty in Late Tsarist Russia: An Investigation of Judicial Proce-
dures,” Russian History 1 (1984): 29–58, here, 48–50; Malte Rolf, “Revolution, Repression und Reform: 
1905 im Königreich Polen,” in Schlüsseljahre: Zentrale Konstellationen der mittel– und osteuropäischen Ge-
schichte: Festschrift für Helmut Altrichter zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Lilia Antipow and Matthias Stadelmann 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2011), 219–32.
23 On everyday violence, see Vladimir V. Esipov, “Narodnaia nravstvennost’,” in Nekotorye cherty po statisti-
ke narodnogo zdraviia v 10 guberniiakh Tsartva Pol’skogo, ed. Varshavskii statisticheskii komitet (Warsaw, 
1907), 59–65, here 62–64; British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Of-
fice Confidential Print. Part I, From the Mid-nineteenth Century to the First World War. Series A: Russia, 
1859–1914, ed. Dominic Lieven (Bethesda, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 132–33 (Doc. 86). See 
also Malte Rolf, “Metropolen im Ausnahmezustand? Gewaltakteure und Gewalträume in den Städten des 
späten Zarenreichs,” in Kollektive Gewalt in der Stadt: Europa 1890–1939, ed. Friedrich Lenger (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2013), 25–49; Malte Rolf, “A Continuum of Crisis? The Kingdom of Poland in the Shadow of 
Revolution (1905–1915),” in The Russian Revolution of 1905 in Transcultural Perspective: Identities, Periph-
eries, and the Flow of Ideas, eds. Felicitas Fischer v. Weikersthal, Frank Grüner, Susanne Hohler, Franzis-
ka Schedewie, and Raphael Utz (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2013), 159–74.
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to see socialists as the main threat to the Empire and were, thus, more open 
to forms of cooperation with all non-revolutionary segments of the Polish 
political spectrum. Since older dialogue partners like the Positivists or the 
Ugodowcy had been politically marginalized during the revolution, tsarist 
authorities began looking for other options.24 By now, the Polish Nation-
al Democrats (Endecja) appeared to be a political movement whose repre-
sentatives, who were engaged in a bitter fight with the socialists, seemed re-
ceptive to some kind of collaboration. After 1906, Governor-general Skalon 
identified Roman Dmowski and his Endecia as possible accomplices in a 
joint effort to isolate socialist forces and end the turmoil in the Kingdom 
once and for all. In fact, Dmowski proved to be quite responsive to such 
ideas. While the socialist parties and the PPS in particular continued to at-
tack the regime with terroristic assaults, Dmowski was willing to operate 
within the new legal sphere offered by the Fundamental Laws of 1906 and 
the electoral system of the Duma. 
In this new alliance of uneven partners, Skalon openly supported the 
National Democrats as the rising political force. He approved their rallies 
for the first Duma election campaign even before the party was  officially 
registered. And he ordered local state representatives to provide indoor 
spaces for Endecia-gatherings. Obviously, already at the turn of the year 
1905–1906, Polish nationalists were assessed as a second-rate threat to the 
stability of the Kingdom.25
By 1906, tsarist officials like Skalon were quite certain that they had won 
back the initiative in fighting the revolution. Martial law and ruthless field 
court justice, along with the presence of massive military forces, seemed to 
play out its effects during this second year of upheaval. Since the discipline 
of Russian soldiers in the Kingdom had never been in doubt, the authorities 
knew that they could enforce “order” at any time, while the random attacks 
24 APW, t. 24 (WWO), sygn. 263, kart. 1–6 (Report on the social and political situation in the Kingdom, 
1913–1914, January 14, 1914); APW, t. 24 (WWO), sygn. 261, kart. 1–32, here kart. 16–17 (Report on 
“people’s opinion” in the Kingdom, 1913).
25 See Pascal Trees, Wahlen im Weichselland: Die Nationaldemokraten in Russisch–Polen und die Dumawah-
len 1905–1912 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2007), 103–16; Rolf, “The Kingdom of Poland in the Shadow of 
Revolution.”
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of socialist fighting groups failed in stirring up mass protests comparable to 
1905. Reassured with such confidence in his own power, Skalon could eas-
ily grant space to the more moderate Polish forces. Thus, although political 
activities of any kind remained restricted during the period of martial law, 
the tsarist administration allowed a certain normalcy to return to the po-
litical and social sphere even before 1909.26
In addition, the Fundamental Laws of 1906 and the advent of parlia-
mentarianism in Russia had radically changed the institutional framework 
of imperial policies. Although the continuing state of emergency suspend-
ed many civil rights, the political dynamics of inner-Russia also affected the 
Kingdom. Political parties and their outlets, social associations, cultural so-
cieties, and all sorts of institutions turned to the imperial administration 
with their request for official registration. Political, social, and cultural life 
began to self-organize and witnessed a boom after martial law was lifted in 
1909. Tsarist authorities also had to adjust their agenda and policies with-
in this new framework of civil laws, elections, and an active public sphere. 
Imperial management needed to find influential allies within this mush-
rooming public sphere if it wanted to be effective. National democrats, in 
contrast to liberal positivists or ugoda-conservatives, represented a power-
ful organization in this respect.27
Growing tensions in international relations also facilitated this alliance. 
Since war against imperial Germany seemed to be almost inevitable, anti-
German sentiments provided some common ground for both imperial and 
Polish representatives. The perception of a common enemy across the bor-
der helped to bridge many differences in worldviews and political goals.28
26 See Blobaum, Rewolucja, 260–91; Christoph Gumb, “Die Festung. Repräsentationen von Herrschaft und 
die Präsenz der Gewalt, Warschau (1904–1906),” in Imperiale Herrschaft in der Provinz: Repräsentationen 
politischer Macht im späten Zarenreich, ed. Jörg Baberowski, David Feest, and Christoph Gumb (Frank-
furt/Main: Campus, 2008), 271–302; N. D. Postnikov, “Terror pol’skikh partii protiv predstavitelei russ-
koi administratsii v 1905–1907 gg.,” in Individual’nyi politicheskii terror v Rossii XIX–nachalo XX v., ed. 
K. H. Morozov (Moscow: Memorial, 1996), 112–17.
27 APW, t. 24 (WWO), sygn. 263, kart. 1–6 (Report on the social and political situation in the Kingdom, 
1913–1914, January 14, 1914); APW, t. 24 (WWO), sygn. 261, kart 1–32, here kart. 16–17 (Report on 
“people’s opinion” in the Kingdom, 1913).
28 See, e.g., Roman Dmowski’s analyses in Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska from 1908.
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All of this contributed to the readjustment of imperial policies in the 
Kingdom of Poland. After 1906, tsarist authorities not only strove to “re-
store order” but to stabilize the political situation long term. But defining 
new paradigms of imperial administration was not only a matter decid-
ed in the chancelleries of a mandarin bureaucracy. The search for new al-
liances and policy guidelines took place in direct contact with Polish soci-
ety. The following section will take a closer look at how successful imperial 
managers were in their interactions with a multifaceted Polish society and 
to what extent they were indeed able to establish a new mode of collabora-
tion. To make matters more complex, in a second step, I will elaborate on 
the effects this new Polish–imperial encounter had on the Russian com-
munity in the Kingdom.
In Search of New Alliances: 
The Tsarist Administration and Polish Society after 1905
St. Petersburg’s representatives had much to offer those willing to partici-
pate in the legal and political system established in 1906. In the period of 
martial law, it was the Warsaw governor-general who decided whether an 
institution would be legally registered and which restrictions might be im-
posed on it. The administration defined the boundaries of the legal public 
sphere, and its power rested on the fact that it could facilitate or hinder any 
kind of political activity.
The bureaucracy decided to use this “enabling power” in order to 
strengthen the National Democrats in particular. It was not only dur-
ing the revolution that Skalon favored Dmowski’s party. Even after 1907, 
when the overall political situation had calmed down, the Endecia and its 
sub-institutions enjoyed considerable support by state authorities, for ex-
ample, the Warsaw governor-general only in rare cases issued administra-
tive decrees when it came to media associated with the National Demo-
crats. Even investigative journalism that revealed the shortcomings of the 
local bureaucracy was tolerated. In 1908, journalists of the daily newspa-
per Goniec exposed the grave mismanagement of and networks of corrup-
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tion within the municipal administration of Warsaw. Skalon reacted to 
the scandal by commissioning a special committee. Consequently, city 
president Viktor Litvinskii had to resign. Contemporaries had already in-
terpreted this as a sign of a new age of independent media empowered to 
pressure the state machinery.29
Even more astonishing is the scope of tacit permission Skalon showed 
toward one of the key projects of the National Democrats: the “Polish 
Mother land School” (Polska Macierz Szkolna). In summer 1906, the gov-
ernor-general gave his approval for the creation of a network of private 
schools in the Kingdom. By 1907, almost seven hundred schools with more 
than seven thousand schoolchildren had already been registered.30 This 
sweeping success obviously raised doubts among imperial representatives as 
to whether a privately run school system might marginalize state-sponsored 
schools in the future. Already in December 1907, Skalon abruptly closed 
the schools run by the institution and withdrew the registration of Pols-
ka Macierz Szkolna.31 This clearly shows the narrow limits in which pub-
lic initiatives were able to unfold in the Kingdom. It also demonstrates how 
arbitrary imperial policies were—even when it came to newly identified al-
lies among the local population. Such sudden interference from above was 
a threat to all associations and institutions active under martial law. From 
time to time, Skalon reminded the young Polish civil society that, in the 
end, he held ultimate power in the Polish provinces.
Still, imperial officials generally showed a great deal of willingness to 
grant Polish civil society at least some participatory authority. After 1906, 
representatives of the municipal society in Warsaw were frequently invited 
to sit on numerous state committees that dealt with the problems of admin-
29 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 6247, kart. 30–38 (Report of the special committee to Skalon, December 21, 1909); 
AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 6247, kart. 20 (Report of the head of the special committee to Skalon, August 27, 
1909); GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 156, l. 6ob (Letter of Skalon to Stolypin, Oktober 1909).
30 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 2723, kart. 6–6v (Letter of the Governor of Siedlce to Skalon, October 30, 1906). 
See Blobaum, Rewolucja, 178–82.
31 Many of these schools were kept running by private initiatives. See Edmund Staszyński, Polityka oświato-
wa caratu w Królestwie Polskim: Od powstania styczniowego do I wojny światowej (Warsaw: Państwowe Za-
kłady Wydawnictw Szkolnych, 1968), 207–40.
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istrating the growing metropolis—for instance, the commission to prevent 
cholera epidemics in the city, or ad-hoc snow removal committees.32 The 
imperial bureaucracy and the city president’s board in particular constant-
ly demonstrated their closeness to the urban citizenry and their goodwill to 
cooperate with the local population. At least in Warsaw, authorities made 
room for citizens to be directly involved in government affairs and granted 
them an, albeit restricted, share in decision-making.
Keeping this in mind, the reasons Governor-general Skalon was indeed 
in favor of introducing municipal self-institutions in the Kingdom of Po-
land is less surprising. With the City Duma, he identified an institutional 
body that could provide the framework for further cooperation with those 
segments of Polish society that were prosperous enough to indeed profit 
from this socially exclusive council. Skalon, thus, opposed those voices call-
ing for laws that would have discriminated against Poles and the use of Pol-
ish in municipal assemblies and boards. In the end, even Skalon failed to 
enforce this highly controversial reform, as Russian nationalists in the State 
Duma and the Senate obstructed the project.33
In general, it becomes obvious that local imperial authorities were try-
ing to forge novel alliances in the post-revolutionary period and that they 
were willing to collaborate with political forces that, just a few years earlier, 
had been identified as bitter enemies. This new openness rested on the in-
version of the hierarchy of friends and foes that had taken place during the 
turmoil of 1905. No doubt, this search for a modus vivendi was strictly lim-
ited even after 1909. Whenever the tsarist administration viewed the polit-
ical and social activities of the National Democrats as threat to public or-
der, they intervened; for example, Dmowski’s efforts to intensify political 
mobilization through antisemitic campaigns—such as the boycott of Jew-
ish businesses in 1912—were curtailed by imperial authorities. This had lit-
tle to do with sympathy for Jewish citizens among state officials, but  rather 
32 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 5820, kart. 54 (Report of the commission’s chairman G. Giunter, January 12, 
1907); APW, t. 25, sygn. 125, kart. 24–25; t. 151, cz. 1 (KGW), sygn. 471, kart. 171–75 (Documents of the 
commission for preventing cholera epidemics, 1908).
33 See Weeks, Nation and State, 152–71.
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with their obsession with “public order” to which aggressive anti semitic 
 agitation might pose a danger.34
But such examples do not distort the overall picture that local tsarist au-
thorities acted with much less hostility toward the political mainstream of 
Polish society after the Revolution of 1905. The National Democrats were 
the principal beneficiaries of such an approach. It could be argued that the 
Endecia’s focus on “cultural autonomy” as the main political target for the 
near future was a reaction to this. This goal stayed within the legal frame-
work provided by the reforms of 1906, but it opened up a terrain in which 
state representatives and Polish politicians could seek out pragmatic col-
laboration on a daily basis. All of this was indeed crucial for stabilizing the 
Kingdom’s political landscape in the final years before World War I.
Thus, imperial authorities proved rather successful in securing public 
order and political stability in the Kingdom after 1905. At the same time, 
they were confronted with a new challenge: the local Russian community 
underwent a deep transformation during the Revolution and began to peti-
tion state representatives with new demands.
A Fragile Alliance: Imperial Authorities and the Russian Community
By sheer numbers, the Russian-Orthodox community in the Kingdom had 
grown considerably during the last decade of the nineteenth century. This 
was particularly obvious in Warsaw: in 1897, the census recorded 49,997 
Orthodox in the city, making up more than 7 percent of the city’s popula-
tion.35 For a long time it was impossible to distinguish between the imperi-
al administration and the Russian diaspora. All higher state representatives 
34 See: APW, t. 22 (ZOW), sygn. 22, kart. 1 (Order of the Warsaw governor-general to the Committee for 
the affairs with the press, November 9, 1912); RGIA, f. 821, op. 128, d. 989, ll. 50–56 (Order of Governor-
general Skalon, December 19, 1912). Iosif A. Kleinman, Mezhdu molotom i nakoval’nei (pol’sko-evreiskii 
krizis) (St. Petersburg, 1910). See also Robert E. Blobaum, “The Politics of Antisemitism in Fin-de-Siecle 
Warsaw,” The Journal of Modern History 73, no. 2 (2001): 275–306; Rolf, Imperiale Herrschaft im Weich-
selland, 398–410; Theodore R. Weeks, From Assimilation to Antisemitism: The “Jewish Question” in Po-
land, 1850–1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), 163–69.
35 Dvizhenie naseleniia goroda Varshavy, ed. Varshavskii magistrat. Stat. otdel (Warsaw, 1902).
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sent to their post in the Kingdom integrated into this local community 
of the “imperial nation.”36 Moreover, until 1900, most Russians in War-
saw were employed by the government. This began to change around the 
turn of the century, as new social groups and professions began to emerge. 
In the late 1890s, a broad range of occupational opportunities had arisen 
outside of the bureaucracy, professions like academics, (private) teachers, 
publicists, book dealers, priests, engineers, physicians, lawyers, and artists.37 
Some of them engaged in activities that went beyond the traditional scope 
of government-sponsored culture.38 The process of a gradual emancipation 
of the Russian community from state structures was facilitated by the re-
forms brought about by the Revolution of 1905. Based on the Fundamental 
Laws of 1906 and similar to Polish society, the Russian diaspora managed 
to create a vivid cultural and political life.39 Many protagonists within this 
36 On the concept of “state–nation” or “imperial nation,” see Berger and Miller, “Building Nations in and 
with Empires,” 2–7.
37 Alexei A. Sidorov, Russkie i russkaia zhizn’ v Varshave (Warsaw, 1900); Putevoditel’ po Varshave i ee okrest-
nostia s adresnym otdelom, ed. V. Z. (Warsaw, 1893). For a thick description of Russkaia Varshava in earli-
er times, see Vladimir Mikhnevich, Varshava i Varshaviane: Nabliudeniia i zametki (St. Petersburg, 1881), 
in particular, 46–48. For more details, see Malte Rolf, “Between State Building and Local Cooperation: 
Russian Rule in the Kingdom of Poland, 1864–1915,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian His-
tory 19, no. 2 (2018): 385–416, in particular, 405–406; Malte Rolf, Pol’skie zemli pod vlast’ iu Peterburga: 
Ot Venskogo kongressa do Pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2019), chap. V.
38 See “Russkoe delo v Privislinskom krae,” in Privislinskii kalendar’ (Warsaw, 1898), 18; Varshavskii russkii 
kalendar’ na 1904 god (Warsaw, 1903). In particular the articles: “Obzor sobytii russkoi zhizni,” 6–15, and 
“Ozhivlenie russkoi obshchestvennoi zhizni v Varshave,” 47–86. See also: Alexei A. Sidorov, Istoricheskii 
ocherk russkoi pechati v Privislinskom krae (Warsaw, 1896); Putevoditel’ po Varshave i ee okrestnostiam, ed. 
V. Z. (Warsaw, 1893); Nikolai F. Akaemov, Putevoditel’ po Varshave (Warsaw, 1902). AGAD, Upravlenie 
Varshavskikh Pravitel’stvennykh Teatrov, sygn. 1, kart. 1–33 [Catalog of theater activities, 1900–1910, 
March 1910].
39 Among others, see the Warsaw Section of the Russian Assembly (Varshavskoe otdelenie russkogo sobraniia) 
and the Russian Society in Warsaw (Russkoe obshchestvo v g. Varshave), which were founded after 1905. The 
Warsaw Section of the Russian Assembly soon became the second largest regional branch of this organi-
zation in the empire and counted more than eight hundred members. AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 2548, kart. 1 
(Letter of the minister of interior to the Warsaw governor-general, January 20, 1905); kart. 4–8v (Found-
ing documents on the Warsaw Section of the Russian Assembly, May 1905). See also Iu. I. Kir’ianov, Russ-
koe Sobranie 1900–1917 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 99. Numerous cultural institutions like the Russian 
Circle for Literature and Science in Warsaw (Russkii Varshavskii literaturno-nauchnyi kruzhok), the Rus-
sian Circle for Music and Drama (Russkii muzykal’no-dramaticheskii kruzhok), or the Russian Circle of 
Lovers of Theater and Scenery (Russkii kruzhok liubitelei stsenicheskogo iskusstva) mushroomed alongside 
with plenty of sports clubs such as the Russian Athletic Society. On this, see Vladimir V. Esipov, Ocherk 
zhizni i byta Privislinskogo kraia (Warsaw, 1909), 14–17; Grigorii G. Moskvich, Putevoditel’ po Varshave 
(St. Petersburg, 1907), 101–104.
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new landscape voiced concerns and demands that were not automatically 
congruent with the interests of local state representatives.40
But now, in the wake of revolution, tsarist officials had to take these 
claims more seriously. This was due to several reasons: first, the new elector-
al system imposed by Prime Minister Petr Stolypin in June 1907 privileged 
Russian-Orthodox voters in Warsaw. With a separate “national” electoral 
curia, one of the two Duma seats allocated to the metropolis was reserved 
for Russians, while the vast majority of Catholic and Jewish voters were left 
with a single representative in the State Duma. Russian voters thus had an 
over-proportional share of electoral power.41
In addition, quite a few Russians in Warsaw maintained close ties to in-
fluential members of the imperial elite in the capital. Some of them held 
seats in the Senate, some of them worked in the central government, and 
some belonged to the circle of power around Prime Minister Stolypin. Ma-
ny of them had served in different administrative positions in the Kingdom 
for some time before moving on to higher posts in St. Petersburg’s institu-
tions. Obviously, belonging to this loose group of “former Warsovians” cre-
ated a sense of affection and made them inclined to promote Russian inter-
ests in the Kingdom of Poland.
The most prominent figure here was, no doubt, Vladimir Gurko, son 
of former Governor-General Iosif Gurko. In 1897, shortly after serving as 
Warsaw’s vice governor, Vladimir Gurko wrote a polonophobic Essay on the 
Vistula Territory. In 1906, Gurko was promoted to deputy minister of the 
interior. He continued publishing polemics and historical studies in which 
he identified the pursuit of Russian national hegemony as a crucial feature 
of imperial policy.42 Anton Budilovich was another visible self-declared 
“defender of the Russian cause” in the borderlands and the Kingdom of Po-
land. He had held administrative positions at the University of Warsaw in 
40 Similar developments can be identified in the Northwestern regions. See Vytautas Petronis’s contribution 
to this volume.
41 See Czesław Brzoza and Kamil Stepan, eds. Posłowie Polscy w parlamencie rosyjskim 1906–1917: Słownik 
biograficzny (Warsaw: Sejmowe, 2001), 7–15; Trees, Wahlen im Weichselland, 320–29.
42 See Vladimir I. Gurko (Pseudonym: V. R.), Ocherki Privislian’ ia (Moscow, 1897); Vladimir I. Gurko, Os-
novy vnutrennei politiki imperatora Aleksandra III (St. Petersburg, 1910).
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the 1880s. In 1892–1893, he was transferred to Iur’ev-University where he 
served as its chancellor shortly after it had been renamed the University of 
Dorpat.43 In 1901, the Minister of Education promoted him to St. Peters-
burg, where he continued to deal with nationality issues and educational 
matters in the non-Russian peripheries of the empire.44 Both officials had 
different views on the most pressing questions in the borderlands, but both 
agreed with many other “former Warsovians” that the “Russian cause” was 
under particular threat in the Polish provinces and that it needed active 
protection from state institutions. 
Figures like Gurko or Budilovich demonstrate how well the alliance be-
tween state representatives and the Russian community in the Kingdom 
still operated. They also show that even officials engaged actively in pub-
lic debates after 1905, where they attempted to place the issue of an alleged-
ly endangered “Russian cause” at the center of political discourse. But such 
prominent activists cannot conceal the fact that this traditional collabora-
tion had become contested in many respects. Taking a look at several ex-
amples of interactions and conflicts between the imperial authorities and 
representatives of the Russian community will help elaborate on the ex-
tent to which the old alliance was still intact and where new frictions be-
gan to surface. Whether the founding of a “House of the Russian People,” 
the reopening of the Imperial University in Warsaw, or the electoral cam-
paign for the Third and Fourth State Dumas, the cohabitation of imperi-
al and national interest groups in the Kingdom caused numerous tensions, 
and sometimes even open clashes. 
43 See Trude Maurer, Hochschullehrer im Zarenreich: Ein Beitrag zur russischen Sozial– und Bildungsge-
schichte (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), 830–32.
44 See Anton S. Budilovich, Vopros ob okrainakh Rossii, v sviazi s teoriei samoopredeleniia narodnostei i trebo-
vaniiami gosudarstvennogo edinstva (St. Petersburg, 1906); Budilovich, Rech’: O edinstve russkogo naroda 
(St. Petersburg, 1907). I have argued elsewhere that the life course and careers of officials like Budilovich 
can be analyzed as “imperial biographies.” See Tim Buchen and Malte Rolf, “Elites and Their Imperial Bi-
ographies: Introduction,” in Eliten im Vielvölkerreich: Imperiale Biographien in Russland und Österreich–
Ungarn (1850–1918)/Elites and Empire: Imperial Biographies in Russia and Austria–Hungary (1850–1918), 
ed. Tim Buchen and Malte Rolf (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 33–37; Malte Rolf, “Imperiale Biographien: 
Lebenswege imperialer Akteure in Groß– und Kolonialreichen (1850–1918) zur Einleitung,” Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft 40, no. 1 (2014): 5–21. See also Gorizontov, Paradoksy imperskoi politiki, 184.
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Already in 1905, it became evident that certain demands articulated 
by the Russian community did not overlap with the agenda of the local 
administration. The idea of establishing a “House of the Russian People” 
(Russkii narodnyi dom) as a cultural institution and giving it a home in the 
center of Warsaw was an old one. Voices calling to (finally) move onward 
with the realization of this project grew louder during the revolution. Ob-
viously, the political mobilization of Poles during the upheaval spurred the 
Russian community to seek cultural countermeasures. Local activists man-
aged to recruit the support of Stolypin, who pressured the authorities in 
Warsaw to pave the way for a large cultural center with conference facilities, 
a library and a concert hall. Although Governor-general Skalon backed this 
project, a dispute soon arose about where to build this impressive build-
ing. The newly founded Russian Society in Warsaw (Russkoe obshchestvo 
v g. Varshave) proposed dedicating a large section of the centrally located 
Ujazdowski park as the future construction site. This provoked opposition 
among tsarist municipal authorities who were not willing to sacrifice parts 
of the city’s most representative and popular park.45 
Skalon soon understood the problematic implications of such a symbol-
ic act that would have antagonized Polish civil society in Warsaw whose 
support Skalon needed in his quest to stabilize the political situation. Since 
Ujazdowski park represented a core part of Warsaw’s bourgeois culture and 
identity, cutting it into slices in order to build a “Russian House” would 
surely have turned Polish opinion against the government. Furthermore, 
no consensus over the future use of this institution could be reached. While 
activists of the Russian community envisioned a cultural center open to the 
general (Russian) public without any restrictions based on estate or prop-
erty, higher-ranking imperial authorities favored a socially more exclusive 
club and declined the idea of cultural services and venues that would also 
attract the lower classes of the Russian community. 
45 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 2606, kart. 8 (Letter of the Russkoe obshchestvo to Skalon, February 3, 1906); 
AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 7031, kart. 1–4 (Minutes of meetings with the Warsaw governor-general, August 
20, 1911).
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In the end, the project failed due to the lack of an adequate construction 
site. Skalon kept refusing to approve property procurement in the center of 
town. Representatives of the Russian community rejected all alternative lo-
cations proposed by the city administration, which were on the peripher-
ies of the city center as this would have symbolically emphasized Russians’ 
marginal position in the metropolis. In light of the extremely high real es-
tate prices in the metropolis, the Russian community could not afford any 
appropriate property downtown on its own. Consequently, the “House of 
the Russian people” was never built.46 Thus, this failure also highlights the 
relative economic weakness of Russkaia Varshava in Warsaw. While the lo-
cal Polish community independently financed numerous cultural institu-
tions in the city center during the same period and was able to donate more 
than a million rubles for the foundation of the Polytechnic Institute, the 
imperial administration wrote frankly about the poverty of Warsaw’s Rus-
sians and their inability to finance a project like the “Russian House” with-
out subsidies from the government.47
In the post-revolutionary period, imperial authorities reacted quite re-
servedly toward claims from the Russian community that would have fu-
eled Polish resentments. This becomes even more evident in the debates 
surrounding the reopening of the Imperial University of Warsaw. The uni-
versity had been closed due to student protests and boycotts during the 
revolution. In 1908, Skalon was considering re-launching academic life in 
Warsaw. Prior to this, numerous representatives of the Russian communi-
ty raised their voices and advanced ideas about the future shape of the uni-
versity in particular, and the educational system in the Kingdom in general. 
46 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 2606, kart. 8–9v; sygn. 7031, kart. 1–97. In particular, AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 7031, 
kart. 9 (Letter of the city president to the Warsaw governor-general, November 24, 1911); kart. 96–96v 
(Letter of the minister of the interior to the Warsaw governor-general, November 8, 1913). Among other 
places, the municipal authorities proposed a construction site behind the Polytechnic Institute. For more 
detail, see Malte Rolf, Russian Rule in the Kingdom of Poland (1864–1915) (Pittsburgh, PA: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming in 2020) chap. 9.
47 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 7031, kart. 97 (Minutes of a meeting on building the “Russian House”, August 20, 
1911). On the overall awareness among imperial officials that the Russian potential in the Western periph-
eries of the empire was rather weak, see also Darius Staliūnas, “Affirmative Action in the Western Border-
lands of the Late Russian Empire?,” in Slavic Review 77, no. 4 (2018): 978–97, in particular, 996–97.
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“Nationalizing education” was the key slogan in this discourse, and writers 
like the influential book trader Vladimir Istomin favored the strict apart-
heid of national cohorts in all educational institutions. Istomin argued that 
the government should only support Russian-language-based “national- 
patriotic schools.”48
According to such radical views, the empire as a political space be-
longed to Russians only. In the anonymous pamphlet, “Why Should There 
Be a Russian University in Warsaw,” the author demanded that the Impe-
rial University should finally take on a clear “Russian character” (russkii 
kharakter).49 Another author argued that the high school could become 
a motor of the “spiritual convergence of the borderland with the center” 
(dukhovn[oe] sblizhen[ie] okrainy s tsentrom) only if it took on such a Rus-
sian character.50 In these formulations, non-Russians within the Empire 
were assigned to the status of cultural helots, deprived of institutions of 
(higher) education.
Neither the governor-general nor the overseer of the educational dis-
trict shared such radical judgments. When Warsaw’s university reopened 
in 1908, little of its pre-revolutionary design had changed. The university 
was explicitly announced as “imperial,” and as such, it was open to all impe-
rial subjects regardless of descent and was by no means meant to be a “Rus-
sian university” in an exclusive ethnic sense.51
Within these debates a great deal of disagreement between the imperi-
al bureaucracy and more radical voices from the Russian community sur-
faced. These frictions became even more apparent during the electoral cam-
paign launched for the Russian seat from Warsaw in the Third State Duma. 
48 Vladimir A. Istomin, Natsional’no-patrioticheskie shkoly (Moscow, 1907), 5: “O natsionalizatsii gosu-
darstvennoi shkol’noi sistemy.” See also: Vladimir A. Istomin, Svoi i chuzhie vragi pravoslavno–russkogo 
dela v guberniiach Privislinskogo kraia (Moscow, 1907); N. A. Vetskii, K voprosu o Varshavskom Univer-
sitete (Warsaw, 1906).
49 “Pochemu v Varshave dolzhen byt’ russkii universitet?”, anonymous polemics, without dating, around 
1908, Department of Handwritings, Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka, f. 44, op. 14, d. 3, l. 10.
50 See Varshavskii Universitet i byvshaia Varshavskaia Glavnaia Shkola (St. Petersburg, 1908), 27.
51 Without question, Russian as the state language would remain the lingua franca of teaching. Due to this 
and other reasons, the number of Catholic students remained rather low in the following years. See in de-
tail Rolf, Rządy imperialne w Kraju Nadwiślańskim, 333–43.
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During the elections, the nationalist “Russian Society in Warsaw” nom-
inated philologist Sergei N. Alekseev as its candidate. Alekseev was infa-
mous for his polonophobic views, and the Russkoe obshchestvo left no doubt 
that they shared his beliefs. In their founding charter, the society already 
stated that it intended to present all “true Russians” in Warsaw. While any-
one regardless of “sex, profession, or estate” could become a member, on-
ly “full-blooded Russians” (polnopravnyi russkii) were invited to join the 
club.52 The Russkoe obshchestvo called the governor-general to finally “pro-
tect the national and cultural interests of the Russian people in the Vistula 
lands.” From this perspective, “strengthening the Russian state in the prov-
ince” was narrowed down to “a fight for the well-being of Russia and its 
great people” (bor’ba na blago Rossii i ee velikogo naroda).53 The empire was 
redefined as serving only “true Russians,” and the government’s main goal 
was reduced to privileging the “national interests of Russians and all those 
who carry this idea [of protecting the Russian cause] in the borderlands.”54
Opinion leaders of the Russkoe obshchestvo propagated extreme visions 
of nationalizing the empire that had little in common with the notions of 
the “Russian cause” shared by most of the upper bureaucracy throughout 
the nineteenth century. In Skalon’s view, such demands laid waste to the 
fragile stability he had been able to establish in Poland. The governor-gen-
eral, thus, refrained from supporting the Russian nationalists during the 
election campaign. Even though Prime Minister Stolypin sympathized 
with the Russkoe obshchestvo, Skalon decided to opt for an open confron-
tation and granted his political patronage to the Octobrist Party. He ad-
vised the local state newspaper Varshavskii Dnevnik to campaign for their 
52 Paragraph III, Artikel 5 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 2606, kart. 5 (Project of founding charter of the Russkoe 
obshchestvo v Varshave, May 1906).
53 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 2606 (1906–1910), kart. 8–9v (Letter of the Russkoe obshchestvo v g. Varshave to 
Skalon, February 3, 1906), here kart. 9. See also Predvybornye izvestiia Russkogo obshchestva v Varshave, No. 
1 (August 20 [September 12], 1907), 1. On Alekseev, see Predvybornye izvestiia Russkogo obshchestva v Var-
shave, no. 3 (September 14  [27], 1907), 2; Obzor deiatel’nostei Russkogo okrainnogo obshchestva za 1910 (St. 
Petersburg, 1911), 33.
54 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 9012, kart. 110b [Program of the Russkoe obshchestvo]; AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 
2606, kart. 8 (Charter of the Russkoe obshchestvo, October 17, 1905); Ob avtonomii Pol’shi, Izdanie Soiuza 
17–go oktiabria (Moscow, 1906), 2–7.
staulinas_book.indb   90 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:26
91
What Is the “Russian Cause” and Whom Does It Serve?
candidate although the Russkoe obshchestvo and Stolypin raised bitter com-
plaints about this.55 In the end, Skalon’s political engagement failed to ob-
struct Alekseev’s sweeping victory. Out of the election delegates, 62 percent 
voted for the nationalist candidate; therefore, they decided to send a polo-
nophobic extremist to the State Duma, who, at the same time, was a bitter 
opponent of the highest state representative in Warsaw.56
This conflict demonstrates quite clearly how divided political attitudes 
and perceptions were between members of the Russian community and the 
imperial bureaucracy. The following years did not ease tensions. In this pe-
riod, petitions, anonymous letters of complaint, and denunciations against 
local officials flooded central institutions. Such accusations of “betrayal of 
the Russian cause” further distanced the Russian political public from lo-
cal state structures and their representatives. This also fueled a process of 
radicalization in which opinion leaders of the Russian diaspora questioned 
the multi-ethnic composition of the tsarist administration and the supra-
national consensus to which most of the officials in the Kingdom still sub-
scribed. The “Russian cause” that had served as a semantic link between 
the central bureaucracy and the Russian community had now turned into 
a highly controversial issue. Russian nationalists had successfully stripped 
the slogan of its original meaning—Russian statehood57—and had nar-
rowed it down to a matter of Russian exclusivity. In this understanding, the 
powerful political phrase could be used to demand guarantees of Russian 
superiority in all aspects of political and social life.58
Skalon’s openness toward new forms of collaboration with Polish so-
ciety specifically evoked anxieties of further marginalization among ma-
55 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 9012, kart. 101 (Telegram from Stolypin to Skalon, September 13, 1907); AGAD, 
KGGW, sygn. 9012, kart. 103–104v (Open letter of the electoral delegates to Skalon, October 8, 1907). 
“Neskol’ko slov po povodu iskazheniia faktov v dvukh stat’iakh Varshavkogo Dnevnika,” in Predvybornye 
izvestiia Russkogo obshchestva, no. 1 (August 30, 1907), 1.
56 Predvybornye izvestiia Russkogo obshchestva, no. 6 (October 16, 1907), 3.
57 GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 97, ll. 25–27 (Notes of the Warsaw Governor-general Imeretinskii, January 12, 
1899).
58 See, e.g., Vladimir A. Istomin, Svoi i chuzhie vragi pravoslavno–russkogo dela v guberniakh Privislins kogo 
kraia (Moscow, 1907); Vladimir G. Smorodinov, Popechitel’ Varshavskogo uchebnogo okruga Aleksandr 
L’vovich Apukhtin (St. Petersburg, 1912).
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ny Russians. Polish calls for cultural autonomy were perceived as essential 
threats to one’s own (privileged) status. Recent social and economic devel-
opments had increased such fears, as Polish civil society proved to be quite 
successful in overcoming the temporary crisis caused by the Russo–Japa-
nese War and the Revolution of 1905. Already during the 1890s and again 
after 1907, the province’s urban bourgeoisie prospered, and its financial and 
cultural potentials became apparent in Warsaw in particular. With institu-
tions like the Polytechnic Institute, the Zachęta National Gallery of Art, 
the Philharmonic, or the Wawelberg housing project, the philanthropy of 
affluent citizens transformed the face of the city and bore witness not on-
ly to the wealth of the Polish-Jewish bourgeoisie but also to the scope of 
the “enabling policy” practiced by governor-generals like Imeretinskii and 
Skalon. The failure of the Russian community to build a “Russian House” 
in the center of Warsaw was an awkward showcase of one’s own weakness. 
And there were other incidents at the time that pointed in the same direc-
tion: “cultural events” in desolate locations, the inability to collect suffi-
cient funds to build a monument to Stolypin, the low academic prestige 
of the “Russian” university in Warsaw, and/or the poor appearance of the 
“Russian public” during celebrations of the anniversary of Borodino. All of 
this threatened to turn local Russians into an object of mockery.59
Such everyday experiences of one’s own social and economic marginal-
ization frustrated members of the Russian community who saw themselves 
as the primary representatives of the empire. This frustration was direct-
ed against local state authorities who seemingly did not intervene to ele-
vate Russians to their entitled status. Some of the members of the Russian 
diaspora hoped to mobilize support from central state institutions. In par-
59 For instance, during a Pushkin lecture convened by the Russian community, a number of guests fainted 
because the rented room proved to be much too small and the air too sticky. AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 2607, 
kart. 5–5v (Letter of the organizers to the governor-general, January 31, 1906). On the Borodino-celebra-
tions and the monument to Stolypin that was never erected, see AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 1339, kart. 126 
(Minutes of the committee for building a monument to Stolypin, 1912–13); GARF, f. 726, op. 1, d. 21, 
ll. 100–101 (Report of Warsaw’s chief of police, July 25, 1912). On Zachęta et al., see GARF, f. 215, op. 1, 
d. 94, ll. 11–14 (Report of the Warsaw governor-general, January 12, 1898); AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 7381, 
kart. 1 (Letter of the Warsaw governor-general, November 23, 1907). See also Beylin, W Warszawie w la-
tach 1900–1914, 7–36; Wiercińska, Towarzystwo Zachęty Sztuk Pięknych.
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ticular, Prime Minister Stolypin appeared to be a true advocate of “Rus-
sian interests” in the peripheries as he had made it clear that the state could 
not possibly be “an impartial arbitrator in the Russian and Polish competi-
tion” but needed to enforce Russian primacy there.60 Indeed, Stolypin in-
terfered in local affairs several times by supporting the claims of the Russ-
koe obshchestvo.61 When anonymous accusations against Skalon and other 
local officials grew louder, Stolypin decided to send a senator revision  to the 
Kingdom. In 1910, Senator Dmitrii Neidgart headed the investigation, and 
in the following year, he published a devastating evaluation of the condi-
tion of Skalon’s local administration. The report echoed many of the claims 
of the Russian community and ennobled some of the core projects of the lo-
cal Russian nationalists, like building a “Russian House.” Neidgart adopted 
their view that the imperial administration’s first and foremost duty was to 
shelter and promote ethnic Russians. In his report, the senator from St. Pe-
tersburg subscribed to an ethnic understanding of the “Russian cause.”62
From there it was only a small step toward viewing the loyalties of the 
empire’s multi-ethnic officialdom with growing doubts. When the young 
army officer Alexei Brusilov was stationed in the Warsaw military district, 
he was convinced he had found “German networks” at work in a local ad-
ministration headed by a Baltic German.63 Such conspiracy theories may 
serve as proof of how strongly certain groups of “Young Turks” in the high-
60 Cited in Manfred Hagen, “Das Nationalitätenproblem Russlands in den Verhandlungen der III. Duma 
1907–1911” (PhD diss., Universität Göttingen, 1964), 59–61. See also Abraham Ascher, P. A. Stolypin: The 
Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 303–20; Alek-
sandra Bakhturina, Okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii: Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie i natsional’naia politika v gody 
Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914–1917 gg.) (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004), 16–17; Mary Schaeffer Conroy, Peter 
Arkadevich Stolypin: Practical Politics in Late Tsarist Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976); Al-
exandra Korros, A Reluctant Parliament: Stolypin, Nationalism, and the Politics of the Russian Imperi-
al State Council, 1906–1911 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Peter Waldron, “Stolypin and Fin-
land,” The Slavonic and East European Review 63, no. 1 (1985): 41–55.
61 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 9012, kart. 101 (Telegram of the minister of the interior to Skalon, September 13, 
1907).
62 See: Dmitrii B. Neidgart, Vsepoddanneishii otchet o proizvedennoi v 1910 godu po vysochaishemu poveleniiu 
Gofmeisterom Dvora Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Senatorom Neidgartom revizii pravitel’stvennykh i ob-
shchestvennykh ustanovlenii Privislinskogo kraia, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1911). On Russkii dom, see vol. 1, 
p. 73–94.
63 See Aleksej A. Brusilov, Moi vospominaniia (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), 50–53.
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er bureaucracy and army were inclined toward ideas of Russian ethnic na-
tionalism and subscribed to concepts of “imperial nation”-building.64
The Prime Minister in the capital may not have shared all of the inher-
ent radicalism of such opinions, but still he was regularly playing “the na-
tional card” when it came to bolstering his position of power. In the case of 
Skalon, he tried to take advantage of the ethnic conflicts in Warsaw in or-
der to promote his relative: Senator Dmitrii Neidgart was his brother-in-
law, and it was an open secret that he had ambitions to replace the Warsaw 
governor-general. Accusations of a “betrayal of the Russian cause” served 
as a strong argument in this attempt to seize this influential position.65 For 
Skalon, this meant that he could hardly ignore the local Russian commu-
nity despite their marginality both in economic terms and population size. 
Representatives of this small group knew all too well that they could exert 
pressure on the governor-general through central authorities in the impe-
rial capital. To some of the nationalist activists in Warsaw’s Russian com-
munity, even this kind of support from St. Petersburg seemed weak. They 
sought a much broader political mobilization based on nationality policies 
that would go beyond the framework of the state apparatus. This became 
apparent when some of the protagonists from Warsaw sought to establish 
ties with other local centers of Russian nationalists. On the one hand, they 
64 See, in particular, Miller, The Romanov Empire and Nationalism, 211–16; Berger and Miller, “Build-
ing Nations in and with Empires,” 2–7. Also: Dietrich Geyer, “Nation und Nationalismus in Rußland,” 
in Nation und Gesellschaft in Deutschland, ed. Manfred Hettling and Paul Nolte (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
1996), 100–13, here, 103–104; Kappeler, “The Ambiguities of Russification,” 294; Ronald Grigor Suny 
and  Terry Martin, “The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, ‘National’ Identity, and Theories of Em-
pire,” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald G. Suny 
and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23–66, here, 54–55; Wayne Dowler, Russia 
in 1913 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), 172–73; Joshua Sanborn, “Family, Fraternity, 
and Nation-Building in Russia, 1905–1925,” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age 
of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald G. Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 93–
110, here, 94–95; Charles Steinwedel, “To Make a Difference: The Category of Ethnicity in Late Imperial 
Russian Politics, 1861–1917,” in Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices, ed. David L. Hoffmann 
and Yanni Kotsonis (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 67–86, here, 76–77; Weeks, Nation and 
State, 193–98.
65 See also: Łukasz Chimiak, Gubernatorzy rosyjscy w Królestwie Polskim 1863–1915: Szkic do portretu zbio-
rowego (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Funna, 1999), 74–75; L. E. Gorizontov, “Vybor nositelia ‘russkogo na-
chala’ v pol’skoi politike Rossiiskoi imperii, 1831–1917,” in Poliaki i russkie v glazakh drug druga, ed. V. A. 
Khorev (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Indrik, 2000), 107–16, here, 110–11.
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tried to connect directly, inviting guest speakers from Kiev or other plac-
es; on the other, they utilized trans-local organizations such as the Russian 
Borderland Society (Russkoe okrainnoe obshchestvo). In addition, they co-
ordinated publications in order to place “borderland topics” at the top of 
the agenda of contemporary debates. In Warsaw, the activists of the Russ-
koe obshchestvo around Alekseev effectively collaborated with the Russian 
Borderland Society. In Platon Kulakovskii, a professor at the Imperial Uni-
versity in Warsaw and one of the most prominent authors of the Library 
of Russia’s Borderlands (Biblioteka Okrain Rossii, a series of book publica-
tions), Alekseev found a congenial fellow campaigner against alleged “Pol-
ish demands.”66 In his writings, Kulakovskii reduced the empire to a mere 
handmaid of ethnic Russian claims for superiority. No wonder the Russkoe 
obshchestvo put him on the short list of suggested readings.67
The most important forum for influencing public debates and, in fact, 
shaping imperial policies, of course, was the State Duma. After their tri-
umphant victory in the elections for the Third Duma, the “Russian Soci-
ety” managed to defend their seat in 1912. Once again, Alekseev was sent 
to Tauride Palace to represent the Russian electoral curia of Warsaw. Here 
he was not a nationalist loner from the fringes of the empire. After 1907, 
Russian nationalists in general dominated the Duma. Within this hetero-
geneous group, delegates from the okrainy-provinces were highly over-rep-
resented. Russian nationalists from these borderland territories not on-
ly tended to be more radical with regard to their calls for discriminating 
against other nationalities and in terms of their antisemitism. They were 
66 See, e.g., Platon A. Kulakovskii, Poliaki i vopros ob avtonomii Pol’shi (St. Petersburg, 1906); Kulakovskii, 
Pol’skii vopros v proshlom i nastoiashchem, in Biblioteka Okrain Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1907); Kulakovskii, 
Russkii russkim, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1907–1913). See also Aleksandr A. Bashmakov, Pamiati Plato-
na Andreevicha Kulakovskogo (Petrograd, 1915). See also D. A. Kotsiubinskii, Russkii natsionalizm v na-
chale XX stoletiia (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), 30–37; Iu. I. Kir’ianov, Russkoe Sobranie 1900–1917 
(Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 53–54. On the Russian nationalists’ circle in Kiev, see Faith Hillis, Chil-
dren of Rus’: Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 2013), in particular chap. 7; Faith Hillis, “Making and Breaking the Russian Empire: The 
Case of Kiev’s Shul’gin Family,” in Eliten im Vielvölkerreich: Imperiale Biographien in Russland und Ös-
terreich–Ungarn (1850–1918)/Elites and Empire: Imperial Biographies in Russia and Austria–Hungary 
(1850–1918), ed. Tim Buchen and Malte Rolf (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 178–98.
67 See: Predvybornye izvestiia Russkogo obshchestva, no. 4 (September 23, 1907), 4.
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 also quite successful in placing “okrainy-topics”—like language regulations 
for the polyphonic peripheries or, generally speaking, the “national ques-
tions”—on the political agenda of the Empire writ large. In fact, individu-
als originating from these borderlands shaped the programmatic positions 
of both the moderate right and the more radical nationalists to such an ex-
tent that we can say that men of the periphery politically usurped the right 
wing of the imperial parliament in St. Petersburg.68 
In addition, activists with a background in the western provinces fig-
ured prominently in the attempts to create a unified political force within 
the divided Russian nationalist camp. Warsaw’s Russkoe obshchestvo worked 
actively in the Third Duma to establish an empire-wide Russian-nation-
al party.69 In the Fourth Duma, the united “Nationalists” even temporari-
ly surpassed the Octobrists, constituting the largest faction in the Tauride 
Palace. Since both factions were represented almost equally by politicians 
from the western regions, the Fourth Duma was not only a “duma of lack-
eys,” but a “duma of the okraina” as well.
The fact that in Russia’s political discourse, the multifaceted borderlands 
often were treated as one kind of okraina already demonstrates how radical 
activists coming from the margins of the empire successfully “provincial-
ized” the metropolitan political landscape. In fostering a collective singu-
lar of “the okraina,” they promoted the notion of a basic dualism structur-
ing imperial space. This binary model separated the okraina-regions from 
the “Russian core lands” (korennaia russkaia zemlia) and gave birth to calls 
for a consistent and standardized okraina-policy.70
While before 1900, the diversity of the peripheries, their languages, cul-
tures, and people—and thus the fragmented nature of the empire—was 
68 See Hagen, “Das Nationalitätenproblem Russlands”; Manfred Hagen, Die Entfaltung politischer Öffent-
lichkeit in Rußland 1906–1914 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1982), 227–34.
69 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 9012, kart. 114–114v (Report of the assistant of the Warsaw governor-general, Sep-
tember 5, 1907).
70 See, e.g., A. N. Druzhynin, Rossiia i ee okraina (Kiev, 1903). To some extent, this dichotomy was older 
with a plurality of borderland territories opposed to the “core of Russian statehood” (osnovnoe iadro russ-
koi gosudarstvennosti). AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 6469, kart. 77–78v (Letter of the Warsaw Governor-Gener-
al Gurko to the chief of Moscow’s municipal administration, May 1, 1893), here kart. 77ob; GARF, f. 215, 
op. 1, d. 94, l. 58 (Decrees of the Committee of Ministers, February 17, 1898).
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widely acknowledged, Russian nationalists now strove to establish a per-
ception of the borderlands as a singular larger entity in political discourse. 
In their view, the bitter fight for the “Russian cause” was the one common 
challenge in all the peripheries. It was the conflict between a small num-
ber of local Russians with the indigenous majority of the non-Russian pop-
ulations they saw as the overarching feature of such diverse regions like 
Bessarabia, the Western and Baltic provinces, Finland, and the Kingdom 
of Poland. Such dualistic concepts of imperial territories made it easy to call 
for a centralized borderland policy that would have diminished the influ-
ence of local state representatives like governor-generals.71 
Consequently, in 1912, the nationalist Duma-faction launched an 
initiative to eliminate the position of the Warsaw governor-general al-
together. This maneuver was not only driven by the mutual hostility 
between Alekseev and Skalon, but also by the nationalists’ essential con-
cept of okraina as a larger borderland territory that needed to be gov-
erned by central institutions without too many intermediate officehold-
ers on the spot.72
Along with their ability to shape the agenda, nationalist Duma-dele-
gates were a crucial political force when it came to obstructing reform proj-
ects that would have granted extended rights or participatory institutions 
to the non-Russian populations of the borderlands. The way in which the 
Council of Ministers’ scheme to introduce municipal self-government in 
the Kingdom of Poland fell apart due to the nationalists’ strict opposition 
in the Duma highlights their influence as a “spoiling factor” or destruc-
tive force. In this constellation, the St. Petersburg government could only 
71 See, e.g., Anton S. Budilovich, Vopros ob okrainakh Rossii, v sviazi s teoriei samoopredeleniia narodnostei 
i trebovaniiami gosudarstvennogo edinstva (St. Petersburg, 1906); Grigorii A. Evreinov, Natsional’nye vo-
prosy na inorodcheskikh okrainakh Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1908). On the impact of imperial biographies on 
such dualistic notions of empire, see: Malte Rolf, “Beamte in Bewegung: Zu Strukturen und Akteuren 
imperialer Herrschaft im ausgehenden Zarenreich,“ in Migrationen im späten Habsburger-Imperium, ed. 
Carl Bethke (Tübingen: TVV Verlag, 2019), 56–86.
72 See “Zakonodatel’noe predlozhenie ob uprazdnenii dol’zhnosti Varshavskogo General-Gubernatora” 
(February 29, 1912), in Prilozheniia k stenograficheskim otchetam Gosudarstvennoi Dumy. III sozyv, ses. V, 
vol. 3, no. 374 (St. Petersburg, 1912).
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promulgate reforms in the peripheries and undermine the privileges of lo-
cal Russian populations there only by executive decrees under article 87.73
All tsarist officials within the state apparatus, be they representatives 
of central or local authority, had to consider this political deadlock and its 
implications for imperial management. How much this new mode of per-
manent, institutionalized confrontation shaped the policies fostered by the 
governor-general in Warsaw still requires investigation.
Between Nationalizing and Managing the Empire:  
Tsarist Administration in the Kingdom of Poland After 1905
To clarify a crucial issue straight away: the nationalists’ attempts to remove 
Skalon from his position utterly failed. Skalon politically survived numer-
ous denunciations, intrigues orchestrated by Stolypin and his entourage, 
and the kind of impeachment launched by delegates of the Fourth Duma. 
Until his death in 1914, Skalon remained the highest tsarist representative 
on the Vistula.
Still, Skalon had to react to the challenges of a shattered alliance with 
the local Russian community. Some of his executive decrees indicate that af-
ter 1910, the “Russian cause” seemed to return to the top of the governor-
general’s agenda. Pressured by Russian nationalists, local authorities now 
re-launched policies to strengthen Russian influence in the periphery. 
First, the nationalization of the Warsaw–Vienna Railway Company in 
1912 was a bitter blow to the Polish Inteligencja because it entailed the loss 
of large number of jobs for Polish technical experts, engineers, and adminis-
trative directors. Soon tsarist authorities also called for a reduction of Cath-
olic employees in the postal and telegraph service sector. These branches 
of government were now classified as areas of strategic importance in the 
borderland region, and efforts to increase the number of staff members of 
“Russian and Orthodox decent” were considered.74
73 On the project of elective city government, see Weeks, Nation and State, 160–71.
74 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 5076, kart. 1–3v (Letter of the minister of the interior to the Warsaw governor-gen-
eral, May 21, 1914).
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To make matters worse, the bureaucracy proceeded with further limit-
ing Polish self-organization in other respects. After 1910, conflicts between 
state authorities and the Polish-run institution of voluntary fire brigades in-
tensified. Rumors circulated that the government might take over the orga-
nization, which was of tremendous symbolic significance to Polish society 
not only because it was an important association for local community-
building, but also because it was the only occupation that allowed Poles 
to wear uniforms in public spaces. Russian nationalists had long called for 
a state take-over of this last bastion of Polish symbolic sovereignty. After 
1910, this option seemed to be more realistic than ever.75
This was only a footnote in comparison to the debate revolving around 
the question of whether a separate Kholm Province should be created, and 
whether these territories should be extracted from the Kingdom of Poland.76 
The older “Kholm-question” became a heated dispute when a law intending 
the formation of an autonomous province was discussed in the State Du-
ma. In the years 1911–12, an illegal “Committee of National Mourning” in 
Warsaw organized a series of symbolic protests. All of this was in vain: with 
the support of the government in St. Petersburg and the nationalists in the 
Duma, the formation of a Kholm Province was decreed in June 1912, and 
already during this year, far reaching measures of Russification were en-
forced in the region.77
75 AGAD, PomGGW, sygn. 1212, kart. 44–45 (Letter of the chief of police to the assistant of the Warsaw 
governor-general, June 8, 1910); kart. 75–75v. See: Stanisław Wiech, “Działalność ochotniczych straży 
ogniowych w Królestwie Polskim (1864–1914): Droga do emancypacji narodowej czy sposób na rusyfika-
cję?,” in Życie jest wszędzie... Vsiudu zhizn’... Ruchy społeczne w Polsce i Rosji do II wojny światowej, ed. Anna 
Brus (Warsaw: Neriton, 2005), 277–91.
76 See Weeks, Nation and State, chap. 9.
77 See the annual reports of the chief of police in 1911 and 1912 in Raporty Warszawskich Oberpolicmajstrów 
(1892–1913), eds. Halina Kiepurska and Zbigniew Pustuła (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Osso-
lińskich, 1971), doc. 19, p. 113, and doc. 20, p. 119. AGAD, Warszawski Komitet Cenzury, sygn. 21, kart. 
512–514v (Report on the Polish press, 1911). The “Kholm-question” evoked a large compendium of publi-
cations and polemics. On the Polish side, see Liubomir Dymsha (Lubomir Dymsza), Kholmskii vopros (St. 
Petersburg, 1910); W. Reymont, Z ziemi chelmskiej: Wyrazenia i notatki (Warsaw, 1911). On the Russian 
side: Varshavskie besedy i rechi Arkhiepiskopa Nikolaia (1908–1909) (St. Petersburg, no year); Kholmskaia 
Rus’ i Poliaki, anonymous (St. Petersburg, 1907). See also Ascher, Stolypin, 320–22; Edward Chmielewski, 
The Polish Question in the Russian Duma (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), 111–37; Klaus 
Kindler, Die Cholmer Frage 1905–1918 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 1990); Kocjubinskii, Russkii natsion-
alizm, 289–91; Weeks, Nation and State, 172–92.
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Finally, the list of state activities pointing at a new emphasis on the 
“Russian cause” would be incomplete if the inauguration of the  Aleksandr 
Nevskii Cathedral in Warsaw remained unmentioned. The project itself was 
much older, dating back to the time of Gurko. Over the years and due to 
the slow pace of construction work, most of Warsaw’s inhabitants probably 
got used to this seemingly eternal building site in the center of the city. The 
opening of the cathedral in 1913 and the pompous celebrations accompany-
ing it still came as a shock. The massive crowd of Orthodox churchgoers, the 
ringing of the huge bells in the bell tower—by far the tallest building in the 
metropolis—and the monstrosity of the golden cupola that “sparkled like 
polished Cossack-boots in the sun” made it clear to everyone that Russian-
Orthodox hegemony overshadowed the old Polish capital.78
They reacted in symbolic forms of protest: for example, when in the 
same year, the opening of the third Vistula bridge was scheduled and tsar-
ist authorities planned to have an Orthodox priest bless the viaduct, Pol-
ish representatives who had been invited to the event decided to boycott it. 
Granting symbolic priority to Orthodoxy through an infrastructural proj-
ect, which, in Polish eyes, the community had paid for through a munic-
ipal tax, was unacceptable to them.79 The imperial Polish encounter again 
seemed to be overshadowed by mutual affronts and mistrust.
In overview, several legal initiatives, administrative orders and symbol-
ic events between 1910 and 1914 seem to point in the direction of a new, 
coordinated wave of discriminatory policies against the local non-Russian 
population. So, the question may be posed: was there a “national paradigm 
shift” within the state bureaucracy on the eve of World War I?
The answer to this is less clear than it might seem at first sight. No doubt, 
even the higher echelons of the tsarist administration were infiltrated with 
a degree of ethnic Russo-centrism that had been rather foreign to these mi-
78 Cited in Paszkiewicz, “Russian Orthodox Cathedral,” 69. See also: Paszkiewicz, Pod berłem Romanowów; 
Paszkiewicz, W służbie Imperium Rosyjskiego; Przeciszewski, Warszawa: Prawosławie i rosyjskie dziedzic-
two; Przygrodzki, Russians in Warsaw, 206–31; Rolf, “Aleksandr-Nevskij-Kathedrale.”
79 APW, t. 24 (WWO), sygn. 263, kart. 1–6 (Report on the social and political situation in the Kingdom, 
1913–1914, January 14, 1914), here kart. 5v.
staulinas_book.indb   100 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:27
101
What Is the “Russian Cause” and Whom Does It Serve?
lieus in earlier times. Stolypin’s style of policy making provided a role mod-
el in this respect, regardless of whether he was utilizing Russo-nationalism 
as a strategic tool in the political bargaining process or whether he was in-
deed convinced of the need to bolster Russian superiority in the empire.80
In contradiction to this, we can trace the strong reservations toward a 
“Russians first” agenda in the local halls of power. In Warsaw, with Skalon 
as the highest tsarist representative in office, we find a particular resent-
ment toward interventionist policies aimed at nationalizing the empire. 
Consider, for example, the case of the state’s takeover of the Warsaw– 
Vienna railway in 1912. Although feared by Poles, it was not actually ac-
companied by major staff changes. Even after the government seized con-
trol of the company, the amount of Catholic employees remained extreme-
ly high at almost 96 percent. Neither did Skalon push strong Russification 
measures in the postal and telegraph administration although central in-
stitutions in St. Petersburg urged him to do so. In 1914, the percentage of 
Catholic Poles working in these “strategic branches” of the state apparatus 
was still nearly 70 percent.81
On top of this, the governor-general avoided the conflict with Polish so-
ciety that any nationalization of the voluntary fire department would have 
initiated. This may have been largely due to practicality and the sheer fact 
that the state depended on the financial, infrastructural, and personal sup-
port from Polish society in organizing a fire protection and rescue system. 
But Skalon, no doubt, also refrained from escalating the issue with fragile 
political stability in the Kingdom in mind. Thus, the fire department re-
mained a Polish voluntary business until the War, despite bitter protests 
from the Russian community.
Even the “Kholm-question” spotlights the differences in political prior-
ities that existed between the local and central authorities. While Stolypin 
80 See: Geyer, “Nation und Nationalismus in Rußland,” 103–04; Alexei Miller, “The Empire and the Na-
tion in the Imagination of Russian Nationalism,” in Imperial Rule, ed. Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber 
(Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2004), 9–45; Suny and Martin, “The Empire Strikes Out” 54–55. On 
Stolypin, see Ascher, Stolypin.
81 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 5076, kart. 9 (Attachment to the letter of the minister of the interior to the War-
saw governor-general, May 21,1914).
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strongly supported the creation of a separated and Russified province, 
Skalon openly opposed it. The Governor-general most likely was motivated 
by a fundamental dissent toward all attempts to diminish his power. The 
new province would have been removed from the “Vistula land,” and thus 
from Skalon’s administration. But he was probably also aware of the  highly 
problematic implications the formation of a Kholm Province would have 
for maintaining “order” in the Kingdom. Because of this, Skalon tried to 
prevent the creation of a Kholm Province until the very end.82
Skalon’s hesitancy to transform imperial management into “Russians 
first” policies becomes most evident in the way he continued to distance 
himself from the nationalists’ milieu within the local Russian communi-
ty. While the governor-general ostentatiously granted logistic and symbolic 
patronage to dignified institutions like the Russian Charity Society (Russ-
koe blagotvoritel’noe obshchestvo), he avoided any form of contact with na-
tionalists’ organizations like the Russian Society or the Russian Assembly 
in Warsaw (Russkoe sobranie v Varshave). During the Duma elections of 
1912, Skalon again openly favored the Octobrists’ candidate—in vain.83
On the other side, Skalon continued to offer concessions, albeit limited, 
to Polish society after 1910. He was openly in favor of introducing munic-
ipal self-government to the Kingdom of Poland; he enabled a widespread 
network of privately run Polish schools; and he ceded space to a very vivid 
public discussion on “cultural autonomy” for the Polish provinces.84 In the 
heady days of “symbolic policies,”85 it was often symbolic actions that mat-
82 See Kindler, Die Cholmer Frage, 170–76. On the general skepticism of imperial officials toward redrawing 
of district borders based on ethnic criteria, see: Darius Staliunas, “Territorialising Ethnicity in the Rus-
sian Empire? The Case of the Augustav/Suvalki Province,” Ab Imperio, no. 3 (2011): 145–66; Edward C. 
Thaden, “The Russian Government,” in Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914, ed. 
Edward C. Thaden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 15–110, here, 65.
83 On the close ties between the Russian Charity Society and the Warsaw governor-general, see Przygrodzki, 
Russians in Warsaw, 113–32.
84 See: Edmund Staszyński, Polityka oświatowa caratu w Królestwie Polskim: Od powstania styczniowego do I 
wojny światowej (Warsaw, 1968), 207–209 and 238–40.
85 On the crucial importance of such politics of symbols, see Murray J. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967). See also Laurence Cole and Daniel L. Unowsky, eds., The Lim-
its of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Mon-
archy, (Oxford: Berghahn, 2009); Andreas Dörner, Politischer Mythos und symbolische Politik. Sinnstif-
tung durch symbolische Formen am Beispiel des Hermannsmythos (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995); 
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tered most: thus, in his efforts to maintain a certain modus vivendi, he sup-
ported the local initiative to erect a monument in honor of Frédéric Chopin 
in Warsaw. In 1912, the governor-general approved the location for the pro-
jected statue. The terrain chosen was highly significant: the monument was 
supposed to be unveiled in Ujazdowski park, precisely the spot Skalon de-
nied to the Russian community for building a “Russian House.” No won-
der that Russians from Warsaw again sent complaints to the minister of the 
interior, lamenting “with great bitterness” that they were witnessing the lo-
cal administration giving way to Polish “national requests” (natsional’noe 
domogatel’stvo) by providing “state territory” for the purpose of “elevating a 
Polish national composer.”86
It is no pure coincidence that the proposal of the Duma’s nationalist 
faction to eliminate the governor-general-position in the Kingdom dates 
to this very year. Besides their institutional reasoning, the initiative also 
sought to discredit Skalon personally, as well as his style of imperial man-
agement. Probably never before had a tsarist official and Polish society 
been brothers-in-arms as much as during these days. Confronted with the 
nationalists’ attacks on the special legal and administrative status of the 
Kingdom, Poles unanimously opposed this proposal. By 1912, the much-
accursed institution of a governor-general had turned into an agency that 
guaranteed the distinctiveness of the Kingdom and its symbolic and ad-
Gerhard Göhler, “Symbolische Politik – Symbolische Praxis: Zum Symbolverständnis in der deutschen 
Politikwissenschaft,” in Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?, ed. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger (Ber-
lin: Duncker & Humblot 2005), 57–70; Manfred Hettling and Paul Nolte, eds., Bürgerliche Feste: Sym-
bolische Formen politischen Handels im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993); 
Herfried Münkler, “Die Visibilität der Macht und die Strategien der Machtvisualisierung,” in Macht der 
Öffentlichkeit – Öffentlichkeit der Macht, ed. Gerhard Göhler (Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1995), 213–30; George L. Mosse, Nationalisierung der Massen. Politische Symbolik und Massenbewegun-
gen von den Befreiungskriegen bis zum Dritten Reich (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1993); Jürgen Osterham-
mel, “Symbolpolitik und imperiale Integration: Das britische Empire im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” in Die 
Wirklichkeit der Symbole: Grundlagen der Kommunikation in historischen und gegenwärtigen Gesellschaf-
ten, ed. Rudolf Schlögl, Bernhard Giesen, and Jürgen Osterhammel (Konstanz: UVK Univ-Verlag, 2004), 
395–421; Rüdiger Voigt, “Mythen, Rituale und Symbole in der Politik,” in Symbole und Rituale des Politi-
schen: Ost- und Westeuropa im Vergleich, ed. Andreas Pribersky and Berthold Unfried (Frankfurt/Main: 
Peter Lang, 1999), 55–72.
86 AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 7031, kart. 38–39 (Letter of the minister of the interior to the Warsaw governor-
general, June 13, 1912).
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ministrative distance to inner-Russia. Maintaining the institutional status 
quo was now in the interest of most Polish opinion leaders, and not those of 
the local Russian community.87
* * *
All the incidents mentioned above show that, with regard to the local state 
authorities in the Western provinces, we can hardly identify a paradigm shift 
around 1910. Even in the final years before the First World War, the gover-
nor-general stayed faithful to the idea of imperial policies based on moder-
ate reconciliation with Polish society. Nationalism aiming at the creation of 
an imperial nation and granting local Russians further privileges did not be-
come the political policy line of his administration. In fact, the escalating 
radicalism of some members of the Russian community was triggered pre-
cisely by the official’s reluctance to embrace nationalizing strategies.
How can we explain this caution and, in come cases, even rejection of 
such claims? Skalon’s Baltic German roots might help us understand why 
he obstructed nationalizing policies. He was certainly aware of the fact that 
the Great Russian nationalist vision of the empire left little room for non-
Russian officials. Nationalist endeavors threatened the pillars of the estab-
lished multi-ethnic bureaucracy, of which Skalon was representative.88
But he also saw that in the medium and long term, nationalist policies 
would destabilize the multi-ethnic empire, particularly on the periphery. 
As a representative of the highest and most elite ranks of a state bureaucra-
cy that was ethnically quite heterogeneous, Skalon advocated a different 
form of imperial governance. He promoted a political order that rested on 
strict social and estate hierarchies, but at same time built on dynastic loy-
87 See the memories of Stanisław Bukowiecki, published under the pseudonym Drogoslav: Rosja w Polsce 
(Warsaw, 1914), 29–30. For more detail, see Kindler, Die Cholmer Frage 1905–1918, 170–76.
88 For a very similar perspective, see, e.g., Gustav Emil Mannerheim‘s views on the empire’s “national ques-
tion.” See Bradley D. Woodworth, “The Imperial Career of Gustaf Mannerheim. Mobility and Identity of 
a Non-Russian within the Russian Empire,” in Eliten im Vielvölkerreich: Imperiale Biographien in Russ-
land und Österreich–Ungarn (1850–1918)/Elites and Empire: Imperial Biographies in Russia and Austria–
Hungary (1850–1918), ed. Tim Buchen and Malte Rolf (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 135–54.
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alty that embraced all ethnic and religious groups in the empire. From his 
standpoint, nationalist agitators posed not only a threat to peace and sta-
bility in the borderlands, where ethnic Russians constituted just a small mi-
nority. They were also a danger to the fundamental estate-based status quo 
of an empire where, according to the 1897 census, Russian was the mother 
tongue of only 53 percent of the noble elite.89 
Like many other higher state officials, Skalon was guided by estate-ori-
entated concepts of social order. In conservative institutions like the emper-
or’s court, the Senate or the upper echelons of the state administration, no-
blemen maintained a corporative loyalty over ethnic–national frictions. It 
is not surprising that in such socially exclusive circles, a skepticism toward 
the “plebeian” elements of mass politics and the democratic implications of 
nationalistic demagogy was widespread.90 Even in post-revolutionary times, 
Skalon and other higher officials tried to defend the established arrange-
ments of an estate-based monarchy built on the supranational idea of dynas-
tic loyalty, which was much more socially biased than exclusive in an ethnic 
sense. Furthermore, they accepted the structural principles of a composite 
monarchy that allowed a large variety of regional “peculiarities” in legal and 
administrative terms. In this perspective, a single okraina policy propagated 
by some nationalists not only seemed simplistic; it also neglected the histor-
ically rooted distinctiveness of each province, which no higher official dared 
to question. Skalon’s persistent emphasis on the special conditions of the 
Kingdom was not only a way of securing his own privileged position as gov-
ernor-general. It rested on the tradition of managing a composite monarchy 
in which all subunits of the empire were unique. Interventionist nationaliz-
ing strategies were not a part of this long-established model of imperial rule.
89 See Jörg Baberowski, “Auf der Suche nach Eindeutigkeit: Kolonialismus und zivilisatorische Mission im 
Zarenreich und der Sowjetunion,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 47, no. 3 (1999): 482–503, here, 
488.
90 See also Geyer, “Nation und Nationalismus in Rußland,” 103–104; Kappeler, “The Ambiguities of Russi-
fication,” 293–95; Geoffrey Hosking, Russland: Nation und Imperium 1552–1917 (Berlin: Siedler, 2000), 
405–406; Suny and Martin, “The Empire Strikes Out,” 55; Raphael Utz, Rußlands unbrauchbare Ver-
gangenheit: Nationalismus und Außenpolitik im Zarenreich (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2008), 257–58; 
Weeks, Nation and State, 194–98.
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In sum, the Warsaw governor-general refused to be a tool for national-
ist agitators. The fact that the tsar kept him in office until his death in 1914 
shows that Skalon’s notion of imperial policy found support not only along 
the Vistula, but in the court in St. Petersburg as well. Facing the nation-
alists’ narrow sense of the “Russian cause” being promoted among ethnic 
Russians, it is hardly astonishing that Skalon refrained from this leitmo-
tif after 1905. A slogan that used to be equated with imperial-Russian state-
hood and the tsar’s mission in the peripheries now had been opened to the 
interpretation offered by opinion leaders on the nationalist right. On the 
eve of the Great War, the old semantic consensus between imperial official-
dom and the Russian community in the borderlands evaporated.
 “Splendid Isolation”? On Future Perspectives of Imperial Management  
in the Kingdom of Poland
The conflicts analyzed above demonstrate the twofold isolation that the 
higher state bureaucracy faced in the periphery of the late tsarist empire. In 
the Vistula lands, the highest representatives of the government were seen 
as foreign, and not only by the indigenous, Polish and Jewish population 
that went about molding their own public sphere after 1905. State authori-
ties became equally alienated from the local Russian community, which in-
creasingly questioned the multi-ethnic nature of the empire. Paired with 
fatalism about any possibility of progress given the continuing local crisis, 
this double isolation frustrated many officials.91
Imperial management at the time of the Fundamental Laws and the ex-
pansion of civil rights was difficult business. After 1906, officials only slow-
ly got used to the formation of autonomous public forums, but they could 
hardly ignore the blossoming political landscape.92 In the Kingdom of Po-
91 APW, t. 24 (WWO), sygn. 263, kart. 1–6 (Report on the social and political situation in the Kingdom, 
1913–1914, January 14, 1914).
92 In 1907, Stolypin and Skalon—while stripping the Russian electoral curia of “unreliable” voters—communi-
cated frankly about the “ills” of elections because their outcome was not predictable, but rather a “matter of 
chance.” AGAD, KGGW, sygn. 9012, kart. 10–12v (Letter from Stolypin to Skalon, July 17, 1907); kart. 13–15v 
(Letter of Skalon to Stolypin, July 24, 1907); kart. 101 (Telegram of Stolypin to Skalon, September 13, 1907).
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land, they were confronted with the parallel existence of governmental and 
social spheres.93 State authorities were not able or willing to overcome their 
isolation and establish solid grounds for intensified collaboration with the 
indigenous population. Incidents of cooperation with representatives of 
Polish society were little more than situational coincidences. This limited 
the potential of an imperial management that fostered policies that would 
have had a deeper impact on the local society, a limitation of which some 
officials were quite aware.94 In times of rapid modernization and social 
transformation, state authority without such grounding remained a frag-
ile endeavor. The administration’s isolation was paralyzing rather than em-
powering.
From the perspective of the periphery, tsarist officials in the Kingdom 
of Poland did not opt for a closer alliance with the local Russian commu-
nity. Active “imperial nation”-building did not advance to the top of the 
agenda of the Warsaw governor-general’s management strategies. Obvious-
ly, Skalon was aware that this would only have been meager compensation 
for the administration’s isolation, and that it would have hardly counterbal-
anced the loss of a certain cooperativeness among Poles. The local state bu-
reaucracy, thus, refrained from interventionist nationalizing policies, and 
the coexistence of the imperial government and Russian nationalists in the 
Kingdom of Poland was strained by numerous tensions and confrontations.
In overview, it seems as if during the final years before the war, the high-
est representatives of the government had no long-term vision of the future 
of the empire, beyond simply trying to maneuver through the current trou-
bles. Tsarist authorities retreated to core areas of governance, mainly focus-
ing on the enforcement of “peace and order” in the public sphere while, at 
93 This is well demonstrated by the parallel existence of educational institutions after 1906, with (Russian) 
state-run schools on one side and Polish private ones on the other. See Blobaum, Rewolucja, chap. 5; Rolf, 
Imperiale Herrschaft im Weichselland, chap. 13. Another example is the Polish parallel public sphere: in 
1913, Warsaw’s distribution network of prints alone counted more than forty bookstores, thirteen librar-
ies, and fourteen shops for periodicals. AGAD, Warszawski Komitet Cenzury, sygn. 29, kart. 5–22 (List 
of bookstores and libraries in Warsaw, 1913).
94 APW, t. 24 (WWO), sygn. 263, kart. 1–6 (Report on the social and political situation in the Kingdom, 
1913–1914, January 14, 1914), here kart. 5v.
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the same time, enabling the advancement of social and cultural life in the 
Kingdom. Protecting the Empire in these provinces followed the guiding 
principle of border security through military means and the prevention of 
any form of domestic unrest. It was a reactive and even passive trait that 
characterized imperial rule in the Kingdom on the eve of the war.95
By now, the Kingdom had lost its experimental status for empire-wide 
“best practices” of imperial management it had been assigned following the 
January Uprising of 1863–64.96 After 1906, it turned into a trouble spot, 
marred by instability and gridlock, with little hope of improvement. While 
the unquestioned military suzerainty of Russia in its borderlands may have 
instilled a notion of “eternalness” of imperial power in the Kingdom, tsar-
ist authorities still had to face the failure of their original ambitions to fur-
ther integrate the Kingdom into the empire and to overcome the region’s 
fundamental foreignness. It had been one of the key features of the Great 
Reforms of Alexander II to surpass the dysfunctional patchwork of prov-
inces with multifold legal and administrative subsystems, and thus, to forge 
a composite monarchy into a unified, homogenous empire.97 In the case of 
the Kingdom of Poland, this approach had reached a dead end. Imperial 
management put into practice after 1906 rather contributed to the persis-
tence of the distinctiveness of these provinces.
Opinion leaders within the local Russian community in the Kingdom 
constantly criticized the authorities’ lack of zeal for fostering nationalizing 
policies and bolstering the “imperial nation.” Confronted with the admin-
95 See also Weeks, Nation and State, 5–8 and 193–98.
96 I have argued elsewhere that St. Petersburg’s decisions to impose some of the administrative principles of 
inner Russia on the Polish provinces in the aftermath of 1863–64 can also be seen as a test for homogeniz-
ing the imperial bureaucracy in the course of the Great Reforms, and thus as an experiment of intensified 
state building in the empire’s peripheries. See Rolf, “Russifizierung, Depolonisierung oder innerer Staat-
saufbau?”; see also Hannes Grandits, Pieter Judson, and Malte Rolf, “Towards a New Quality of State-
hood: Bureaucratization and State-Building in Empires and Nation States Before 1914,” in The Jena Histo-
ry of Twentieth-Century Central and Eastern Europe, vol. 2: Statehood, ed. Sabina Ferhadbegovic, Joachim 
von Puttkamer, and Włodzimierz Borodziej (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
97 See W. Bruce Lincoln, The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial 
Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1990), 36–60; Grandits, Judson, and Rolf, “Towards 
a New Quality of Statehood: Bureaucratization and State–Building in Empires and Nation States before 
1914.”
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istration’s reservations toward such an agenda, nationalists even radicalized 
their “Russians first” demands and further undermined the fragile founda-
tion of the multiethnic empire. In this sense, the continuous tensions in the 
Kingdom of Poland had a severe impact on the political and mental land-
scape of the Russian Empire as a whole. Together with other peripheries, 
the Kingdom had become a “breeding ground” of nationalist radicalization 
and claims of Russian superiority. Russian nationalists from the fringes of 
the empire developed extreme apartheid policies that discriminated against 
the indigenous populations and, thus, contributed greatly to the overall cri-
sis of the borderlands and the late empire as a whole. Contemporaries had 
already identified such a “feedback loop” between Poland and Russia.98 In 
the process of “provincializing the center,” the erosion of imperial rule in 
the okraina territories in the long run facilitated the demise of the authori-
ty of the monarchy in the capital itself.
Although the future prospects for the empire on the eve of World War I 
were grim, it would still be misleading to rate the implosion of the fragile 
imperial system as inevitable. The Russian Empire had proven before that it 
was able to overcome severe crises—for example, during and after the Rev-
olution of 1905—and that it was able to adjust to new circumstances. It is 
worth stating that in 1914, the authorities’ police and military control over 
the Kingdom was not the least in doubt. The end of St. Petersburg’s long-
lasting rule over the Polish provinces came not from within, but was en-
forced from the outside. Only with the Russian military defeat in August 
1915 and the occupation of Warsaw by German troops, had the “Russian 
cause” on the Vistula become, in fact, a “dying cause.”99
98 Politicheskie itogi: Russkaia politika v Pol’she; Ocherk Varshavskogo publitsista (Perevod s pol’skogo), pub-
lished anonymously (Leipzig, 1896), 12. The authors also pointed out the danger that the Kingdom might 
turn into a negative role model for the empire because it was presented as an “incubator of arbitrariness” 
(rassadnik proizvola) that would eventually “infect” the imperial bureaucracy as a whole. See p. 14.
99 GARF, f. 215, op. 1, d. 156, l. 27 (Minister of the Interior on an anonymous letter, July 26, 1908). After 
reestablishing independence, Poles quickly eliminated some of the most visible remains of the “Russian 
cause.” Inter alia, they demolished the Aleksandr Nevskii Cathedral in Warsaw. See Werner Benecke, 
“Zur Lage der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche in der Zweiten Polnischen Republik 1918–1939,” in Religi-
on im Nationalstaat zwischen den Weltkriegen 1918–1939. Polen—Tschechoslowakei—Ungarn—Rumäni-
en, ed. Hans-Christian Maner and Martin Schulze Wessel, 123–44 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2002), 125–
26; Rolf, “Aleksandr-Nevskij-Kathedrale,” 188–89.
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Interconfessional Rivalry in Lithuania  
after the Decree of Tolerance
V i l m a  Ž a l t a u s k a i t ė
Emperor Alexander II visited Vil’na on July 13, 1867. Among the representa-
tives from all the estates that gathered to welcome him were peasants who had 
recently converted from Catholicism to Orthodoxy. The emperor stressed 
when speaking to them that “They would not be able to revert to their earlier 
faith, and I am pleased to see them as Orthodox believers” (my italics).1 These 
words were printed and displayed at all volost’-self-governments (volostnoe 
pravlenie) in the Minsk province, so they would be known to anyone consid-
ering reverting to Catholicism.2 The mass distribution of the emperor’s words 
shows that reversion was indeed a likely problem, and that the involvement 
of an authority figure such as the emperor was necessary to solve it. Leaving 
the Orthodox Church was not an option according to the laws of the Russian 
Empire until the Decree of Tolerance (April 17, 1905) was proclaimed across 
the whole empire, including the Northwest region (NWR), where there were 
recent converts to Orthodoxy. The mass conversion of Catholic peasants to 
the Orthodox faith between 1863 and 1867 was part of the government’s pol-
icy of “de-Polonozation.”3 One of its outcomes was that between 1863 and 
  This research was supported by the Research Council of Lithuania (No S-LJB-17-3).
1  We have no data to suggest that similar notices were displayed in the Vil’na, Grodna, or Kovna provinces. 
Perhaps this kind of measure was applied because the Minsk province had the greatest number of new Or-
thodox believers (35,569). Statistical data from: Darius Staliūnas, Making Russians: Meaning and Practice 
of Russification in Lithuania and Belarus after 1863 (Amsterdam; New York, NY: Rodopi, 2007), 133.
2  Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (Russian State Historical Archives, RGIA), f. 821, op. 
125, d. 267, l. 28, 34. 
3  For more details, see Staliūnas, Making Russians, 131–80.
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1867 in the so-called Lithuanian provinces, which are the focus of this chap-
ter, there were 18,775 new Orthodox believers in Vil’na province, 466 in Kov-
na province, and 16,267 in Grodna province.4 
In the nineteenth century, the government and the Orthodox Church 
in the NWR were forced to deal with the category of “recalcitrants” (upor-
stvuiushchie), those who had formally converted to Orthodoxy but did not 
consider themselves as Orthodox believers.5 There were instances of legal 
and illegal efforts to return to their previous faith, usually among Roman 
Catholics. Personal and collective requests were written and submitted, 
couples were married, and children continued to be baptized in accordance 
with Catholic rites.6 The government resolved this problem through the use 
of repressive measures and increased control, transferring all the blame to 
the Catholic Church and its clergy. The registration of new Orthodox be-
lievers was enforced and threats were made to close down churches where 
the clergy provided religious services to nominal Orthodox believers; as a 
result, these clerics faced criminal and administrative liability.7 
These kinds of measures were sufficient to control the situation: there 
were only a few mass efforts to leave the Orthodox Church and return to 
the former faith. For example, between 1881 and 1894, only 139 person-
4  Ibid., 133. 
5  There were people like this among the Uniates as well because this Church was absorbed by the Orthodox 
Church in the Western Region in 1839; the Kingdom of Poland followed suit in 1875. 
6  Statistics from the period 1881–1894 about submitted requests to return to Catholicism: RGIA, f. 821, op. 
125, d. 267, l. 4–5. Orthodox Church hierarchs had already drawn attention to the actions of the Catho-
lic clergy against new Orthodox believers in 1881–82; the issue of restricting Catholic “propaganda” was 
discussed for an entire decade in the Vil’na province. See Lietuvos valstybės istorijos archyvas (Lithua-
nian State Historical Archives; LVIA), f. 378, BS, ap. 1882, b. 230 (Po otzyvu Arkhiepiskopa Litovskogo 
i Vilens kogo s zapiskoiu o dopuskaemykh otstupleniiakh ot ustanovlennogo v SZK poriadka).
7  Report from the Vil’na Roman Catholic Consistory dated December 3, 1899 to the Bishop of Vil’na (it in-
dicates that stricter regulations were enforced in 1888 for recording converts to the Orthodox Church in 
registries and other social status documents; Orthodox Church initiatives were indicated as well), LVIA, 
f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2482, l. 6–7; 9–10. When secular and Orthodox Church authorities investigated a case in 
1887 in which the peasant Ivan Martsinchik sought to revert to Catholicism, it was found that he had re-
ceived religious rites from the Dambravas parish priest Fr. Zimnocha. Officials suggested warning that if 
this situation continued, his church would be closed. The Vil’na governor-general informed the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, which supported the recommendation. The priest was informed by an official from the 
Vil’na diocese. Report from the Vil’na governor-general to the Vil’na diocese official, March 19, 1888; re-
port from the Vil’na diocese official to the Dambravas parish priest Fr. Zimnocha, March 22, 1888, LVIA, 
f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2482, l. 1–2.
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al requests and 6 collective requests were submitted from the Vil’na and 
Grodna provinces.8 However, the situation changed fundamentally in 1905 
with the declaration of the Decree of Tolerance, in which the first article in-
dicated that individuals could leave the Orthodox Church without facing 
any legal repercussions. The “ruling” (gospodstvuiushchaia) status of the Or-
thodox Church was maintained even after the announcement of the decree, 
but nevertheless, the opportunity to legally leave the Orthodox Church was 
a radical innovation in the Russian Empire. 
The aim of this study is to analyze the outcomes of the declaration of 
the Decree of Tolerance (April 17, 1905) on the Orthodox and Catho-
lic Churches in the so-called Lithuanian provinces of Kovna, Vil’na, and 
Grodna, all of which were part of the NWR. Specifically, this essay asks 
the following questions: What was the social position of Churches in com-
munities and what were the roles of Churches as institutions? How did 
these change over time? And what were the differences and similarities 
in the Lithuanian dioceses/provinces above? I shall also try to ascertain 
how the imperial government participated in these processes, and wheth-
er the burgeoning nationalisms of non-dominant ethnic groups influenced 
interconfessional relations. I intend to determine the innovations (and/
or continuity) in government policy after 1905 as it compares to the poli-
cies regarding the Catholic Church after the uprising of 1863–64. In this 
study, I argue that the reversion from Orthodoxy that commenced after 
the announcement of the decree of April 17, 1905 demonstrated the low 
social prestige of the Orthodox Church in these specific provinces in the 
NWR at the time. This meant that the government’s “de-Polonization” 
measures implemented after the uprising of 1863–64 were not only ineffec-
tive; they were also a stimulus for interconfessional tension that went on 
until 1904, and even intensified after the Decree of Tolerance. This inter-
8  Statistics from 1881–1894 about submitted requests to return to Catholicism, RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 267, 
l. 4–5. Mikhail Dolbilov has analyzed the Minsk governor’s initiative concerning the possible return of the 
peasants of Lagoshin to Catholicism in 1878–79. The initiative was not successful. M. Dolbilov, Russkii 
krai, chuzhaia vera: etnokonfessional`naia politika imperii v Litve i Belorusii pri Aleksandre II (Moscow: 
Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010), 702–706. 
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confessional tension can be understood, to a certain extent, as an outcome 
of the decree. The tension that arose between the Orthodox and Catholic 
Churches after the announcement of the Decree of Tolerance has to be ex-
plained by taking into consideration the socio-cultural norms that func-
tioned in society for a long period of time, the traditions of each Church, 
and the political reforms underway (the Decree of Tolerance was followed 
by the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, the Temporary Provisions of Societ-
ies and Unions issued on March 4, 1906, and elections to the State  Duma). 
I would like to stress that political reforms are not the focus of my research, 
and due to the scope of my study and my research questions, they will not 
be discussed. However, these simultaneous developments were also impor-
tant for understanding interconfessional relations, and they  appeared in 
the same context. 
In this study, Lithuania is understood as part of the NWR, and specifi-
cally the Kovna, Vil’na, and Grodna provinces. The imperial government’s 
policies in Lithuania in the second half of the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries differed significantly from those implemented in the Be-
lorussian provinces of Minsk, Mogilev, and Vitebsk, which were consid-
ered more politically reliable.9 These provinces made up the Lithuanian 
and Vil’na Orthodox diocese. In 1900, separate Grodna and Brest dioces-
es were formed from the former Grodna province. In terms of the Catho-
lic Church, the Vil’na and Grodna provinces constituted the Vil’na diocese. 
Kovna (and Kurland) province made up the Samogitian (Tel’shi) diocese.10 
It is important to note that the imperial administrative space correlated 
rather closely with the administrative spaces of both Churches. Meanwhile, 
the other provinces in the NWR, Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk, were part 
of the Catholic Church’s Mogilev archdiocese; they did not have a separate 
  9 Zita Medišauskienė, “Lietuvos samprata: tarp istorijos ir etnografijos,” in Lietuvos istorija: Devynioliktas 
amžius; visuomenė ir valdžia, vol. 8, part 1, ed. Tamara Bairašauskaitė, Zita Medišauskienė, and Rimantas 
Miknys (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 2011), 52.
10 The double name of the Tel’shi or Samogitian diocese was in use starting in the beginning of the 1840s, and 
it was this form of the name that was recorded in 1847 in the agreement between Russia and the Holy See. 
The government moved the center of the diocese from Varniai to the provincial center of Kovna in 1865. 
However, the diocese’s name remained the same. 
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Church administration, and their separate jurisdictions were directly sub-
ordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. So, in terms of both the gov-
ernment and the Church, they were different from the other NWR prov-
inces. The confessional structure of the mentioned NWR provinces was 
not uniform with regard to the numbers of Orthodox and Catholic believ-
ers. Catholics dominated in Kovna province (1,214,603 believers in total 
as of January 1, 1904, and 45,906 Orthodox faithful in 1905). Almost half 
the Orthodox believers in Kovna province lived in the northern part of the 
Novoaleksandrovsk (Zarasai) district, which bordered Vil’na province. In 
Vil’na, there were 419,770 Orthodox believers (according to 1902 data), and 
984,676 Catholics. In Grodna province, there were 920,277 Orthodox be-
lievers (according to 1905 data), and 403,362 Catholics (1905).11 The net-
work of Orthodox parishes was much denser, which meant that parishes 
were smaller and there was more clergy compared to the Catholic Church.12 
Both the Orthodox and Catholic parish networks overlapped, so neither of 
these Christian communities was isolated. 
The Beginning of (In)tolerance in the NWR 
The announcement of the Decree of Tolerance meant that it was possible to 
choose one’s faith freely: it became possible to leave the Orthodox Church, 
join another Church, and profess another faith. Paul W. Werth argues 
that the government foresaw the mass conversion of nominal Orthodox 
believers to Catholicism.13 However, the conversion process in the NWR 
took place on a much larger scale than the local government or Orthodox 
Church expected. It was as if everything that happened in the NWR after 
the announcement of the Decree of Tolerance caught the government and 
the Orthodox Church completely off guard. For example, even before the 
11 Eighty-three Catholic parishes, 350 Orthodox parishes. 
12 Kovna province: 300 Catholic parishes, 37 [45] Orthodox parishes; Vil’na province: 154 Catholic  parishes, 
167 [171] Orthodox parishes; Grodna province: 83 Catholic parishes, 350 Orthodox parishes.
13 Paul W. Werth, Pravoslavie, inoslavie, inoverie: ocherki po istorii religioznogo raznoobrazia Rossiiskoi impe-
rii (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2012), 50. 
staulinas_book.indb   117 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:28
V i l m a  Ž a l t a u s k a i t ė
118
Decree of Tolerance, when Vil’na governor-general Freze recommended a 
positive solution to the issue of “recalcitrants,” that is, to allow them to pro-
fess the Catholic faith, he did not envisage mass conversion to Catholicism 
because he believed that the government’s economic measures and the ac-
tivities of the Orthodox clergy and schools would be effective in retaining 
believers.14 In a report written on April 8, 1905 about the situation in the 
diocese in 1904 (just before the announcement of the Decree of Tolerance), 
Nikanor, the Orthodox Archbishop of Grodna and Brest, stated that the 
“recalcitrants” living in the Slonim, Volkovysk, and Sokulka districts were 
not dangerous; they were elderly, they did not attract Orthodox believers 
to their side, and they “gave no grounds to fear the fate of Orthodoxy in 
the diocese.”15 A member of the clergy in the Bystritsa Orthodox parish in 
the deanery of Shumsk in the Vil’na district admitted that uporstvuiushchie 
made up the majority in the parish of almost 1,500 believers, but he saw no 
danger that the parish would disappear as a result.16 In July 1905, one of the 
Vil’na governor-general’s officials who analyzed the situation stated that in 
the Orthodox parish, which used to number 2,000, only thirty to forty be-
lievers remained.17 
Even after taking the obvious statistical inaccuracies into account, the 
data shows clearly that the local government and the Orthodox Church did 
not fully grasp how important the need to change confessions—that is, to 
leave the Orthodox Church—was. Imperial officials and Orthodox clergy 
appeared to have forgotten that the Orthodox Church had grown so much 
in the NWR not as a result of the Church’s successful missionary activi-
ties, but due to the imperial government’s confessional political projects, 
14 Report from the Vil’na governor-general Aleksandr Freze to the minister of internal affairs, February 23, 
1905, RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 268, l. 4.
15 Report about the situation in the Grodna and Brest diocese in 1904, April 8, 1905, RGIA, f. 796, op. 442, 
d. 2021, l. 41–42.
16 According to data from the cleric Lev Tyminskii, in 1903 the parish had 1,580 parishioners. They includ-
ed 165 uporstvuiushchie. Data from the Shumsk deanery’s cleric Lev Tyminskii about the Bystritsa church, 
June 19, 1904, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1904, b. 272, l. 466–68. In 1904, it is said that there were 1,604 parish-
ioners. Statistics about the growth of the Bystritsa Orthodox parish, June 22, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 
1904, b. 272, l. 381. 
17 Report by Pugavko to the Vil’na governor, July 17, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1905, b. 404, l. 47.
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namely, the abolition of the Uniate Church, and the mass forced conver-
sion of the peasantry to Orthodoxy. Without these government-initiated 
measures, the growth of the Orthodox Church was very slow: the Ortho-
dox community in the Lithuanian and Vil’na dioceses recorded only a few 
hundred conversions from Catholicism to Orthodoxy annually; for exam-
ple, in 1904, there were 152 such conversions.18
After the announcement of the decree of April 17, 1905, certain commu-
nities of believers in the NWR began to change. In some, the number of be-
lievers started to rise (Catholics), while in others it fell (Orthodox). Werth 
has conducted the most thorough research on how this process was regulat-
ed, the practices associated with changing one’s confession in the Vil’na and 
Samogitian (Tel’shi) dioceses, and the obstructions to opportunities to actu-
ally utilize the religious freedom outlined in the Decree.19 His analysis shows 
that the legal regulations for changing confession were not prepared at the 
same time as the announcement of the decree; he also presents the historical 
development of the attitudes of the government and the Orthodox Church 
toward former Uniates and so-called “recalcitrants” up to the announcement 
of the decree. In addition, Werth draws attention to the fact that the major-
ity of conversions to Catholicism (74 percent) were in 1905. This means that 
they took place immediately after the announcement of the decree. 
Aleksandr Bendin has carried out probably the most comprehensive re-
search on interconfessional relations in the NWR, and thus also conver-
sions after the Decree of Tolerance.20 His study stands out from others in 
the field in that he uncritically adopts the rhetoric and social stereotypes of 
contemporary sources (and also, in some cases, the broad anti-Catholic nar-
rative typical of the government and officials dating from the context of the 
18 Annual report about the situation in the Lithuanian diocese in 1905, RGIA, f. 796, op. 442, d. 2096, l. 37.
19 Paul W. Werth, The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Paul W. Werth, “Trudnyi put̀  k katolitsizmu: Veroispoved-
naia prinadlezhnost’ i grazhdanskoe sostoianie posle 1905 goda,” Lietuvių katalikų mokslo akademijos 
metraštis 26 (2005): 447–74.
20 Aleksandr Bendin, Problemy veroterpimosti v Severo-Zapadnom krae Rossiiskoi imperii (1863–1914) 
(Minsk: BGU, 2010); Aleksandr Bendin, “Religioznye konflikty v Belorussii i Litve,” Chatverty mizhn-
arodny kangres dasledchykau Belarrusi. Pratsounyia materialy 4 (2015): 106–10. 
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de-Polonization policy), and analyzes the confession-changing process with-
in the context of the “Catholic Church’s propaganda,” Catholic “fanaticism,” 
and the actions of the “clever yet cunning” Catholic Bishop of Vil’na, Edward 
von der Ropp, toward the tsarist government. Bendin’s work creates an ag-
gressive image of the Catholic Church (the clergy and believers) after the an-
nouncement of the Decree of Tolerance. He claims that until then, “good 
neighborly relations had been established,” while after the decree, they trans-
formed along the lines of “intolerance,” which suddenly changed the character 
of interconfessional relations.21 Bendin also mentions “extremist” propagan-
da, arguing that “religious and ethnic extremism took on especially danger-
ous social forms” that spread throughout Lithuania’s Orthodox dioceses.22 
Even though his research covers the period from 1863 to 1914, he does 
not seem to realize the outcomes of the government’s “de-Polonization” 
policy actions on the position of the Catholic Church after the announce-
ment of the Decree of Tolerance, nor does he take into account the cultur-
al norms in interconfessional and social relations at the time. In his study, 
confessional changes are the outcome of “militant Catholicism,” thus elim-
inating any other possible reasons for such conversions, including a person’s 
individual right to choose. In this way, he remains stuck in the rhetorical 
narrative of his sources, which often discuss the dark (nevezhestvennaia) 
masses under the sway of an authority figure (the government or a member 
of the clergy). He does not delve deeper into expressions of religiosity, the 
nature of religious life, changes to the Catholic Church’s social education, 
the Christian tradition of the Western and Eastern Churches. 
In this study, I present a critical assessment of Bendin’s position that the 
confession-changing process, which began after the announcement of the 
Decree of Tolerance, should be interpreted as Catholic religious extrem-
ism that produced a wave of Catholic violence that swept through Ortho-
dox dioceses. He is correct in saying that many in these diocese converted 
to Catholicism: the Orthodox dioceses in the Lithuanian, Vil’na, Grodna, 
21 Bendin, Problemy veroterpimosti, 273–74.
22 Ibid., 322; 328–29.
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and Brest provinces lost over 20,000 faithful in 1905 alone (in Vil’na prov-
ince 16,286, in Grodna province 3,625, and in Kovna province, 900 con-
verted to Catholicism).23 These are indeed enormous figures, but the need 
to change confession and return to Catholicism was alive and well in the 
nineteenth century as well, but the difference was that it was legally impos-
sible to do so. I have no doubt that there were cases of psychological coer-
cion and physical violence in the conversion process, but there is no proof 
that this happened in the majority of cases. What should also be consid-
ered is the context of cultural norms at the time, where violence and coer-
cion were frequently used as a means of resolving tensions in social life. It is 
quite telling that corporal punishment was still exacted on peasants, even 
after legal reforms in the second half of the nineteenth century.24 
In my opinion, the confession changing process that commenced in the 
NWR after the announcement of the Decree of Tolerance, and the inter-
confessional tension that followed, were determined not only by political 
circumstances, but by a larger set of factors. Some of them were new; how-
ever, many measures in the confessional sphere enacted by the imperial gov-
ernment earlier (after the 1863–64 uprising) continued to function after 
the 1905 Decree. For example, measures forced upon the Catholic Church 
by the imperial government had a negative influence on interconfessional 
relations later on because the officials enacting them came to be identified 
with the Orthodox Church.25 The perspective that “This government does 
not come from God, but from the Devil” was already apparent in 1876, as 
shown by these words spoken by a monk from a monastery that had been 
23 Note that the Grodna governor indicated that in 1905, a total of 4,409 people had converted to Catholi-
cism, and 1,931 in 1906, of whom 998 returned to the Orthodox Church. Report from the Grodna gover-
nor Boiarskii about the Polonisation of Belorussians in the Grodna province, September 11, 1913, RGIA, 
f. 821, op. 150, d. 167, l. 11. 
24 Vladas Sirutavičius, Nusikaltimai ir visuomenė XIX amžiaus Lietuvoje (Lietuvių Atgimimo istorijos studi-
jos 12) (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 1995), 96; Vilma Žaltauskaitė, “Socialiniai aspektai Vilniaus ir Žemaičių 
(Telšių) vyskupijos Romos katalikų dvasininko tarnystėje ir gyvensenoje (XIX amžiaus antroji pusė),” 
Lietuvos istorijos metraštis 1 (2017): 109.
25 Such measures included: restrictions on the authority of bishops; deportations in 1863 and 1885; state con-
trol over the mobility of the clergy; church closures—sometimes even using military force against believ-
ers who resisted them, the last such case of which was in 1893 in Kražiai in the Kovna province—control 
and restrictions over religious practices; and even the prohibition of certain practices.
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closed.26 The approach that the Orthodox faith was the Devil’s work can 
also be encountered in rhetoric after the announcement of the Decree of 
Tolerance.27 Likewise, the Orthodox faith was sometimes called “the dog’s 
faith” (sobachia vera) by the Catholic clergy and believers in the NWR, 
both before and after the announcement of the decree.28 But the altered po-
litical conditions of the post-1905 period made these perceptions of the Or-
thodox Church among the Catholic population more visible in the public 
sphere. Not only were there more reasons and opportunities to make such 
declarations, but such declarations contributed to their entrenchment, gov-
ernment institutions issued sanctions for such phrases.
It is noteworthy that the Catholic Church based its relations with indi-
viduals of other faiths (and not only Orthodox believers) on the tradition 
of the Council of Trent, which was itself formed as a response to the Refor-
mation. Consequently, its relations with people of other faiths were, on the 
whole, poor, and any positive cases were exceptions, not the rule. For exam-
ple, due to this attitude towards other confessions, in 1898 students from 
the Imperial Roman Catholic Spiritual Academy did not participate in the 
funeral of their Lutheran lecturer.29 Friendly relations between Catholic 
priests and Orthodox laymen were uncommon and were even punishable 
as a priestly misdemeanor, which might invite an investigation by superiors 
within the Church.30 Three glasses of cognac shared by an Orthodox cleric 
and a Catholic priest were worth mentioning in one such investigation (it is 
26 Vilma Žaltauskaitė, “Socialiniai aspektai Vilniaus ir Žemaičių (Telšių) vyskupijos Romos katalikų dvas-
ininko tarnystėje ir gyvensenoje (XIX amžiaus antroji pusė),” Lietuvos istorijos metraštis 1 (2017): 83.
27 Report from the Porozovsk Orthodox church (Volkovysk district) to the Grodna Orthodox consistory, 
July 9, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1904, b. 272, l. 400.
28 Request from the former organist Adam Karvovskii to the Minsk governor, January 8, 1873, LVIA, f. 694, 
ap. 1, b. 2346, l. 4; report from the Archbishop of Lithuania and Vil’na to the Vil’na governor-general Ed-
uard Totleben, February 15, 1882, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1882, b. 230, l. 14; report from the Grodna gover-
nor-general mentioning Fr Julian Karpowicz, January 28, 1891, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1891, b. 375, l. 31; an-
nual report about the Lithuanian and Vil’na diocese in 1905, RGIA, f. 796, op. 442, d. 2096, l. 30; report 
from the Archbishop of Lithuania and Vil’na to the Vil’na governor-general, June 13, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, 
BS, ap. 1905, b. 405, l. 5.
29 Povilas Januševičius, Visokių atsitikimų sąrasza: 1895–1898, ed. Vilma Žaltauskaitė (Bibliotheca Archivi 
Lithuanici 5) (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2004), 275. 
30 Report from the Vil’na dean to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Vil’na, July 30, 1894, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 3, b. 
1172, l. 42.
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not possible to determine the exact circumstances as to why the investiga-
tion was conducted).31 In short, relations between Catholics and Orthodox 
believers were not idyllic both before and after the announcement of the 
Decree of Tolerance. Therefore, interconfessional relations before and after 
the Decree should be assessed by taking into account the whole context and 
socio-cultural norms active at the time.
Conversion to Catholicism after the Decree
As has already been mentioned, in 1905 alone, the Orthodox Church lost 
thousands of members in the NWR. It is significant to note just how the 
numbers relate to the numbers of those converted to Orthodoxy by imperial 
officials between 1863 and 1867. While this would be difficult to determine 
precisely, some general trends can be identified. It is quite likely that the first 
to convert to Catholicism after the Decree were those who were considered 
only nominal Orthodox believers, the so-called “recalcitrants.” In this way, 
during the several months after the decree’s announcement, the previous-
ly mentioned Orthodox parish of Bystritsa dwindled.32 Eighty-eight people 
joined the Slonim Catholic parish (Vil’na diocese, Grodna province) in De-
cember 1905.33  There were many nominal Orthodox believers in the Slonim 
district, so we can presume that it was they who converted in 1905.34 Elder-
ly people, sixty-four or seventy eighty-year-olds, also reverted to the Catholic 
faith.35 Entire families joined the Catholic Church (the ages of the parents 
went up to forty, which suggests that they may have been the descendants of 
“recalcitrants”). Ivan Minkevich from the Minsk province in the Vil’na dio-
cese asked for the sacrament of baptism, as he claimed only to have been bap-
31 Report from a police officer to Stepan Petrovich[?], July 15, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1904, b. 272, 
l. 398–399.
32 See note 20.
33 Report from the Slonim priest B. Sarosek to the Bishop of Vil’na, December 31, 1905, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, 
b. 2806, l. 281.
34 [I.K.?] About the recalcitrants in the Grodna province, July 26, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1904, b. 272, 
p. 419.
35 Data about those who converted to Catholicism, 1905–1914, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2805, l. 1–80.
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tized with water, indicating at the very start of his request that he was from 
the “Logishin parish of recalcitrant Catholics.”36 The governor and the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs had examined the fates of former Catholics in Lo-
gishin (Minsk province) back in 1878–79, but they had not been permitted 
to convert back to the Catholic faith at that time.37 The intention to return 
to the faith of their parents and their ancestors was recorded in numerous re-
quests and in the characterizations of “recalcitrants” both prior to the De-
cree of Tolerance and afterward.38 In a report about the parish from 1907, 
the Orthodox Archbishop Mikhail of Grodna and Brest stated that there 
were no mass conversions to Catholicism, as all the uporstvuiushchie had al-
ready reverted to Catholicism.39 Eighty-one people converted to Catholi-
cism in Grodna province in 1907.40 Thus, it is fair to assume that the major-
ity of those who changed their confession immediately after the Decree of 
Tolerance had been forced into Orthodoxy earlier. 
The process of conversion to Catholicism was most evident in Vil’na 
province (Vil’na diocese): in 1905, 16,286 people became Catholics.41 Cath-
olic Bishop Ropp of Vil’na was convinced that it was not true Orthodox 
believers who were converting to Catholicism, but rather those who had 
always considered themselves to be Catholic and were only nominally Or-
thodox believers, especially ex-Uniates and those who had been forced into 
Orthodoxy in the 1860s.42 Ropp was consistent. He underlined this expla-
36 Request from Ivan Minkevich to the Bishop of Vil’na, July 24, 1907, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2838, l. 8.
37 Dolbilov, Russkii krai, chuzhaia vera, 702–06.
38 Request from Adolfa Makarevich Burachevskaia to a Vil’na diocese official (she writes about the efforts of 
an Orthodox cleric to persuade her to return to the Orthodox Church. The woman claims that Catholi-
cism was the faith of her grandparents and great-grandparents, which she had always wanted, and that she 
was attending church of her own free will, while she would only go to an Orthodox Church for Easter con-
fession, and not of her own free will), December 4, 1908, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2954, l. 37, 40, 42–44. Re-
port from the Ostrovets Orthodox clergyman Zhebrovskii to the Lithuanian Orthodox consistory, with 
data about the Ostrovets parish, July 19, 1904, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1904, b. 272, l. 462.
39 Report from 1907 by Archbishop Mikhail of Grodna and Brest about the diocese, RGIA, f. 796, op. 442, 
d. 2204, l. 26, 32, 33.
40 Bendin, Problemy veroterpimosti, 276.
41 Ibid.
42 Report from the Bishop of Vil’na to the Department of Foreign Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs, May 13, 1905, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2482, l. 18; report from the Bishop of Vil’na to the minis-
ter of internal affairs, July 23, 1905, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2482, l. 30–31.
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nation in his report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and, at almost the 
same time, the bishop sent out another circular to the clergy in his diocese 
in which he gave the same interpretation. In the circular, he indicated that 
in the procedure of conversion to Catholicism, a brief profession of faith 
that acknowledged the Pope and indicated an understanding of the differ-
ences between the Catholic and Orthodox faiths sufficed for those “who 
were Catholics in spirit.”43 
Cases that were dependent on the cultural environment in a region 
are also worth mentioning; for example, when an Orthodox believer who 
lived in a cultural space dominated by Catholics decided to convert to Ca-
tholicism. In this way, in Ponevezh (Panevėžys) district in Kovna prov-
ince, twenty-four Orthodox peasants (known as “colonists”) from the Ri-
azan’ slabada chose Catholicism because they now associated themselves 
with Lithuanian Catholics both in a linguistic and a cultural sense. They 
claimed to have accepted the tenets of the faith of their neighbors (Lithua-
nian Catholics), had forgotten Russian, and had married into Lithuanian 
(Catholic) families.44 Officials of Kovna province examined this case very 
closely, and the governor purposely delayed sending his response (a term of 
one month applied) to the leaders of the Catholic Church.45 Ultimately, 
the Orthodox cleric who tried to talk them out of their decision stated that 
the “Orthodox Church had completely lost these applicants.”46 Perhaps for 
similar reasons, the number of conversions to Catholicism was lowest in 
Grodna province, where Orthodox believers rather than Catholics dom-
inated; the number of conversions to Catholicism was smaller there than 
was the number of people forced to convert to the Orthodox Church be-
tween 1863 and 1867.
43 Report from the Bishop of Vil’na to clergy in the diocese, May 15, 1905, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2482, l. 21. 
44 Report from a Ponevezh district ispravnik to the Kovna province board, April 7, 1906, Kauno regioninis 
valstybės archyvas (Kaunas regional state archives; KRVA), f. I-49, ap. 1, b. 24717, l. 110. Documents from 
1905–07 related to these requests, ibid. l. 106–12.
45 Requests were submitted in November 1905, while responses only arrived on April 19, 1906. Report from 
the Bishop of Samogitia (Tel’shi) to the Vil’na governor-general, March 13, 1908, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 
1905, b. 403, l. 72–74.
46 Report to the Lithuanian Orthodox consistory, March 19, 1907, KRVA, f. I-49, ap. 1, b. 24717, l. 109.
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There were other cases of confessional changes, notably as a result of var-
ious social circumstances: a person might have adopted Orthodoxy in pris-
on and wished to return to his former faith; there were cases of mixed mar-
riages where one spouse was Orthodox and the couple’s children had been 
baptized as Orthodox believers and now sought a different faith, etc.47 The 
activities of the Roman Catholic clergy was also one of the factors that in-
fluenced reversion to Catholicism. The Orthodox Church and local gov-
ernment specifically highlighted these activities. However, the central gov-
ernment only had information about fifteen Roman Catholic clergymen 
from Kovna province, five from Vil’na province, and six from Grodna prov-
ince who could potentially face criminal prosecution for their anti-govern-
ment activities.48 Incidentally, “anti-government activities” was a broader 
concept than “crimes against the Orthodox Church,” but they were often 
intertwined.49 In any case, the number of priests prosecuted for such of-
fenses in the first year after the Decree of Tolerance was not high. Further-
more, there were fewer clergymen accused of “anti-government activities” 
in Vil’na province in the first year after the decree’s announcement, com-
pared to Kovna province, although, as previously mentioned, the number 
of converts was much higher in Vil’na province. This seems to indicate that 
the Catholic clergy was active in many spheres of life and was not the sole 
trigger of conversions. 
The Legitimization of Conversion to Catholicism: 
The Position(s) of the Church and Government 
A number of social and cultural factors determined a person’s return or con-
version to Catholicism. Obviously, after the Decree of Tolerance, the Cath-
olic Church was much better prepared for this process than was the impe-
47 Request from the peasant Chiapulis (to the Vil’na Roman Catholic consistory?), November 1, 1910, LVIA, 
f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2954, l. 63.
48 List of priests who could be held criminally liable, RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 3250, l. 36; report from A. Ma-
montov, May 3, 1907, RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 3251, l. 214–254; report from A. Mamontov (1907), RGIA, 
f. 821, op. 150, d. 254, l. 2.
49 Report (author unknown; 1905?), RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 3264, l. 261–262.
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rial government or the Orthodox Church. The Catholic Church’s hierarchs 
reacted promptly to the decree with specific actions. Bishop Ropp of Vil’na 
had already confirmed the procedure for conversion from Orthodoxy to Ca-
tholicism by April 21, 1905, almost immediately after the announcement of 
the decree.50 Archbishop Jerzy Szembek of Mogilev also sent a dedicated cir-
cular to the clergy on May 2, 1905.51 This may be an indication of the coordi-
nated actions of both hierarchs, especially when we know that Bishop Ropp 
was in St. Petersburg when the decree was announced (where the Archbish-
op of Mogilev resided).52 The Diocese of Samogitia (Tel’shi) distributed 
their circular to the clergy somewhat later, on May 27, 1905.53 
The Catholic Church’s leaders preempted the government by several 
months in regard to disseminating information about the conversion pro-
cedure; the Ministry of Internal Affairs set out provisional procedures for 
the registration of conversions from the Orthodox Church in a circular is-
sued on August 18, 1905.54 That circular was sent to the bishops on Sep-
tember 8, and went into effect in November. The government ordered the 
following procedure: it foresaw a term of one month, during which the gov-
ernor of a province had to inform the leadership of the Catholic Church 
about submitted requests after a series of required actions. Important-
ly, those who wanted to leave the Orthodox Church would have to sub-
mit a written request to the governor, who would then inform the leaders 
of the Orthodox Church about the individual wishing to leave their fold. 
The Orthodox Church would have the opportunity to influence this deci-
sion (uveshchanie). Werth’s study shows that the provisional circular from 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs was valid for over a decade.55 It could be 
said that the speed of the Catholic bishops and their initiative through the 
50 Circular from the Bishop of Vil’na, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1905, b. 404, l. 6.
51 Report from the Metropolitan of Mogilev Wincenty Kluczyński, 1910s?, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2482, l. 
127–29.
52 Report from the Bishop of Vil’na to the Vil’na governor-general Konstantin Krshivitskii, April 20, 1906, 
LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2482, l. 80.
53 Instructions from the Suffragan Bishop of Samogitia (Tel’shi) G. F. Cirtovt to members of the clergy, 
LVIA, f. 1671, ap. 4, b. 184, l. 9.
54 Circular from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, August 18, 1905, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2482, l. 40–41.
55 Werth, “Trudnyi put’ k katolitsizmu,” 471. 
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circulars were forerunners of the Catholic Church’s decades of correspon-
dence concerning the legitimization of converts’ registration and reproach-
es over the ignorance of the government’s circular.56 Later on, repressions 
were exacted against clergy who provided religious services to Catholics 
who had not been registered in accordance with the procedures set out by 
the government. However, the bishops’ initiative also demonstrated their 
authority, the Church’s governance of the clergy, and the overall strength of 
the religious community. By registering conversions, local clergy were abid-
ing by the procedures outlined by their religious leaders.
Several stages in the confession changing registration process can be dis-
tinguished. Initially, the imperial government reacted moderately; it waited 
patiently for information from Catholic bishops about individuals who had 
converted to Catholicism in the period from April 17 to August 18, 1905. 
By the end of 1905, taking into account the enormous number of conver-
sions since the Decree of Tolerance and the demand to adhere to the proce-
dures outlined in the circular from the Ministry of Internal Affairs on Au-
gust 18, 1905, the Vil’na governor-general, Aleksandr Freze recommended 
that the procedure be simplified only for those who had converted to Ca-
tholicism before August 18, that is, prior to the circular’s validity, so as to 
prevent cultivating the “belief in the minds of the uneducated masses that 
the government was disrupting their conversion to Catholicism.” He as-
serted that it would suffice for the Catholic clergy to present lists of such 
people to the governor, indicating their estate, former faith, age, and the 
parish they were joining, while the governor would inform the Orthodox 
Church.57 The central government approved an even simpler procedure: the 
temporary minister of internal affairs let Krshivitskii, the incoming Vil’na 
governor-general, know that he supported the idea of a more simplified pro-
cedure.58 The State Council member Petr Durnovo also approved, saying it 
56 File (O perekhodakh raznykh lits v katolichestvo), 1888–1913, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2482; File (Materia-
ly iz kantseliarii Mogilevskoi eparkhii, smena veroispovedaniia), 1910–1914, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 4273.
57 Report from Andrei Stankevich, an official in the Vil’na governor-general’s chancellery, to the Kovna gov-
ernor Petr Verevkin, December 5, 1905, KRVA, f. I-49, ap. 1, b. 24717, l. 34.
58 Report from a temporary official at the Ministry of Internal Affairs to K. Krshivitskii, the Vil’na governor-
general, December 23, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1905, b. 403, l. 26–27.
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would be enough to just “inform” the governor without abiding by the oth-
er instructions in the circular.59 Nonetheless, subsequent correspondence 
between government institutions and the Catholic Church shows that im-
perial officials appeared to forget these simplified procedures and demand-
ed that written requests be made to the governor, including those who had 
converted to Catholicism before the August 18 circular.60 
Starting around 1908–1909, the accuracy of registration took a much 
stricter approach. In 1909, Petr Reviakin, an official from Kovna province, 
prepared an announcement about conversions from Orthodoxy to Cathol-
icism, in which he indicated that there were 353 cases of registration of 
Catholic converts that ignored the August 18, 1905 circular (at the time, 
there was a total of 1,148 converts), and that the prosecution of several doz-
en clergymen had been initiated in the so-called Peace Courts. Reviakin 
claimed that the clergy’s actions, described as insolent [nagly] and mocking 
[izdevatel’stvo], threatened the government’s authority.61 
The question of damage to imperial authority or the Orthodox Church 
arose not only regarding the actions of the Roman Catholic clergy. One po-
lice officer wrote that his subordinate, “without his knowledge or permis-
sion,” married and converted to Catholicism, ignoring the procedure set out 
in the August circular.62 In 1905, an Orthodox cleric in Grodna province 
wrote to the Vil’na governor-general’s office and said that the authority of the 
Orthodox Church was eroded in his deanery as a result of the conversion of 
the volost’ and village elders to Catholicism; he alleged that Catholics argued 
that intelligent and influential people chose Catholicism.63 The defense of 
government authority meant returning to pre-Decree repression. The govern-
ment’s greater attention to the registration procedure for conversions could be 
59 Report from Andrei Stankevich, an official in the Vil’na governor-general’s chancellery, to the Kovna gov-
ernor Petr Verevkin, January 11, 1906, KRVA, f. I-49, ap. 1, b. 24717, l. 94.
60 Report from the Vil’na governor to the Bishop of Vil’na, July 18, 1906, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2482, l. 87.
61 Report from Reviakin to the Kovna governor, November 11, 1909, KRVA, f. I-49, ap. 1, b. 28259 (the pag-
es are not numbered).
62 Report from the Grodna governor to the Vil’na governor-general, November 22, 1907, LVIA, f. 378, BS, 
ap. 1905, b. 403, l. 64.
63 Report from the Volkovysk Orthodox dean to the Vil’na governor-general’s chancellery (with a confiden-
tial additional note), July 26, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1905, b. 405, l. 60.
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related to the reform of registration under discussion in 1906–07, which the 
Orthodox Church’s Holy Synod opposed.64 The Vil’na governor-general also 
opposed these changes after he received reports from the governors of Vil‘na, 
Kovna, and Grodna.65 It is most likely that the government’s greater atten-
tion to the conversion procedure was determined by changes in confessional 
policy. The Catholic Bishop Ropp of Vil’na was dismissed from his position 
at the government’s behest at the beginning of October 1907.66 
Further changes occurring after 1907 affected the government’s ap-
proach toward the Catholic Church in a broader sense than just whether 
registration procedures were being followed correctly. Numerous circulars 
regulating the Catholic Church’s activities were sent by the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs.67 In the case of Fr. Zenkevicz, dated February 16, 1910, re-
garding his provision of religious services to Orthodox believers who had 
converted to Catholicism after the Decree of Tolerance, the Ruling Senate 
determined that the procedures for registering conversions to Catholicism 
of August 18, 1905 had to be followed, and if they were not, the individual 
would continue to be considered Orthodox.68 This means that the formal 
registration norms based on Orthodox registry book entries that were valid 
up to the Decree of Tolerance were still in place. 
64 Werth, “Trudnyi put’ k katolitsizmu,” 467. 
65 Report from the Vilna governor-general to the minister of interior, March 6, 1908, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 
1908, b. 339, l. 16–17.
66 Darius Staliūnas, “Vilniaus vyskupo E. Ropo veiklos pėdsakais (1903–1907),” in Lietuvių Atgimimo isto-
rijos studijos, vol. 7: Atgimimas ir Katalikų Bažnyčia (Vilnius: Katalikų pasaulio leidiniai, 1994), 213–18.
67 For example: a circular to governors on July 25, 1908 about restrictions on holding religious processions; a 
circular on January 17, 1909 regarding the appointment of convicted and punished clergymen as priests; 
a circular on January 29, 1909 regarding the comprehensive investigation of illegal actions by clergymen 
in the struggle against “religious-national fanaticism”; a circular on December 16, 1909 about the trans-
fer of clergymen from other dioceses; circulars on December 21, 1909 and November 20, 1910 regard-
ing the appointment of clergymen only with the approval of the ministry; a circular on January 13, 1910 
about controlling the appointment of teachers of religion; circulars on September 19, 1911 and October 
28, 1911 about the urgent investigation of cases brought against clergymen and whether their punishment 
had been enforced; a circular on September 21, 1911 about banning the catechism in all institutions apart 
from schools. Sbornik tsirkuliarov po DDDII otnosiaschikhsia k rimsko katolicheskomu dukhovenstvu, 
1905–1912 god, RGIA library, 41, 43, 52, 54–55, 57, 60, 68–69, 75, 81. 
68 Report-draft No 5984 from the Metropolitan of Mogilev (c. 1913/1914); report No. 945 from the Met-
ropolitan of Mogilev to the clergy of the Mogilev archdiocese and the Minsk diocese, 27 February 1915, 
LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 4273, l. 2, 10–15. Excerpts from annual reports of the Minsk diocese. The Polish–
Catholic question, RVIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 172, l. 228. 
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In demanding that Catholic bishops adhere to its regulations for regis-
tering conversion to Catholicism, the government (the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs) claimed that the registration process outlined in the August 18, 
1905 circular did not impinge in any way upon the Decree of Tolerance.69 
However, adherence to this bureaucratic formality was understood as an 
expression of the government’s authority and power, and the clergy were ex-
pected to acknowledge it. On June 23, 1906, Petr Stolypin, the Minister of 
Internal Affairs, explained to the Bishop of Vil’na that the August circular 
was mandatory for both secular and religious authorities. Otherwise, the 
(Catholic) clergy’s actions would be viewed as promoting opposition to and 
mistrust of the legitimate actions of the government.70
The “Ruling” Church and Government after the Decree of Tolerance 
Bishop Ropp of Vil’na knew in advance about the Decree of Tolerance 
and prepared accordingly. There is no doubt that leaders of the Orthodox 
Church also knew about the preparation of the decree.71 Nonetheless, un-
like the hierarchs of the Catholic Church in the NWR, they trusted the 
imperial government’s authority to regulate the procedures for conversion 
to Catholicism, or, more specifically, to halt any such conversions. The gov-
ernment’s patronage was the accepted status quo for the Orthodox Church 
in the NWR. The Orthodox clergy demanded this patronage even after 
political conditions changed. Following his visits to churches in the No-
voaleksandrovsk district in September 1905, Bishop Sergei of Kovna asked 
the Vil’na governor-general to protect the Orthodox Church and Russi-
anness from erosion because they were closely associated with the govern-
ment’s authority and its “prestige.”72 Thus, the Orthodox Church called on 
69 Report from the minister of internal affairs to the Bishop of Vil’na, June 23, 1906, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 
2482, l. 85–86.
70 Ibid.
71 Aleksandr Polunov, K. P. Pobedonostsev v obshchestvenno-politicheskoi i dukhovnoi zhizni Rosii (Moscow: 
Rosspen, 2010), 322–37. 
72 Report from Bishop Sergei to the Vil’na governor-general, September 12, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1905, 
b. 404, l. 139.
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the government to act in defense of its interests. One of the Vil’na governor-
general’s officials even openly identified as a serious problem the inactivity 
of Orthodox clerics and their lack of authority after the announcement of 
the Decree of Tolerance.73 Some Orthodox leaders also acknowledged this 
challenge in addition to other problems within the Orthodox Church.74 
Numerous appeals were made by the Orthodox archbishops of Vil’na, 
Grodna, and Brest to governors and governors-general regarding conver-
sions to Catholicism as early as 1905. The Mother Superior at the Krasnos-
tok monastery (in Grodna province) even appealed to the emperor in May 
1905.75 In June 1905, a congress of Orthodox clergy from the Diocese of 
Lithuania and Vil’na on “the struggle with Latin-ness” was held,76 while 
another meeting about the revival of Church life and the establishment of 
parish communities was held on January 24, 1906.77 There were also small-
er congresses involving deanery clergy, who shared their impressions of con-
versions to Catholicism and suggested ways of resolving the ensuing prob-
lems. For example, a congress of clergy from the Shumsk deanery was held 
on January 2, 1906. The clergy appealed through their archbishop to the 
imperial government, asking it to protect the remaining Orthodox believ-
ers and clergy. In order to achieve this goal, they suggested that the proce-
dure for appointing state civil servants should be changed: all civil servants 
should be Orthodox believers. It was claimed that this would undermine 
the Catholic clergy’s networks and influence.78 These cries for help from 
the Orthodox Church did not go unheeded: already by November 23, 1905, 
73 Report from Pugavko to the Vil’na governor, July 17, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, 1905, b. 397, l. 7.
74 Polunov, K. P. Pobedonoscev v obshchestvenno-politicheskoi i dukhovnoi zhizni Rosii, 239–52, 322–37.
75 Report from the mother superior of the Krasnostok monastery to the Vil’na governor-general, May 16, 
1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap.1905, b. 399, l. 20–25.
76 Annual report about the Lithuanian and Vil’na diocese for 1905, RGIA, f. 796, op. 442, d. 2096, l. 24. 
“Latin-ness” meant the Catholic Church.
77 Report from Archbishop Nikandro of Lithuania and Vil’na to the Vil’na governor-general, January 23, 
1906, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1906, b. 397, l. 7.
78 Report from Archbishop Nikandro of Lithuania and Vil’na to the Vil’na governor-general, February 14, 
1906, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1906, b. 397, pp. 50–54; report from Bishop Sergei of Kovna to the Vil’na gov-
ernor-general (where he cites the letter he received from the Shumsk deanery’s Bystritsa Orthodox cleric 
Lev Tyminskii), March 26, 1906, ibid., l. 56–57. Newspaper article from Novoe vremia (April 25, 1906, No 
10797), which presents information identical to that in Tyminskii’s letter. Ibid., l. 61.
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a circular sent out by the Vil’na governor-general ordered the local govern-
ment to monitor the actions of the Catholic clergy and inform the Ortho-
dox Archbishop of Lithuania and Vil’na.79 Apart from other points, the 
circular indicated that, given that the majority population in the region 
was uneducated peasants, and taking into account their lack of indepen-
dence, the administration should support the Orthodox Church to main-
tain a sense of order. It argued that the imperial government should take 
into account the demands of Catholics and their clergy; further, it should 
not allow Catholic antagonism against Orthodox believers—which the cir-
cular attributed to peasants’ poor understanding of the decree and mani-
festo—to grow. This is why the governor-general drew attention to cases of 
religious intolerance and violence, ordering that the courts be informed of 
such events and appeals made. The circular explained which parts of the 
law were valid, and which ones were not, and stated that all cases should be 
heard only after religious authorities initiated them.80 This circular was fol-
lowed by orders from the local government: for example, the Kovna gov-
ernor’s circular to district police officers, ispravniki (district police chiefs), 
and city police chiefs issued on December 19, 1905. Thus, local government 
institutions attempted to protect the Orthodox Church from religious in-
tolerance and cases of violence. 
The diocese’s official position on the announcement of the Decree of 
Tolerance was published in its newspaper, the Litovskiie eparkhialnyie vedo-
mosti (Lithuanian Diocesan News), rather late, only at the end of June 1905 
(Nos. 25–26). It wrote that conversions were not harming the Church be-
cause it was only “false members” who were leaving. Additionally, the losses 
were considered the “outcome of militant Catholicism,” or a form of attack, 
and therefore, something that had to be countered by defending “Ortho-
dox-Russian matters in the NWR.” The newspaper used a rather tradition-
al rhetoric of attack and struggle, while also naming enemies, and similar 
79 Report from the Vil’na governor-general Freze to Archbishop Nikandro of Lithuania and Vil’na, Decem-
ber 14, 1905, LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap.1905, b. 404, l. 166.
80 Report from the Vil’na governor-general Freze to the Kovna governor, with the additional entry ‘raspori-
azhenie po kraiu’, November 23, 1905, KRVA, f. I-49, ap. 1, b. 24717, l. 23–24.
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rhetoric was also used by diocesan hierarchs and parish clergy in the NWR. 
This rhetoric of attack and militancy was neither incidental nor new. It had 
been applied broadly even before 1905, by both the Orthodox Church and 
the government. 
In 1906, the Ministry of Internal Affairs received a note from the Ro-
man Catholic Mogilev metropolitan over antagonistic activities against 
Catholics by Orthodox clerics, which also included spreading defamatory 
material about Catholicism. An appeal was made to the Synod of the Or-
thodox Church. The Synod replied that it did not approve of such phenom-
ena, but neither did it condemn them. It maintained the view that a nation-
al-religious struggle between Catholics and Orthodox believers was taking 
place in the Western provinces, where it was Catholics, not Orthodox be-
lievers, who were on the offensive. Moreover, the Synod asked the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs to inform the Catholic metropolitan that his clergy 
should not engage in proselytization.81 Consequently, the very Catholics 
who initially made the complaint ended up as the accused. 
The complaint from the Mogilev metropolitan was not the only one.82 
Clergy from the Vil’na diocese often complained to the bishop about Or-
thodox clergy who disseminated literature that demeaned Catholicism, 
both in 1905 and later on.83 For example, Fr. Necziporowicz of Shereshev 
(Pruzhany district, Grodna province) appealed to the Bishop of Vil’na over 
defamatory literature against Catholics that was being spread among the 
town’s Orthodox believers by their own clerics.84 It appears that the offend-
81 Report from the Chief Procurator of the Orthodox Holy Synod, October 29, 1907, RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, 
d. 3250, l. 88–89.
82 The official of the Archdiocese of Mogilev also lodged a complaint about anti-Catholic publications from 
the Polotsk diocese in 1908. See: report from the Mogilev archdiocesan official to the minister of inter-
nal affairs, August 26, 1908, RGIA, f. 826, op. 3, d. 193, l. 30. Report from the Borudzenichy parish priest 
to the Roman Catholic diocesan board, November 1906, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2954, l. 22, printed anti-
Catholic materials on ll. 23–27. Incidentally, the same print was indicated in 1909, and the information 
contained in it is also recognizable in Catholics’ testimonies about defamatory information about them. 
83 Report from the Borudzenichy (Bezdzezho) parish priest to the Roman Catholic diocesan board, Novem-
ber 1906, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2954, l. 22, printed materials on pp. 23–27. Incidentally, the same was indi-
cated in 1909, and the information contained in it is also recognisable in Catholics’ testimonies about de-
famatory information about them, ibid., l. 37–40.
84 Report from the Shereshev parish priest Jan Necziporowicz to the Bishop of Vil’na, September 2, 1905, 
LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2954, p. 81; publications included in l. 82–102 of the file. It is important to note that 
staulinas_book.indb   134 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:29
135
Interconfessional Rivalry in Lithuania
ing literature was copies of the June–September issues of Pochaevskii lis-
tok (Pochaev Pages), published by the Pochaevskaia Lavra.85 Another  cleric 
from the Grodna province, Fr. Gurski at Dambravas, also complained about 
Pochaevskii listok.86 Roman Catholic clergy also mentioned other publica-
tions that propagated the same narrative: for example, the “leaflets to the 
people” by the Orthodox Brotherhood of the Holy Spirit in Vil’na.87 This 
indicates the rather systematic dissemination of anti-Catholic literature in 
these provinces. The distribution of printed material published by Ortho-
dox dioceses and monasteries was understood as a separate means of over-
coming “Catholic propaganda,” and in 1912, Archbishop Mikhail of Grod-
na and Brest mentioned this as one of the measures that could be taken to 
counter conversions.88 
Analysis of the government’s approach towards the registration of or-
ganized conversions to Catholicism by the Catholic bishops, should in-
clude discussion of the ever-stricter position of the government towards 
the Catholic Church in the NWR. The dismissal of Bishop Ropp of 
Vil’na in October 1907 could be considered the formal end of this period 
of liberalization (this was not the first time the government had resorted 
to this kind of measure in the diocese: in 1863, Bishop Adam Stanisław 
Krasiński was deported, followed by Bishop Karol Hryniewicki in 1885). 
This was merely part of its policy to weaken “Polish influence/propagan-
da,” and it revealed dynamism in the government’s treatment of Polish-
the secular authorities viewed this cleric as being particularly fanatical, and he was known for his antago-
nistic activities. Report from the Vil’na governor-general K. Krshivitskii to the minister of internal affairs, 
May 2, 1906, RGIA, f. 821, op. 125, d. 3251, l. 1.
85 Pochaevskaia Lavra was a monastery in the Volhynia province. A branch of the Sojuz Russkogo Naroda 
(Union of the Russian People) party functioned under its wing, which actively defended the people from 
“Polonization” and Jewish economic influence (by making concessions to peasants to enable them to ac-
quire land, and establishing consumer associations). It was headed by Archimandrite Vitaly. Report about 
the de-Polonization of the Church (1911–1912?), RGIA, f. 821, op. 10, d. 1072, l. 31–38.
86 Report from the Dambravas parish priest Fr. Gurski to the Bishop of Vil’na, November 23, 1905, LVIA, f. 
378, BS, ap. 1905, b. 393, l. 71; the mentioned publications are added in l. 72–75. 
87 “Leaflets to the people” with defamatory content against Catholics are mentioned here: report from the 
Vil’na diocesan official to the minister of internal affairs, May 13, 1910, LVIA, f. 694, ap. 1, b. 2954, l. 2, 
64–65.
88 Annual report from Archbishop Mikhail of Grodna and Brest about the situation in the diocese in 1912, 
RGIA, f. 796, op. 442, d. 2521, l. 35.
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ness (in the eyes of the government, Poles were again becoming the main 
enemy in the NWR).89 
The government did partly return to the former policy of “de-Poloni-
zation” regarding the Catholic Church. When writing about the situa-
tion in the Vil’na province in 1907, the governor indicated that a “Pole” 
had become a political concept rather than an ethnographic one. He be-
gan his review of the political situation in the province by noting that na-
tional-religious relations and the activities of the Roman Catholic clergy 
were the main focus of attention.90 The governor also mentioned the strug-
gle by Lithuanians against “Polonization” and the Polonized Catholic cler-
gy, the struggle against the use of the Lithuanian and Belorussian languag-
es in church services, and the intellectual darkness of the peasant masses.91 
The government sought to shape relations with various national groups in 
the NWR based on different agendas, but “de-Polonization” was always a 
key target. Local governments even decided to study tsarist confessional 
policy in the post-1863 period and requested copies of documents from the 
Inspection Commission for the Affairs of the Roman Catholic Clergy in 
the North Western region (Revizionnaia komissiia po delam rimsko-katol-
icheskogo dukhovenstva Severo-zapadnogo kraia), which operated between 
1866 and 1868.92 But in this effort to “de-Polonize“ the Catholic Church, 
the government distinguished between Catholic Poles, who, in the gover-
nor’s understanding, should have made greater distinctions between reli-
gion and politics, Catholic Lithuanians, and Catholic and non-Catholic 
Belorussians. The latter, Belorussians, were emerging from “the dark peas-
ant masses”’ to become a (self-aware) people (naselenie), who also had to be 
protected from Polonization, especially by the Catholic clergy.93 
89 See the chapter by Darius Staliūnas in this volume. 
90 Annual report about the situation in the Vil’na province in 1907 (draft), LVIA, f. 380, ap. 65, b. 215, l. 4.
91 Ibid., 4–8.
92 Delo s perepiskoiu o byvshej Revizionnoi Komissii uchrezhdennoi v Vil’ne v 60-kh godakh proshlogo 
stoletia po delam rimsko-katolicheskogo dukhovenstva, February 29, 1908–April 8, 1908, LVIA, f. 378, 
BS, ap. 1908, b. 368, l. 1–8.
93 Report from the Grodna governor-general Petr Boiarskii about the Polonisation of the Belorussian popu-
lation in the Grodna province, September 11, 1913, RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 167, l. 7–24.
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Catholic Lithuanians were viewed in various ways: when they stood up 
in defense of their right to use the Lithuanian language in church, they were 
in line with the government’s interests regarding its struggle against “Pol-
ish influence.” However, the spread of Catholic culture in the form of soci-
eties, schools, and catechism education was not viewed in an entirely pos-
itive light.94 This is especially evident in the government’s attitude toward 
the procedure for registering converts to Catholicism in Kovna province. 
In meetings of higher officials initiated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
in 1914, some recommendations and the motivation behind them signaled 
a return to the measures applied to the Catholic Church after the uprising 
of 1863–64 (control over seminaries, the regulation of religious processions, 
and the question of supplementary Mass services).95
Thus, interconfessional relations after the Decree of Tolerance of 1905 
were affected by more than just the decree. In the NWR, the decree was im-
plemented in the context of the new political conditions, but it also drew 
on an anti-Catholic narrative that had already existed for decades and fea-
tured rhetorical themes such as: “militant Catholicism,” “militant Poloni-
zation,” fanatical clergy, the “Jesuitical” way of doing things (meaning de-
ceptive, evil, and sly), the fanaticism of believers, the strong religiosity of 
women and their activities, and the shadowy influence of the clergy on the 
dark peasant masses, which instilled them with discipline, obedience, and 
submissiveness. Some of these themes were encountered less, and others 
more frequently; however, none of them disappeared from central and local 
government rhetoric between 1905 and 1915. 
94 Announcement from the minister of internal affairs about the activities of the Roman Catholic clergy 
(which mentions the meeting of NWR governors held in April 1914, so the document must have been 
written later), RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 150, l. 10.
95 Report from the minister of internal affairs about the activities of the Roman Catholic clergy (which men-
tions the meeting of NWR governors held in April 1914), RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d 150, l. 1–15. On the dis-
cussion about the program for the struggle against Polonization in the Western region (re: Kovna prov-
ince), RGIA, f. 821, op. 150, d. 172, l. 12–68; entries from governors’ reports (1910), ibid., l. 200–30. Darius 
Staliūnas gives a detailed analysis of the content of these discussions in his chapter in this volume. 
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Conclusions
In enacting its policy of “depolonization” after the 1863–64 uprising, the 
government created conditions that would allow tensions in interconfes-
sional relations to flourish. These tensions were visible up to 1905, and be-
came even more apparent after the Decree of Tolerance. In April 1905, the 
government was not prepared to issue legal regulations outlining proce-
dures for conversion, even though this right was declared in the decree. It 
sought to maintain its control over the process, while also ensuring partici-
pation by both itself and the Orthodox Church in the process. Meanwhile, 
the procedures set out by the Catholic Church were repressed. The Ortho-
dox Church remained the ruling Church and continued to enjoy the sup-
port of the government with regard to its hegemonic social position and in 
its dealings with the Catholic Church. 
This analysis has also highlighted provincial differences concerning 
conversions in the NWR. There were conversions to Catholicism in Kov-
na province; however, these did not take place on a mass scale because the 
number of Orthodox believers there was not very large to begin with. Vil’na 
province (like part of the Vil’na diocese) was not confessionally homoge-
nous, and it had more newly formed Orthodox parishes that were signifi-
cantly affected by the conversion process. In Grodna province, this process 
did not reach the scale it did in Vil’na province, and it was concentrated 
mostly in those districts where the population was mostly Catholic already. 
After the announcement of the Decree of Tolerance, the Orthodox Church 
lost some of its community of believers in the NWR (even though some of 
them were only nominally Orthodox) and had to revise its position in so-
ciety, but it continued to enjoy the government’s support. The creation of a 
new model of social activity demanded time and intellectual and econom-
ic resources. 
In his note to Vil’na governor-general Freze dated June 28, 1905, Or-
thodox Archbishop Nikanor of Grodna and Brest indicated the detrimen-
tal actions by the Roman Catholic clergy against Orthodox believers. He 
asked for a printed government note that explained the meaning of the 
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April decree to the “unenlightened peasant masses” (maloprosveshchenna-
ia massa naroda) to be hung up in district head offices and disseminated in 
other ways, hoping that this action could halt dangerous Polish-Catholic 
propaganda.96 Archbishop Nikanor was not convinced that these kinds of 
actions would prove effective, but he hoped that they would have some ef-
fect, however small. In short, he trusted that the government would pro-
tect the Orthodox Church against the loss of its followers. This situation 
nearly repeated the situation from 1867, when Tsar Alexander II’s speech to 
the volost-self-government offices was distributed. Thus, Nikanor had actu-
ally no new ideas; instead he harkened back to old models of tsarist regula-
tion of interconfessional relations. 
96 Report from Archbishop Nikanor of Grodna and Brest to the Vil’na governor-general, June 28, 1905, 
LVIA, f. 378, BS, ap. 1905, b. 405, pp. 11–12.
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The Struggle between Confessional and Nationalist Groups 
for the Chełm–Podlasian Region:  
The 1905 Decree of Tolerance and Former Uniates
C h i h o  F u k u s h i m a
Introduction
The Eastern territories of the early modern Polish–Lithuanian Common-
wealth were called Ruthenia (Ruś), which had been domains of the Kyivan 
Rus and its successors (principalities of Rus), therefore, traditional inhabit-
ants of Ruthenian lands were Orthodox Christians. After Polish influences 
began overwhelming Ruthenian lands, local elites gradually acclimated to 
the new environment, accepting Polish language and Western Christianity 
as their own. In contrast to the local elites, who became Polonized and Ca-
tholicized, Ruthenian non-elites remained Orthodox. Although the Union 
of Brest (1595–96) made majority of Ruthenian population Eastern Cath-
olic (Uniate), it secured them separate (from Roman Catholic) hierarchy 
and parishes based on Eastern tradition, therefore, did not Polonize them. 
As a consequence, a situation peculiar to Ruthenia, where Polish nobility 
(including Polonized nobility of Ruthenian origin) ruled over Ruthenian 
peasants, was made up.
After the partitions of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, 
throughout the nineteenth century, Ruthenian lands were under the rules 
of the Russian Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, where the formation 
of Ukrainian or Belorussian nations started. However, many of the Ru-
thenian peasants had not yet been assimilated to any nationality until the 
twentieth century. They were no one but “tutejsi” (or autochtons) of the 
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lands, dependent on their Polish lords even after the Emancipation, where-
as the Russian Empire always treated them as Polonized branches of “Rus-
sian” nation and continued the efforts to de-Polonize them.
This chapter features these Ruthenians and the competition over them 
between the Polish and Russian elites. The focus of the discussion is the 
religious issue, especially the Decree of Tolerance (1905), and the Chełm 
question, the most visible consequence of the Decree.
Former Uniates in the Former Territories  
of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth
When the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was formally dissolved in 
1795, the Uniate population was unevenly distributed and more heavily 
concentrated in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania than in the Kingdom of Po-
land. Earlier research indicates that during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, Uniate peasants were already conscious of their confessional iden-
tity as Catholic, although they were still very far from any form of nation-
building. In 1838, on the eve of the Union of Polotsk (the “reunion” of the 
Uniate Church and the Russian Orthodox Church), more than one hun-
dred Uniate priests petitioned Nicholas I for permission to become Roman 
Catholic and not Orthodox if the Uniate Church was to be abolished.1 
Not all Uniates expressed such resistance to the empire’s policy of ab-
sorbing them into the Russian Orthodox Church. Resistance was peculiar 
to those Uniates living in the Western provinces concerned with the Union 
of Polotsk, and especially those in Congress Poland, where the Uniate dio-
cese of Chełm remained active until 1875. Uniates in Right-Bank Ukraine, 
where the policy to reunite them with the Orthodox Church had already 
been initiated during the reign of Catherine II, converted rather smooth-
ly to Orthodoxy. The main reason for this was the lack of dominance of the 
Uniate Church among local Little Russians there.2
1  Alena Fiłatowa, “Kościół unicki a tożsamość Białorusinów (koniec XVIII–pierwsza połowa XIX wieku),” 
Polska–Ukraina 100 lat sąsiedztwa 4 (1998): 201.
2  The struggle between the Uniate and the Orthodox church was seesawing in the Ukrainian lands.  Barbara 
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Before the Union of Polotsk, Uniates more or less evaded Orthodox 
Mass and sacraments. Conscious of their own confessional identity, they 
considered Orthodox believers as “other” and doctrinally schismatic. Those 
who moved to the Orthodox Church were called “Moskals” by those who 
did not. Smaragd Kryżanowski, the Orthodox Bishop of Polotsk and 
Vitebsk, mentioned conflicts between local Uniates and Orthodox believ-
ers in his letters. They called each other names such as “Moskals,” “apos-
tate,” or “Polish fools.”3 Since the locals had no distinct national identi-
ty, they were identified only by their religious association and were seen as 
Catholic or Orthodox. Both “Muscovite” and “Polish” were just alternative 
names for Catholic and Orthodox confessional identities.
Even before the Union of Polotsk, the Russian government made lo-
cal Uniate priests celebrate Mass and preach in their local (Ruthenian) lan-
guage instead of Polish in order to de-Polonize these regions. This was ra-
tional because not all locals understood Polish, and the switch from Polish 
to Ruthenian was accepted by locals. Notwithstanding this development, 
a segment of Ruthenian Uniates changed their rite and became Roman 
Catholic after the Union of Polotsk, while the majority became Orthodox.4
Yet those Orthodox priests who had previously been Uniate priests 
faced difficulties in fulfilling their functions after 1839. Many of them had 
never been taught how to conduct Mass in Old Church Slavonic. Parish-
ioners were even less proficient in Old Church Slavonic, although they did 
not understand Polish either. Pavel Ignatiev, the governor of Vitebsk, ad-
mitted that the integration of former Uniates to Orthodoxy was not go-
ing well.5 After the “reunification” of Uniates with the Russian Orthodox 
Church, they were no longer Uniate, but neither were they strictly Ortho-
dox. Having maintained Uniate-like characteristics in their culture, they 
Skinner, The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in 18th-century Poland, 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009).
3  Fiłatowa, “Kościół unicki,” 201.
4  Ibid., 202. As a consequence of this union, around 1,500,000 people converted to Orthodoxy. Paul W. 
Werth, The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia (Oxford: 
Oxford Universirty Press, 2014), 79.
5  Fiłatowa, “Kościół unicki,” 202.
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became quasi-Orthodox. Some researchers emphasize that this hybrid 
character of autochthonous peasants became one of the fundamental ele-
ments of future Belorussian identity.6
Although the attempts to make former Uniates fully Orthodox or Rus-
sify them were not very successful, the Russian Empire did succeed in part-
ly de-Polonizing them. In the mid-nineteenth century, Ruthenian peasants 
seemed to distance themselves from their Polish lords. Further, the Poles 
failed to mobilize Ruthenian peasants during the January Uprising (1863–
64), though there were exceptions, for example, in Congress Poland.7 
The Reality of “Nominally” Orthodox Former Uniates
Until the suppression of the January Uprising, the situation of Congress 
Poland had been different from that of other former Polish–Lithuanian 
territories. It enjoyed comparative autonomy, and the Uniate diocese of 
Chełm was the only place in the empire where Uniates could legally prac-
tice their religion. The autonomous status of the kingdom came to an end 
with the suppression of the January Uprising. It was then renamed Vis-
tula Land, and the diocese of Chełm, which included its approximately 
260,000 parishioners, was dissolved and merged into the Russian Ortho-
dox Church in 1875.8 The Russian Empire leveraged Orthodox immigrants 
from Galicia—who were Russophiles and hostile to the growth of Polo-
nism among Ruthenians—to establish Russian Orthodoxy and de-Polo-
nize the Ruthenian lands of former Congress Poland, that is, the Chełm–
Podlasian regions.9 
After 1875, Uniates of the Chełm diocese who longed to join Roman 
Catholic Church but were rejected became formally (but nominally) Or-
6  Michitaka Hattori, Fushigi no kuni Belarus (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 2004), 50.
7  Anna Krochmal, “Kościoł unicki w Galicji i na Chełmszczyźnie wobec manifestacji patriotycznych i Pow-
stania Styczniowego (1861–1864),” Teka Komisji Historycznej X (2013): 47–77.
8  According to the calculation by Kołbuk, the number of parishioners of the whole diocese numbered to a 
total of 260,156 in 1874. Witold Kołbuk, Duchowieństwo unickie w Królestwie Polskim 1835–1875 (Lublin: 
Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, 1992), 15.
9  Włodzimierz Osadczy, Święta Ruś: Rozwój i oddziaływanie idei prawosławia w Galicji (Lublin: Wydaw-
nictwo UMCS, 2007), 204–34.
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thodox. While contact between Roman Catholics and former Uniates was 
forbidden in the empire after the January Uprising, former Uniates were 
dependent on Catholic priests. Many of the former Uniates of Congress 
Poland registered in Orthodox parish records boycotted Orthodox services 
and sacraments and secretly availed themselves of various Catholic servic-
es and sacraments performed by Catholic priests.10 It is ironic that in spe-
cific cases, the attempt to de-Polonize Ruthenian peoples produced the op-
posite result.
After 1875, former Uniates of former Congress Poland not only became 
more dependent on local Roman Catholic priests but also grew their ties 
with the Galician Uniate Church. Many Podlasian couples avoided Ortho-
dox weddings and held their marriage ceremonies in Galicia, where the Uni-
ate Church still functioned. This became somewhat fashionable, and such 
marriages were called “Cracovian marriages.” Since “Cracovian marriag-
es” were considered illegitimate in the Russian Empire, couples who had 
“Cracovian marriages” were continuously pressured to marry in the Ortho-
dox Church, and their children were treated as illegitimate.11 Moreover, cou-
ples who married in Galicia could be fined for illegally crossing the border.12
Another popular custom among former Uniates was “burial without a 
priest.” When former Uniates did not want an Orthodox priest to super-
vise their funerals and they could not find a Catholic priest, they buried 
the dead by themselves. This custom was formally prohibited in the former 
Congress lands in 1882, and violators were fined.13
10 According to data (1876) presented by Cabaj, in six districts (Biała, Konstantynów, Radzyń, Siedlce, 
Sokołów, Włodawa) of the province of Siedlce, only 9.74 percent of formally Orthodox parishioners visited 
Orthodox churches; unbaptized (in the Orthodox Church) children numbered 1,307. Jarosław Cabaj, “Uni-
ci Podlascy wobec ukazu tolerancyjnego z 30 kwietnia 1905 r.,” Rocznik Bialskopodlaski IV (1996): 157–59.
11 According to data presented by Cabaj (based on Loganow’s calculation in 1913), in four districts (Biała, 
Kostantynów, Radzyń, Włodawa) of the province of Siedlce, 4,182 couples married in Galicia, while 8,703 
married in local Orthodox churches. Cabaj, “Unici Podlascy,” 159. “Cracovian marriage” had been a pun-
ishable offence since 1880. Witold Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska 1839–1918: między religią a polityką,” Ze-
szyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Studia Religiologica 32 (1999): 144.
12 Cabaj, “Unici Podlascy,” 159. The weakly guarded Russo–Austrian border was also crossed by parents with 
babies who wished their own children be baptized by Uniate clergy. Robert Blobaum, “Toleration and 
Ethno-Religious Strife: The Struggle between Catholics and Orthodox Christians in the Chełm Region 
of Russian Poland, 1904–1906,” The Polish Review XXXV, no.2 (1990): 115.
13 Cabaj, „Unici Podlascy,” 160.
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Those who were nominally Orthodox but did not follow the Ortho-
dox Church were called “recalcitrants” (“oporni” in Polish). There has been 
much discussion about how many former Uniates still remained attached to 
Catholicism. According to data emanating from the Orthodox side (shared 
by Bishop Evlogii Georgievsky), about 100,000 former Uniates were under 
the influence of Poles, including both Catholic and secular nationalists.14 
Another set of data from an investigation conducted by the Holy Synod in 
1899 revealed the number of “recalcitrants” to be 81,246 (nearly 18 percent 
of former Uniates).15 The governor of Siedlce reported that about 20,000 of 
136,215 “Russians” in his province emphatically claimed to be Catholic.16 
Until 1905, various punishments (penalties or banishment) were meted out 
to “recalcitrants” for working on Orthodox holidays, burying their dead in 
Catholic cemeteries, and so on. Occasionally, they were even deported to 
the deep interior of Russia proper.17
The Decree of Tolerance (1905) and Mass Conversion  
in Former Territories of the Commonwealth
The Decree of Tolerance, which was the primary issue in the religious politics 
during the twilight years of the Russian Empire, must be studied in the broad 
context of the Eurasian Empire as has been done by Paul Werth.18 Indeed, the 
status and treatment of former Uniates was comparable to that of other reli-
gious groups in the empire who had been forced into Orthodoxy and were al-
so the beneficiaries of the Decree of Tolerance. Yet, as part of the “Russian na-
tion,” former Uniates could not be put placed in the same category as various 
groups of “foreign” faiths. In this sense, former Uniates were very similar to 
the Old Believers, who were the primary beneficiaries of the Decree.
14 Ibid., 162.
15 Ks. Józef Łupiński, “Ukaz tolerancyjny Cara Mikołaja II z 17/30 kwietnia 1905 roku,” Saeculum Christia-
num 8, no. 1 (2001): 185.
16 Theodore R. Weeks, “The ‘End’ of the Uniate Church in Russia: The Vozsoedinenie of 1875,” Jahrbücher 
für Geschichte Osteuropas 44, no. 1(1996): 38.
17 Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 144.
18 Werth, The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths.
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The background of former Uniates was specific to them: the historical 
encounter of Ruthenianness (later, Russianness) and Polishness in their re-
gions. As nationalism flowered, the issues of confessional identity could not 
remain separate from that of nationality. 
Aleksander Łotocki (Oleksandr Lototskyi), a contemporary Ukrainian 
politician, analyzed the motives behind the conversion and the influence 
of conversion on the formation of the national identity of Podlasian Ru-
thenians.19 Karol Dębiński analyzed the list of converted people compiled 
by the Catholic Church, which was called the Liber Conversorum.20 Stud-
ies on former Uniates by contemporaries not only prefigured research on a 
group which requires special attention in regard to the effect of the Decree 
in the Polish–Russian borderlands, but are also valuable as primary sources 
for researchers of later generations.
Since that time, in Polish historiography there is an accumulation of re-
search into the consequence of the Decree of Tolerance among former Uni-
ate population. This research has established new facts and clarified many 
points regarding, for instance, the situation of the former Uniates before 
and after the Decree, and how the mass conversion to Catholicism affect-
ed their identity.21 Activities of external groups (Catholic Poles, Polish na-
tionalists, Orthodox clergy, Russian officials and so on) have been studied 
as important agents affecting former Uniates, as the latter rarely left their 
own voice in the historical record.22 The question of identification of for-
19 Oleksandr Lototskyi (published under pseudonym, Bilousenko), Kholmska sprava (Kiev: Vik, 1909).
20 Karol Dębiński, Ukaz tolerancyjny z dnia 30 kwietnia 1905 roku w diecezji lubelskiej: Wolność unitów po-
rzucenia prawosławia (odbitka z Wiadomości Archidyecezjalnych Warszawskich) (Warsaw: Drukarnia Spo-
łeczna Stow. Robotn. Chrześc, 1918).
21 Jarosław Cabaj examined the attitudes of former Uniate Podlasians toward the Decree. Cabaj, “Unici Pod-
lascy.” Robert Blobaum’s article is the most pioneering research available in English. Blobaum, “Toleration 
and Ethno-Religious Strife,” 111–24.
22 Tadeusz Krawczak researched the reactionary activities of the Orthodox and Russian nationalistic camp 
after 1905. Tadeusz Krawczak, Kształtowanie świadomości narodowej wśrod ludności wiejskiej Podlasia w 
latach 1896–1918 (Biała Podlaska: Podlaskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne, 1982). Witold Kołbuk, 
who researched Orthodox–Russian interference with the practice of the Decree, concluded that the De-
cree of Tolerance was strictly for appearances, and neither the tsar nor the Orthodox Church allowed for-
mer Uniates to leave “the Russian world.” Witold Kołbuk, “Skutki carskiego ukazu tolerancyjnego z 1905 
roku na ziemi chełmsko-podlaskiej,” Roczniki humanistyczne XLV–XLVI, no. 7 (1997): 239–49. Józef 
Łupiński pointed out the discord in the Orthodox camp due to the lack of consensus between the tsar, 
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mer Uniates, which is connected with the situations around the Decree and 
the conversions as their choices, and the separation of the eastern border-
land of the Congress Kingdom of Poland (the Chełm–Podlasian region) 
as a consequence of the loss of equilibrium caused by the mass conversion 
of former Uniates to Catholicism have also aroused researchers’ interests.23
The work of these historians reveal much about the Chełm–Podlasian 
region at a time of great change in the religious policy of the Russian Em-
pire, and have helped explain the role of religious issues in the political 
struggles between the Russian Empire and Polish nationalists in regard to 
the borderland. But less attention has been paid to the potential for a Uni-
ate revival.
In this study, based mainly on Polish sources, I am going to retrace the 
transformation process of the autochthonous identity into a modern na-
tionality by analyzing the outcomes of the Decree of Tolerance and reac-
tions and counteractions from competing actors in the region. My special 
attention will be directed to examining the possibility of a Uniate reviv-
al, which could provide autochthonous Ruthenians other options than be-
coming Polonized. By following developments before and after the Decree, 
the links between religious and nationality issues and the conflicts involv-
ing not only the Russian Empire and Poland, but also the Ukrainian na-
tion-building program become clear.
Mass conversion to Roman Catholicism and the Chełm question are 
the most significant issues that emerged from the Decree of Tolerance, and 
while this chapter touches on these, many researchers have also addressed 
the Committee of Ministers, and the Holy Synod. Łupiński, “Ukaz tolerancyjny,” 183–200. Meanwhile, 
Jan Konefał concentrated on the role Roman Catholics played in supporting former Uniates. Jan Konefał, 
“Towarzystwo Opieki nad Unitami (1903–1912),” Chrześcijanin na Świecie 114 (1983): 49–56. Mariusz 
Sawa discusses the identity question of the “tutejsi”of this region by comparing the approaches to vari-
ous outside groups (both religious and secular) toward them. Mariusz Radosław Sawa, “‘Unici chełmsko-
podlascy’ i ich potomkowie (XIX/XX w.)–kim byli: Perspektywa historyka-autochtona,” Bazyliańskie 
Studia Historyczne 4 (2014): 67–83.
23  Jarosław Cabaj, “Postawy ludności Chełmszczyzny i Podlasia wobec kwestii przynależności państwowej 
swych ziem (1912, 1918–1919),” Kwartalnik Historyczny 99, no. 4 (1992): 63–81. Andrzej Szabaciuk focu-
sed on the circumstances before and after the Decree in the Chełm–Podlasian region in his monograph 
dedicated to the Chełm question. Andrzej Szabaciuk, “Rosyjski Ulster:” Kwestia chełmska w polityce impe-
rialnej Rosji w latach 1863–1915 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2013).
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them. But another important and no less curious question has received de-
cidedly less attention: Why did a Uniate revival not occur?24 This chapter 
explores this question as well.
The Decree of Tolerance, April 17/30, 1905
When the Russian Empire realized reforms and liberation were necessary 
after its defeat in the Russo–Japanese war, it quickly set about changing the 
religious policy. On February 11/24, 1905, the bill that later became the 
draft of the Decree of Tolerance was introduced by the Committee of Min-
isters and confirmed by Nicholas II. Further, on April 17/30, 1905, “The 
Decree confirming the beginning of the Toleration,” or the so-called De-
cree of Tolerance was issued by the tsar.25 This decree enabled the subjects 
of the tsar to convert from Orthodoxy to other Christian faiths. Convert-
ing from Orthodoxy to other religions, which was considered apostasy, had 
been formally prohibited and designated as a punishable offense under the 
penal code of the Russian Empire since 1847.
The Decree contained seventeen articles. The main intended beneficiaries 
of this decree were the Old Believers, to whom seven articles (5–11) of the De-
cree were dedicated. The first, second, and fourth articles covered all Chris-
tian religions. In addition to those three articles, the thirteenth article, which 
focused on the places of worship for all Christian denominations, and the 
fourteenth, which focused on religious education (catechism, above all), ap-
plied to former Uniates. The third article, concerning nominally Orthodox 
people who actually followed the religion of their ancestors, was intended for 
non-Christian peoples, and therefore, did not apply to former Uniates.26
24 Konrad Sadowski’s approach to the question of Uniate revival is full of useful information and sugges-
tions, but it is tailored to understand situations in interwar Poland. Konrad Sadowski, “Religious Exclu-
sion and State Building: The Roman Catholic Church and the Attempted Revival of Greek Catholicism 
in the Chełm Region, 1918–1924,” in Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Hon-
or of Roman Szporluk, ed. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr A. Hajda, John-Paul Himka, Roman Solchanyk, et al. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 507–20.
25 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, sobranie 3-e, vol. XXV: 1905 (St. Petersburg, 1908), 257–58.
26 Ibid., 257.
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Mass Conversion
The Decree of Tolerance did not permit the foundation of new religious 
groups, and it only allowed tsarist subjects to select one from the many ex-
isting groups. Therefore, former Uniates, who had nowhere to return to, 
expressed their affiliation with Catholicism by converting to the Roman 
Catholic Church. 
Following the Decree, there were large-scale conversions from Orthodoxy 
to Catholicism. Werth has estimated that 252,571 people converted to Ca-
tholicism between 1905 and 1915 (214,949 out of them converted between 
1905 and 1906) in the whole Empire.27 Many conversions were recorded in 
the provinces of Vil’na and Grodna (approximately 62,000 cases between 1905 
and 1908). Eastern Belorussian lands recorded smaller numbers (4,000 in the 
province of Vitebsk, for example), while in Western Belorussia, where a large 
population of “recalcitrants” lived, far more conversions were recorded.28
There were discussions on the actual number of conversions. According 
to the data documented by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, approximately 
170,000 people converted from Orthodoxy to the Roman Catholic Church 
between 1905 and 1909 across the whole of Congress Poland, and out of 
them, 150,000 were from the Chełm–Podlasian region.29 The tsar’s govern-
ment officially estimated smaller numbers (100,000 cases), while the Poles 
overestimated the number as closer to 200,000.30 Today, many researchers 
tend to use the data documented by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, al-
though Łupiński suggests the possibility of an intentional underestimation 
of the number of cases by the Ministry.31
27 His calculation was based on the records of the Department of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Faiths. Werth, 
The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths, 210.
28 Hryhoriewa uses the data produced by the Catholic side. Walancina Hryhoriewa, “Wyznanie unickie a 
świadomość narodowa Białorusinów (druga połowa XIX–początek XX),” in Polska–Ukraina: 1000 lat 
sąsiedztwa, ed. Stanisław Stępień, vol 4., 205.
29 The Chełm–Podlasian region is defined as the Chełm region together with the Southern part of the Pod-
lasian region, which corresponds to the eastern halves of the provinces of Lublin and Siedlce. Ninety-five 
percent of such conversions occurred in 1905. These numbers are supported by the records of the Ortho-
dox Church. 
30 Kołbuk, “Skutki carskiego ukazu,” 240–41. Blobaum, “Toleration and Ethno-Religious Strife,” 120.
31 Kołbuk, “Skutki carskiego ukazu,” 240–41. See also Łupiński, “Ukaz tolerancyjny,” 197.
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There is no doubt that the Ruthenians of the former Congress Poland 
had the highest rate of conversions. According to Dębiński, the Catholic 
population, which was 32,769 in 1904, increased to 90,349 in 1906 in eight 
selected parishes in the province of Siedlce.32 The rate of increase was al-
most 280 percent.33 Many people converted to Catholicism in the province 
of Lublin, too, although the rate of conversion was much lower than in the 
province of Siedlce.34 In the Chełm–Podlasian region, the Roman Catho-
lic Church was a minority until the twentieth century. The ratio of Catho-
lic and Orthodox followers was approximately 1 to 4.5 until 1905, when the 
numbers were reversed. Between 1905 and 1909, more than 95 percent of 
those who left Orthodoxy wished to become Roman Catholic.35
The Catholic Church’s Attitude to Large-Scale Conversion
Because Uniate Ruthenian peasants of former Commonwealth territories 
had been dependent on local lords and intellectuals, or government offi-
cials, who were usually Roman Catholic or Orthodox, they were inevita-
bly affected by activities of those actors after the Decree. Further, as Roman 
Catholics of the “Historical Poland” became increasingly conscious of their 
Polish nationality, their attempts to recover their exclusive hegemony over 
Ruthenian peasants were assisted by the Catholic Church.
The Catholic Church welcomed conversions of former Uniates. Cath-
olic priests actively traveled around former Uniate regions and encouraged 
people to join the Catholic Church. Kazimierz Franciszek Jaczewski, the 
Bishop of Lublin, gave instructions to Catholic parish priests to register 
all those who wished to leave Orthodoxy and “come back” to the Catho-
32 In the province of Siedlce, there were nine parishes (dekanaty) total. The parish of Garwolin is excluded 
from consideration by Dębiński because it was exceptional in the sense that more than 95 percent of the 
population was Polish and Jewish, and Ruthenians were a very small minority. 
33 Cabaj, “Unici Podlascy,” 164.
34 According to a brochure published in 1918, the Catholic population grew by 109 percent (from 184,134 to 
201,052) in the sample districts of Lublin. M. T. (Maria Tańska) (oprac.), Sprawa chełmska (Warsaw: Na-
kład Gebethnera i Wolffa, , 1918), 19.
35 Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 148.
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lic Church.36 Since large numbers of former Uniates were rushing to local 
Catholic priests, the priests wanted the procedure for accepting them to be 
as quick and easy as possible.
In July 1905, Bishop Jaczewski asked Konstantin Pobednostsev, the 
chief procurator of the Holy Synod, for directions on how the Catholic 
Church should deal with former Uniates. In August 1905, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, pressured by the Orthodox Church, provided additional 
clarification of the Decree, and on August 20, 1905, the Department of For-
eign Confessions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced the con-
crete conditions and procedures for leaving Orthodoxy: 
Those who wish to leave Orthodoxy must first inform the local governor 
about their decision, and then inform the Orthodox bishop. An Orthodox 
parish priest has to confirm a person’s desire to leave Orthodoxy. If the per-
son cannot be persuaded by the Orthodox priest to remain in Orthodoxy, 
he/she would inform the local governor of his/her desire to convert. The 
local governor has to report this to the Orthodox bishop, then to the hi-
erarch of the church to which this person wants to belong. The Orthodox 
bishop sends this person the agreement within a month, and the governor 
gives the hierarch of the designated church the permission to accept him/
her. The local curia discusses the matter and informs the province’s chan-
cellery whether the person is acceptable or not. If the person is considered 
to be acceptable, the local curia has an obligation to report this to the gov-
ernor and the Orthodox Church. The governor then informs the Ortho-
dox parish about the conversion.37
The purpose of such complicated procedures was to make conversions 
from Orthodoxy to Catholicism long and arduous. It was the Holy Synod’s 
way of resisting the Decree of Tolerance. Twice in 1907, Bishop Jaczews-
ki made official complaints about these complicated procedures. However, 
36 Łupiński, “Ukaz tolerancyjny,” 193–94.
37 Ibid., 195; Cabaj, “Unici Podlascy,” 167.
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the seemingly complicated procedures did not discourage people from be-
coming Catholic because Catholic priests in practice accepted even those 
who had not completed the procedure for leaving Orthodoxy. In December 
1906, the Catholic Church in Poland summoned a special synod in War-
saw to discuss the Decree. The leading figure at the synod was Bishop Jac-
zewski. The synod stated the Catholic hierarchs’ intention of accepting as 
many applicants as possible into the Catholic Church. In 1908, the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs intervened and decided to treat as Orthodox those 
people who had moved to the Catholic Church without following proper 
procedures to leave Orthodoxy. Despite the repeated appeals by Jaczewski 
and other Catholic figures, and the discussions by the Polish Circle (Koło 
Polskie) at the State Duma, the procedures for leaving Orthodoxy were not 
made easier.38
Not all Catholic priests took pains to accept former Uniates uncondi-
tionally. Some priests rejected them upon finding that they had not fol-
lowed the legitimate procedures to leave Orthodoxy. Other priests demand-
ed bribes for accepting former Uniates (although Jaczewski had instructed 
them not to accept anything from converts).39
Since the Decree of Tolerance was not particularly detailed and did 
not pay special attention to former Uniates, many concrete problems re-
mained, and it took some time to resolve them. The most peculiar problem 
among former Uniates was the issue of “Cracovian marriage.” As already 
mentioned earlier, “Cracovian marriage” was invalid in Russia, and chil-
dren from such unions were considered illegitimate. In 1907, the Coun-
cil of Ministers made the decision to allow civil courts to legitimize such 
marriages, as well as the children born in them. The problem of age was 
also unresolved. The Decree guaranteed the freedom to choose faiths to 
adults only, while the Orthodox and Catholic churches had different stan-
38 Łupiński, “Ukaz tolerancyjny,” 196–97.
39 Ibid., s.198. Bribes were also offered to local officials to speed up the process. According to Polish sources, 
the commission located in Warsaw, which had jurisdiction over conversion cases, received approximately 
two million rubles in bribes from those who desired to convert from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. Ortho-
dox sources confirm this. Orthodox Bishop Evlogii complained that officials received bribes and released 
former Uniates from the Orthodox Church too easily. Kołbuk, “Skutki carskiego ukazu,” 241.
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dards concerning legal age. In the Orthodox Church, legal age was twen-
ty-one years old, while in the Catholic Church, it was fourteen. In 1910, 
the Department of Foreign Confessions decided that for the purposes of 
the  Decree of Tolerance, the legal age should follow the Orthodox stan-
dard of twenty-one.40
The stubbornness of “the recalcitrants” had always attracted local Ro-
man Catholics. Additionally, Poles’ compassion for the miseries of the for-
mer Uniates in the Chełm–Podlasian region was anchored in their resent-
ments over the suppression of the 1863–1864 Uprising. Roman Catholics 
tried to attract former Uniates to their side. To this end, their activities 
aimed at former Uniates included running such organizations as the Col-
legium Secretum, which was established in 1896 in Congress Poland and 
published underground periodicals for former Uniates, or as the Society 
for Defending Uniates (Towarzystwo Opieki nad Unitami), which was 
established in 1903 in Cracow and provided former Uniates with educa-
tion in the Polish language.41 In 1904, the Society drew up a petition to 
the Pope (Pius X) calling on him to recognize former Uniates as Catholic, 
and 56,500 former Uniates signed it.42 Another organization called Cath-
olic Association (Związek Katolicki), established in 1907 in Congress Po-
land conducted critical activities against not only the Orthodox Church, 
but also the Mariavite Church which exercised growing influence among 
Poles in the Russian Empire.43
The interest of Poles in Ruthenian matters was not limited to the re-
ligious sphere. Organizations like the Society for Defending Uniates and 
the Catholic Association contributed significantly to making many Ruthe-
40 Łupiński, “Ukaz tolerancyjny,” 195–96.
41 Sawa remarks that the initial activities of the Society for defending Uniates, which was connected to the 
Polish League (Liga Polska), later renamed as “the National League” (Liga Narodowa), can be traced back 
to 1897. Blobaum, “Toleration and Ethno-Religious Strife,” 116; Sawa, “‘Unici chełmsko-podlascy,’” 74. 
42 Łupiński, “Ukaz tolerancyjny,” 161–63; Kołbuk, “Skutki carskiego ukazu,” 245.
43 Having been excommunicated from the Catholic Church since 1906, the Mariavite Church was criticized 
by mainstream Catholic Poles. Blobaum, “Toleration and Ethno-Religious Strife,” 113. Kołbuk points out 
that the Holy Synod even supported the Mariavite Church with the hopes of making it strong enough to 
rival the Catholic Church, which was becoming more and more influential over former Uniates due to the 
strong leadership of the Bishop Jaczewski. Kołbuk, “Skutki carskiego ukazu,” 242, 245; Kołbuk, “Kwestia 
chełmska,” 149, 152.
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nians, especially in the Chełm–Podlasian region, pro-Polish. Cabaj points 
out that Polish secular nationalist activists joined the open-air Mass orga-
nized by the Society for Former Uniates.44 In addition to the schools run by 
religious-based organizations, Polish political parties also provided former 
Uniates with Polish-language education in several institutions, for exam-
ple, the Polish Motherland School (Polska Maciez Szkołna) run by Nation-
al Democrats (Endecja) and even the Light (Swiatło) run by essentially an-
ti-clerical Socialists. They were forced to move their activities underground 
by the government at the turn of 1907.45
Against the background of fierce struggle with Ukrainian national-
ists in Galicia, Poles were enthusiastically sought to facilitate the entry of 
Podlasian Ruthenians into their camp. Many contemporary publications 
in Galicia highlighted Poles’ sympathy toward former Uniate Podlasians.46 
Besides working with these former Uniate Podlasians, Polish activists also 
tried to awaken the Poles’ interest in them.47
The Counteractions of the Orthodox/Russian Camp
Łupiński pointed out that the decree was embarrassing for the Russian 
Orthodox Church. Pobednostsev, the procurator of the Holy Synod, had 
not been consulted during the preparation process of the Decree and stood 
categorically against it. Orthodox priests were uneasy about the large-scale 
conversions and were afraid of the collapse of Orthodox parishes in the 
former Congress Poland. In May 1905, Ieronim, the Orthodox archbish-
op of Chełm and Warsaw, warned about the possibility of persecutions of 
44 Cabaj, “Unici Podlascy,” 167.
45 Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 151–52. By 1904, the network of underground schools with curriculum em-
phasizing the study of Polish language and Catholic religion numbered 134 in the province of Siedlce. Or-
thodox bishop Evlogii was astonished by the “Orthodox” children of his diocese who addressed him in 
Polish during his visitation in 1903–1904. Blobaum, “Toleration and Ethno-Religious Strife,” 116–17.
46 An example of such publications seeking to inform Poles about former Uniates was Hospody Pomiłuj na Pod-
lasiu: Kronika 33 lat prześladowania unii przez naocznego świadka, which was published in Cracow, 1908.
47 Z ziemi chełmskiej by Władysław Reymont (1909) and several works by Stefan Żeromski were inspired by 
the tragic history of Belorussian Uniates. Makoto Hayasaka, Belarus: Kyokai-ryoiki no rekishigaku (To-
kyo: Sairyu-sha, 2013): 226–34.
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Orthodox believers in that region, and the local governors reported the 
volatile situation in the Chełm–Podlasian region to the governor-gener-
al of Warsaw. In fact, even stones were thrown at some Orthodox priests 
(probably by former Uniates). Since the Decree of Tolerance did not allow 
the conversion of Orthodox churches to Catholic churches, the former be-
came vacant in those parishes where the majority of parishioners had con-
verted to Catholicism. Further, government officials, at the request of the 
Orthodox Bishop Evlogii, did not turn over these churches to Catholics.48
On realizing that their position was in danger in the westernmost regions 
of the empire, the Orthodox camp reacted quickly. The figure leading the Or-
thodox side in its reaction to the crisis was the Bishop of Chełm, Evlogii Geor-
gievskii. In the sense that he was hard-working and extremely charismatic, 
he was the exact counterpart of the Catholic Jaczewski. He actively made his 
rounds in the diocese and called on Orthodox followers to adhere to the Or-
thodox faith. He also pressured the Holy Synod (Pobednostsev), and even the 
tsar, to lend more support to Orthodox people in the Congress Poland.49
To compete with the Catholic and Polish influences, the Orthodox 
camp had already founded organizations aimed to shield Ruthenians from 
Polish influence in 1905. The Confraternity of the Holy Mother in Chełm 
was one such organization. It engaged in anti-Polish propaganda and 
warned locals not to switch to the Catholic side. In addition, it conduct-
ed a campaign to vilify the Commonwealth as a suppressor of Ruthenians 
and to exalt the tsars as protectors. Another organization, the Confrater-
nity for the Protection of Ruthenians from Poles and Catholic Priests, was 
established specifically to counter the Catholics’ the Society for Defending 
Uniates. The journal Kholmskii narodnyi listok (1906–08) recorded a num-
ber of criticisms against Polish-Catholics by the Russian-Orthodox side.50
Comparing the activities of such Russian organizations with their Pol-
ish counterparts, Cabaj noted some commonalities: they both referred to 
history, although their interpretations of the history of Ruthenian lands 
48 Łupiński, “Ukaz tolerancyjny,” 191–92, 194; Szabaciuk, “Rosyjski Ulster,” 98.
49 Szabaciuk, “Rosyjski Ulster,” 94–98, 101–02.
50 Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 150.
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greatly differed. The Catholic side emphasized the persecution of Ruthe-
nian Uniates by the Russian Empire, while the Orthodox side emphasized 
the partition of the Commonwealth as God’s punishment for torturing 
Ruthenian Orthodox people.51
In the westernmost territories of the empire, the Poles’ focus on for-
mer Uniates, their anti-imperial, anti-Orthodox activities, and the rap-
id increase in their population as a consequence of the large-scale conver-
sions to Roman Catholicism led to a reaction not only from the Orthodox 
Church but also from the imperial government. To prevent former Uniate 
Podlasians from leaning toward Catholics and Poles, a discriminative poli-
cy against non-Orthodox subjects was introduced. The Włościański Bank 
(Peasants’ Land Bank) was forbidden from lending money to non-Ortho-
dox peasants to purchase land. Russians even used demagoguery, with Bish-
op Evlogii promising to divide Polish estates among Orthodox peasants.52
Toward the Separation of the Chełm–Podlasian Region
The last attempt to defend Russianness, or perhaps more appropriately, Ru-
thenianness, in the Chełm–Podlasian region was an administrative reform: 
the separation of the Chełm–Podlasian region from Congress Poland and 
its reorganization into an independent administrative unit called the Prov-
ince of Chełm (1912–1915).53
The Chełm–Podlasian region was where Orthodox inhabitants faced 
the most serious pressure to convert to Catholicism after the issue of the 
51 Cabaj, “Unici Podlascy,” 165–67.
52 Kołbuk, “Skutki carskiego ukazu,” 247–48; Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 142, 153. On both the Catholic 
and Orthodox sides, various demagogueries or rumors fabricated by rural clergy and parishioners unin-
structed by bishops circulated and occasionally drove people to panic. Blobaum, “Toleration and Ethno-
Religious Strife,” 119.
53 Until the separation, this region consisted of all or part of eleven counties in the eastern halves of the Siedlce 
and Lublin provinces. The counties of the former, where Orthodox population was relatively large, were 
Włodawa (56 percent), Biała (38 percent), Konstantynów (31 percent). Of the latter, the Orthodox popu-
lation formed a majority in Chełm, Biłgoraj, and Zamość. Blobaum, “Toleration and Ethno-Religious Stri-
fe,” 113–14; Kołbuk, “Skutki carskiego ukazu,” 248–49; Cabaj, “Unici Podlascy,” 168; Wojciech Trzebiński 
i Adam Borkiewicz (oprac.), Dokumentacja geograficzna, Z. 4: Podziały administracyjne Królestwa Polskie-
go w okresie 1815–1918 r. (Zarys historyczny) (Warsaw: Instytut Geografii PAN, 1956): 96–99.
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Decree of Tolerance, and this occasionally took the forms of terroriz-
ing or discriminating against their Orthodox neighbors. The region even 
came under martial law for several months so that the state could reestab-
lish there, but it could not fully halt anti-Orthodox violence. 54 Bishop Ev-
logii played a crucial role in realizing this plan, too. Three months after the 
promulgation of the Decree, Evlogii drew up a petition for the separation.55 
He proposed that “Kholmskaia Rus,” (the eastern part of the provinces of 
Lublin and Siedlce) should be separated from the Vistula Land and made a 
new province. He also proposed that the region should be annexed to the 
provinces of Grodna or Volhynia, if it was too costly to establish an inde-
pendent province.56
The idea of separating this region from Congress Poland had already 
been discussed by the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. When 
Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism appeared as “Great Russian nationalism” in 
the Russian Empire, the Chełm–Podlasian region, also called “Kholmskaia 
Rus’” or the “Russian Trans-Bug region,” was considered to be an impor-
tant strategic front in “the Russian world.”57
In the 1860s, the emancipated peasants of the region, the majority of 
whom were former Uniates, were targeted for integration into the Great 
Russian nation. It was Vladimir Cherkasskii, a Slavophile activist, who first 
mentioned the foundation of the province of Chełm in 1866.58 In 1878, 
the plan for separation was discussed at the Commission for the Affairs 
of Congress Poland but was rejected. In the 1880s, the idea was again pro-
posed, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, the governor of Siedlce, the 
governor-general of Warsaw, and the Orthodox bishop of Chełm and War-
54 Blobaum, “Toleration and Ethno-Religious Strife,” 120–23. State authorities demanded the Bishop of Lu-
blin transfer local Catholic priests disrupting social peace by zealously trying to convert rural Orthodox 
inhabitants. Reports sent by statesmen of Siedlce and Lublin provinces show how local Orthodox believ-
ers and state officials were threatened by daily outbreaks of “pogroms.” They reported about Polish employ-
ers’ wage discrimination against Orthodox workers.
55 M. T., Sprawa chełmska, 18.
56 Szabaciuk, “Rosyjski Ulster,” 103.
57 Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 142.
58 Ibid., 143.
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saw (Leontii Lebedinskii at that time) supported this idea.59 In the 1890s, 
Vladimir Bobrinskii, a representative of “the Russian–Galician Associa-
tion,” actively promoted this idea.60 However, during the nineteenth centu-
ry, the idea of the separation was never implemented because there was still 
optimism that the whole Congress kingdom could be de-Polonized over a 
long period of time. Moreover, there were opposing opinions on territorial-
administrative reforms from a legal viewpoint.61
At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the idea of separa-
tion finally came to fruition. The ecclesiastic administrative reorganization 
preceded the secular administrative reorganization. In February 1903, the 
governor-general of Warsaw sent a letter to the Holy Synod emphasizing 
the necessity of the formation of the independent diocese of Chełm.62 After 
the Russo–Japanese War, and soon after the Decree of Tolerance, the  Holy 
Synod made the decision to establish an independent diocese of Chełm on 
April 29, 1905. In June, this decision was acknowledged by a decree, and 
the new diocese began in September.63 The former archdiocese of Warsaw 
was divided into two dioceses: the archdiocese of Warsaw and the Vistula 
region, and the diocese of Chełm and Lublin.64 The secular administrative 
reorganization followed this ecclesiastical reorganization.65
The Chełm province was explicitly designed to be Orthodox domi-
nant.66 However, the regions where the Orthodox Church had dominance 
over the Catholic Church were too small (only the districts of Hrubesczów 
59 Ibid., 144, 146.
60 Ibid., 147.
61 Iosif Gurko, the governor-general of Warsaw, was anxious about the significant difference between the le-
gal systems of Congress Poland and the Russian mainland. Therefore, he seemed unenthusiastic about 
transferring the Chełm region to the Empire proper. M.T., Sprawa chełmska, 16–17.
62 Szabaciuk, “Rosyjski Ulster,” 103.
63 Ibid., 104.
64 Evlogii, who was a strong supporter of the idea of a separate province of Chełm, was appointed the bishop 
of Chełm and Lublin, while Hieronim was appointed the bishop of Warsaw.
65 Prior to the actual separation, several policies indicating the government’s intention to treat the Chełm re-
gion separately were formulated. In June 1905, the Chełm region was excluded from the limited concessions 
for local administration and elementary schools granted by the Committee of Ministers in the Vistula lands. 
During the second Duma of 1906, the “Russian” population of the Chełm region was guaranteed the right 
to separately elect its own representatives. Blobaum, “Toleration and Ethno-Religious Strife,” 123–24.
66 Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 147–148.
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and Chełm) to form a separate province. Consequently, the government al-
so had to include in the province some other regions where the Orthodox 
and Catholic populations were more equally split.67 The administration of 
the new province of Chełm corresponded with the administrative reorga-
nization in the Orthodox Church. The territories in Congress Poland be-
longed to the diocese of Warsaw and the Vistula region, and the province of 
Chełm belonged to the diocese of Chełm and Lublin.68
The Chełm Question in the Polish National Discourse
The Poles were unnerved by the separation of the Chełm–Podlasian region 
from the historical territory of Congress Poland. Lubomir Dymsza, the 
delegate to the State Duma from the province of Siedlce, emphatically ob-
jected to the separation. He argued that the separation would prove to be a 
serious mistake for both the state’s interests and the local inhabitants’ wel-
fare in his book published in 1911, which presented various demographic 
data on the provinces of Siedlce and Lublin.69 He opposed the separation, 
especially from the perspective of equal rights for Orthodox and Catholic 
inhabitants, which the Decree of Tolerance was meant to secure.70 He also 
condemned Russia as an oppressor of the Poles, despite Russia’s claim to be 
the leader of Slavic nations. He entreated that Russia should respect those 
nationalities who had no state on their own.71
To counter the Russian and Ukrainian national discourse, which 
claimed the Chełm–Podlasian region as their own (Russian or Ruthe-
nian), the Poles developed their own arguments. The important points of 
those arguments can be found in a brochure written by an anonymous au-
thor (with initials M. T., later identified as Maria Tańska) and published 
in Warsaw in 1918.72 Tańska called the separation of the Chełm–Podla-
67 M. T., Sprawa chełmska, 20.
68 Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 152. 
69 Lubomir Dymsza, Sprawa chełmska (Warsaw: Nakład Gebethera i Wolffa, 1911).
70 Ibid., 96–104.
71 Ibid., 119–20.
72 M. T., Sprawa chełmska.
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sian region “the new partition of Poland,” and attempted to demonstrate 
the region’s Polishness.73 The author mentioned many reasons to consider 
the Chełm–Podlasian region could have been a part of the historical Pol-
ish territory. The first was the geographical location of the region, which 
was a part of the Vistula and, not the Dnieper or Dniester basin. Second, 
it was only  Vladimir who brought the region into his realm; until then, it 
belonged to the Western Slavs.74 Added to those geographical and histori-
cal reasons is the third reason: the region’s religious tradition. Tańska men-
tioned the Church Unions of Florence (1439) and Brest (1596) as the ex-
amples of the region’s long familiarity with Catholicism, and emphasized 
the Commonwealth’s tolerant attitude toward Orthodox institutions (ed-
ucational and printing institutions above all), which was generally much 
friendlier than Russia’s attitude toward Ruthenian coreligionists.75
As for ethno-national factors, the fourth reason, Tańska claimed that all 
Podlasian (and Volhynian and East-Galician) peasants have Polish blood. 
She insisted that they, along with their lords, were of a Polish–Ruthenian 
mix, even though they became “Ruthenianized” while their lords were Po-
lonized.76 On the one hand, the author emphasized historical connections 
between the Chełm–Podlasian land and Poland, while on the other hand, 
she emphasized the lack of any strong relationship between this region and 
Russia. She recalled that in the third partition of the Commonwealth (1795), 
Russia did not specifically object to Austria’s claim to this region. Using this 
incident, she pointed out Russians’ indifference to the region and also noted 
that the emergence of the idea of separating this region from Congress Po-
land was a very recent development in Russia.77
The author placed a great emphasis not only on the history of the Com-




76 When Poles extensively colonized eastern territories during the medieval and early modern periods, Pol-
ish peasants (many of them were taken from Mazovia and Mazuria) became Ruthenian, while local elites 
assimilated into the Polish nobility. Ibid., 7. 
77 Ibid., 11, 15.
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ed legal and juridical features in Congress Poland derived from the Duchy 
of Warsaw. She also asserted the crucial differences between these features 
and those of Russia proper, and argued that the incorporation of the Chełm 
region into the empire’s estate-based system could cause great confusion as 
well as legal and economic disadvantages for locals.78 She did not fail to 
mention the different calendar systems adopted by Congress Poland and 
the empire, and insisted that the revision of the calendar created consider-
able difficulties in everyday lives of local Catholics.79
The Chełm Question in the Ukrainian Nation-Building Scheme
Former Uniate peasants in the Chełm–Podlasian region, who were yet to 
be integrated into any modern nation, could potentially become not only 
Russians or Poles, but also Ukrainians. 
The first attempt to “Ukrainianize” this group was made not by Ukrai-
nians, but by the Russian imperial government, which tried to introduce 
the Little Russian language in Orthodox churches in 1905, not long af-
ter the influence of the Decree of Tolerance became visible. Although 
the Mass was to be held in Old Church Slavonic, sermons were to be giv-
en in Little Russian, which was more similar to the local dialect of the re-
gion in comparison with Russian, so that parishioners could easily under-
stand them. The goal of this policy was to de-Polonize local churches and 
parishioners.80
When Nikolai Ignatiev, the Minister of Internal Affairs, advocated for 
the separation of the Chełm–Podlasian region from Congress Poland, he 
proposed that the region must become a part of the Volhynian province, 
which belonged to the general government of Kiev (the so-called South-
western provinces, where the predominant nationality was Ukrainian).81
78 Ibid., 20–26.
79 Ibid., 21–23.
80 Sawa, “‘Unici chełmsko-podlascy’,” 77–78. Bishop Evlogii required even Roman Catholic churches in the 
former Uniate region to introduce Old Church Slavonic and Little Russian (Ukrainian). Szabaciuk, “Ro-
syjski Ulster,” 98.
81 Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 146.
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Ukrainian nationalists in Eastern Galicia also had an interest in the 
Chełm question. They first approached the Chełm–Podlasian former Uni-
ates around 1907. The Shevchenko Society and Prosvita (Enlightenment) 
had begun their activities in the region, and Ukrainian nationalists be-
lieved that they had to be more cautious about the Polonization rather than 
the Russification of the Podlasian Ruthenians. Therefore, they welcomed 
the formation of the independent province of Chełm, which meant the sep-
aration of  “Chełm Ukrainians” from the Polish lands.82
The author of the abovementioned brochure seemed anxious about the 
eventual Ukrainization of the region. She pointed out the great distance 
that lay between the province of Chełm and Kiev given that the gover-
nor-general of the latter was also in charge of the province of Chełm. The 
author also criticized the transfer of Catholic parishes to the bishopric of 
Lutsk and Zhytomyr. She expressed her objections to those changes from 
the perspective of convenience. Presumably, however, the author did not 
underestimate the ambitions of the Ukrainian side in this region.83As the 
Ukrainians established their state, Poles hoped that even if the worse came 
to worst, the Polish–Ukrainian border would still be fixed on the Bug (also 
known later as the Curzon Line), although it was more likely that the Styr 
would become the borderline. This was desirable from the perspective of 
the ethnicity and religion of the people in the region.84
The Chełm question attracted the attention of the Habsburg monarchy, 
too. Poles were actively lobbying to involve Hungarians in particular in this 
issue because both faced the same menace: the Ukrainian national move-
ment. Their common interest was to prevent the Carpatho-Ruthenians 
from becoming involved in the Ukrainian national movement. The Pol-
ish Circle even sent representatives from Russia to visit Budapest to form 
a united front.85 During World War I, Austria supported the Polishness of 
82 Ibid., 155; Cabaj, “Postawy ludności Chełmszczyzny i Podlasia,” 69.
83 M. T., Sprawa chełmska, 26–28.
84 Adorján Divéky, Sprawa Chełmska a Węgry (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo “Przeglądu Dyplomatycznego”, 
1919),: 6.
85 Ibid., 6–7.
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the Chełm region, in contrast to Germany, which supported Ukrainians’ ef-
forts to nationalize the region.86
In 1917, the Ukrainian Central Rada proclaimed that this region was 
to be included in the Ukrainian state.87 In 1918, when the treaty of Brest-
Litovsk was signed, the Ukrainians got close to taking control of this region 
with German support. However, the Chełm–Podlasian region was becom-
ing increasingly Polonized due to the efforts of Poles, while the Ruthenian 
population was decreasing as a result of Russians’ appeals for the local Or-
thodox population to migrate eastwards.88
The Reactivation of the Uniate Church
Despite their enthusiasm about joining the Roman Catholic Church, for-
mer Uniates seemed to have no ambition to reestablish the Uniate Church. 
The top priority for them was being acknowledged as Catholic, and the dif-
ference between the rites in the two Churches was not of much interest 
to them. This clearly shows that, at least in former Congress Poland, Ru-
thenians had been firmly confessionalized as Catholics but had no nation-
al identity yet (whether Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, or Belorussian; appar-
ently not even Ruthenian). Although Hryhoriewa sees the reason for this 
in the longer local history of religious tolerance (or perhaps indifference) 
among the people of the region, it seems that their identity as Catholics was 
unquestioned, even if they were not really concerned about their Eastern 
ecclesiastical tradition.89
Still, there were some prospects for reviving the Uniate Church, but not 
from within the region. Interestingly, it was Russians and Ukrainians who 
discussed the possibility of reestablishing the Uniate Church. The liberal 
86 Sawa, “‘Unici chełmsko–podlascy’,” 75.
87 Ibid., 78. Ukrainianizing movements were followed by the German occupation during World War II. 
Ibid., 80. 
88 After the provocation of World War I, nearly 200,000 Orthodox inhabitants were evacuated from the 
Chełm–Podlasian region to the Russian interior. Some of them returned to their homeland, which belonged 
to Poland in the interwar period, and revived the Church Union. Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 155–56.
89 Hryhoriewa, “Wyznanie unickie,” 206.
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press in Russia argued that they must not abandon the possibility of re-
constructing the Uniate Church. They considered the Uniate revival the 
best counteraction to the mass conversions to Roman Catholicism, and the 
most effective way to protect Chełm–Podlasian peasants against aggressive 
Catholicization, and eventual Polonization. They argued that the Greek 
Catholic Church of Galicia, which was effectively resisting the Poloniza-
tion of the region, could be used as a model, although the Russian central 
government and Orthodox clergy did not agree with this position.90
In Ukraine, Andrii Sheptytskyi, the Metropolitan of the Galician Uni-
ate Church, had already initiated concrete actions for the Uniate reviv-
al in the Russian Empire in 1901.91 After the Decree of Tolerance, Niko-
laj Franko, a Studite monk of Albanian origin, and Jeremia Lomnytskyi, a 
Basilian monk from Lviv, became actively involved in the reorganization of 
the Uniate diocese of Chełm.92 The interests of these clerics were, of course, 
not unrelated to the Ukrainian nationalists’ program mentioned above. 
Such efforts aimed at the Uniate revival disturbed the Orthodox clergy. 
Bishop Evlogii categorically opposed the idea of such a revival, and he as-
serted that it is the reeducation of the former Uniates in Russian Ortho-
doxy, and not the revival of Uniatism that was most needed to exterminate 
the Polish influence in the region. His opinion was supported by the Holy 
Synod in 1906.93 The Ministry of Internal Affairs did not permit the revival 
of the Uniate diocese, but it allowed the newly converted Catholics (former 
Uniates) to practice Eastern rites in Roman Catholic churches.94
Inside the Congress Kingdom, Konstantin Maksimovich, the governor-
general of Warsaw, and Evgenii Menkin, the governor of Lublin, together 
with Bishop Evlogii, discussed the plan to re-launch the Uniate Church in 
90 Szabaciuk, “Rosyjski Ulster,” 90.
91 His intervention in Russian territory was justified by the old tradition of the Rus’ that entrusted a vacant 
diocese to the jurisdiction of the neighboring diocese’s hierarch. Ibid., 90–91. In 1907, Sheptytskyi re-
quested and received jurisdiction over all Uniates of the Russian Empire from Pius X. He seemingly was 
concerned that a considerable number of former Uniates converted to the Catholic Church of the Latin 
rite. Sadowski, “Religious Exclusion and State Building,” 512.
92 The former appealed to the pope, while the latter to the tsar. Szabaciuk, “Rosyjski Ulster,” 91.
93 Ibid., 92.
94 The Christmas of 1905 became the first such occasion for holding Mass in the Eastern rite. Ibid., 93.
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order to stop the mass conversion of Podlasian Ruthenians to the Roman 
Catholic Church. However, the plan was never realized.95 Nevertheless, no 
such effort for a Uniate revival came from former Uniates themselves.
I would argue that there were three major factors that impeded a spon-
taneous Uniate revival among former Uniates at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. The first is the lack of an intellectual stratum among former 
Uniates. Since there were effectively no Uniate priests available, former 
Uniates would have been largely dependent on Roman Catholics for the ed-
ucation of younger generations. The education provided in Polish may have 
facilitated the Polonization of the local Ruthenian society. Second, former 
Uniates lacked property. The thirteenth article of the decree allowed non-
Orthodox Christians to build, rebuild, and repair their churches and prayer 
houses, but it did not clarify if the institutional infrastructure confiscated 
by the Orthodox Church would be returned to non-Orthodox Churches.96 
Therefore, in principle, the former Uniates were without any ecclesiastic 
property even after 1905. The Orthodox Church did not return church-
es, nor monasteries, to them, and neither did the Catholic Church trans-
fer their institutions to former Uniates.97Additionally, the thirteenth arti-
cle ordered that the construction of churches must be carried out with the 
permission of the top priest of every religious group. Since there was no par-
ticular hierarchy among Uniates, no former Uniate could obtain such per-
mission to build a new church. Hence, the decree implicitly deterred the re-
vival of the Uniate Church. 
Lastly, Roman Catholics, who devotedly supported former Uniates, 
were not enthusiastic about reviving the church union, despite the fact that 
they made great use of the Uniate martyrology in preserving their influence 
over former Uniates. Even the Society for Defending Uniates failed to help 
95 Kołbuk, “Skutki carskiego ukazu,” 243; Kołbuk, “Kwestia chełmska,” 150.
96 Polnoe sobranie zakonov, 258.
97 After the suppression of the January Uprising, the Empire confiscated a part of the Roman Catholic 
Church’s assets in the Western provinces, with many of them closed and transferred to the Orthodox 
Church. Since then, the Catholic Church itself had been prohibited from building new churches or re-
pairing old churches. Witold Jemelity, “Sytuacja Kościoła Katolickiego w Królestwie Polskim po Rewolu-
cji 1905 r.,” Prawo Kanoniczne 48, nos. 1–2 (2005): 157–84.
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former Uniates to reorganize their own church. It only offered them pro-
tection against pressures exerted by the Orthodox Church.
The connection between the Galician Uniate Church and Ukrainian 
national interests was the crucial factor behind the Polish Roman Catho-
lic clergy’s lack of support for the reorganization of the Uniate Church in 
the Russian Empire.98 
Moreover, former Uniates themselves were content with the opportuni-
ty to convert to the Roman Catholic Church.99 However, the memory of 
having been Greek Catholics survived. It was in interwar Poland that “Be-
lorussian” people attempted to reestablish the Uniate Church (Neounia).100 
Those who had once migrated eastward, and then returned to their home-
land from Soviet Belarus made an effort to revive the union, and in 1923, 
Rome expressed its support for the project. Against all expectations, this 
new Uniate Church’s growth was impeded by World War II, and only one 
parish has survived.101
Conclusion
In concluding this chapter, I would like to confirm the hypothesis that, 
from a long-term perspective, the dissolution of the Uniate Church Lati-
nized and Polonized a section of Ruthenians (potential Belorussians/
Ukrainians) both in terms of religion and nationality. This process oc-
curred despite forcible attempts to de-Polonize/Russify the majority (an 
example of such an orientation was “Western Russism” [Zapadnorusizm] 
in Belorussia).
98 The fear that Galician Ukrainian nationalism might expand outside of Galicia through a Uniate revival in 
the Chełm–Podlasian region was the main reason Poles prevented the attempts by Galician Uniate cler-
ics to reorganize the Uniate Church in this region in the interwar period. Sadowski, “Religious Exclusion 
and State Building,” 518–20.
99 Jan Urban, a Jesuit, remarked that former Uniates no longer missed Uniate priests. Sawa, “‘Unici 
chełmsko-podlascy,’” 75. 
100 Krzysztof Grzesiak, “Efforts to Reactivate the Uniate Church in Lublin Region in the Interwar Period,” 
Roczniki Kulturoznawcze 5, no. 2 (2014): 45–58.
101 The parish of Kostomłoty, which now comprises the Roman Catholic parish of Siedlce, has not been ab-
sorbed into the Ukrainian Uniate Church and has preserved its originality.
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The conversion to the Roman Catholic Church and the formation of 
Roman Catholic identity became the route used by “recalcitrant” former 
Uniates to embrace Polish national identity. This transition was initiated 
primarily through Polish-language education. Even though the autochtho-
nous Ruthenians continued to use their mother tongue in everyday life, 
their younger generations became literate in Polish. Through the Polish-
language education offered by politically motivated Poles, former Uniate 
peasants in Podlasia were greatly influenced not only by Polish culture but 
also Polish political nationalism. Since the National Democrats were influ-
ential in the former Congress Poland at that time, and many churchmen 
supported this party, former Uniates who had become Roman Catholic 
quickly internalized the party’s message: unenlightened peasants who are 
potentially Poles must be educated to be Poles.102 Since the formerly Uniate 
peasants in the Chełm–Podlasian region had not identified themselves as 
Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, or Belorussians, their one and only identity— 
Catholics—eventually made them embrace Polishness, or perhaps more 
specifically the identity of “Polak-Katolik.”
Meanwhile, the Orthodox camp failed to draw in those “autochthons” 
in order to secure the region’s “Russianness,” an imperial rather than a na-
tional identity. Moreover, a Uniate identity, which could possibly steer the 
“autochthons” toward the Ukrainization, was not reestablished. The Pol-
ish national program had the advantage over its rivals because of the histor-
ical connections between Roman Catholics and former Uniates in the re-
gion, and this older identification was not interrupted despite conditions in 
Congress Poland (or Vistula Land), enabling its consolidation during the 
 Second Polish Republic. 
102 Stanisław Kutrzeba, professor at Jagiellonian University, tried to refute the Russians’ claim to Lithuania 
and Belorussia in his 1919 study which asserted that “Catholic White-Ruthenians consider themselves 
mostly as Poles.” Stanisław Kutrzeba, The Rights of Russia to Lithuania and White-Ruthenia (Paris, 1919), 6.
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Native Language Education  
in the Western Border Regions  
around 1905
Yo k o  A o s h i m a
Introduction
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian imperial govern-
ment revised its so-called Russification policy directed toward the empire’s 
western border regions and decided to allow the education of languages de-
scribed as “native” (rodnye), “natural” (prirodnye), and “local” (mestnye). 
Was this a temporal retreat from the “Russification policy” in the face of 
national movements, or was it a fundamental change in the policy toward 
the non-Russian population, or something else altogether? In order to an-
swer these questions, we need to explore the nuanced context of what actu-
ally happened. 
This chapter considers the process of transformation in the conditions 
surrounding native language education among non-Russian populations at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, especially around 1905 in the west-
ern border regions. In so doing, it shows how a small concession by the gov-
ernment resulted in fundamental changes to Russian imperial society. The 
western border regions always had special political significance for the Rus-
sian Empire because they marked the empire’s point of contact with the 
Western world, which was considered economically and technically more 
advanced and culturally more sophisticated. As the link with “neighboring 
contiguous empires,” (Alexei Miller) this region was inhabited by various 
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national groups whose members spread over these imperial borders.1 For 
the imperial elites, the western regions used to be “a showcase for the em-
pire’s Europeanness.” However, serving as the gateway through which the 
age of nationalism penetrated the empire, gradually they became a threat to 
the stability of the empire.2 In this sense, the western border regions were 
the frontline of the empire’s national issues.
In the midst of the war with Japan, the imperial government planned a 
re-examination of the guiding principles of the state under the pressure of 
social ferment. Under the tsar, meetings “to discuss the need for reorganiza-
tion of the state” were held on December 2, 6, and 8, 1904, the participants 
of which were the Chairperson of the Committee of Ministers Sergei Witte, 
the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Minis-
ter of the Interior Petr Sviatopolk-Mirskii, and all the other ministers and 
most important state bureaucrats.3 The result of this meeting, “The Decree 
on Directions (prednachertanii) to Improve State Order” was signed by the 
tsar on December 12, 1904.4 Relating to non-Russian populations, among 
the most important provisions was article 7, which addressed “the rights of 
non-Russians (inorodtsy) and local natives (urozhentsy) of individual areas of 
the Empire.” Subsequently, based on this article, the Committee of Minis-
ters began deliberating on the concrete measures that could fulfill those “Di-
rections” in the first half of 1905, which gradually took shape in the form 
of laws and administrative instructions, including the introduction of non-
Russian education.5 However, rather than reducing the social turmoil, those 
1  On “the macrosystem of continental empires,” see Alexei Miller, The Romanov Empire and National-
ism: Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2008), 20–27. 
2  Karsten Brüggemann, “Representing Empire, Performing Nation? Russian Officials in the Baltic Prov-
inces (Late Nineteenth/Early Twentieth Centuries)” Ab Imperio 3 (2014): 236, 261.
3  B.V. Anan’ich and V.S. Diakin, eds., Krizis samoderzhaviia v Rossii 1895–1917 (Leningrad: Nauka, 
1984), 165.
4  Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (PSZ), series 2, no. 25495 (December 12, 1904), “O pred-
nachertaniiakh k usovershenstvovaniiu gosdarstvennogo poriiadka.” 
5  I analyzed the features of this discussions previously. See: Y. Aoshima, “Reforma imperskogo ob-
shchestva: peremeny v iazykovoi politike v shkolakh zapadnykh okrain Rossiiskoi imperii v 1904–1905 
gg.,” in Millerovskie chteniia—2018: Preemstvennost’ i traditsii v sokhranenii i izuchenii dokumetal’nogo 
akademicheskogo naslediia: Materialy II Mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, 24–26 maia 2018 g., 
Sankt-Peterburg, ed. I.V. Tunkina (St. Petersburg: Renome, 2018), 506–14.
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measures accelerated demands from local non-Russian populations. Peti-
tions based on governmental announcements flowed into various offices.
Why did the government take the risky step of acknowledging the right 
of non-Russians to introduce non-Russian languages in schools? Before an-
swering this, we need to remember the traditional methods used by the 
Russian government to rule its border regions. Russian imperial policies 
had been inconsistent, differing significantly according to the period, re-
gion, administrative department; even individual officials who held various 
posts made a difference in how borderlands were treated.6 Political deci-
sions were influenced by the aggregation of administrative practices with-
in separate administrative units, rather than unified instructions toward 
all non-Russian populations. One of the factors that influenced these ad-
ministrative practices was “the Russian nationalist perspective” (as  Alexei 
Miller put it) toward a region. For example, the authorities’ attitudes dif-
fered significantly between the nine Western Provinces, which the gov-
ernment firmly regarded as Russian national territory, and the Baltic Prov-
inces, which did not necessarily hold such a position in the imperial mind.7 
In this sense, the government dealt with problems relating to non-Russian 
populations quite differently according to the region, rather than accord-
ing to the national group. 
It is true that some specific national problems posed serious political 
challenges to the government. Among the most important was the so-called 
6  Edward C. Thaden proposed the already well-known classification of “Russification”: unplanned, ad-
ministrative, and cultural. Alexei Miller, highly evaluating this first step, criticized “the Thaden clas-
sification does not single out any regional peculiarities.” Miller pointed out “the absence of unity on 
the questions of the tactics and strategy of Russifying efforts between the state and society, as well as 
within the bureaucracy between various social movements and within those movements […].” Edward 
C. Thaden, ed., Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1981); Miller, The Romanov Empire, 46–47, 55. 
7  Alexei Miller, “The Empire and the Nation in the Imagination of Russian Nationalism,” in Imperial 
Rule, ed. Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2004), 9–26. The “men-
tal map” of the Russian government and society varied depending on the situation and the individual 
involved. The attempt to understand the regional perspective of various groups in the Russian Empire 
has recently begun. For a general overview, see: Steven Seegel, Mapping Europe’s Borderlands: Russian 
Cartography in the Age of Empire (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012); for an analysis dedi-
cated to Lithuania, see: Darius Staliūnas, ed., Spatial Concepts of Lithuania in the Long Nineteenth Cen-
tury (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2016).
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“Polish question,” especially after two uprisings.8 However, the government 
still tended to cope with these questions in a regional framework rather than 
as a general ethnic minority issue. The government preferred to solve prob-
lems relating to local non-Russians at the discretion of each administrative 
unit depending on each situation. The 1904–1905 discussion in the govern-
ment shared this previous feature, but the result was different. This paper ex-
amines this change in the historical context surrounding the introduction 
of native language education, shedding lights on the Kingdom of Poland 
and the Baltic Provinces. From the governmental perspective, these two re-
gions were relatively separate from Russian national territory.9 In this sense, 
the change of policies was more visible in these two regions than in the nine 
Western Provinces the government viewed as national territory and, conse-
quently, where it firmly maintained the so-called Russification policy. 
The main concern of the government had been to maintain stability in 
all regions of the empire.10 The government perceived the means to guaran-
tee the stability in a variety of ways, but we can identify two tendencies after 
the 1863–64 Uprising. One gave sufficient attention to the interests of local 
8  “The Polish question” was of critical importance for the Russian Empire, partially because the dis-
loyal elites posed a threat to the empire, which was based on the solidarity of multiethnic elites, and 
partially because the Poles were the ruling elites in the areas that were allegedly Russian territory in-
habited by Little Russians and Belorussians, which composed All-Russian nation together with the 
Great Russians. Accordingly, academic attention has been paid to the area. Leonid Gorizontov, Para-
doksy imperskoi politiki: Poliaki v Rossii i Russkie v Pol’she (Moscow: Indrik, 1999); Alexei Miller, The 
Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century (Budapest: CEU 
Press, 2003); Theodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russifi-
cation on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); Mikhail 
Dolbilov and Alexei Miller, Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Oboz-
renie, 2006); Darius Staliūnas, Making Russians: Meaning and Practice of Russification in Lithuania 
and Belarus after 1863 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007); Mikhail Dolbilov, Russkii krai, chuzhaia vera: 
etnokonfessional’naia politika imperii v litve i belorussii pri Aleksandre II (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnor 
Obrazovanie, 2010); Faith Hillis, Children of Rus’: Right-bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian 
Nation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).
9  The Kingdom of Poland was the target of “the Polish question,” of course, but the governmental strat-
egy differed between the Kingdom of Poland and the Western Provinces that were regarded as Rus-
sian national territory. Dolbilov and Miller, Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii. Regarding the general 
view of the language politics in the Western regions around 1905, see: V.S. Diakin, Natsional’nyi vopros 
vo vnutrennei politike tsarisma (XIX-nachalo XX vv.) (St. Peterburg: LISS, 1998), 36–40.
10 According to Theodore Weeks, “first and foremost, the government aimed to defend the unity and in-
tegrity of the Russian state,” and “the Russian imperial government, far from pursuing a consistently 
nationalist course, reacted rather than acted.” Weeks, Nation and State, 5, 13.
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non-Russian residents; the other pursued “the Russian Cause” by promot-
ing the Russian language and protecting Russians’ interests. The direction 
that officials adopted in each instance depended on individual situations. 
The fluctuation between the two main tendencies continued up to the be-
ginning of the twentieth century. 
The decree of December 12, 1904 implied that the central government 
had a rather tolerant attitude toward non-Russian populations. The Com-
mittee of Ministers also subsequently interpreted the seventh article to favor 
the rights of non-Russian subjects, at least in its discourse.11 However, the 
article of the decree itself included the abovementioned two opposing ten-
dencies even in the same sentence. Additionally, the Committee of Minis-
ters discussed the rights of non-Russian populations in traditional ways: sep-
arately, and by administrative unit. What was different this time is that they 
examined the rights of non-Russians in various regions at the central level 
simultaneously.12 This brought about something new. Various non-Russian 
groups in various regions enthusiastically raised their demands relating to 
the native language education in close succession, to which the government 
responded by referencing administrative practices in other regions as well as 
the decisions of the Committee of Ministers. On the one hand, the princi-
ple of respecting the native language in schools gradually expanded and con-
solidated. On the other hand, this situation provoked the fervent aspiration 
to protect Russians’ interests in the peripheries of the empire. 
Native Language Education Before 1904–1905
Prior to 1904–1905, the matter of native language in schools had been dis-
cussed in various regions regarding various types of educational institu-
tions and organizations. Here I explore the points of the discussion con-
11 The Committee of Ministers’ discussion took on a “liberal-reformist tone.” Anan’ich and Diakin, eds., 
Krizis samoderzhaviia v Rossii, 167.
12 There were precedents regarding deliberative organs established in the central government that dis-
cussed matters concerning the border regions, such as the Western Committee around the 1863–64 
Uprising. However, usually those organs dealt with specific regions in reaction to specific matters. For 
more on the Western Committee, see: Miller, The Ukrainian Question, 139–45.
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cerning native language education in the two regions, the Kingdom of 
Poland and the Baltic provinces, where the government granted some con-
cessions around 1905.
Let us begin by looking back to the pre-history of such education in the 
Kingdom of Poland, which was based on the discussions of the Commit-
tee of Ministers concerning the reexamination of the rights of non-Rus-
sians in 1905. Educational policy toward the Kingdom of Poland had vac-
illated between educational and political goals after the 1830–31 Uprising. 
After the uprising, the government began to control educational institu-
tions in the area, but once Alexander II ascended the throne, the govern-
ment mitigated these repressive policies.13 Nikolai Miliutin, known as an 
“enlightened bureaucrat,” formulated a tolerant educational policy toward 
the Kingdom and promulgated it on August 30, 1864 as a Tsar’s Rescript, 
which expressed Alexander II’s determination to consider only “disinterest-
ed service to education, constantly improving the public education system 
in the Kingdom.”14 To achieve this, “the opportunity should be given to the 
Polish youth to study in their native language (ego prirodnyi iazyk).”15 Yet 
despite these declarations, by the late 1860s, the Russian language became 
the language of education in the Kingdom. In 1872, the same gymnasia 
law as had been introduced in the internal provinces was implemented, and 
in 1885, in elementary schools, the educational language became Russian, 
except for non-Orthodox religious instruction and the native language 
of pupils.16 Regarding private schools, after the new rule to teach physics, 
mathematics, and history in the Russian language was introduced in 1869, 
subsequently, all subjects were taught in primarily in Russian though no 
clear rule was issued.17
What were the actual problems surrounding the educational language 
in the area just before 1904–1905? Let us take the discussion on native lan-
13 Zhurnaly Komiteta Ministrov po ispolneniiu ukaza 12 dekabria 1904 g. (St. Petersburg, 1905), 386–68.
14 Ibid., 381–82.
15 Ibid., 382.
16 Ibid., 382–83; S.V. Rozhdestvenskii, Istoricheskii obzor deiatel’nosti Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshche-
niia, 1802–1902 (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia, 1902): 586–92.
17 Zhurnal, 402; Rosiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGIA), f. 733, op. 166, d. 737, l.28.
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guage in elementary schools as an example. The 1893 edition of the em-
pire’s Digest of the the Laws proposed that non-Orthodox religious instruc-
tion and courses on the native language of pupils should be taught in that 
language in the elementary schools of the Kingdom.18 On this matter, local 
people often complained to the Warsaw governor-general that the Polish 
language was not being taught to a satisfactory extent. On November 11, 
1897, Governor-general Aleksandr Imeretinskii asked the overseer of the 
Warsaw educational district about the actual condition of the Polish lan-
guage education, considering complaints from below as justifiable, because 
“in schools where the vast majority of pupils is composed of native people 
from the  area and which are financed mainly by local communities, resi-
dents have a right to anticipate, even to demand that their children properly 
learn native literacy.”19 In response to this, the Overseer, Valerian Ligin, in-
vestigated the condition of the Polish language in so-called Polish schools, 
where the teaching of this subject was obligatory by law.20 He found that 
among the thirty-six hours of study a week, Polish language classes occu-
pied four instructional hours on average although there was great variabil-
ity according to school districts; in contrast, Russian language classes took 
up twelve hours. Among 2,183 Polish elementary schools in 1897, in 179 
of them (8 percent) Russian teachers taught the Polish language. Accord-
ing to Ligin, the assumption of the governor-general was somewhat valid. 
Therefore, on February 19, 1899, he created an improvement plan, designed 
mainly to enhance Polish language education. It planned to increase Pol-
ish language classes to six hours a week and transfer Russian teachers from 
their posts in Polish schools to Russian ones, gradually replacing them with 
Polish teachers.21 Ligin concluded that the institutionalization of courses 
in the state language had already been solidified by thirty years of prac-
tice in the Warsaw educational district, and that strengthening the Polish 
18 Svod zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (SZ), ed. 1893, article 3686, 3687. The number of classes other than 
Polish language: religious instruction—2, Russian language—12, history and geography—3, arithme-
tic—8, calligraphy—2, drawing—1, singing—2. RGIA, f. 733, op. 172, d.1435, l.3.
19 RGIA, f. 733, op. 172, d.1435, l. 1.
20 Ibid., 2.
21 Ibid., 3.
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language would, therefore, not distract pupils from being successful in the 
Russian language.22 Thus, governmental officials sometimes tried to give 
more consideration to the local language, though often on the condition of 
the continued predominance of the Russian language. The Minister of Ed-
ucation agreed to Ligin’s suggestion in April 1899 and sent secret instruc-
tions to the Overseer of the Warsaw educational district on April 30, 1899.23 
However, once the head of the educational district changed, this mod-
erate improvement plan was rejected. The following Overseer, Grigorii 
Zenger (1902–04) petitioned to cancel the replacement of teachers. The 
letter to the minister from July 19, 1900, which Vladimir Beliaev actual-
ly wrote for Zenger based on the reports on local directors of the school di-
rectorate, complained that the sudden order promoting the “avoidance of 
Russian teachers” confused the process of appointing new teachers, which 
only produced a serious lack of teachers as a result.24 According to local of-
ficials, this replacement was not only “unfair” to Russian teacher candi-
dates, but also “dangerous.” Orthodox teachers played the role of “mission-
aries” to protect “young true Russian children,” mainly children of lower 
ranking officers in the area. In some cases, their parents came to the region 
“for the Russian cause,” but had no possibility of returning to “core Rus-
sia (korennaia Rossiia).”25 They felt “abandoned among the non-Orthodox 
population” and could not educate their children in the rules of the Ortho-
dox faith, which meant that, in the end, they “must be Catholicized.” It was 
necessary, therefore, to maintain or even increase the number of Orthodox 
teachers in Polish schools for the “Russian cause in general.” For these rea-
sons, the Overseer considered it “highly desirable to leave Russian teach-
ers” in Polish schools under the condition that they “familiarize themselves 
with the local language.” Thus, the Overseer stubbornly insisted on the pro-
tection of Russians’ interest in preserving Russian rule in this region even 
at the expense of few opportunities for Poles to learn the Polish language 
22 Ibid., 4.
23 Ibid., 5–7, 20.
24 Ibid., 10.
25 Ibid., 12.
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 simply as an educational subject. As a result of this letter, the idea of replac-
ing Russian teachers with Polish ones was immediately rejected.26 
Aleksandr Shvarts, the subsequent Overseer of the Warsaw educational 
district, went one step further to decrease educational opportunities for Pol-
ish pupils.27 He demanded a reduction of the educational program from four 
years to three years in total because the four-year curriculum proved over-
ly burdensome for local residents. According to his suggestion, for example, 
in the one-class school, local language instruction would be reduced from 
six to four hours, while the Russian language continued to be twelve hours.28 
On June 22, 1904, the Scholarly Committee of the Ministry of Education 
mostly agreed to the new educational program, though with some reserva-
tions. For example, the committee changed the wording regarding Russian 
language use in the classroom from “require” to “recommend” because it was 
not practical to enforce if teachers were Polish, and, in addition, opposed  the 
reduction of Polish language education in the curriculum in general.29 Be-
fore 1904–05, local languages were permitted, but only as a separate subject, 
and the local educational office often firmly opposed even slightly increasing 
the number of classes—from four to six hours, for example. Even though the 
central office took an accommodating view toward non-Russian residents, it 
was still sensitive to the voices of local officials. The local officials’ obstinate 
attitude impeded a small concession to local non-Russians. 
We can find a similar example in the Riga educational district. Yet, 
whereas in the Warsaw district, the power of local Polish elites had been of-
ficially nullified, here local communal organizations—composed of rep-
resentatives of the Lutheran church, the nobility, peasants, and schools 
themselves—maintained substantial power over educational matters.30 
26 Ibid., 8–13.
27 Aleksandr Shvarts served as the Overseer of the Riga educational district from 1900 to 1902, the War-
saw educational district from 1902 to 1905, the Moscow Educational District in 1905, and from 1908 
to 1910, he was the Minister of Education.
28 RGIA, f. 733, op. 172, d.1435, l. 19–27.
29 Ibid., 29–34.
30 Zhurnal, 461–62; Rozhdestvenskii, Istoricheskii obzor, 581; SZ, 3568–3611; Büggemann, “Representing 
Empire, Performing Nation?” 242–43; Thaden, Russification, 68–72.
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As suspicions toward the German-speaking Lutheran nobility and clergy 
grew in the mid-1880s, according to the explanation of the Committee of 
Ministers of 1905, a desire emerged to “liberate” the Estonian and Latvi-
an population from German influence and to “replace” it with Russian in-
fluence.31 For this purpose, officials sought to promote the gradual pene-
tration of the Russian language into local schools and, at the same time, to 
transfer local private and elementary schools, previously under the jurisdic-
tion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to the control of the directors and 
inspectors of the Ministry of Education.32 Since local communal bodies re-
mained in place even as jurisdiction passed to the Ministry, confrontation 
between the local organizations and the local educational authority inten-
sified.33 The ambiguity of existing laws merely added to the confusion. The 
Digest of the Laws declared in one article (3617) that subjects taught in the 
elementary school included elementary German language, in addition to 
religious instruction, the Russian language, arithmetic, and so on, while 
another (3640) claimed that permissible educational languages were Rus-
sian, Estonian, or Latvian: German was not mentioned.34 Additionally, ed-
ucation in the Russian language was gradually introduced even into private 
schools in the region, except for Lutheran religious instruction, German 
language, and other local dialects.35 Under these confused and repressive 
conditions, communal bodies went so far as to stop meeting and support-
ing schools financially.36
In this situation, the obstinacy of local officials was also visible. For ex-
ample, on April 27, 1901, the Iur’ev Philanthropy Association petitioned 
the Ministry of Education for permission to allow education in the Ger-
man language in their private school for poor children, based on Article 
3617 in the Digest of the Laws.37 In August, October, and December, 1901, 
31 Zhurnal, 463; Rozhdestvenskii, Istoricheskii obzor, 670. 
32 Zhurnal, 463–64; Rozhdestvenskii, Istoricheskii obzor, 677.
33 Rozhdestvenskii, Istoricheskii obzor, 678.
34 Zhurnal, 474; SZ, ed. 1893, article 3617, 3640.
35 SZ, ed. 1893, article 3741.
36 Zhurnal, 470–71.
37 RGIA, f. 733, op. 172, d.1807, l.1–4.
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the Overseer of the Riga educational district, at the time Shvarts, categor-
ically refused this petition in reaction to repeated inquiries from the Min-
istry of Education. According to Shvarts, Article 3617 was itself limited by 
a law from 1887, which allowed only Russian, Latvian, and Estonian as in-
structional languages in the first year of elementary school.38 Making full 
use of his legal knowledge, Shvarts refuted the association’s demands one by 
one, and regarded allowing local organizations to open private-styled edu-
cational institutions in the first place as undesirable because organizations 
were likely to exploit this permission to strengthen the teaching of the Ger-
man, Latvian, or Estonian languages at the expense of Russian.39 When 
the Ministry remarked that because Article 3617 was included in the Di-
gest of the Laws , it had the force of law, Shvarts responded that Article 3617 
had been left in the Digest simply because of a “misunderstanding or over-
sight of the codifier.”40 He contended that at stake in the interpretation of 
this article was the issue of whether further “school reform”—that is, giving 
the Russian language the opportunity to take root in this region though 
schooling—would actually occur or not.41 Shvarts attempted to hamper 
German language education firmly, and he even stood opposed to private 
schools with non-Russian language education in general. 
The local educational authority was apt to construe as their mission the 
inculcation of “the state language” into non-Russian populations, and for 
this purpose, placing limits on the use of native languages. On June 12, 
1902, the Ministry of Finance asked for permission to use the Estonian and 
Latvian languages in lectures on anti-alcoholism for the people (narodnye 
chtenia) in order to enable locals to understand lectures. On August 22, 
1902, the Overseer of the Riga educational district, Petr Izvol’skii refused 
this request, insisting on the necessity of using Russian in these lectures 
38 PSZ, series 2, no. 4455 (May 17, 1887), “Vysochaishe utverzhdennye Vremennye Dopolnitel’nye Pravila 
ob upravlenii nachal’nymi uchilishchami v guberniiakh Lifliandskoi, Kurliandskoi i Estliandskoi.” See 
also: Thaden, Russification, 71.
39 RGIA, f. 733, op. 172, d. 1807, l.15.
40 Ibid., 14, 19–20, 23, 28–29.
41 Ibid., 25–26.
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so as to promote the Russian language among the local population.42 The 
Ministry of Education nonetheless overrode Izvol’skii’s opinion and ap-
proved the request of the Ministry of Finance on September 9, 1902.43 The 
central ministries preferred the effective promotion of anti-alcoholism over 
bolstering the Russian language.44 
Before the decree of 1904, requests concerning the use of native languag-
es had repeatedly appeared in each region under different circumstances. 
In these matters, the local educational authority had often stubbornly ad-
hered to their mission to fortify imperial rule through the promotion of 
Russian language education and, accordingly, to restrain the use of native 
languages as much as possible, even when central offices preferred flexible 
measures suitable for each particular case. Under these circumstances, the 
revolutionary situation emerged in the midst of the Russo–Japanese war. 
The government was forced to find any social groups that might cooper-
ate with and support the government. The Committee of Ministers in 1905 
probably believed that if the generous central government were to reproach 
the excesses of local offices and to accommodate whichever petitions they 
desired as they often did, then local peoples would cease complaining and 
adopt a collaborative stance toward the government. 
The Decree of 1904 and the Committee of Ministers
The seventh article of the decree of December 12, 1904 impacted the situ-
ation in the end, but the government did not necessarily intend to princi-
pally transform the policy of native language education. In the first place, 
the seventh article of the decree itself was ambivalent: it asserted the general 
need “to re-examine existing regulations that restrict the rights of non-Rus-
sians and local natives in individual areas of the empire,” while restrictions 
42 RGIA, f. 733, op. 172, d. 2069, l.1–3.
43 Ibid., 4–5.
44 Just after the decree of 1904, the same discussion and disagreement between the local and central offic-
es took place relating to the Shlok Public Meeting of Livland province, which petitioned to hold lec-
tures for people in the Latvian language on December 24, 1904. Ibid., 7–24.
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on the rights of non-Russians, which were caused by “vital interests of the 
state and clear benefit of the Russian people (narod),” would be preserved.45 
From March to May of 1905, the Committee of Ministers discussed the 
concrete measures required to fulfill the decree. 
At first glance, the committee showed sincere support for the rights of 
non-Russian people, especially in the sense of permitting them to use their 
own “natural” languages in various administrative and social institutions, 
including educational ones. Yet this attitude was shaped not out of concern 
for the civil rights of the populations, but rather emerged from the idea 
of the Russian Empire’s generosity. The committee emphasized that when 
the Russian Empire incorporated “land inhabited by non-Russian peoples,” 
Russian monarchs sought to “guarantee to each nationality (narodnost’) the 
way of life to which it is accustomed.”46 Therefore, the committee stated, 
“the dignity of the Russian name, first of all, requires that each nationality 
(natsional’nosti) […] be given as wide a use of its own language as possible.”47 
Thus, the government firmly assumed that the rights of non-Russian people 
were granted as a result of the benevolence of the state, and therefore, that 
the government should have a power to assess “the possible range of allow-
ance” for non-Russian languages.48 
The approach of the Committee of Ministers was conventional as well. 
The discussions of the Committee of Ministers were separated according to 
administrative unit, as mentioned above: first, on the nine Western Provinc-
es (March 15, 22, 23); second, on the provinces of the Kingdom of Poland 
(April 5, 6, and May 3); third, on the Jewish population (May 3); and fourth, 
on the “non-Russian (inoplemennye) peoples” who inhabited the Baltic Prov-
inces and the Eastern Provinces (May 10). The members of the Committee 
examined these matters based on previous political observations and legis-
lative and administrative practices. As a result, the Committee of Ministers 




48 Ibid. 357, 359.
staulinas_book.indb   183 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:32
Y o k o  A o s h i m a
184
The order of the discussion and the number of days devoted to each 
region reveal significant features of official attitudes. The Committee of 
Ministers selected the nine Western Provinces as the first region for con-
sideration and upheld as the manifest “fundamental policy” there the task 
of “strengthening Russian dominance and weakening Polish influence,” 
based on the assertion that the region “had been Russian land since an-
cient times.”49 
In contrast, the committee construed the Kingdom of Poland to be a 
non-Russian national area inhabited by “an almost exclusively ethnograph-
ically single mass—the Polish nationality.”50 Here, the Committee of Min-
isters confidently stated, the government had no intention “of Russifying 
(obrusit’) the Poles and denationalizing them,” since they had been “ac-
quainted with European culture” and developed “their own language and 
literature to a high degree.”51 The goal of the government was “their possible 
rapprochement with Russian society, while maintaining the religious and 
ethnic characteristics of the Polish population.” Punitive measures should 
be mitigated, and the Polish language could be further allowed.52 But de-
spite all the sympathetic comments toward the Poles, the Committee of 
Ministers considered that the introduction of the education in the Rus-
sian language after the 1860s was a correct policy, and it insisted on princi-
ple that after 1905, schools in the region “should remain Russian as before”; 
that is, the educational language should continue to be Russian in order to 
preserve the idea of “Russian statehood.”53 According to the Committee, 
the reason the policy sometimes did not work well was that “the intention 
of the higher government” was “arbitrarily interpreted by the subordinate 
institutions.” In particular, “the local educational authority” showed “ex-
cessive intransigence and an obvious lack of goodwill to all Poles.”54 There-
fore, the Committee believed if they restrained local officials’ stubborn 
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 attitudes and showed some care to the Polish population, then they would 
collaborate with the government.
In contrast to the Kingdom of Poland, the Committee of Ministers per-
ceived the Baltic Provinces through the prism of an old estate society, em-
phasizing the “significant differences of the social system from the central 
areas of the Empire.” Society there was under “the cultural predominance 
of the nobility and clergy of German origin,” and the education of the re-
gion’s main inhabitants, Latvians and Estonians, “was conducted mainly in 
German.”55 The Committee of Ministers negatively reviewed the introduc-
tion of the Russian language in the Baltic Provinces and lamented the im-
portation of the same administrative system as in the internal provinces in 
the 1880s, which resulted in the “lowering of the cultural condition of the 
region.”56 To restore it, the Committee of Ministers counted on “the high-
er and educated classes of the Baltic region,” who were “always among those 
committed to the firm legal authority and state order.” Through education, 
the Committee remarked, those classes tried to inculcate “feelings of loyal-
ty to the Emperor, respect for religion, and the necessity of supporting the 
existing system among the peasant population.”57 The Committee of Min-
isters considered German elites as the loyal group in the region, and posited 
that if the government recognized their dominant social status, they would 
cooperate in securing the region.
Thus, the Committee of Ministers attempted to implement the seventh 
article of the 1904 decree by administrative region, with considerably dif-
ferent views on each of them. In general, the Committee of Ministers re-
vealed a hope that they might reconstruct the collaborative relationship 
with local ruling elites in the Kingdom of Poland and the Baltic provinces, 
while in the nine Western provinces, they adhered to the idea that the ter-
ritory belonged primordially to Russia, and decisively refused to recognize 
the Poles as the dominant power in the region. 
55 Ibid., 460, 467.
56 Ibid., 471.
57 Ibid., 471.
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The Committee of Ministers, emphasizing the original imperial toler-
ance, insisted on the necessity of reconsidering excessive restrictions on the 
use of native languages; remedying the “ambiguities of laws,” which evoked 
erroneous interpretations; and “going a bit further (poiti eshche neskol’ ko 
dalee)” to widen the range of use of native languages in schools.58 There 
were two main points of the proposed changes at this time: first, to secure 
native language and religious instruction in elementary schools and extend 
it slightly further, for example, to permit the use of native languages to teach 
arithmetic in the first year; and second, to allow for education in native lan-
guages, except in courses on the Russian language, history, and geography, 
in private schools without any state privileges.59 Thus, the Committee’s ac-
tual concession was not all that large: in the case of the elementary schools, 
it just slightly widened the range of the use of the native language, but in 
the case of private schools, it was a new attempt to permit education in na-
tive language, but it was limited only to the type of the private school that 
lacked any state privileges. But if we recall the administrative practices in 
each region prior to 1904–05, which stubbornly impeded the use of the na-
tive language in all circumstances, then it is understandable that the Com-
mittee believed their decision would be sufficiently tolerant and would pos-
itively affect the situation. However, the situation moved in the opposite 
direction from what the Committee anticipated. 
58 Ibid., 391, 399.
59 There was a type of private schools run with private or public funds, but they granted the state privi-
leges regarding pupils and teachers, such as the rights to further education, state service, and military 
service. If pupils of the private school with no state privileges wanted to enter higher educational in-
stitutions, they had to take the entrance examination in the Russian language. This was the main rea-
son the Committee of Ministers insisted that history and geography remain taught in the Russian lan-
guage. Ibid., 369, 401–04, 432–33, 475–77, 488–89; PSZ, series 2, no. 26162 (May 1, 1905), “Ob otmene 
nekotorykh ogranichitel’nykh postanovlenii, deistvuiushchikh v deviati Zapadnykh guberniiakh, i o 
poriadke vypolneniia punkta sed’mogo Imennogo ukaza 12 Dekabria 1904 goda v otnoshenii sikh gu-
bernii,” no. 26368 (June 6, 1905) “O poriadke vypolneniia punkta sed’mogo Imennogo Vysochaishego 
ukaza 12 Dekabria 1904 goda v otnoshenii gubernii Tsarstva Pol’skogo,” and no. 26452 (June 18, 1905) 
“O poriadke vypolneniia punkta sed’mogo Imennogo Vysochaishego ukaza 12 Dekabria 1904 goda v 
otnoshenii inoplemennykh narodnostei.” In the Kingdom of Poland, for example, the new posts of Pol-
ish language and literature were introduced in the University of Warsaw. However, the main targets of 
the discussion were elementary schools and private schools. 
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Expanding Demand for Native Language Education
Instead of subsiding, social turmoil escalated after the decree. In the King-
dom of Poland, already in the autumn of 1904, Polish public figures, with 
famous lawyer Vladimir Spasovich as their leader, sought to influence the 
government by petitions, as well as direct the general turbulence from the 
Russo–Japanese war and revolutionary movements toward the acquisition 
of regional autonomy in terms of language, religion, and administrative po-
sitions. The actions of workers, peasants, and students also became inter-
mingled with this movement, and together they demanded permission to 
use the Polish language in public institutions. The Lublin governor Vladi-
mir Tkhorzhevskii stated in his report on February 1905 that the decree 
of 1904 raised new hopes in Polish society. In particular, they interpreted 
Article 6 on religious toleration and Article 7 on the rights of non-Russian 
populations as benefitting them.60 In this situation, the Lublin governor in-
sisted that it would be crucial to “calm Polish minds” by making them un-
derstand the clear difference between the state language, which could on-
ly be Russian, and local languages, which could be used for family, church, 
and private communication. For this purpose, they demanded “an authori-
tative word” from St. Petersburg.61 
The disorderly situation in towns heavily influenced pupils in education-
al institutions in the Warsaw educational district. On March 2, 1905, Min-
ister of Education Vladimir Glazov (1904–05) expressed concern that since 
the middle of January, the revolutionary atmosphere had prevailed in the 
whole of Polish intellectual society. Among others, “pupils of Polish origin 
and the Catholic faith” submitted petitions that asserted that all schools 
should be taught in the Polish language by Polish teachers, and they boy-
cotted their classes. At the beginning of February, Overseer Shvarts, who 
had insisted on maintaining a resolute attitude toward pupils—including 
expulsion—in the end acceded to the suggestion from the local community 
60 RGIA, f. 733, op. 195, d. 702. l.1–3.
61 Ibid., 5.
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to hold a meeting to discuss measures for reestablishing order in the schools 
of the educational district and invite pupils’ parents to it. Once the meeting 
convened, however, it turned out that more than a thousand parents partic-
ipating in the meeting firmly called for the restoration of the Polish school, 
which Poles had lost after 1863. It was obvious that outraged pupils were 
supported by many parents and members of the Polish intelligentsia.62 The 
decree of 1904 resulted in fostering declaration of local society’s aspirations 
in the turmoil, instead of pacifying the crowd. 
In this context, the petitioning movement, known as “memorials” in 
Warsaw, was growing. Representatives of individual groups first petitioned 
the highest bodies of the government and then transmitted the contents of 
those requests with sympathetic comments to various newspapers in the 
Russian capital; finally they sold the papers in Warsaw, where Russian news-
papers had previously been rare. Shvarts regarded such efforts as enabling 
the spread of “false information” and promoting propaganda among pupils.63 
A typical case of the use of such “memorials” concerned the discussion 
on establishing advanced classes in girls’ private schools. The discussion had 
begun at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the Warsaw educa-
tional district had been very cautious in addressing it. Although district 
laws permitted private schools with three or four classes to exist, many pri-
vate schools asked for permission to have six classes. On July 12, 1903, the 
government decreed that those seeking to expand the number of classes 
should transform their schools into the governmental type of school with 
seven classes and accept the control of a Russian supervisor.64 In a “me-
morial” of October 1904 reacting to this, Spasovich condemned “the lo-
cal educational authority” for forcing school owners to transfer their pri-
vate schools over to the Russian administration while continuing to use the 
owners’ funds. Furthermore, Polish teachers were expelled even from pri-
vate schools, not for any demonstrable transgression but solely “for their 
nationality,” which “insults primarily the common human sense of legality 
62 Ibid., 33–36.
63 RGIA, f. 733, op. 166, d. 737, l.30.
64 Ibid., 17–18.
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and justice.” Spasovich argued that while it was understandable that boys’ 
governmental educational institutions were to be controlled because they 
provided state privileges, “there was no reason that girls’ private schools, 
to which parents sent their daughters just for education that met the de-
mands of their families, should be restrained.”65 In response, on December 
18, 1904, Shvarts emotionally criticized the note, cursing it as “unjustifi-
ably and impudently charged with completely false accusations” that im-
posed “improbable and heavy reprimands” on officials of the Ministry of 
Education for their “patriotic activity.” He accordingly appealed to Minis-
ter Glazov for “a worthy refutation of the unceasing attacks on us and a de-
fense of us from slander and undeserved insults.”66 In addition, he added a 
report from the general-governor’s assistant, which stated, “Warsaw female 
private educational institutions undoubtedly serve as one of the most dan-
gerous breeding grounds of revolutionary ideas.”67 
Just after the decree of 1904, the local educational authority contin-
ued to respond as repressively to the demands from the local society as be-
fore. The demands from the local society, however, gained force and became 
more systematic. Soon after that, on February 23, 1905, Shvarts reported 
that forty-eight petitioners of girls’ private schools had applied for immedi-
ate permission to introduce the teaching of all subjects in Polish into their 
schools, with the exception of Russian language and Russian history. Shvar-
ts, proclaiming that this “memorial” represented “the consistent and natu-
ral conclusion of derision aimed at the Russian authorities,” insisted that all 
the educational institutions whose owners had signed “the deviant require-
ment” be closed permanently.68 In the wake of this incendiary response, on 
June 3, 1905, Minister Glazov wrote to Spasovich defending Shvarts and re-
marking that the latter’s opinion was in line with the decision of the gov-
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authority was desperate enough to crush the aspirations of Polish society 
that the 1904 decree had roused. 
Yet, even as all of this was unfolding, on June 8, 1905, the Committee of 
Ministers reached the decision to allow education in the Polish language—
except for the subjects of Russian language, history and geography—in pri-
vate schools without state privileges in the Warsaw Educational District.70 
The district’s official journal, which informed readers about the instruction 
of July 29, 1905 concerning the abolition of restrictions on the use of the 
Polish language, added that, while private school owners hoped to intro-
duce the Polish language in their schools, in the case of schools that enjoyed 
the same privileges as state schools, school owners had to abandon these 
privileges and transform their schools into fully private institutions.71 This 
decision of the Committee of Ministers helped restrain the repressive atti-
tude of the local educational authority as well as encouraged the local soci-
ety to increasingly articulate their national aspirations. For example, when 
Shvarts received a petition to allow education in the Polish language from 
a boys’ private school on August 8, taking into consideration the Com-
mittee of Ministers’ discussion, he decided to accept the petition and add-
ed that this case would be a precedent for the future.72 On September 4, 
1905, Glazov recognized that, after the decision of the Committee of Min-
isters on June 8, “the ever-increasing number of petitions indicating the de-
sire of society to have an upper school with education in Polish as soon as 
possible obliges me to meet this need.”73 The Minister concluded that he 
found it possible to permit private schools in the district to provide educa-
tion in Polish, thus reflecting the situation in the Baltic Provinces. On Sep-
tember 7, he asked the Committee of Ministers for a prompt ruling of offi-
70 Zhurnal, 433. At this stage, a law on this matter was not yet prepared. 
71 “Po voprosu ob upotreblenii pol’skogo iazyka v uchebnykh zavedeniiakh Varshavskogo uchebnogo ok-
ruga,” Tsirkuliar po Varshavskomu Uchebnomu Okrugu. no. 9 (1905): 294–95.
72 This is about a petition from the Vavel’berg and Rotvand secondary technical schools in Warsaw to 
allow the opening of parallel classes (without any privileges) in which education would take place in 
the Polish language. In this period, the need for mechanical technician training for employment in lo-
cal factories increased, and accordingly the need to teach mathematics and physics in Polish also grew. 
RGIA, f. 733, op. 166, d. 737, l. 53–55.
73 Ibid., 61.
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cial law on this matter.74 The central and local educational authorities were 
shaken by the decisions of the Committee of Ministers, and, referencing 
the situations of other regions, obeyed it.
Local society in the Kingdom was further encouraged to submit pe-
titions. Indeed, in the middle of September 1905, owners of girls’ private 
schools simultaneously sent numerous petitions with the same request to 
the Overseer of the Warsaw educational district. All of them solicited per-
mission to teach all subjects, except for Russian language, history and ge-
ography, in Polish as soon as possible; their requests were urgent because, 
they wrote, parents refrained from sending their children to schools, wait-
ing for the time when this matter would be resolved in their favor.75 On 
October 1, 1905, St. Petersburg finally issued a decree that permitted the 
teaching of all subjects (except Russian language, history, and geography) 
in Polish and Lithuanian in private educational institutions without state 
privileges located in the Kingdom.76 Following this decree, on October 
21, 1905, the Ministry asked the Warsaw educational district to screen the 
private schools that had submitted petitions and to decide which of them 
could have more than four classes. On November 2, 1905, the next Overseer 
 Beliaev refused this request, finding plenty of legal reasons for his denial, 
and he attempted to make a new rule that would place private schools un-
der strict ministerial control. However, the central office replied negatively 
to this suggestion, noting that the decree of October 1, 1905 already had the 
force of law.77 Some officials still stuck to the old perspective, but the deci-
sions of the central government constrained their activities.
In the Baltic Provinces, the government treated the local German no-
bility relatively tolerantly from the beginning. One reason for this was 
74 Ibid., 72, 75.
75 Ibid., 76–161.
76 Ibid., 228–29. The Lithuanian language was also permitted, influenced by a demonstration in the Mar-
iampol’ male gymnasium of the Warsaw educational district on September 15. One of its requirements 
was the improvement of Lithuanian language education. Ibid., 186–90, 196–97. PSZ, series. 2, no. 
26756. “O razreshenii v chastnykh uchebnykh zavedeniiakh v guberniiakh Tsarstva Pol’skogo prepo-
davaniia nekotorykh predmetov na Pol’skom i Litovskom iazykakh.”
77 RGIA, f. 733, op. 166, d. 737, l. 211–17, 226.
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the fact that around 1905, Latvian-speaking peasants actively participat-
ed in the revolutionary movement against the privileges of local noblemen.78 
More than once, the government quelled the movements thanks to “the as-
sistance of Germans.”79 Viewing the local situation as a problem of class 
conflict rather than national conflict, the government came to rely on the 
conservatism of the local nobility. Indeed, according to the decision of the 
Committee of Ministers on June 18, 1905, the Ministry of Education took 
up the requests of the Livland Noble Assembly for their own gymnasia with 
German language education.80 The Minister asked the Marshal of the Liv-
land nobility for an opinion about the plan to build gymnasia for the chil-
dren of the local nobility. In November 1905, the Marshal replied that his 
corporation did not aspire to have such estate-limited educational institu-
tions, which would not be desirable in terms of pedagogical considerations; 
instead, the Livland nobility desired to build gymnasia “open to children of 
all confessions and estates.”81 The local German nobility hoped to establish 
private schools with German language education, which would be open to 
the wider population.
However, the local educational authority was suspicious of local elites, 
whose schools could result in the Germanization of local pupils. On March 
9, 1906, for example, the office of the Riga educational district rejected the 
petition from A.K. Saloman requesting permission to teach in the German 
language in her private girls’ school in Iur’ev. The office explained to the 
Ministry that it could permit the petition if all the pupils spoke in Ger-
man language freely before they entered the school. However, in Saloman’s 
school, those girls whose native language was German, in the local office’s 
view, constituted only 20 to 24 percent of pupils. The majority of students 
came from the families of Estonian-speaking townspeople and peasants, 
for whom the German language was “completely alien by nature,” that is, 
78 RGIA, f. 733, op. 173, d. 26, l. 12–23.
79 RGIA, f. 733, op. 196, d. 233, l. 95.
80 Zhurnal, 489.
81 RGIA, f. 733, op. 166, d. 1082. l. 2–3.
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not their native language.82 Here as well, the local educational authority 
was vigilant about local elites whose language might take on the role of “the 
state language,” and even after the decision of the Committee of Ministers, 
it still reacted repressively toward requests from this segment of society.
Soon after this ruling, however, on April 19, 1906, the government fi-
nally promulgated a law for the Baltic Provinces that allowed private educa-
tional institutions that were maintained solely by local funds and received 
no public subsidies to teach all subjects in local languages except Russian lit-
erature, history, and geography, which would be taught in Russian.83 Based 
on this law, Vil’gel’mina Iogansen, a private tutor in the town of Valk of the 
Livland province, petitioned to have education in the German language in-
troduced in her private girls’ school. Expressing no direct opposition to the 
use of German in her school, the district’s Overseer insisted that the school 
be fully transparent in its regulation of funding, school expenses, reference 
books, library collection, and so on. In response, the Ministry’s Scholarly 
Committee rejected this suggestion because it was not based on the law of 
April 19, and on August 21, it decided to permit the use of German to the 
school without reservation.84 On October 19, Iogansen’s school was final-
ly approved by the Ministry of Education. The school statute even includ-
ed the following phrase; “the school accepts children of all confessions and 
estates.”85 Despite the wariness of the local office, the central office was less 
cautious about the Germanization of the local society, at least at this stage. 
Meanwhile, even the local educational office tended to expand the right 
to use the native languages in private and elementary schools to various 
language groups, if the majority of pupils in a school spoke a non-Russian 
language. As already noted, the Lithuanian language was permitted in 
private educational institutions in the Kingdom of Poland on October 1, 
1905, if the language used by the majority of the local population around 
82 RGIA, f. 733, op. 173, d. 26, l. 80–81.
83 PSZ, series 2, no.27729 “O vvedenii v chastnykh uchebnykh zavedeniiakh Pribaltiiskogo kraia prepo-
davaniia na mestnykh iazykakh.”
84 RGIA, f. 733, op. 166, d. 1364, l. 1–8.
85 Ibid., 9.
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the school was Lithuanian. In September 1905, the Committee of Minis-
ters explained that once they decided to permit Polish language education 
in private schools on June 6, 1905, then “there is no reason to place the Pol-
ish language in a privileged position.” The Committee of Ministers, men-
tioning that the population in Riga and Revel’ petitioned for permission 
to have German language education, also predicted that the same kind of 
petitions for Latvian and Estonian language education would come soon-
er or later. The Committee, revealing their intention to permit those pe-
titions, noted that this permission met “the requirement of maintaining 
equilibrium between different groups of the non-Russian population (ino-
plemennoe naselenie).”86 The local office was also amenable in this regard. In 
March 1906, the office of the Riga educational district, in reaction to a peti-
tion for the introduction of the Polish language in an elementary school in 
Libava (Liepāja) in Kurland Province, permitted Polish, and even expressed 
its intention to permit Lithuanian language education in the region, even 
though it had not received any petitions yet. Overseer Grigorii Ul’ianov 
noted that even though the Digest of the Laws did not include those lan-
guages, if these languages were the native languages of students, then they 
should be permitted based on the law of June 18, 1905.87 Both the local and 
central government seemed to agree to native language education in pri-
vate schools, the introduction of native languages as a subject in elementa-
ry schools, and the use of native languages as an auxiliary bridge  languages, 
especially in the first years of schooling. 
Furthermore, in the Warsaw educational district, the General Super-
intendent of the Warsaw Evangelical Consistorial district on August 16, 
1906 asked for permission to use the German language in those elemen tary 
schools of the Warsaw educational district in which the majority of stu-
86 RGIA, f. 733, op. 166, d. 702, l.104–05. The local office basically conformed to the idea of the central 
government. The office of the Warsaw educational district noted on October 6, 1905, that if the Lithua-
nian language education was not permitted, the local Lithuanian intelligentsia would believe they were 
being ignored because the government allowed “privileges” regarding the use of the native language to 
“the less legitimate Polish population (menee legal’noe pol’skoe naselenie).” RGIA, f. 733, op. 166, d. 737, 
l.189.
87 RGIA, f. 733, op. 173, d. 26, l.79.
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dents were German. On September 21, the Council of the Overseer permit-
ted the request in principle, “seeing no reason for depriving the more peace-
ful and loyally devout German population of the privilege that is now being 
granted to the local Polish and Lithuanian population.” Yet the local educa-
tional office was still cautious about a national group gaining power local-
ly. Therefore, taking into account the fact that a part of the German pop-
ulation might prefer to preserve the state language, and bearing in mind 
the protection of children of other nationalities from “artificial German-
ization (iskusstvennoe onemecheniie),” the local educational authority added 
the phrase “at the request of the majority of the founders.”88 On January 31, 
1907, the official permission was issued, which allowed German language 
education in the elementary schools and private schools of the Warsaw ed-
ucational district that had been established for the “German people (narod-
nost’),” if there was a petition from the founders of the school.89 Moreover, 
German language education was also permitted for “former German colo-
nists” in Bessarabia, Kherson, Tavrida, Ekaterinoslav, the Volyn Provinc-
es, and Don on March 23, 1907, and in the Saratov and Samara Provinces 
on May 21, 1907.90 Thus, the significance of native language education was 
clearly increasing in private schools and elementary schools. Permission for 
native language education spread rapidly and widely to various groups in 
various regions of the empire, as local offices mutually referenced the cas-
es of other groups in other regions. Additionally, the right was quite evenly 
distributed among various language groups since the local office, and more 
or less the central office as well, were still vigilant about the possibility that 
other, non-Russian groups might take on the dominant role in local societ-
ies. As a result of all these processes, native language education came to be 
considered the right of each language group in the empire in practice. 
Indeed, the liberal Minister of Education under Witte, Ivan Tolstoi 
(1905–06) once attempted to make a general rule on education in the native 
88 RGIA, f. 733, op. 173, d. 21, l.14–15, 18.
89 Ibid., 26–27.
90 Ibid., 42–44, 50.
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language for non-Russian populations.91 As early as December 24, 1905, 
just after becoming minister, he sent a memo to Witte about “the next mea-
sures of the Ministry of Education” and asked to discuss it in the Council 
of Ministers. In this memo, he stated that “the question concerning teach-
ing in the native language of pupils in schools for the non-Russian popula-
tion” was “particularly acute in the present extraordinary circumstances.” 
Therefore, the ministry had to establish “solid grounds” for resolving this 
question according to the guidelines set out in the Committee of Ministers’ 
conclusions relating to the Warsaw educational district and the Riga educa-
tional district: first, in primary and middle schools for non-Russian popula-
tions, teaching in the native language of pupils could be allowed, except for 
courses in Russian language, Russian history, and geography. Second, pri-
vate schools could offer education in local languages, but in these cases, pu-
pils had to pass examinations for all subjects in Russian to receive the same 
rights the state school provided.92 
Tolstoi suggested establishing a clear principle permitting education in 
native languages in elementary and secondary schools, as well as private 
schools, which would allow considerably wider rights than the decisions of 
the Committee of Ministers. Tolstoi’s successor, Petr Kaufman (1906–08), 
tried to adopt his policies, and as mentioned above, the principle of educa-
tion in non-Russian languages was widely accepted in private schools and 
in elementary schools, where native languages were widely introduced as a 
subject and used to teach other subjects. Yet, the government was reluctant 
to make any general rule about education in native languages. Eventually, 
the next minister, Shvarts, who had been ousted from the post of the Mos-
cow Overseer by Tolstoi in 1905, and returned to the Ministry of Educa-
tion as a minister in 1908 under Petr Stolypin (1906–11), changed the min-
istry’s course in a more conservative and restrictionist direction.93 In the 
91 Memuary grafa I.I. Tolstogo (Moscow: Indrik, 2002), 39. 
92 Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi natsional’noi biblioteki, f. 781, d. 269, l.1–2; f. 781, d. 115, l.1, 4–5. Tolstoi 
also tried to introduce Polish language education into the entire educational system in the Kingdom of 
Poland, which was not realized either. RNB OR, f. 781, d. 118, l.1–11; Memuary grafa I.I. Tolstogo, 163–
171. Diakin, Natsional’nyi vopros, 370–72.
93 Regarding the “inter-departmental meeting on the matter of school education in regions with a non-
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end, rather than creating general rules that might tie its hands, the govern-
ment sought to maintain an arrangement that gave it the freedom to decide 
each case based on its specific circumstances. Here we can see almost the 
definition of autocracy: the freedom and power to rule arbitrarily, without 
constraints, even of one’s own making. In fact, the government shifted the 
emphasis away from the rights of non-Russians and toward Russians’ ad-
vantage in the short term.
The Reawakening of State Interests and Russians’ Privileges
Although the rights of each language group were taken up by central and lo-
cal authorities, the interest of Russians was still the main focus of state pol-
icy in the western border regions. On October 11, 1905, the Ministry of Fi-
nance requested cooperation from the Ministry of Education on the matter 
of a petition to permit Polish language education submitted by the mem-
bers of the Dombrova Gornaia School Society in the Petrokov province of 
the Kingdom of Poland because there was otherwise the possibility of “dis-
order” and strikes among workers “for the most insignificant reason.”94 At 
almost the same time, on October 24, 1905, Overseer of the Warsaw educa-
tional district Shvarts requested that the central office provide “a guarantee 
for the Russian Orthodox population in the Kingdom of Poland to be able 
to receive education in the Russian language.” According to him, one after 
another, private schools and elementary schools in the region tried to move 
to education in Polish, and the local Russian population, which numbered 
more than two hundred Orthodox Christian families, petitioned to open a 
separate Russian language division for their children in one of Dombrova’s 
elementary schools. Yet, according to the director of the Łodz’ school dis-
trict, it was impossible to open such a division because all the schools already 
had an excess of pupils. Therefore, the only possible solution was that the 
Russian and non-Orthodox population” (mezhduvedomstvennoe soveshchaniia po voprosu o post-
anovke shkol’nogo obrazoveniia v mestnostiiakh s inorodcheskim i inoslavnym naseleniem) in the 
Stolypin era on January 30, 1910, see; Diakin, Natsional’nyi vopros, 99–109.
94 RGIA, f. 733, op. 173, d. 25, l.5–7.
staulinas_book.indb   197 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:33
Y o k o  A o s h i m a
198
central government allocate funds for establishing an independent school 
just for Russian children. Agreeing to this suggestion, Shvarts insisted that it 
should be the responsibility of the government to guarantee the possibility of 
studying in the state language for all who so desired, and also the opportuni-
ty to obtain an education in Russian for Russians who came from the impe-
rial core. He emphasized the importance of protecting Russians living in the 
peripheries—very often involuntarily—from absorption into the non-Rus-
sian (inorodcheskie and inoplemennyi) population. Shvarts complained that 
with the introduction of local language education in private and elementa-
ry schools, it became almost impossible to preserve Russian language educa-
tion because the Russian population was too scattered, and thus too small, 
to maintain their own schools.95 Thus, Shvarts vigorously requested funds 
for establishing an independent school just for Russians. But up to the au-
tumn of 1907, the central office delayed the allocation of funds for it. Finally, 
on November 6, the Ministry sent a small amount of money and promised 
to send funds every year starting the following year. While at least by the end 
of 1907, the central office was not very enthusiastic about this matter, locally 
a sense of urgency about Russians’ marginalization intensified. 
In due course, the situation of Russians in the Kingdom of Poland drew 
the attention of the newly emerging right-wing political group, the Russian 
National Union of the Archangel Michael. On June 22, 1908, they called on 
Shvarts, now the Minister of Education, to pay attention to the issue of an el-
ementary school for the children of the Russian population, which had been 
left in a “hopeless and unprofitable situation” in the Kingdom of Poland. 
The Ministry then reacted to this on July 31, 1908 by asking the Overseer 
his opinion. In response to this, the Overseer hastily tried to justify himself 
by listing his measures to satisfy the needs of the Russian people in the re-
gion.96 Now, the radical political tendency that pursued Russians’ interest, 
especially in the border regions where Russians constituted minority, came 
up to the surface. 
95 Ibid., 18–19.
96 RGIA, f. 733, op. 173, d. 25. l. 64.
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The recognition that Russians’ interests were neglected in the border re-
gions stirred up a sense of crisis about the health of imperial rule even with-
in the central government. Starting around 1908, the central government 
once again cast a distrustful eye on the local German population. On Feb-
ruary 1908, Stolypin sent an article to Minister of Education Shvarts enti-
tled, “From the Baltic Region,” that had been published by the chauvinis-
tic newspaper Peripheries (Okrainy) of Russia on February 2. This article 
pointed out that “Russian influence is weakened” in the region. The article 
raised alarms over the situation that posts in the local administration were 
occupied almost completely by “non-Russians and non-Orthodox people,” 
such as Germans, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Poles. The article warned 
that “those who think that the Baltic Germans are supporters of Russia 
and friends of Russian statehood are entirely mistaken.” “Our Germans are 
happy to rush into the arms of their Vaterland at any moment.” In this con-
text, the article claimed that the government should do everything to pro-
mote the “Russian cause”; otherwise, “Russians will be squeezed out from 
here so that there will be no memory of them.” Stolypin, “entirely sharing” 
the article’s outlook, demanded that Shvarts “strive in every possible way to 
increase the number of core Russian people in the Baltic Provinces, both in 
the ranks of the local service class and among the agricultural population” 
in order to strengthen Russian statehood in the region.97 Stolypin was af-
fected by the campaign of the radical right, and became an enthusiastic 
supporter of Russians’ interests in the western borderlands.
On July 8 and November 13, 1908, Stolypin again pressured Shvarts. 
Based on the information from Russian media, he warned that schools 
maintained by the Baltic “German Societies,” which used the German 
language for education after the regulation of April 19, 1906, were actu-
ally subsidized by the All-German School Union in Germany. Regarding 
this matter, Governor-general Aleksandr Meller-Zakomel’skii commented 
to Stolypin that “sufficient counteraction from the side of local organs of 
the Ministry of Education” had not been conducted until now against “the 
97 RGIA, f. 733, op. 196, d. 233, l. 9–12. 
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dangerous activity in support of the success of the Russian cause.”98 Now it 
was Shvarts’s turn to be on the defensive. On November 13, 1908,  Shvarts 
told Stolypin that the Overseer of the Riga educational district had already 
paid attention to the matter. According to the Overseer, at the present, the 
local office not only had to deal with the “cultural” matter—that is, to pro-
tect a culture by teaching children in native languages—but also with the 
“political” matter—that is, “proselytizing” about German language educa-
tion to all the peoples of the Baltic region. To resolve the latter problem, the 
only possible way was to strengthen Russian schools in the region. Only in 
this way could the “lofty competition of world cultures between Russian 
and German” be won. Agreeing to this, Shvarts nevertheless insisted that 
it would be “untimely” to suppress the local Germans’ activity by changing 
the law because Latvian revolutionary activity had been suppressed with 
the assistance of the Germans, and even now, tranquility in Russia had not 
yet been fully achieved. He then argued that what was most important was 
the restoration of the soundness of the school with Russian language educa-
tion. He especially emphasized that it was important to reaffirm that in ele-
mentary schools, education in the local language should be permitted only 
in the first years as an auxiliary tool for mastering the Russian language. In 
senior classes, the local language could be introduced but only as a subject, 
and all other subjects should be taught in Russian.99 He tried to look back 
to the initial point of discussion at the time of the Committee of Ministers 
in 1905 in order to stabilize the situation, pushing against pressures from 
both the Russian and non-Russian nationalist movements. In the period 
of Witte, Shvarts seemed to be very conservative and obstinate, but now in 
the period of Stolypin, he became moderate and flexible. As a traditional 
bureaucrat, Shvarts adhered to the idea of securing imperial governance by 
balancing non-Russians’ demands and state interests through administra-
tive discretion. Yet, the political movements both of non-Russians and Rus-
sians had already escaped the traditional administrative framework. 
98 Ibid., 68, 86–89. Meller-Zakomel’skii himself was strongly opposed to Stolypin’s idea of “demographic 
‘Russification’ of the Baltic Provinces.” Büggemann, “Representing Empire, Performing Nation?” 256–59.
99 RGIA, f. 733, op. 196, d. 233, l. 94–96.
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Conclusion
Around 1905, amid war and revolution, the imperial government decid-
ed to show its merciful side by making small concession to the non-Rus-
sian populations in order to calm social turmoil. These concessions in-
cluded assenting to native language education in elementary and private 
schools. Since the administrative practices just before 1904–05, especial-
ly those of local authorities, were overly inflexible, central officials believed 
that if they constrained local officials and exhibited a generous attitude to-
ward non-Russian populations, the government would mobilize their co-
operation. However, the situation did not stabilize; rather, it became more 
chaotic. The demands of local populations increased, and even supposed-
ly marginal types of schools not directly related to state privileges, such as 
private and elementary schools, became the targets of political movements. 
In particular, private schools raised the hopes of various local groups be-
cause native language education was allowed in this type of school. Mean-
while, after the decision of the Committee of Ministers, local officials were 
forced to follow its instructions, and many petitions were gradually ac-
cepted. The number of private schools offering native language instruc-
tion expanded, and various native languages were introduced into many 
elementary schools. As a result, the principle that non-Russians need na-
tive language education became entrenched in both the imperial govern-
ment and society. 
However, this was not necessarily the intention of the government. It 
was true that the government recognized the need to care for non-Russian 
populations, but the rights of non-Russians should only be realized in so 
far as the “vital interests of the state and clear benefit of the Russian peo-
ple (narod)” were preserved, and the government preferred to maintain dis-
cretionary power over requests for native language education. This was how 
the traditional autocracy had governed its extremely diverse territories for a 
long time. Indeed, as the demands from non-Russian populations grew and 
Russians’ privileges and state interests seemingly eroded, the government 
veered into a course that prioritized the protection of the latter. 
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Yet, the political context surrounding the matter had already changed, 
and in the process, various linguistic groups came to demand their aspira-
tions explicitly and energetically, which, in turn, led to the emergence of 
Russian nationalist groups designed to counteract this trend. These Rus-
sian national groups lobbied and pressured the central government from 
outside the administrative framework. The educational authority, under 
pressure from the central government, was now forced to enforce previous-
ly issued laws and strike a balance between non-Russians’ and Russians’ po-
litical movements in order to stabilize imperial governance. As Russia en-
tered the age of representative mass politics, this task was becoming much 
harder than ever before.
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Politics around Universal Education in Right-bank Ukraine 
in the Late Tsarist Period
K i m i t a k a  M a t s u z a t o
The introduction of obligatory or universally accessible education repre-
sented a landmark of modernization in many countries.1 In nation-states 
that were latecomers to modernization, such as Germany and Japan, oblig-
atory primary education was vital for nation-building and survival in the 
age of imperialism. The tsarist government in Russia was comparatively in-
different to nation-building and preferred to entrust the burden of primary 
education to public institutions such as churches, peasant communes, and 
local self-governments. The government’s dependence on these institutions 
necessitated constant negotiation so as to deposit as great a burden as pos-
sible on the other party, but at the same time, it promoted heroic endeavor 
and self-sacrifice among pedagogues, clerics, and municipal officers. 
The politics around the introduction of universal primary education 
in the Southwestern Region (Right-bank Ukraine) of the Russian Em-
pire in the early twentieth century raised two issues. First, it intensified the 
contradiction between accessibility to and the quality of primary educa-
tion. Right-bank Ukraine lacked zemstvos until 1911 because of the gov-
ernment’s fear of local Polish elites’ dominance. Because of this disadvan-
tage, the local “Russian” youth needed the swift spread of lower elementary 
1  I use the terms “universally accessible education” and “universal education” to distinguish the tsarist 
government’s policy of primary education from obligatory education. Until the end of its existence, 
the tsarist government did not find it possible to introduce obligatory primary education in Russia, 
but instead tried to realize a situation whereby all children of school age could go to school if they 
and their parents wished.
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 education.2 At the same time, industrial growth and mounting profession-
alism in Right-bank Ukraine made the existing one-class (three-year) and 
two-class (five-year) schools obsolete since these schools gave their gradu-
ates no opportunities for advancing to middle school or state service.3 Fac-
ing the choice between geographically uniform elementary schooling and 
advanced primary education, the Ministry of Education (ME) chose the 
former, but it needed to convince those communities requesting the latter. 
Second, the policy for universal primary education intensified the competi-
tion between parish and secular (ME and zemstvo) schools in Right-bank 
Ukraine. Given the lack of zemstvo schools, at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, 83 percent of primary schools in rural Right-bank Ukraine 
were Orthodox parish schools,4 but ME officers were dissatisfied with the 
quality of these schools. 
On May 1, 1904, the government established the Provincial and Dis-
trict Committees for Zemstvo Administration (Komitety po delam zem-
skogo khoziaistva; hereafter, zemstvo committees) in three Southwestern 
Provinces.5 Composed of representatives of state institutions and appoint-
ed councilors, zemstvo committees were nicknamed “margarine  zemstvo,” 
meaning pseudo-zemstvo. Since then, zemstvo schools began to chal-
lenge the monopolistic position of Orthodox parish schools in Right-bank 
Ukraine, though the government obliged zemstvo committees to subsidize 
2  In pre-revolutionary Russia, the adjective “Russian” implied what post-revolutionary terminology 
called “Eastern Slavic.” In other words, it included Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. On this is-
sue, see Alexei Miller, “Ukrainskii vopros” v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia 
polovina XIX v.) (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2000); Klimentii K. Fedevych and Klimentii I. Fedevych, 
Za Viru, Tsaria i Kobzaria: Malorosiis’ ki monarkhisty i ukrains’ kyi natsional’nyi rukh (1905–1917 
roky) (Kiev: Krytyka, 2017); and my “Pol’skii faktor v Pravoberezhnoi Ukraine: Konets XIX–nachalo 
XX  v.,” Ab Imperio, no. 1 (2000), 91–106.
3  At single-class schools a teacher had a class composed of pupils of three different grades, while two-class 
schools had another senior class composed of the fourth and fifth grades.
4  L. M. Drovoziuk, “Osvitnia diial’nist’ zemstv Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy (1904–1920 rr.),” PhD disserta-
tion (Vinnytsia, 1998), 18.
5  On the delayed introduction of zemstvos in Right-bank Ukraine, see Theodore R. Weeks, Nation 
and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on Russia’s Western Frontier 1863–
1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), Ch. 7; Kimitaka Matsuzato, “The Issue of 
Zemstvos in Right Bank Ukraine 1864–1906: Russian Anti-Polonism Under the Challenges of Mod-
ernization,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 51, no. 2 (2003): 218–35.
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parish schools. The multi-confessional composition of the region’s popu-
lation made this competition even harsher. Recent studies have revealed 
that non-Orthodox parents, such as Polish Catholics and Jews, unexpect-
edly acquiesced to sending their children to Orthodox parish schools, per-
haps for the sake of their secular knowledge. Orthodox parish schools, in 
turn, released non-Orthodox pupils from the obligation to attend classes 
on Divine Law (zakon bozhii), meaning elementary Orthodoxy.6 Never-
theless, Polish parents hoped to have secular ministerial (ME) and zemst-
vo schools in their neighborhoods (or at least, that is what ME and zemstvo 
officers believed).7 Polish notables’ and intellectuals’ activities to establish 
Polish schools without the authorities’ permission rose after the Revolu-
tion of 1905. The oversight office of the Kiev educational district not on-
ly repressed this movement but also collected data on these Polish schools. 
Such data did not indicate the political dangerousness of the Poles’ move-
ment, but the ME demonized it so as to validate a request to the Ministry of 
Finance to subsidize its attempts to establish universal primary education. 
This paper investigates the politics around universally accessible educa-
tion in Right-bank Ukraine in the early twentieth century from the mul-
tiple perspectives briefly outlined above. Before embarking on this task, 
a detour is necessary to survey the history of primary education in post-
Emancipation Russia, the most striking feature of which was the govern-
ment’s dependence on religious, local, and communal institutions.
Pre-History: Dependence
Under serfdom, various ministries, such as the Ministries of Crown Lands 
and State Properties, ran their own schools, but the most numerous catego-
ries were ministerial (ME) and parish schools.8 In contrast to the post-1861 
6  Volodymyr Pererva, Tserkovni shkoly v Ukraini kintsia XVIII–pochatku XX st.: zabytyi svit, vol. 1, 
Zahal’na chastyna (Bila Tserkva: Vydavets’ Oleksandr Pshonkivs’kyi, 2014), 386.
7  In 1894, the overseer of the Kiev educational district reported that parish schools were useless for educa-
tion because they could not interest the population of other faiths who compose “more than 18 percent of 
my district, and, in Volyn Province, more than 23 percent.” (Drovoziuk, “Osvitnia diial’nist’,” 19).
8  In villages of state peasants, for example, parish schools were built under the guidance of local branch-
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period, their functions were divided by children’s educational stages. Ru-
ral children were to obtain elementary literacy at parish schools. Those who 
enjoyed better material conditions entered ministerial schools to receive 
higher primary and intermediate education. Despite these divisions based 
on pupils’ educational levels, there was an ideological contrast between the 
two types of schools. Ideas of modernization, professionalism, and social 
mobility guided ministerial schools, while parish education represented 
the idea of estate-based stability and clericalism. Ministerial schools were 
much more qualified than parish schools from a pedagogical point of view, 
but they were expensive and inaccessible for the unprivileged strata of so-
ciety. Parish schools were closer to the people, if they existed at all, but the 
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) was too poor to build enough parish 
schools to service the vast empire, and priests were too uneducated to be-
come teachers of rural children.9 Zemstvo schools would fill the vacuum 
between these extremes—qualified but inaccessible ministerial schools and 
relatively cheap but unqualified parish schools.
The imminent abolition of serfdom provoked the government’s inter-
est in revitalizing primary education in rural Russia. It was unconceivable 
to conduct peasant reforms without creating a stratum of literate peasants 
who understood their new legal status, rights, and obligations. Released 
from the power of their owners, the peasantry needed literate officials de-
riving from their own estate to manage village and township self-govern-
ment. In the early 1860s, the initial bet was placed on parish schools to ful-
fill this goal. Alexander II and the newly appointed minister of education 
Aleksandr Golovnin, a representative of the so-called progressive bureau-
crats, supported this policy, and the Holy Synod obliged the local clergy to 
involve themselves in primary education. Because of the lack of sufficient 
es of the Ministry of State Peasants, while the ME could only “influence” their management. See 
S. V.  Rozhdestvenskii, Istoricheskii obzor deiatel’nosti Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia. 1802–
1902 (St. Petersburg, 1902), 284. As Petr Zaionchkovskii noted, pre-Reform Cadet Corps were not so 
much military schools as schools for general education of the noble youth. See P. A. Zaionchkovskii, 
Voennye reformy 1860–1970 gg. v Rossii (Moscow, 1952), 30.
9  Ben Eklof, Russian Peasant Schools: Officialdom, Village Culture, and Popular Pedagogy, 1861–1914 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), Ch. 1.
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budget and available teachers, many parish schools, the number of which 
mushroomed in 1861, remained on paper. The peasants were disappoint-
ed with the parish schools’ poor performance and began to deny them ma-
terial support. Even the parish schools, which had survived the upheavals 
surrounding their creation, were practically replaced by zemstvo schools in 
zemstvo provinces, while in the non-zemstvo Right-bank Ukraine parish 
schools continued to play a more or less important role.10
In 1860, the government created the Special Commission to deliberate 
on supplemental proposals required by the coming Peasant Provision. This 
commission reported the need to substantially develop primary education 
among peasants to the Editing Commission. Given that universal oblig-
atory education was unachievable because of insufficient funds and man-
power among the peasants, the Special Commission found entrusting the 
creation of village schools to peasant communes unavoidable, and placed 
the contents of education (uchebnaia chast’) under the control of the ME. 
The Special Commission submitted this opinion to the Editing Commis-
sion, which in turn passed it on to the Main Committee on Peasant Affairs. 
Correspondence between the Main Committee and the ME resulted in the 
famous Peasant Provision, confirmed by the tsar on February 19, 1861. This 
Provision granted village assemblies the right to petition for literacy educa-
tion and authorized township assemblies to petition for establishing town-
ship schools. Peasant communes were allowed to collect commune taxes in 
order to run schools and pay salaries to teachers.
During the term of Minister of Education Golovnin, two managerial is-
sues came to the fore. First, the ME began to integrate schools run by vari-
ous ministries, which had been inherited from the pre-Emancipation peri-
od, into its jurisdiction.11 This policy unsurprisingly caused conflicts with 
the Holy Synod. Golovnin appeased the Synod by asserting that the ME 
had no intention of intervening in the primary education run by the ROC, 
but, on the contrary, the rural clergy’s active involvement in primary educa-
10 Olena Drach, “Rozvytok pochatkovoi osvity v Ukraini (1861–1917 rr.).” Dysertatsiia na zdobuttia na-
ukovoho stupenia kandydata istorychnykh nauk (Kharkiv, 2001), 49–53.
11 Rozhdestvenskii, Istoricheskii obzor, 396–97.
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tion would give them additional income to alleviate their difficult materi-
al conditions.12 Secondly, the imminent creation of local self-governments, 
zemstvos, provoked a discussion about to what extent the zemstvo should 
bear responsibility for public education.13 The Zemstvo Statute of 1864 did 
not regulate relations between the government and zemstvos in public ed-
ucation, but the Provision on Primary Popular Schools, confirmed by the 
tsar on July 14, 1864, stipulated zemstvo participation in the provincial and 
district education councils. While building their own schools, zemstvos in 
many cases accepted schools established by various ministries and village 
communities in the pre-Emancipation era.14
The Law of May 29, 1869 authorized the ME to open “model schools” 
in villages if the latter’s assemblies adopted the agreement (prigovor) to 
provide land for the building of schools. Moreover, the ME was to pay sti-
pends to priests who finished pedagogical courses at theological seminar-
ies and who were selected as teachers by zemstvos and peasant communes. 
The ME was to subsidize schools run by the ROC, zemstvos, village com-
munes, and private persons. To supervise schools, the ME introduced in-
spectors of popular schools (inspektory narodnykh uchilishch), whose du-
ties and competencies were prescribed by the Instruction of October 29, 
1871. These inspectors were obliged to encourage zemstvos, city self-gov-
ernments, and peasant communes to open new schools. If these local com-
munities did not have sufficient means to establish new schools, inspectors 
were to petition the overseers of the educational districts. When the office 
of Directors of Popular Schools was introduced in each province, this obli-
gation was passed on to them.15 
The new Provision on Primary Popular Schools of May 25, 1874 led 
the system of provincial directors of schools and inspectors of popular 
schools to completion. Historians often attribute this system to Minis-
ter of Education Dmitrii Tolstoi’s intention to establish state control of 
12 Ibid., 449. 
13 Ibid., 450.
14 Drach, “Rozvytok pochatkovoi osvity,” 57.
15 TsDIA Ukrainy, f. 707 (Kiev educational district), op. 229, 1908, spr. 103, ark. 12–14.
staulinas_book.indb   208 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:33
209
Politics around Universal Education in Right-bank Ukraine in the Late Tsarist Period
public education, while simultaneously limiting the zemstvos’ responsibil-
ities to the purely managerial and material aspects of schools.16 Yet, the 
point was that the government once again confirmed its intention to re-
ly on social institutions in primary education by assigning supervision to 
the ME.  Before 1897, the ME’s expenditure for subsidizing primary educa-
tion was negligible, while the zemstvos bore the main financial burden of 
building and running rural primary schools. This is why the Southwestern 
 Region (Right-bank Ukraine), which lacked zemstvos because of the Pol-
ish question, was so disadvantaged in primary education. In Right-bank 
Ukraine, the Provincial Committee of Guardianship of People’s Temper-
ance, introduced in 1894 (when the government introduced state sales of 
 vodka), managed primary schools.17 Apparently, these schools were ex-
pected to substitute the role of zemstvo schools in zemstvo provinces, but 
this was an unrealizable desire. As a result, peasants’ literacy rate was  lower 
in Right-bank Ukraine than in Left-bank Ukraine and the Great Russian 
Provinces which had zemstvos.18
On July 12, 1879, the last years of Alexander II’s reign but under the in-
fluence of his son, the future Alexander III, the Committee of Ministers 
adopted a resolution which found it impossible to develop primary edu-
cation “without granting the clergy the dominant position in the manage-
ment of primary education.”19 Under Alexander III, this new course was 
promptly codified. On January 26, 1882, the Committee of Ministers re-
quested Ober-Procurator Konstantin Pobednostsev of the Holy Synod to 
work out measures to develop parish schools. The Special Commission es-
tablished under the Synod prepared the Rules on Church-Parish Schools, 
which were confirmed by the tsar on June 13, 1884. According to these 
rules, the Synod introduced school councils attached to bishoprics. At the 
16 For example, see I. V. Zaichenko, Osvita i pedagogichna dumka v Ukraini u XIX–na pochatku XX st. 
(Kiev: Komprint, 2013), 201–02.
17 This was a high-profile institution in which the provincial governor, bishop, and marshal of the nobili-
ty participated. 
18 Matsuzato, “Pol’skii faktor,” 99–101; L. M. Drovoziuk, “Osvitnia diial’nist’,” 21–24. 
19 Zapadno-russkaia tserkovnaia shkola 10 (1909): 16.
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end of the 1880s, these councils opened their district (uezd) branches. In 
the 1890s, following the model of ministerial and zemstvo schools, two 
types of schools, one-class and two-class schools, were established. The one-
class schools provided a three-year education mainly composed of divine 
law, hymns, reading in Church Slavonic, Russian language instruction, cal-
culation, and penmanship. The two-class schools provided a five-year edu-
cation that supplemented one-class schools’ contents with elementary geog-
raphy, Russian history, an understanding of nature, drawing, and painting. 
In contrast to the short-lived boom of parish schools in the early 1860s, 
this time, the ROC enjoyed abundant financial support from the govern-
ment. During the twenty-five years after 1884, about forty thousand par-
ish schools were opened in the empire, and the total number of their pupils 
reached about two million.20 
The Turning Point
As mentioned earlier, in the early postreform period, the ME tried to in-
tegrate schools run by various ministries into its jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
it preferred to subsidize its own (ministerial) schools, rather than zemstvo 
and parish schools.21 In 1869, the ministry issued 170,000 rubles of credit 
for popular education in the thirty-four zemstvo provinces, but only 51,000 
rubles of this were distributed to non-ministerial schools. Since 1897, the 
ME increased subsidies for popular education every year. In 1899, it started 
to subsidize parish schools. The sum of the credits delivered to primary and 
parish schools rose from 1,484,672 rubles in 1897 up to 8,284,672 rubles in 
1906, that is, it increased more than 6.6 times in nine years. Besides, schools 
in the Warsaw educational district and the Western Provinces received spe-
cial subsidies. In 1902, the ME decentralized distribution of credits; the 
ME began to issue credits to school districts, which in turn decided how to 
20 Ibid., 1, 17–20. 
21 It might seem strange to refer to a ministry “subsidizing” agencies under its own control. However, this 
was the standard terminology adopted in documents of the then ME, which testify to the fact that the 
creation of a ministerial school in a locality did not mean automatic funding by the ministry. 
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distribute the credits among schools, considering petitions sent from vari-
ous secular and religious institutions that supported schools.22 Ministeri-
al schools often needed to compete with zemstvo schools located nearby.
The ME devised this application-based financial support to make pe-
titioners promise to bear appropriate burdens in response to government 
subsidies. Communities requesting government subsidies to build a new 
school had to explain what they could give the planned school: land for 
the school building, part of its construction expenditures, or apartments 
for teachers. Moreover, the ministry expected public initiative and creativi-
ty to develop primary education, which often proved to be more important 
than money. For example, in 1904, the ME started to subsidize handicraft 
courses at popular and parish schools. This was a response to public propos-
als aiming to make primary education more attractive to peasant parents.
After the introduction of margarine zemstvo in Right-bank Ukraine in 
1904, both the ME and the Provincial Committee of Guardianship of Peo-
ple’s Temperance began to transfer their schools to zemstvo committees. 
That this transfer started not after the real zemstvo was created in Right-
bank Ukraine in 1911 but during the presence of “margarine zemstvo” be-
tween 1904 and 1911 deserves attention. For example, in 1906, in Kiev Prov-
ince, the Provincial Committee of Guardianship of People’s Temperance 
transferred nine primary schools over to zemstvo committees, which al-
so opened four primary schools by themselves. In sum, there were thirteen 
zemstvo schools in Kiev Province at the end of 1906. In 1907, the number of 
zemstvo schools increased from thirteen to twenty. Among the seven new 
schools, six had been transferred from the ME to zemstvo committees.23
As a result of the vigorous expansion of primary education, as of January 
1, 1904, the number of ministerial schools in the Russian Empire reached 
42,574 with 97,874 teachers and 3,126,359 pupils, while the total number 
of the other kinds of schools amounted to 45,376 with 97,619 teachers and 
1,961,670 pupils. Thus, the total number of school pupils was 5,088,029, 
22 TsDIA Ukrainy, f. 707, op. 229, 1908 rik, spr. 103, ark. 14zv.–16 (part of the ME document “Svedeniia 
po razrabotke shkol’nykh setei i planov osushchestvleniia vseobshchego obucheniia”).
23 Otchet Zemskogo upravleniia Kievskoi gubernii po narodnomu obrazovaniiu za 1907 god (Kiev, 1908), 1.
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while the number of children of school age in the Russian Empire was 
12,549,068.24 Consequently, the enrollment rate in Russia in 1904 was 40.5 
percent. Though the financial crisis caused by the Russo–Japanese War and 
the revolutionary turmoil retarded the expansion of primary education be-
tween 1904 and 1906, public passion for education did not diminish. In 
1906–07, seventy-nine district zemstvos and city self-governments submit-
ted petitions for the ME’s subsidy to make primary education in their ter-
ritories generally accessible (obshchedostupnoe). Indeed, some districts of 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Olonets, Viatka, Samara, Saratov, Nizhegorod, 
and other provinces had nearly realized universal (generally accessible) pri-
mary education.25 
The ME prepared a project for the introduction of universal primary ed-
ucation in Russia. The project continued the idea of reliance on  zemstvos, 
city self-governments, and peasant communes financially, especially in re-
gard to the construction of schools, while the ME worked to standardize 
teachers’ salaries with its own budget (360 rubles a year for teachers and six-
ty rubles for teachers of Divine Law, that is, priests). Meanwhile, the ME 
changed the organizational principle or criterion to expand school net-
works. Previously, the educational districts decided whether to finance the 
creation of a new school, considering whether the petitioning community 
was ready to bear the appropriate burden for the institution. This method 
saved the ME’s money and stimulated public interest in primary education, 
but it was problematic from the viewpoint of the spatially uniform distri-
bution of schools. In some localities, there were multiple two-class schools, 
while in others even one-class schools were few and far between. In 1908, 
the ME requested district zemstvos and city self-governments to submit 
plans for constructing school networks in their localities that would enable 
the realization of universal education in the future. The  educational dis-
tricts began to finance local self-governments and communities based on 
these general plans. 
24 TsDIA Ukrainy, f. 707, op. 229, 1908 rik, spr. 103, ark. 16.
25 TsDIA Ukrainy, f. 707, op. 229, 1908 rik, spr. 103, ark. 16zv.–17.
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In the same post-1905 period, the population’s growing interest in edu-
cation resulted in new petitions to the ME requesting financial aid for ad-
vanced primary education, particularly four-class city-style schools, based 
on the Provision of May 31, 1872.26 The ME faced a difficult choice. The 
planned, steady realization of universal education required the even distri-
bution of resources, while popular requests for advanced primary educa-
tion were pulling the ME back to the previous preferential distribution of 
resources. This contradiction was especially serious in Right-bank Ukraine. 
On the one hand, the late-coming zemstvos in the region desperately needed 
the swift expansion of their school networks, however elementary they were. 
Moreover, the “Russian” population’s low literacy, inferior to that of the 
26 The ME proposed this type of school to substitute district (uezd) schools based on the Provision 
of 1828. See Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, Sobr. 2, Tom 47 (1872) (St. Petersburg, 
1875), No. 50907. According to I. V. Zaichenko, the transformation of district schools into city-
style schools went slowly, and 147 district schools continued to function as late as 1894. At the same 
time, city-style schools enjoyed a certain amount of popularity, and their number amounted to 
527, at which almost eighty thousand pupils throughout the empire studied in 1898 (see his Osvita 































































Table 1. Changes in the Issue Structure before and after (approx.) 1905 
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Polish and Jewish populations, also prioritized lower elementary education. 
On the other hand, the Right Bank’s industry and commerce, which was 
more developed than other parts of the Russian Empire, cultivated a progres-
sive strata of the rural population that began to request advanced primary ed-
ucation for their children. Ben Eklof has paid attention to this phenomenon, 
but he equates the upgrade from two-class to four-class city-style schools to 
the upgrade from one-class to two-class schools.27 The former implied a chal-
lenge to the ME policy of even geographical distribution of schools. 
The ME responded to the requests for upgrade from two-class to four-
class schools restrictively because it was concerned that the upgrade, which 
was often accompanied by the preferential allocation of resources to a few 
communities in a district, would probably violate the already-adopted plan 
for the introduction of universal primary education. The Kiev educational 
district required the communities requesting the upgrade from two-class to 
four-class schools to inform them of: (1) the number of the people living in 
the community; (2) the size of territory the requested school would cover; 
(3) how many schools existed in the same and neighboring communities; 
(4) whether the community or organizations supporting the request for the 
advanced school were ready to provide the school with sufficient land; (5) 
the expected number of pupils; (6) how much state subsidy was needed to 
build and maintain the school; and (7) whether the community had kept 
its promises in the past.28 The following section examines the administra-
tive processes around the upgrade of schools.
The Administrative Process of Upgrading Primary Schools
The first case is from Murafa Town (a mestechko which presently belongs to 
the Sharhorod district of Vinnytsia oblast’), Iampol’skii district,  Podoliia 
Province. In 1912, this town and its surrounding villages had about a 
7,300-strong “native [i.e., Ukrainian] peasant population,” while about 
27 Eklof, Russian Peasant Schools, 438–44. 
28 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, ll. 27–28.
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2,000 people of other estates lived in Murafa.29 Among the 7,300 natives, 
about seven hundred were school-age children. In 1908, when Iampol’skii 
district Zemstvo Committee composed its plan for universal primary edu-
cation, Murafa Town and its surrounding villages had a two-class primary 
ministerial school with two full groups (komplekty) and a two-class parish 
school. Four teachers were working at the ministerial school: the school-
master, his wife who was a teacher, an unmarried teacher, and a teacher of 
Divine Law (zakonouchitel’), the last of whom was a local priest.30
To teach all children of the territory elementary literacy, it was neces-
sary to expand primary education by organizing twelve groups of pupils in 
various places in the territory in addition to the two existing groups of pu-
pils. During the following four years, only two one-class ministerial schools 
with two groups and one two-class zemstvo school were introduced, while 
the other nine planned groups of pupils had not been organized.31 A reason 
for this delay was the population’s attachment to advanced primary educa-
tion. In these years, a clientelist group took shape, guided by the local peace 
arbitrator,32 Iarmolovich, and a State Duma member from the  locality, 
Vasilii K. Pakhal’chak. 
In 1907, instead of using the preexisting wooden school building, the 
Murafa community, under the leadership of Peace Arbitrator Iarmolovich, 
began to build a stone-made school with six classrooms appropriate for ad-
vanced primary education, expecting that the full construction would cost 
about 8,000 rubles. Yet this expectation proved to be extremely optimistic. 
In 1907 and 1908, the ME subsidized the community to the tune of 1,200 
and 3,000 rubles respectively. This was not sufficient, and the community 
repeatedly petitioned to receive 7,329 rubles to complete the building. The 
ME gave 1,500 rubles more to complete the classrooms in the building. The 
Provincial Zemstvo Committee issued 2,400 rubles to complete the other 
29 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 40.
30 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, ll. 38ob.–39.
31 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 106.
32 On this position, see my “S komissarov antipolonizma v prosvetiteli derevni: mirovye posredniki na 
pravoberezhnoi Ukraine (1861–1917 gg.),” Ukrains’ kyi humanitarnyi ogliad 9 (2003), 62–121.
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parts of the building on the condition that, first, the community organize 
a “special commission” that included a zemstvo technician to supervise the 
construction process. The second condition was that the community allow 
the zemstvo committee to use some of the classrooms for two groups of the 
one-class zemstvo school, which was going to be opened soon. The commu-
nity, perhaps because it was interested in using the new building exclusively 
for advanced primary education, resisted this modest condition. Only after 
Iamolovich resigned from the post of peace arbitrator did the community 
agree with the zemstvo committee. In 1910, a one-class zemstvo primary 
school with one group opened in this building, and this school quickly de-
veloped into a two-class zemstvo school, but the problem of teachers’ apart-
ments remained unsolved.33 
In January of the same year, the precinct inspector of popular schools 
asked the Murafa community whether it was ready to support the open-
ing of a four-class city-style school and whether it could temporarily pro-
vide land for the school’s construction. The community joyfully adopted 
the agreement (prigovor) and submitted it to the precinct school inspector. 
Yet, the inspector did not respond at all to the community’s answer but, in-
stead, after several months sent the same query, to which the community re-
sponded in the same manner, proposing to transform the existing two-class 
school into a four-class school. The inspector repeated the same query again, 
which convinced the Murafa population that he was intentionally delay-
ing the new school. In 1912, the plenipotentiaries of the community peti-
tioned State Duma member Pakhal’chak, who in turn submitted a memo-
randum together with numerous documents accumulated during 1910–12 
to the minister of education. In their petition, the peasant plenipotentia-
ries proudly noted that “the local population’s cultural level rose so signif-
icantly that the real need for the advanced type of school has matured.”34 
33 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, ll. 105ob.–107. Later, the overseer of the Kiev educational district argued 
that the school building could not be completed because the school precinct inspector did not allow 
the special commission to spend the zemstvo subsidies to pay off the debts despite the requests of par-
liamentarian Pakhal’chak and his group. The second reason was that Iamolovich was alienated from 
the affair.
34 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 40.
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Pakhal’chak remarked that the stone-made school building was too large 
and extravagant for the present two-class school and that the peasants were 
complaining about “why we have paid the last bit from our meager means 
for the construction of this magnificent building.”35 
The ME requested the overseer of the Kiev educational district to ex-
plain the situation. The Kiev overseer, in turn, requested the school inspec-
tor of the precinct report to him on the events of the previous four years. 
The opinion of the inspector significantly differed from that of the peas-
ant plenipotentiaries and provided a factual basis for the Kiev overseer’s 
counter-argument. The peasant plenipotentiaries noted that the territory of 
the school site was more than three desiatinas (one desiatina is about 1.09 
hectars). The new stone building had six classrooms, a recreation hall, and 
a teachers’ room. The site had a workshop for handicraft courses, while a 
wooden building on the site that had been the previous school was also us-
able. The Kiev overseer corrected the Murafa plenipotentiaries’ optimism 
by noting that the school site was less than two desiatinas and that the old 
building required major repairs to make it usable for education. A funda-
mental problem was the lack of teachers’ apartments.36 Readers may be im-
pressed to learn that the school inspector was acquainted with such trivial 
matters when he argued against the local communities’ requests. Concern-
ing the expected enrollment of the requested school, the plenipotentiaries 
noted that their district had only one advanced primary school in the dis-
trict seat, so the demand for an advanced school in Murafa would be enor-
mous. The plenipotentiaries added that the future advanced school would 
absorb pupils presently going to the local parish school. The overseer was 
a realist here, too, noting that an advanced primary school had opened 
in Shargorod city in Mogilev district, only ten verstas (one versta is about 
1.067 km) from Murafa Town, in 1912, so the need for a similar school in 
Murafa decreased.37
35 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 38ob.
36 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 105ob.
37 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 107ob. Presently, Shargorod/Sharhorod is the seat of the district (raion) 
to which Murafa belongs.
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A fundamental counterargument by the Kiev overseer was that the 
transformation of the existing two-class school into a four-class one meant 
nothing but the elimination of the existing school, which would unques-
tionably impede the realization of universal education in the locality. There-
fore, it was desirable to open higher primary schools “not instead of the ex-
isting lower schools, but independently from them, in the interests of the 
poorest group of the local population.”38 As described below, the ME and 
the zemstvo committee (since 1911, a full-fledged zemstvo) invested signifi-
cant money in the construction of the new school building, and its purpose 
was to further develop existing lower primary education. Therefore, accord-
ing to the Kiev overseer, the Murafa community should obtain the ME’s 
special permission and the zemstvo’s consent to use the school building for 
advanced primary education.39
The second example is Rzhishchev Town in Kiev district. As a river port 
city on the Dnipro, Rzhishchev was one of the most populous settlements in 
Kiev Province on the eve of World War I. The whole population was 20,154 
and the number of children of school age was 2,015. It had a grain-exporting 
wharf, a sugar factory, two pig-iron factories, two sawmills, two brick facto-
ries, a boiler house, three tanneries, and other numerous small enterprises. 
Nevertheless, Rzhishchev had no more than a two-class ministerial primary 
school of the rural type, a parish school for girls, a two-class school for Jew-
ish boys, and a private school for Jewish girls.40 In contrast, for example, Sme-
la Town (then belonging to Cherkassy district of Kiev Province, presently 
belonging to Cherkassy Oblast), though similar to Rzhishchev in terms of 
population and industrial development, had several lower primary schools, 
one four-class advanced primary school, and boys’ and girls’ gymnasiums.41
In 1908, perceiving this situation as unfair, Rzhishchev’s town commu-
nity discussed the possibility of establishing a four-class city-style school, 
but there was no building for this purpose. In 1910, the community con-
38 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 106.
39 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, ll. 106ob.–107.
40 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 29.
41 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 4.
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structed a building with six classrooms and a teachers’ room for the existing 
two-class school. As was the case with Murafa, the construction of a new 
school building too luxurious for a lower primary school stimulated the 
population’s yearning for transforming it into an advanced primary school. 
When Chairman V. K. Tritshel’ of the Kiev district zemstvo visited St. 
Petersburg perhaps in late 1912 or early 1913, he petitioned the ME to trans-
form the existing ministerial two-class primary school with four groups in 
Rzhishchev into a four-class school starting in the autumn of 1913. The ME 
accepted this request on the condition that the district zemstvo take respon-
sibility for managing the existing four groups of the ministerial school in the 
autumn of 1913.42 This response seems confusing. The zemstvo requested 
to transform the existing two-class ministerial school into a four-class one, 
but the ME responded that if the zemstvo took responsibility for the exist-
ing four groups, that is, if the management of the existing ministerial school 
could be passed to the zemstvo, the ME would permit the construction of a 
new ministerial four-class school. The ME’s policy was consistent with the 
Murafa case; the ME did not support upgrading the existing lower elemen-
tary school into an advanced one because this would impede early realiza-
tion of universal education. Instead, the ME proposed the creation of a new 
advanced primary school parallel to the existing lower primary school.
The Kiev district zemstvo regarded this condition as acceptable since 
the regular zemstvo assembly of 1911 had already decided to establish a one-
class primary school with two groups in 1912, so the zemstvo only need-
ed to add facilities and programs for another two groups. In April 1912, 
the zemstvo assembly petitioned the ME to continue to deliver the same 
amount of subsidies that the ministry was giving to the ministerial school, 
even after control over the school was transferred to the zemstvo. The mer-
it of Rzhishchev in comparison with Murafa was that the district zemstvo 
and the township paid attention to the issue of teachers’ apartments, allo-
cating 360 and 300 rubles a year respectively for this purpose.43
42 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 4.
43 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, ll. 4–4ob. and 29–29ob.
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The third example is Shuliavka Village, located in the suburbs of Ki-
ev City with a population of forty thousand. The villagers decided to open 
a four-class primary school to celebrate the tricentennial of the Romanov 
Dynasty and, they allocated 850 square sazhens of land for this purpose. 
Councilor I. N. Denisiuk of the district zemstvo proposed a plan for the 
construction of the school to the zemstvo assembly on April 6–7, 1912. 
Based on the assembly’s decision, the district zemstvo board sent a petition 
to the Kiev educational district. The office of the Kiev educational district 
responded to the zemstvo, noting that the petition only proposed to allo-
cate 850 square sazhens (one sazhen is 2.13 meters) of land, but mentioned 
neither participation in construction nor monetary support. On July 4, 
1912, the zemstvo board replied and justified the lack of contribution—
other than land—by noting that issue was discussed at an extraordinary 
session of the zemstvo, which was not authorized to decide on budgetary is-
sues. The board remarked that since the Kiev district zemstvo had recent-
ly spent much money on the education of the populace, it would agree to 
support the Shuliavka school after the ME decided positively on this mat-
ter. This attitude of “leaving things to others” did not move the overseer, 
who shelved the issue without even responding to the zemstvo. In Novem-
ber 1912, the Monarchist Party “Kievan Union of the Russian People” took 
up this issue and petitioned the ministry; party leaders emphasized that 
the anniversary of the dynasty was approaching, and that it was “quite de-
sirable to realize the population’s patriotic desire to open the school on this 
day of celebration.” Yet the “patriotism” of the population was not enough 
to move the Kiev overseer. Responding to the ME’s query, he replied curtly 
that the school in Shuliavka might be included in the future general plan of 
the network of advanced schools in Kiev Province.44
The final example comes from the Cossack Ivangorod town of Borzensk 
district, in Chernigov Province. Though Chernigov Province did not be-
long to the Southwest Governor-Generalship, it belonged to the Kiev ed-
ucational district. As early as November 2, 1908, the Ivangorod Cossack 
44 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, ll. 134–134ob. and 161–161ob.
staulinas_book.indb   220 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:34
221
Politics around Universal Education in Right-bank Ukraine in the Late Tsarist Period
Community adopted a resolution requesting the transformation of the 
two-class ministerial school in the town into a city-style four-class school 
based on the 1872 Provision. The agreement stated that advanced primary 
schools were superior to two-class schools in terms of their teaching pro-
gram, the quality of teachers, and possibilities for graduates’ further edu-
cation and employment. According to the agreement, the demand for ad-
vanced primary education was so high in this provincial town that parents 
sent their sons to city-style schools in surrounding cities. Ivangorod itself 
had a population of ten thousand and it was the center of gravity for the 
surrounding five townships, the total population of which surpassed fifty 
thousand, all of which had only lower primary schools. The community 
promised to dedicate the existing communal two-storied house of the ex-
isting two-class school to the future advanced school.45 
In May 1912, the community repeated the request. The Kiev overseer 
provided a portrait of the situation that stood in diametric opposition to 
the community’s own description. According to the overseer, the Ivan-
gorod population was not distinguished by their desire to give their chil-
dren maximally advanced education. Evidence for this was the fact that the 
population did their best to send their children to the zemstvo school in 
the town. The reason was that necessary attendance at zemstvo schools was 
shorter than at ministerial schools, and zemstvo schools distributed text-
books for free. It was true that a four-class school could provide more ben-
efits to children, but it was questionable whether the parents would send 
their children to a four-class school with a much longer attendance peri-
od, which made it far more expensive than the existing two-class school. 
The overseer referred to the Ivangorod community’s past insincere behav-
ior. When it petitioned for the two-class school, it promised to dedicate one 
desiatina of land, but in fact allotted only eight hundred square sazhens, 
namely, about three times less than promised. Moreover, the community 
opened two communal stores in the schoolyard to earn profits, and it was 
necessary to remove them to build teachers’ apartments. Despite the situa-
45 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, ll. 35–36.
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tion described above, the Kiev overseer supported the idea of transforming 
the existing two-class school into a four-class one precisely because of the 
present school’s miserable situation. The only way to pump more resourc-
es out of the Ivangorod community was to upgrade the existing school in-
to a four-class school. Yet, the ME did not support its Kiev agent’s sugges-
tion of a “flight to the front,” and ordered the overseer to reject the request.46 
Orthodox Clericalism and Clandestine Polish Schools
After the zemstvo committees were introduced in 1904, there were three 
kinds of primary schools in Right-bank Ukraine: ministerial, zemstvo, 
and parish institutions. ME and zemstvo officers felt a deep disdain for 
the poor quality of lessons given at parish schools, their coarse and insan-
itary buildings, and the reactionary ideology clerics impressed on pupils.47 
In response, the ROC clergy and pro-ROC intellectuals argued that par-
ish schools had merits that the secularized education provided by minis-
terial and zemstvo schools lacked. First, a significant portion of zemstvo 
schools were two-class schools; parish schools were overwhelmingly one-
class schools and requested neither longer attendance nor heavier financial 
burdens from parents for education. Considering the differing period of 
attendance, the pedagogical effectiveness of parish schools should not be 
underestimated. Christian ethics supported parish schools, which meant 
that schools were not beholden to one or another pedagogue’s individual 
influence; rather, the community’s Christian environment undergirded the 
schools’ educational effect. This was exemplified by the teaching of Church 
hymns at parish schools, a subject lacking at secular schools. Choruses sung 
by children not only enhanced their spiritual development; it also made an 
extraordinary impression on their family members.48
Another reason for the ME’s and the zemstvo’s negative opinion of 
parish schools was that, in their view, in multi-confessional Right-bank 
46 RGIA, f. 733, op. 179, d. 80, l. 76ob.
47 On zemstvo liberals’ criticism of parish schools, see: Drovoziuk, “Osvitnia diial’nist’,” 29–31, 37.
48 Zapadno-russkaia nachal’naia shkola 10 (1909): 20–21; 3 (1911): 12–13.
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Ukraine, Polish and other non-Orthodox parents did not wish to send 
their children to Orthodox parish schools. This also motivated the Poles to 
establish their own clandestine schools. ME officers remarked that Polish 
parents’ desire was just knowledge and the social promotion of their chil-
dren, so if the network of secular schools managed by the ME and zemst-
vos became sufficiently dense, Polish parents would send their children to 
these schools.49 Volodymyr Pererva introduces countless examples where, 
in Right-bank Ukraine, Polish, Jewish, and other non-Orthodox parents 
resigned themselves to sending their children to Orthodox parish schools.50 
This phenomenon makes us question why the same Polish parents support-
ed the activities of clandestine Polish schools. Pererva suggests that Polish 
parents sent their children to Orthodox parish schools to demonstrate their 
loyalty to Russia, while they had their children educated at clandestine Pol-
ish schools for the future restoration of Polish statehood.51 However, this 
interpretation seems to overestimate Polish parents’ political consciousness.
Indeed, in the Western Provinces after the abolition of serfdom, the 
Poles often established their national schools without asking the permis-
sion of the authorities. The Criminal Codex identified this deed as a mis-
demeanor (prostupok), and the punishment was too light to have a preven-
tive effect; the fine was seventy-five rubles (in cities) and five rubles (in rural 
areas), neither of which was accompanied with a prison sentence. On April 
3, 1892, the emperor’s decree “On the Punishment of Clandestine Educa-
tion in Vil’na, Kovna, Grodna, Minsk, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Kiev, Podoliia, 
and Volynia Provinces” made punishments stricter, imposing on those who 
founded clandestine Polish schools a fine of three hundred rubles or a three-
month prison sentence.52 In August 1906, this decree was abolished and the 
ineffective light punishment was restored. Unsurprisingly, the Poles began 
to establish illegal schools without permission.53
49 Report of the Director of Popular Schools in Kiev Province to the Overseer of the Kiev educational dis-
trict, March 15, 1907 (TsDIA Ukrainy, f. 707, op. 229, 1907 rik, spr. 112, ark. 17). 
50 Pererva, Tserkovni shkoly, 63–64, 151, 385–91.
51 Ibid., 63–64. 
52 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, Sobr. 3, Tom 12 (1892) (St. Petersburg, 1895), No. 8486. 
53 TsDIA Ukrainy, f. 707, op. 229, 1907 rik, spr. 112, ark. 22; Rozhdestvenskii, Istoricheskii obzor, 689–90.
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In 1907, the government began to adopt countermeasures. They searched 
and closed such schools and punished the founders. According to the files 
preserved by the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, the Kiev ed-
ucational district continued to record these discoveries and repressions un-
til 1910, which seems to indicate that the Polish movement for clandestine 
schools declined after 1910. I identified one hundred and thirteen cases of 
clandestine Polish schools revealed in 1907.54 Their locations are included 
in the following chart.
Table 2: Cases of Clandestine Polish Schools Recorded in 1907
Province District Settlements Total 
numbers
Kiev Radomysl’ Colony: Guta-Zabrlochskaia; Villages: Krymska, 
Berkozovka, Ostrov, and Romanovka; Towns: Malin
6
36
Berdichev City: Berdichev; Towns: Dziun’kov, Pogrebishche, 
Makhnovka; Villages: Pustakha, Zarudintsy, 
Pikovtsy, Polichintsy, Bogudzen’ka
9
Vasil’kov Towns: Shamraevka, Rokitno, Belaia Tserkova; Vil-
lages: Venrik, Prishivan’n, Leshchanka, Yankovka
7
Tarashcha Villages: Ianishovka, Tetiev, Burkovtsy, Shuliaki, 
Aleksandrovka, Bagva
6
Skvira Towns: Volodarka, Khodorkov; Villages: 
Prichepovka, Berezianka, Volitsa-Zarubinetskaia, 
Ivan’ki, Khmelevka
7
Uman’ Village: Peregonovka 1




Proskurov Towns: Fel’shtin; Villages: Zarech’e, Moskalevka 3
Letichev Villages: Mashkovtsy, Korolevka, Mikhalpol’, Svin-
naia, Fashchievka, Slobodka, Korzhovtsy, Pop-
ovtsy, Grimiachka
9
54 I reviewed TsDIA Ukrainy, f. 707, op. 229, 1907 rik, spr. 112. Further descriptions in the text derive from 
my comprehensive analysis of this file. Therefore, I will not put archival sheet (list) numbers as a source for 
each statement. The source of a particular statement is the whole file, not one or another sheet.
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As shown by this chart, Polish clandestine schools emerged most fre-
quently in Volyn’ Province and second-most frequently in Kiev Province. 
The counties of Radomysl’, Verdichev, Vasil’kov, Skvira, Tarashcha (Ki-
ev Province), Letichev (Podoliia Province), Lutsk, Starokonstantinov, and 
Ovruch (Volyn’ Province) recorded numerous cases of Polish clandes-
tine schools. Obviously, the local number of Polish clandestine schools re-
flects ethnic Poles’ demographic weight in these localities. Yet, this number 
Balta Town: Krivoe Ozero 1
Vinnitsa Town: Ianov; Villages: Uladovka, Piliava (2 cases) 3
Litin Colony: Guta-Chernelevskaia 1
Gaisin Town: Kunia 1
Ushitsa Village: Shchebutintsy 1
Ol’gopol’ Town: Bershad’, Village: Chechel’nik 2




Colony: Romanovka; Villages: Biidiug, Blydov 3
Lutsk City: Lutsk (4 cases); Colonies: Gubinskie Budki, 
Keremenets; Town: Vladimirtsy; Villages: Lavrov (2 
cases), Nesvichi, Podberez’e, Romanov, Biskupichi
13
Zaslavl’ Village: Gorodishche 1
Zhitomir Town: Krasnopol’ (2 cases); Villages: Motrunki, 
Motovilovka, Torchin, Korytyshche
6
Rovno City: Rovno; Colonies: Voronukha, Zurno 3
Starokon-
stantinov
Towns: Teofipol’, Krasilov, Bazaliia, Kupen’;
Villages: Zapadintsy, Lonki, Krasilovskaia Slobod-
ka; Sloboda Novomeiskaia 
8
Duben’ Towns: Olynka, Mlynov; Villages: Kosarevskaia-
Rudka
3
Kremenets Towns: Shumsk, Iampol’ 2
Novograd-
Volynskii
Villages: Tadeushpol’, Khrobuznaia, Brazhintsy 3
Ovruch Sloboda: Khriplia; Villages: Shashalovka, Kalin-
ovka, Buda-Golubievichskaia, Novaia Guta, Klitka, 
Pelcha, Mechnaia Rudnia
8
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 possibly also depended on local Russian notables’ tolerance towards Poles. 
For example, I. S. Matiets, the schoolmaster of a two-class parish school 
in Lipki village, Skvira district, Kiev Province, was famed for his profes-
sionalism. As the director of popular schools in Kiev Province reported to 
the overseer of the Kiev educational district, the Kievan bishop visited the 
school in May 1910 and was satisfied with the school’s facilities, as well as 
by the pupils’ answers when he examined them. The bishop was especial-
ly fascinated by the pupils’ choral singing. A member of the Kievan Zem-
stvo Committee joined this appraisal when he visited the school. However, 
the director of popular schools lamented that when this “ideal schoolmas-
ter” noticed the existence of a clandestine Polish school in his village, he 
not  only failed to report it to the authorities; he even allowed his Ortho-
dox pupils to attend it. The director of popular schools gave Matiets a strict 
reprimand for his “indifferent attitude toward the breeding of moral-reli-
gious and national feeling among Russian children.” The director warned 
 Matiets that he would be removed if he repeated this behavior.55 It appears 
that the schoolmaster was an advocate of inter-confessional dialogue in a 
multiethnic society. By making a show of accusing the schoolmaster, the 
director, in fact, protected one of his best subordinates from receiving an 
even more severe punishment. Further, let us discern the general tendencies 
of clandestine schools in the three Southwest provinces.
Founders
In most cases, clandestine schools were founded either by local Polish no-
tables, such as landowner-nobles, owners of sugar factories, pharmaceuti-
cal chemists (provizor), lawyers (prisiazhnyi poverennyi, two cases in Lutsk 
City), or Catholic priests. These two categories could work together, as was 
the case with Grimiachka Village, Letichev district, Podoliia Province, 
where a landowner, the owner of a brewery, and a priest cooperated to open 
a school at a peasant’s house. Founding a school could also be a collective 
action, as was the case with the Catholic parish guardianship in Vorodarka 
55 TsDIA Ukrainy, f. 707, op. 229, 1910 rik, cpr. 145, ark. 60–61.
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Town, Skvira District, Kiev Province. There were cases of more democratic 
management of schools. In Ovruch District, Volyn’ Province, for example, 
donations by local Catholic believers maintained three of the schools estab-
lished by priests; in one of them, parents provided lunch to a female teacher 
instead of salary. Meanwhile, landowners often opened a school in their es-
tate office building to educate the children of agricultural workers and ten-
ant farmers. There were three cases where schools developed from orphan-
ages (priiut).
In most cases, notables or priests on the same settlements founded 
schools, yet they sometimes opened schools in neighboring settlements. 
There was a case in Letichev District of Podoliia Province, where a Catholic 
priest named Antonii (Grzhmailo), in tandem with landowner Kovnatskii, 
itinerantly opened schools in four villages: Mashkovtsy, Korol’vka, Mikhal-
pol’, and Svinnaia. A relevant portion of the founders were women—female 
nobles and nobles’ daughters or widows; I identified seven women among 
the thirty secular founders.
Teachers and Contents of Teaching 
Women made up a significant proportion of teachers; of forty-three teach-
ers who taught secular subjects, twenty-five were women (58%). Teachers 
of Divine Law were Catholic priests and accordingly men. The contents 
of the education provided by Polish schools were poor: Divine Law, Pol-
ish language and sometimes Russian language courses, and handicraft and 
sewing courses. They are, at best, comparable to one-class Orthodox parish 
schools. Noble and peasant girls, often younger than twenty years old, de-
voted themselves to educating children, but they often lacked a pedagogical 
license, as was also the case with Orthodox parish schoolteachers.
Pupils 
Polish schools were small and could not accept many children mainly be-
cause of the lack of space. Schools were often opened at nobles’ or peas-
ants’ houses, parsonages, and sometimes in estate out-buildings, the last 
of which were relatively large. Among the forty-one schools whose enroll-
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ments could be identified, seven schools had fewer than eleven pupils, fif-
teen schools had from eleven to twenty pupils, thirteen schools had from 
twenty-one to thirty pupils, and only six schools had more than thirty-one 
pupils. The authorities became extremely sensitive if pupils included Or-
thodox children. I was able to identify eight such cases, among which four 
were observed in Ovruch Uezd of Volyn’ Province.
Exposure
There seemed to be three channels to disclose clandestine Polish schools: 
first, the line of officials moving from police—governors—governor-gen-
eral; second, the ME’s local agents (inspectors and directors of popular 
schools); and third, local Orthodox priests (often teachers of Divine Law), 
who reported the existence of Polish schools in their parishes to the bish-
opric. When local police officers found clandestine schools, they report-
ed it to the governor, who independently took the necessary measures to 
close them. When local agents of the ME or local priests found clandestine 
schools, they reported it to the provincial director of popular schools, who 
in turn asked the governor to close them.
The characteristics of clandestine Polish schools emerging after the 
1905 Revolution seem to indicate that they sought no more than to repro-
duce Polish and Catholic identity. Poor and disorganized, Polish schools 
could at best be compared to one-class Orthodox parish schools, and they 
were far from breeding young rural intellectuals who would embrace Pol-
ish ideas. Obviously, Polish parents, Catholic clerics, and social activists 
(volunteer teachers) did not expect advanced secular knowledge to ema-
nate from Polish schools. Yet, the Russian authorities interpreted these 
schools as rural Poles’ attempt at strengthening Catholic propaganda.56 
On May 12, 1907, when Polish clandestine schools began to be disclosed, 
the overseer of the Kiev educational district sent a petition to the minis-
ter of education, in which he argued that Polish enlightening societies at-
56 See, for example, Kievskii eparkhial’nyi missionarskii komitet, Katolicheskaia propaganda v Kievskoi 
eparkhii posle darovaniia svobody veroispovedanii 17 aprelia 1905 goda (Kiev, 1908).
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tempted to Polonize not only the Russian population who espoused Ro-
man Catholicism, but also Orthodox Russians if possible. To deter this, 
the overseer asked the Southwest governor-general to pursue criminal 
charges against the founders of the Polish schools. However, prohibitive 
measures alone would not be able to impede the “new onslaught of Pol-
ish-Catholic propaganda.” The most effective positive measure would be 
to establish a network of primary schools in places “where Polish schools 
emerged.” For this purpose, the Kievan overseer requested funds to ac-
complish this from the ME: 120,000 rubles at first and then 34,000 rubles 
every year. According to the Kievan overseer, the most appropriate form 
of school for the task of promoting the “Russian cause” in the Southwest-
ern Region was two-class primary schools, which should be established 
everywhere. He added that, for the time being, local communities would 
not be ready to deliver subsidies for such schools. In the future, the pro-
cedure of delivering government subsidies should be simplified to build 
school networks quickly.57
I could not find any evidence that the ME supported this petition re-
questing that schools be built wherever illegal Polish schools emerged. 
Such a position was improbable because, first, this policy would provoke 
furious protest from other local communities that had already borne the 
heavy burden of opening and running a school in their territory. Second, 
the core idea of universal education, which the ME was then preparing, 
was spatially even networks of schools. The speedy establishment of one 
or another school for confessional reasons would have damaged this at-
tempt at uniformity. Indeed, I have not found any argument advanced 
by either the ME or the Kievan overseer that two-class schools were more 
advantageous than four-class advanced schools in the struggle against Po-
lonism, when they criticized local communities’ petitions for four-class 
schools. As I described above, their main concern was spatial uniformi-
ty of school networks.
57 TsDIA Ukrainy, f. 707, op. 229, 1907 rik, spr. 112, ark. 8–8zv. 
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Conclusion
When it began to modernize, the Russian Empire was already a world 
 power. To sustain its vast territory, the government spent a huge amount 
of money. As a result, in contrast to other countries belatedly modernizing, 
such as Japan and Germany, the available funds for modernization was se-
verely limited in the Russian Empire. The government had no alternative 
but to rely upon public resources and initiative for modernization, while 
public institutions such as the zemstvos, the ROC, and local communities 
exploited the government’s reliance on them in order to achieve their own 
goals. Thus, constant negotiation between the government and local insti-
tutions characterized modern Russia’s public administration. Moreover, 
the geographical uniformity in the allocation of resources—easily achiev-
able in state-led modernization efforts—became a serious issue in the con-
testation over modern Russia’s public administration. The introduction of 
universal education should be understood in this context. One must bear 
in mind that primary education was not a priority area among the govern-
ment’s modernizing projects after 1905, while agricultural aid enjoyed the 
generous financial support of Petr Stolypin’s government. This added an-
other layer to the ME’s policy; under any pretext, be it Polish clandestine 
schools or the introduction of universal education, it tried to increase its 
share of the government’s budget.
Another unexpected challenge to the geographical uniformity of bud-
get allocation was the Polish question. The softening of the prohibition of 
unauthorized Polish schools after the 1905 Revolution caused these schools 
to mushroom in Right-bank Ukraine. Although the local Poles’ request for 
their own national schools was defensive and philanthropic as this chapter 
has demonstrated, the overseer of the Kievan educational district used this 
movement as a pretext for requesting an increased budget allocation for pri-
mary education in the region. Yet at the same time, his office never adopt-
ed the discovery of an unauthorized Polish school as a criterion for estab-
lishing a new school in the locality. This would have violated the geographic 
uniformity of budget allocation for school construction and,  accordingly, 
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the ME’s effort to introduce universal primary education. To put it dif-
ferently, measures aimed at universal education could not become an in-
strument of anti-Polish policy in Right-bank Ukraine because the former 
developed in the contradiction between the need for administrative opti-
mization (spatially even distribution of schools) and requests by local com-
munities which, as a rule, had become more aspirational in terms of social 
and economic modernization and less obedient to the authorities than they 
had been in the pre-1905 period. Consequently, the imperial government’s 
struggle against clandestine Polish schools could only be accomplished by 
“prohibitive measures.”
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To Sense an Empire: Russian Education Policy and the 
Origins of Mass Tourism in the Northwest Region
J o l i t a  M u l e v i č i ū t ė
The Fugitive Nose and the Question of Colonial Imagination
By opening his book Internal Colonization with a discussion of Nikolai 
Gogol’s “surrealist” short story The Nose (1836), cultural historian Alex-
ander Etkind was not simply hoping to achieve the literary impact so val-
ued in contemporary humanistic studies. According to Etkind, “Gogol is 
an imperial author who belongs to the list of great colonial authors, along 
with James Joyce and Joseph Conrad,” as evidenced by his famous satirical 
work that encompassed the sweeping expanse between Riga, St. Petersburg, 
the Caucasus, and Kamchatka.1 Etkind also notes that the story’s fugitive 
nose was apprehended on its way to Riga without speculating why the mys-
tical creature was trying to reach the center of the Livland province, a ques-
tion that would be an entirely logical one and might provide insight into 
the nature of the Russian colonial mentality. So, why exactly did the nose 
of the story’s unfortunate protagonist, Kovalev, decide to depart St. Peters-
burg for Riga, when it could have easily chosen Helsingfors (today, Helsin-
ki), Reval (Tallinn), Warsaw, Viľna, Kiev, Odessa, Nizhny Novgorod, or 
Moscow? This study, which focuses on excursions, especially but not on-
ly school tours organized in the so-called Northwest Region of the Russian 
Empire in the early twentieth century, provides an answer to this question 
1  Alexander Etkind, Internal Colonization: Russia’s Imperial Experience (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 
13–14.
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among others. I assert that group travel was not just an educational tool or 
form of recreation, it was also a cultural undertaking that helped define a 
specific political space and disseminate an imperial ideology in the imagi-
nation of Russia’s subjects.
Such an analytical viewpoint would have been impossible in Lithuanian 
historiography fifteen or twenty years ago because of the predominance of 
ethno-linguistic and ethno-confessional themes in local historical research. 
For a long time, nineteenth-century history was largely constructed as a 
narrative about the struggle to retain a Lithuanian-language press, Lithua-
nian schools, and to defend the rights of a Lithuanianized Catholic Church. 
Any analysis of the circumstances of this struggle from the Lithuanian per-
spective viewed Russian imperial power as a repressive external force, and 
all of its employed tactics were defined as furthering Russification, which 
meant nothing less than the assimilation of local inhabitants. By the turn 
of the twenty-first century, however, such a defensive, ethnocentric histor-
ical model concentrated on political events and linguistic issues began to 
erode. In the past two decades, there has been a shift away from the study 
of the ethnic Lithuanian nation toward the analysis that includes all ethnic 
and confessional groups residing in the territory of Lithuania. The dynam-
ic diversity of political and administrative methods of governance has been 
much discussed, and the multifaceted meaning of “Russification” has been 
revealed. Moreover, the grand narrative has been rejected as the search be-
gan for new approaches that draw on the lessons of the so-called “turns” in 
the humanities. All these methodological changes have made it possible to 
delve not only into the facts of political and social life of the former empire, 
but also into the mentality, imagination, and emotions of a bygone society.2 
2  For attempts to apply new methodological approaches in nineteenth-century Lithuanian studies, see, for 
example: Egidijus Aleksandravičius and Antanas Kulakauskas, Pod władzą carów: Litwa w XIX wieku 
(Cracow: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych “Universitas,” 2003), first published as 
Egidijus Aleksandravičius and Antanas Kulakauskas, Carų valdžioje: Lietuva XIX amžiuje (Vilnius: Bal-
tos lankos, 1996); Darius Staliūnas, Making Russians: Meaning and Practice of Russification in Lithuania 
and Belarus after 1863 (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2007); Darius Staliūnas, ed., Spatial Concepts of 
Lithuania in the Long Nineteenth Century (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2016); Vasilijus Safronovas, 
The Creation of National Spaces in a Pluricultural Region: The Case of Prussian Lithuania, trans. Albina 
Strunga (Brighton, Mass.: Academic Studies Press, 2016).
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This article follows these trends in Lithuanian historiography. Several 
points of departure are important for my analysis: first and foremost, is the 
tenet, which comes from postcolonial theory, that an imperial government 
and the nations ruled by it are not simply two separate, opposing histori-
cal actors, but that they are constantly interacting and constructing new, 
mixed forms of reality; here it is important to take note of Mary Louise 
Pratt’s concept of “contact zone” and Homi K. Bhabha’s theory of cultur-
al hybridity.3 This perspective suggests a second principle, which requires 
taking into account not only the destructive, autocratic expression of pow-
er that led to the country’s underdevelopment, but also the creative and in-
ventive practices undertaken by imperial authorities. Thirdly and finally, 
my focus will center on visual practices because, based on John Urry’s view 
of tourism, one can assert that any form of sightseeing is primarily and es-
sentially associated with the visual experience.4 Thus, I rely on insights of-
fered by visual culture studies, but instead of scrutinizing specific imagery, 
I focus on the context of visual perception. In so doing, through the prism 
of the history of organized travel, I reveal how the Russian government re-
sponded to the political, economic, and social challenges of a new era and 
sought to modernize its strategy for integrating and protecting the empire. 
At the same time, however, I highlight a contradictory aspect of this pro-
cess and demonstrate how, despite the government’s efforts, one construct 
of tsarist administration—the Northwest Region comprised of six Lithua-
nian and Belorussian provinces—remained one of the most problematic re-
gions within the imagined imperial space.
Against Entropy
In 1908, Georg Kerschensteiner (1854–1932), the renowned German ed-
ucator and promoter of the so-called new school concept, published an 
3  Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992); Homi 
K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London, New York: Routledge, 1994).
4  John Urry, The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies (London: Sage Publications, 
1990).
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article on the issues of national education in the journal Internationale 
Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik. Three years later, the 
text was translated into Russian and included in a collection of articles 
by  Kerschensteiner published in Moscow. In his paper, Kerschensteiner 
warned his readers about the destructive entropy eating away at the foun-
dations of modern, democratic states: “Everything that we value the most 
in a contemporary state—the freedom of academic research, a free press 
and free speech, the right of assembly and association, universal suffrage, 
free industry and communication—all of these freedoms and their conse-
quences for the industrial and economic life of a country, all of this uncurbs 
individualism, counteracts the solidarity of the masses, and encourages cen-
trifugal, not centripetal forces.”5
The views of this German academic were quite popular in early twen-
tieth-century Russia. Many Russian social activists who advocated for the 
unification of the heterogeneous ethno-cultural and economic imperial 
space eagerly supported his ideas. Kerschensteiner proposed combatting 
destructive centrifugal processes not by employing coercive administrative 
measures, but through educational and cultural methods, which is precise-
ly what the Russian government began to consistently implement from the 
1880s onward. “When people are connected by a common cultural aspi-
ration and when they understand this tie, they perceive weakness in any 
attempt to divide their forces, and thus seek to avoid it. So, the modern 
state is a union consolidated by such common cultural objectives,” wrote 
Kerschensteiner trying to demonstrate the advantages of the cultural ap-
proach.6 What is more, he believed that cultural activity can only be effec-
tive in a large country (which Russia certainly considered itself to be), be-
cause only a large country is (potentially) capable of providing for a modern 
individual’s spiritual needs. Kerschensteiner proposed developing the col-
lective activity of young people based on a shared sensory experience, the 
5  Georg Kerschensteiner, “Problema narodnogo vospitaniia,” in Georg Kerschensteiner, Osnovnye voprosy 
shkol’noi organizatsii, perevod so vtorogo nemetskogo izdaniia pod red. E. Ger’e, s vstup. stat’ei N. V. Speran-
skogo (Moscow: Tipografiia T-va I. D. Sytina, 1911), 33.
6  Ibid., 36.
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pleasure of which would awaken children’s drive to serve others and bind 
their individual egoism to a community spirit, helping to nurture, in the 
author’s words, a social instinct and sense of solidarity, thereby educating 
the nation as an integral whole.
Kerschensteiner singled out student associations for sport and tourism 
as one of the few forms of German collective cultural activity that actual-
ly fostered the devotion of young people toward their community and their 
homeland. His assertions began to resonate just as the practice of organiz-
ing group excursions was beginning to take hold in the Russian Empire. 
The development of Russian tourism was supported by several favorable cir-
cumstances: the emergence of a railway network, the relative liberalization 
of the internal passport regime in 1894, and discounted railway fares ap-
proved at the turn of the twentieth century.
Tours organized by schools became the most popular type of early mass 
tourism in Russia. In 1900, the Ministry of Education revoked an 1873 
edict establishing summer educational programs largely limited to writing 
exercises and instead instructed primary and secondary schools to intro-
duce nature walks and field trips.7 Detailed rules for educational tours were 
developed in the first decade of the twentieth century. School trips were re-
quired to be organized in accordance with administrative orders and re-
strictions based on sex and nationality. Tour organizers had to obtain a per-
mit from the overseer of the local educational district. Girls’ schools were 
encouraged to focus on travel to nearby locations and religious or agricul-
tural sites. It was not recommended to take Jewish students on long-dis-
tance trips, but if tours did include these students, organizers were required 
to obtain advance approval for their participation from the local adminis-
trative bodies in the district to be visited if it was beyond the permitted set-
tlement zone.8 By the early twentieth century, then, opportunities to ex-
7  “(2-go avgusta 1900 goda, no. 20185). Tsirkuliar Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia popechiteliam 
uchebnykh okrugov – ob otmene letnikh kanikuliarnykh rabot uchenikov srednikh uchebnykh zavede-
nii,” Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia 331 (sentiabr’ 1900): 64.
8  “Svedeniia ob uchenicheskikh ekskursiiakh,” in Vilenskii kalendar’ na 1911 prostoi god (Vilnius: Elektro-
Tipografiia “Russkii Pochin,” [1910]), 64.
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plore the Russian Empire had expanded considerably, but the chance to 
travel freely through the vast country was largely reserved for male persons 
of Christian faiths.
Organized touring was considered to be a modern and effective peda-
gogical tool. It was asserted that travel could help overcome the conflictu-
al relationships between teachers and their students, bring students togeth-
er, shape shared group interests, and instill a sense of mutual solidarity. This 
method did have one serious shortcoming, however—it was expensive. This 
explains why efforts were made to reduce travel costs. Beginning in 1902, 
discounted train fares were introduced, low-income students were provid-
ed with financial assistance, support was obtained from local municipal-
ities and private transport companies, and internal resources were sought 
through fostering cooperation among institutions reporting to the Min-
istry of Education. This policy produced certain results; for example, the 
professor of classical philology and the descendant of petty Lithuanian no-
bility, Merkelis Račkauskas (1885−1968), recalled that a tour of Kiev orga-
nized by a secondary school (gimnaziia) in Shavli (Šiauliai) for about fifty 
students, both Orthodox and Catholic, was particularly appealing for him 
as someone who had never visited any larger city, and that the cost of the 
trip was low—only seven rubles.9 Nevertheless, despite government efforts, 
travel to more distant locations remained out of reach for poorer pupils. 
The opportunity to visit the remote expanses of Russia was primarily en-
joyed by the children of wealthy families. Thus, for objective reasons school 
trip organizers in the Northwest Region, as in the empire overall, focused 
their efforts mainly on the middle class, that is, the families of local officials 
and representatives of the intelligentsia as well as members of the bourgeoi-
sie and gentry. At the same time, however, it was precisely these profession-
ally active and financially independent social groups that played an essen-
tial role in the country’s economic development and political stability.
9  Merkelis Račkauskas, Užrašai: Dvidešimt metų (1885–1905) Žemaitijos užkampy (Vilnius: Lietuvių 
literatūros ir tautosakos institutas, 2008), 295.
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Knowing One’s “Little Motherland” and Loving the “Great Fatherland”
Fundamental school reforms launched in the second half of the nineteenth 
century in Europe, Russia, and the United States conferred new impor-
tance on tourism as a broad means of education. This process was influ-
enced by the rapidly adopted understanding of visual learning, which was 
centered on the belief that training should be based not on theory or “book 
knowledge,” but on direct, sensory (especially visual) experience capable of 
providing children with specific information and practical skills. Human 
vision was believed to have exceptional educative powers. It was asserted 
that “the eye is not only a conduit of light, but also of enlightenment,” and 
therefore, all efforts had to be undertaken to ensure that “the foundation of 
any instruction must be ‘visibility’, so that an ‘object’, or at least its image, 
shall have precedence over the word.”10 Influenced by such views, schools 
in the Russian Empire began to assemble visual aids and change their cur-
ricula. Excursions became one of the most effective new visual educational 
tools, giving students the opportunity to view the natural and cultural sites 
they were learning about in situ.
The principles of visual learning and the practice of organizing tours 
were closely linked to an ideology grounded in getting to know one’s birth-
place. This attitude promoted the belief that it was essential to become fa-
miliar with one’s immediate surroundings because, according to the propo-
nents of this approach, only through the specific and personal experience 
of the “little motherland” (rodina) could one hope to develop a proper love 
for one’s “Great Fatherland” (Otechestvo).11
Local studies had been encouraged throughout Europe since the days of 
the Enlightenment and romanticism. “One doesn’t have to become a pro-
found scientist, but failing to come to know the land in which one lives is 
10 Boris Iakovlev, Risovanie, kak obshcheobrazovatel’nyi uchebnyi predmet (Moscow: Ucheb. otd. Muzeia 
prikl. znanii v Moskve, 1896), 13, 15.
11 For the distinction between the concepts of rodina and Otechestvo, see Mariia Leskinen, “Predstavleni-
ia ob ‘otechestve’ i ‘rodine’ v russkikh uchebnikakh geografii poslednei treti XIX v.: konstruirovanie 
natsional’noi identichnosti,” Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, seriia 8: Istoriia, 3 (2010): 43−44.
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a great shame—and an even graver shame if one knows more about foreign 
lands than about one’s own,” wrote the poet Ludwik Kondratowicz (1823–
62).12 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, such patriotic ideas that 
emerged alongside national movements began to take on a political form 
in many countries, and exploratory wandering through the countryside 
by lonely intellectuals were soon replaced by organized group excursions. 
It should be noted that according to the Russian interpretation, exploring 
one’s native land had a specific aim. On the one hand, it was intended to 
help Russian settlers truly “own” the newly colonized territories, provid-
ing a sense of “home” for colonists finding themselves in foreign surround-
ings. At the same time, it was also hoped that ethnic minorities, once armed 
with greater knowledge about their own history and having experienced 
pride for their “little motherland,” could better participate in Russian so-
cial life and become more effectively integrated into the greater imperial 
space.13 Therefore, teaching about local nature, economics, and culture as a 
part of imperial geographical and social structure was considered to be an 
effective means for consolidating multi-ethnic society in such a huge coun-
try, the Romanov Empire.
The task of developing “homeland studies” programs (rodinovede-
nie) began to be addressed in Russian educational institutions starting in 
the 1860s. Among the first to tackle these courses was the renowned Rus-
sian educator Konstantin Ushinskii (1824−71), who believed that children 
must know their own country, but also argued that such knowledge should 
be visual, specific, and must begin with a student’s native region: children 
must learn how to compare the familiar with the remote and must proper-
ly understand the relationships between things.14 This particular pedagog-
12 Władysław Syrokomla [Ludwik Kondratowicz], Wycieczki po Litwie w promieniach od Wilna, vol. 1, Tro-
ki, Stokliszki, Jezno, Punie, Niemież, Miedniki etc. (Vilnius: Nakładem księgarza A. Assa, 1857), 7.
13 See Vera Tolz, “Sobstvennyi Vostok Rossii:” Politika identichnosti i vostokovedenie v pozdneimperskii i ran-
nesovetskii period (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2013), 76–77, first published as Vera Tolz, Rus-
sia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
14 See Konstantin Ushinskii, Rodnoe slovo: Dlia detei mladshego vozrasta: God vtoroi (St. Petersburg: Tipo-
grafiia Glavnogo artilleriiskogo upravleniia, 1864).
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ical method was likely first adopted in the Dorpat (Tartu) educational dis-
trict. According to Ulrike Plath, after the publication of Gustav Blumberg’s 
book Heimathskunde. Stofflick begrentz und methodisch bearbeitet (Dorpat: 
 Gläser, 1869), schools in the Baltic provinces, where the German cultur-
al influence was predominant, began to teach local history and geography, 
and patriotic tourism (walking Heimat) was introduced step-by-step as a 
practical means of education.15
By the early twentieth century, “homeland studies” had become an inte-
gral part of the primary school curricula throughout the European territory 
of the Russian Empire.16 A considerable body of educational literature was 
published for the subject in the form of textbooks instructing teachers how 
to correctly develop the educational process beginning with a child’s living 
place and progressing to the Russian Empire as a whole, and specialized sur-
veys that described the climate, nature, demographics, native populations, 
economy, and culture of individual areas. To make such instruction more ef-
fective, many of these publications featured extensive illustrations. Efforts 
to make “homeland studies” more visual reached their zenith in the years 
between 1909 and 1911, with the ambitious idea to incorporate colored pho-
tographs taken by Sergei Prokudin-Gorskii (1863–1944), which represented 
various locations throughout the empire and their inhabitants with extraor-
dinarily powerful realism.17 In 1910, a special inter-ministerial commission 
was established to acquire and publish the photographic prints. The result-
ing album was meant to serve as a grand visual encyclopedia of the country 
ruled by the Romanov dynasty, and a subscription campaign was launched 
to encourage advance purchases of the book. The institutions of the Vil’na 
educational district were also required to order the collection of pictures, 
and only three of them had the courage to refuse to do so due to the prohib-
15 Ulrike Plath, “Heimat: Rethinking Baltic German Spaces of Belonging,” Kunstiteaduslikke Uurimusi/
Studies on Art and Architecture/Studien für Kunstwissenschaft 23, no. 3−4 (2014): 67, 73.
16 See Marina Loskutova, “S chego nachinaetsia rodina? Prepodavanie geografii v dorevoliutsionnoi shkole 
i regional’noe samosoznanie (XIX–nachalo XX v.),” Ab Imperio 3 (2003): 159−98; Leskinen, “Predstavle-
niia ob ‘otechestve’ i ‘rodine’,” 40−55.
17 See Natal’ia Naryshkina-Prokudina-Gorskaia, “Chelovek, kotoryi shel bystro”: Po stranitsam semeinykh vo-
spominanii (St. Petersburg: Rodnye prostory, 2015), 112. 
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itive cost of the publication for their meager school budgets.18 But despite 
the energy invested in the launching of the project, the endeavor was nev-
er realized, likely because of the unfavorable financial and copyright terms 
( Prokudin-Gorskii offered to sell his collection for a hundred thousand ru-
bles on the condition that he would retain sole rights to his work).19
Notwithstanding the drive to create an illusion of reality and to pres-
ent all material as clearly as possible, the vision of the country that unfold-
ed before students’ eyes on the pages of textbooks was rather fragmented, 
consisting of individual landscapes, examples of local flora and fauna, eth-
nic types, and economic and cultural sites. According to Marina Loskuto-
va, the mosaic-like nature of the presentation was the result of an ahistori-
cal, naturalist approach as well as disparate classification principles, which 
is why the “native land” had no recognizable features: “In Russia, the little 
motherland could easily shrink to the horizons of one village, and just as 
easily expand to the very edges of the great ‘fatherland.’”20 We could go fur-
ther and assert that, in both Russian imperial discourse and in the academ-
ic geography that reflected it, the only absolute and unquestionable con-
cept was the “Great Fatherland,” while one’s homeland was devoid of clear 
content or autonomous value. Its depiction was subjected to political cir-
cumstances and only became meaningful when projected upon a symbolic 
metastructure: the Romanov state. This approach was particularly evident 
in schools in the Northwest Region.
The concept of “homeland studies” reached the Northwest Region at the 
same time as other areas of the Russian Empire. After conducting an inspec-
tion of schools in Vitebsk, Dinaburg (Daugavpils), and Mogilev in 1865, the 
overseer of the Vil’na educational district complained that students lacked 
18 See the file regarding subscriptions of the album by Sergei Prokudin-Gorskii in institutions of the Vil’na 
educational district, 1910, Lietuvos valstybės istorijos archyvas (henceforth, LVIA), f. 567, ap. 1, b. 1851.
19 For more details on this topic, see the files: “O priobretenii v kaznu sostavliaemoi professorom Prokudinym-
Gorskim kollektsii fotograficheskikh snimkov dostoprimechatel’nostei Rossii,” 1910, Rossiiskii gosudarst-
vennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (henceforth, RGIA), f. 1276, op. 6, d. 597; “Proekt zakliucheniia k rabotam 
Mezhvedomstvennoi komissii po voprosu o priobretenii v kaznu fotograficheskikh kollekcii S. M. Proku-
din-Gorskogo,” 1911, RGIA, f. 25, op. 5, d. 381, l. 2−8.
20 Loskutova, “S chego nachinaetsia rodina?,” 183, 194, 196.
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information about their neighboring provinces and that Russian geography 
was being taught as if it was the geography of China.21 Although local offi-
cials regularly emphasized the need for learning about one’s native land, no 
significant progress on this subject was achieved as evidenced by the con-
cerns periodically expressed by educators as well as the lack of instructional 
tools allocated to the Western provinces. Not a single geography textbook 
encompassing the entire Northwest Region was published prior to World 
War I. Indeed, publishers only succeeded in issuing brief, non-illustrated 
surveys of the Minsk and Vil’na provinces that appeared particularly insub-
stantial within the overall context of similar publications elsewhere in the 
Russian Empire.22 In truth, efforts were made to incorporate elements of 
“homeland studies” programs into Russian language and literature lessons, 
but these attempts also avoided the use of illustrations of local sites of inter-
est.23 More importantly, textbooks on Russian literature for local children 
were compiled according to a contradictory logic: rather than beginning 
with a focus on subjects pertinent to the native land, publications started 
by examining works that glorified Russia, inserting information about the 
regional culture in the form of brief supplements. The conclusion, then, is 
that the “native land” in the course books used in Northwestern regional 
schools remained invisible both literally and figuratively; its representation 
“faded” due to the focus on the “Great Fatherland.” Given that the litera-
ture intended for “homeland studies” programs was closely related to the 
practice of educational excursions (by providing selective information, text-
books shaped the principles of instructional tourism), one can assume that 
a similar strategy for controlling perspective was also applied in the organi-
zation of student tours.
21 “Report by the overseer of the Vil’na educational district, Ivan Kornilov, on the inspection of schools in 
Vitebsk, Dinaburg, and Mogilev, April 1865,” LVIA, f. 567, ap. 3, b. 1435, l. 14v–15.
22 Aleksandr Smorodskii, Geografiia Minskoi gubernii (Rodinovedenie) (Minsk: Parovaia tipo-litografiia Kh. 
Ia. Dvorzhetsa, 1894); Evstafii Orlovskii, Uchebnoe opisanie Vilenskoi gubernii (Vilnius: Tipografiia M. R. 
Romma, 1904; 2-e izdanie: Vilnius: Tipografiia A. G. Syrkina, 1912).
23 Nikanor Odintsov and Vsevolod Bogoiavlenskii, eds., Kniga dlia chteniia v narodnykh uchilishchakh Seve-
ro-Zapadnogo kraia Rossii s russkim i tserkovno-slavianskim bukvarem i materialom dlia samostoiatel’nykh 
pis’mennykh uprazhnenii, vol. 1–3, (Vilnius: Tipografiia A. G. Syrkina, 1896).
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Travel Itineraries: Opportunities and Limitations
As in other European countries, the appeal of tourism within the Russian 
Empire was bolstered by popular science publications, travelogues, and ad-
venture fiction, particularly the romantic novels of James Fenimore  Cooper, 
Thomas Mayne Reid, and Jules Verne, all of which were eagerly collected by 
Russian school libraries. The imperial royal family’s trips were held up as ex-
emplary models for school excursions, including the 1837 visit made by the 
future emperor Alexander II to twenty-nine of the Russian Empire’s Euro-
pean provinces, which the poet Vasilii Zhukovskii (1783−1852) compared 
to a “national betrothal to Russia,”24 or the tour to the Russian Far East tak-
en in 1890 by the future Nicholas II in order to inaugurate the construc-
tion of the Trans-Siberian railroad—a visit that was later widely promoted 
through illustrated lectures, photography collections, and books.
Much like the travels embarked upon by the country’s leaders, school 
excursions were also ideologically driven and strategically motivated. The 
dominant elements featured on the educational tourism map included the 
old and new capitals of Russia, Kiev—long considered the symbolic cradle 
of Russian statehood and the Orthodox religion—as well as entire regions, 
first and foremost the Volga region, Crimea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, 
and Finland. The geography of educational tours essentially reflected the 
colonial structure of the Romanov Empire, and it was meant to shape the 
spatial perception of a “Great Russian State” to be embraced by the tsar’s 
subjects.
The Vil’na educational district began organizing tours in 1900, the same 
year in which the Ministry of Education directive was issued.25 Following 
education policymakers in St. Petersburg, local teachers began discussing 
the special benefits of tourism, asserting that group travel would provide 
children with necessary knowledge and would help to harden students phys-
24 Sergei Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II: Ego zhizn’ i tsarstvovanie, izdanie 2-e, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Iz-
danie A. S. Suvorina, 1911), 82.
25 Maksim Kossakovskii, “K voprosu ob uchenicheskikh ekskursiiakh s pedagogicheskoi tsel’iu,” Tsirkuliar 
po Vilenskomu uchebnomu okrugu 6 (iiun’ 1900): 421–41.
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ically as well as to develop their willpower, responsibility, and self-reliance. 
In the view of educators, school tours would also bring teachers and students 
closer together and, most importantly, would inspire young people’s faith in 
the moral and material capabilities of the Romanov Empire.26 Already in the 
first three years, alongside a number of local hikes, several long-distance trips 
took place: visits to Pskov, Kiev, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, an excursion 
to the famous Orthodox Solovetskii monastery and the Murmansk area, as 
well as a trip to Crimea with stops in Gomel’, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, 
Odessa, Sevastopol’, Yalta, Feodosia, and Khar’kov.27 Systemic planning of 
multi-day trips to more distant locations took on even greater relevance in 
1910, after the board of the Vil’na educational district called for more atten-
tion to be devoted to visiting remote regions.28
In many respects, school travels organized in the Northwest Region dif-
fered little from the routes that were popular in the rest of the country. 
The tours promoted in the Vil’na educational district brought students to 
St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, the Black Sea resorts, and the Caucasus and 
Turkestan. It is worthwhile noting that the last destination was the most 
challenging. Implemented in 1911 to replace a planned visit to Vladivo-
stok and the Russian Far East Region because of an outbreak of the plague, 
the excursion to Turkestan lasted forty-two days and included numerous 
stops in Khar’kov, Rostov-on-Don, Baku, Krasnovodsk, Bukhara, Samar-
kand, Khodzhent, Tashkent, Samara, Nizhnii Novgorod, Moscow, Smo-
lensk, and other cities. Thirty-eight children and eight adults from various 
Northwestern schools with their personal belongings and ten photo camer-
as covered 10,002 versts (10,670 km) by train, steamship, and horse-drawn 
26 S. Kovaliuk, ed., Otchet o sostoianii Vilenskoi 1-i gimnazii za 1899–1900 uchebnyi god, (Vilnius: Tipografiia 
Vil. Prav. Sv.-Dukhovskogo Bratstva, 1901), 82–83.
27 See S. Kovaliuk, ed., Otchet o sostoianii Vilenskoi 1-i gimnazii za 1899–1900 uchebnyi god, 53; Ekskursiia 
uchenikov Vilenskoi 1-oi gimnazii v Krym (7 iiunia –11 iiulia 1901 goda) (Vilnius: Tipografiia Vil. Prav. Sv.-
Dukhovskogo Bratstva, 1902); A. I. Shestov, ed., Opisanie ekskursii uchashchikhsia Vilenskogo uchebnogo 
okruga za 1910 god, (Vilnius: Tipografiia Iosifa Zavadzkogo, 1911), 8; S. I. Medvedev, ed., Opisanie ekskur-
sii vospitannikov srednikh uchebnykh zavedenii Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga v Turkestan letom 1911 goda, 
(Kaunas–Vilnius: Tipografiia I. Zavadskogo, 1912), 3; “1903 report on a trip taken by the Mozyr’ second-
ary school to Kiev,” LVIA, f. 567, ap. 1, b. 1400, l. 2−10.
28 Medvedev, ed., Opisanie ekskursii, 3.
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carriage. The travel costs for each participant totaled sixty rubles and stu-
dents’ families and public donations defrayed these costs.29
Tour planners sought to portray the Russian Empire as a country of in-
exhaustible natural resources, boundless economic possibilities, and innu-
merable cultural treasures. Various mnemonic techniques including jour-
naling, drawing, and photography were employed to record travellers’ 
experiences. In mandatory reports about their travels written after return-
ing home, sightseers and their tour leaders usually emphasized their im-
pressions of the country’s great diversity. To put it more precisely, the most 
important leitmotif of these bureaucratic travelogues was not dangerous dif-
ference but rather variety as a peaceful kaleidoscope of landscapes, ethnici-
ties, and cultural landmarks emblazoned in the memory and joined into an 
integral whole by recurring symbols of imperial rule and the expression of 
Russian nationhood. School reports drafted to satisfy the demands of the 
Ministry of Education displayed a clear overall ideological trend that em-
braced the image of the Russian people as a supra-ethnic community. In 
other words, accounts written by tour participants captured the emerging 
idea of a complex form of “Russianness” as an alternative to the portrayal 
of a homogenous Russian nation. They signaled the increasing acceptance 
of the need, according to Vera Tolz, to cultivate multiple, complementary 
identities in an effort to more effectively manage Russia’s ethnic plurality.30 
However, this interpretation of the Russian state as a resultant force encap-
sulating the energies of numerous constituent nationalities generally incor-
porated slightly different content in different regions and was developed in 
particular local ways, as is demonstrated in the history of tours organized 
in the Vil’na education district.
Not surprisingly, prevailing anti-Polish policies meant that schools in 
the Northwest Region had to refrain from organized travel to the King-
dom of Poland. It is also understandable that pupils from this restive ar-
ea were not given the opportunity to visit foreign destinations, despite the 
29 Ibid., 5−9. 
30 Tolz, “Sobstvennyi Vostok Rossii”, 50, 65.
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fact that many students and teachers from other provinces of the empire 
were traveling to Paris, Prague, Berlin, Constantinople, and Jerusalem 
with increasing frequency.31 Since 1911, when the ministers of education, 
internal, and foreign affairs approved a form of collective foreign student 
passport, departures of general and higher education school groups abroad 
became much easier.32 Meanwhile, no such excursion was organized by 
the Vil’na educational district. It seems that tsarist authorities, fearing the 
influence of Polish nationalism and Catholicism as well as revolutionary 
ideas spreading across European countries, sought to obstruct any West-
ern-orientated school trips arranged in the Northwest Region. What is es-
pecially notable, however, is that local education administrators general-
ly avoided traveling to the Grand Duchy of Finland and the neighboring 
Baltic provinces. Only a handful of such tours were organized in the 1910s, 
including an excursion for students of the Pinsk Realschule (real’naia 
shkola) to the environs of the Gauja river, known as the Livliandian Swit-
zerland; a sailing trip for Vil’na educational district students in the Bay of 
Finland; and visits by schools from Ponevezh (Panevėžys) and Vil’na to 
Libava (Liepaja).33 Of these tours, only the first was motivated by genu-
ine cultural interest, while both the sailing trip and excursions to Libava 
(then famous for its modern submarine base) were organized with propa-
ganda goals in mind—to extol the power of the Russian navy. These facts 
are indeed telling if we remember that a multitude of tourists from across 
the Russian Empire regularly visited Riga, Reval, Helsingfors, and Imatra. 
Finland was an especially popular destination—the country was viewed as 
an ideal imperial colony.34 Its idyllic portrayal encompassed the safety of 
31 For statistics on this topic, see Anatolii Belgorodskii, Uchenicheskie ekskursii (Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk, 
znachenie i organizatsiia ikh) (St. Petersburg: Sinodal’naia tipografiia, 1912), 5–6; Genadii Dolzhenko, Is-
toriia turizma v dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii i SSSR (Rostov-na-Donu: Izdatel’stvo rostovskogo universiteta, 
1988), 42−52; Z. P. Solov’eva, “O nekotorykh osobennostiakh organizatsii ekskursii v Rossii (1905−1914),” 
Peterburzhets puteshestvuet: Sbornik materialov konferentsii, ed. in L. I. Kashpur (St. Petersburg: “Piligrim,” 
1995), 62−68; Andrei Ivanov, Istoriia rossiiskogo turizma (IX−XX veka) (Moscow: Forum, 2011), 145−47.
32 Ivanov, Istoriia rossiiskogo turizma, 146.
33 See Shestov, ed., Opisanie ekskursii, 73–82, 86–94, 115–18; “1912 report by the director of the Alexander I 
secondary school villa in Vil’na,” LVIA, f. 567, ap. 1, b. 2465, l. 151–59.
34 Nathanaëlle Minard-Törmänen, “An Imperial Idyll: Finland in Russian Travelogues (1810–1860)” (PhD 
diss., University of Helsinki, 2016), 319.
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agrarian conservatism, practicality of Western cultural convenience, and 
the beauty of primordial nature. Therefore, the Grand Duchy of Finland 
was visited by both members of the imperial royal family as well as stu-
dents from the Caucasus educational district, which itself was not lacking 
in natural treasures.35 When the director of the Vil’na Secondary School 
(gimnaziia) proposed a tour of the Baltic provinces, St. Petersburg, and 
Finland, however, the overseer of the educational district rejected the idea, 
arguing that “tour participants would encounter the foreign Finnish and 
German cultures..., while they should first be exploring native Russian 
regions [korennye oblasti Rossii] with all of their holy sites and historical 
landmarks which are so dear to the Russian heart.”36
The geographical boundaries of school trips organized in the Vil’na ed-
ucational district were limited by long-established political interests. For 
example, Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, the author of a monograph about the 
Russian railway era, cited a brochure by Sergei Buturlin (1803−73) that had 
been published in 1865 during a debate on further railway development. In 
his pamphlet, Buturlin warned against the dangers arising from expanding 
the communications network linking the Western territories and suggest-
ed forcing the “binding” of these border areas to the territorial core of the 
country.37 School tour organizers adhered to a similar principle, attempting 
to associate the cultural experiences of students in the Northwest Region 
with the central and more distant territories of the Romanov Empire, hop-
ing to prevent the rise of any new separatist sentiments among local com-
munities in the process.
35 See, for instance: Ekskursii uchashchikhsia Kavkazskogo uchebnogo okruga v 1908 godu (Tbilisi: Tipografi-
ia T-va “Liberman i Ko,” 1909).
36 S. Kovaliuk, ed., Otchet o sostoianii Vilenskoi 1-i gimnazii za 1900–1901 uchebnyi god, (Vilnius: Tip. Vil. 
Prav. Sv.-Dukhovskogo Bratstva, 1901), 113.
37 See Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, Poezd v sovremennost’: Mobil’nost’ i sotsial’noe prostranstvo Rossii v vek zhe-
leznykh dorog, trans. Maiia Lavrinovich (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2016), 67–68, first pu-
blished as Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, Russlands Fahrt in die Moderne: Mobilität und sozialer Raum im Ei-
senbahnzeitalter (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014).
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A Split Identity, or Where Does Russia End?
As the history of school travels shows, the tsarist government saw the in-
tellectual and emotional integration of residents of the Western region in-
to the greater imperial space as an important strategic aim. At the same 
time, however, organized tourism from the central imperial territories to 
the Lithuanian and Belorussian provinces was rarely undertaken. In truth, 
when the railway line linking St. Petersburg to Warsaw opened in 1862, 
Vil’na was increasingly visited by various transients, mostly traders and en-
tertainers in search of better wages. The rapid rise in travellers is evidenced 
by the growth of businesses offering temporary lodging: in 1864, only sev-
en such businesses operated in Vil’na, while by 1915, there were as many as 
seventy-five hotels and rooms for rent.38 The development of a travel indus-
try is also evident in the publication of tourist guides and books.
The first study about Vil’na to meet the demands of the travel guide 
genre was issued in 1856 by the publisher, archaeologist and antiquities col-
lector Adam Honory Kirkor (1818−86).39 Written in Polish, the book em-
phasized the heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania based on the tradi-
tions of Western culture and was aimed at educated readers in the lands of 
the former Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.
After the Polish−Lithuanian Uprising of 1863–64, travel guides about 
Vil’na began to appear in Russian.40 The first to begin writing such guides 
was the playwright, poet, and Orthodox Church historian Andrei Murav’ev 
(1806−74). Likely encouraged by his brother, Mikhail Murav’ev, the Gov-
ernor General of the Northwest Region responsible for the suppression of 
38 See Ukazatel’ goroda Vil’ny: Sostavlen po razporiazheniiu g. glavnogo nachal’nika kraia (Vilnius: Tipogra-
fiia A. K. Kirkora, 1864), 132; M. Tassel’ kraut, ed., Vsia Vil’na: Adresnaia i spravochnaia kniga gor. Vil’ny. 
1915 god, (Vilnius: Tipografiia M. Kukhty, 1915), 200–01.
39 Jan ze Śliwina [Adam Honory Kirkor], Przechadzki po Wilnie i jego okolicach (Vilnius: [s. n.], 1856).
40 For more information on this topic, see Pavel Lavrinets, “Russkie putevoditeli po Vil’niusu XIX–nacha-
la XX vv.: printsipy kompozitsii i otbora ob’ektov,” in Liubov’ Kiseleva, ed., Putevoditel’ kak semioticheskii 
ob’ iekt, (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2008), 219–39; Mikhail Dolbilov, “Gorod edva li svoi, no i ne 
vovse chuzhdyi: Vil’na v imperskom i natsionalisticheskom voobrazhenii russkich (1860-e gody−nachalo 
XX veka),” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 2 (144) (2017), accessed November 30, 2018, https://www.nlobo-
oks.ru/magazines/novoe_literaturnoe_obozrenie/144_nlo_2_2017/article/12414/.
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the 1863–64 uprising, A. Murav’ev prepared a brief survey of the city’s Or-
thodox churches, which was published in St. Petersburg in 1864 and soon 
reprinted in both Russian and French in Vil’na.41 The brochure became the 
foundation of a canon of all subsequent Russian guidebooks about Vil’na. 
In it, A. Murav’ev portrayed the region’s central city as a historical cradle of 
the Orthodox religion, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a Russian state, 
and its territory as a collection of Russian-Lithuanian lands that fell in-
to decline after unification with the Polish Kingdom, recovering only af-
ter their “return” to the Romanov Empire. The publication’s author, thus, 
sought to find a place for Vil’na within the expanse of an imagined Russian 
world and encourage other travellers, first and foremost pilgrims from the 
interior Russian provinces, to visit the city. But neither A. Murav’ev’s book 
nor later, more expansive guides succeeded in achieving these goals.42 Sta-
tistics about the number of visitors to the Vil’na Public Library and its An-
tiquities Museum attest to this fact.43
Records from that bipartite institution dedicated to local history and 
culture show only sporadic visits by tourists from more remote regions. In 
1902, 1903, and 1909, they tell of visits by students from the Irkutsk and 
St. Petersburg Orthodox Seminaries, as well as pupils from a girls’ second-
ary school (gimnaziia) in Pskov.44 In addition to civilian Vil’na residents 
41 Russkaia Vil’na: Prilozhenie k puteshestviiu po sv. mestam russkim (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Vtorogo ot-
del. Sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliarii, 1864); Russkaia Vil’na: Prilozhenie k puteshestviiu po sv. mestam rus-
skim (Vilnius: Tipografiia A. Syrkina, 1865); Vilna Russe: par l’auteur du Pèlegrinage aux lieux-saints de la 
Russie, traduit du russe (Vilnius: Imprimerie de A. H. Kirkor, 1865).
42 A slightly different opinion was expressed by Mikhail Dolbilov (see Dolbilov, “Gorod edva li svoi, no i ne 
vovse chuzhdyi”). According to the historian, in the first decade of the twentieth century, both local Rus-
sians and visitors from the internal imperial areas began to feel themselves less alienated in Vil’na. How-
ever, a few examples provided by the researcher can be considered as manifestations of Russian wishful 
thinking aimed at ideological or commercial purposes than evidences of actual psycho-cultural changes. 
Quite on the contrary, 1905 revolution deepened political and inter-ethnic tensions in the city and there-
fore heightened specific Russian feeling of insecurity and otherness.
43 From 1867 to 1915, relevant information on the attendance rates was published in the annual reports of 
the Vil’na Public Library and Museum. See Kratkii otchet o Vilenskoi publichnoi biblioteke (Vilnius: Tipo-
grafiia A. Syrkina, 1867) and the subsequent publications.
44 On the visits by seminaries, see Otchet Vilenskoi publichnoi biblioteki i muzeia za 1902 god (Vilnius: Tipo-
grafiia A. G. Syrkina, 1903), 6; Otchet Vilenskoi publichnoi biblioteki i muzeia za 1903 god (Vilnius: Tipo-
grafiia A. G. Syrkina, 1904), 5. On the visits by the group from Pskov, see Otchet Vilenskoi publichnoi bib-
lioteki i muzeia za 1909 god (Vilnius: Elektro-Tipografiia “Russkii Pochin,” 1910), 22.
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and Russian soldiers stationed in the city, the majority of tourists visiting 
the public library and museum consisted of students from the Vil’na, War-
saw, and Kiev educational districts, as well as Catholic and Orthodox pil-
grims from the Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Polish provinces. Given that 
in the early twentieth century, museum tours were an obligatory part of the 
official educational policy program, such visitation statistics for the region’s 
most important cultural institution suggest that Vil’na was considered pri-
marily a locally significant site on the Russian tourism map. Its draw was 
limited to the Northwest Region and its neighboring provinces. In oth-
er words, despite the efforts of the tsarist administration to integrate the 
Western areas into the imperial body through both administrative meth-
ods and cultural means, the appeal of this historic center reached only into 
the former territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, failing to penetrate 
deeper into the empire.
Vil’na was a rarely embraced destination for rank-and-file imperial of-
ficials as well as the ruling elite. A tour by Grand Duke Vladimir Alexan-
drovich is particularly telling. From 1884 to 1888, this member of the Ro-
manov royal family made a series of trips to the western borderlands of the 
country, which were later described by the poet and novelist Konstantin 
Sluchevskii (1837−1904), who accompanied the duke on his travels. Vladi-
mir Alexandrovich devoted considerable attention to visiting Finland and 
the Baltic provinces, familiarizing himself with regional administrative, 
economic, and cultural centers, as well as the area’s smaller historic cities 
and resorts. The Northwest Region was relegated to the sixth, or last, place 
on the itinerary. Instead of traveling to the main city of the region, Vil’na, 
connected with St. Petersburg by a direct railway line, the Grand Duke 
made a detour, briefly visiting Kovna (Kaunas), Jurburg (Jurbarkas), and 
Grodna. From there, he went to Osowiec and Warsaw. After a three-day 
visit to Warsaw, the traveller turned back to the imperial capital, stopping 
along the way in Novogeorgievsk (today Modlin, a part of the city Nowy 
Dwór Mazowiecki), Brest Litovsk, Nesvizh, Minsk, Smolensk, Kaluga, and 
Tula. Although the tour was officially represented as a sort of cultural ac-
tivity, its trajectory suggests that inspecting this “wedge-shaped territory” 
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(which, according to Sluchevskii, “continues to demand difficult and persis-
tent government efforts to achieve its final unification with the empire”45), 
Vladimir Alexandrovich was guided by strategic state interests. Nearly all 
of the aforementioned stops on the tour were important military sites that 
had assumed extraordinary significance in the context of the foundation of 
the Triple Alliance in 1882. Even the picturesque Neman (Nemunas) riv-
er valley stretching from Kovna to Jurburg was not chosen for its histori-
cal treasures: the high-ranking traveller was more concerned with securi-
ty along the border zone with Prussia, through which an unprecedented 
quantity of contraband was flowing to the Romanov Empire.
The image Russian travellers had of the Northwest Region differed con-
siderably from their perception of neighboring lands. Finland and the Bal-
tic provinces were traditionally associated with Western culture. This Rus-
sian-controlled “domestic” West, this “Little Europe,” attracted even the 
aforementioned character from Nikolai Gogol’s story. Having escaped 
from its master and determined to enjoy life, Kovalev’s nose decided to trav-
el to Riga, which surpassed Reval in its urban appeal and which, compared 
to Helsingfors, was much more accessible (crossing the border into Finland 
would have required the fugitive to present papers and undergo a luggage 
inspection).
Riga, Reval, and Helsingfors were destinations unto themselves, while 
Vil’na and Kovna were rarely chosen as the final stop on most tours. The 
Northwest Region was usually a brief stopover, as was the case for a group 
of railway school students from Odessa embarking on a tour of St. Peters-
burg and Finland in 1910.46 Similarly, cities in the Lithuanian and Belo-
russian provinces were presented as transit stops in guides and travel books 
printed by foreign as well as Russian publishers.47 One such book was pub-
lished by naturalist, translator, and poet Vasilii Sidorov (1843−1903) in 
45 Konstantin Sluchevskii, Po Severo-Zapadu Rossii, vol. 2: Po Zapadu Rossii (St. Petersburg: Izdanie A. F. 
Marksa, 1897), 397.
46 See Odessa, Vil’na, Peterburg, Finliandiia: Ekskursiia uchashchikh i uchashchikhsia Odesskogo zheleznodo-
rozhnogo uchilishcha: 1910 g. (Odessa: Tipografiia Ia. Kh. Shermana, 1910).
47 For instance, see Russland: Europäisches Russland, Eisenbahnen in Russ-Asien, Teheran, Peking. Handbuch 
für Reisende (Liepzig: Verlag von Karl Baedeker, 1904).
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1891.48 This Baedeker-style pocket guide was notable for its vibrant, literary 
form of narrative. In it, Sidorov described his journey from St. Petersburg to 
Yekaterinoslav, devoting quite a bit of attention to his brief visit to Vil’na.
Sidorov began by viewing Vil’na from a distance, from a hill in the sub-
urbs, looking out over an enticing landscape. He noticed the dwellings, 
Catholic churches, and Orthodox shrines climbing the slopes of the  Viliia 
river valley and admired the picturesque urban texture interspersed with 
occasional pyramids of poplars and islands of green gardens.49 But once the 
traveller descended into the dense world of the city, his impression changed. 
Having arrived from Riga where he enjoyed that city’s broad boulevards 
and spacious squares, Sidorov was unpleasantly surprised by the crooked, 
narrow, and poorly-paved streets of Vil’na crammed with Jewish residents; 
by the city’s old and dilapidated houses; and, most importantly, by a re-
flexive sense of uncertainty. This feeling only grew in intensity after see-
ing Catholic churches converted into military barracks: cabbage soup sim-
mered and horses neighed where God had once been worshipped. Local 
holy sites handed over for use by the Orthodox faithful offered little solace 
either. The Catholic spirit, so foreign to the Russian mind, was still clear-
ly evident in the old architectural forms hidden beneath Byzantine deco-
ration. Overall, the local milieu suggested something ambiguous and left 
unsaid—as if something were missing. It was an unfinished, discordant, 
ill-defined city lacking sufficiently comfortable living space.50 Here, too, 
Sidorov’s imagination takes a sudden leap. In his words, observing such cit-
ies as Vil’na always made him want to spring forward at least one hundred 
years into the future to see what this place would be like: “I feel as if I can 
see electric lights everywhere, and all these [cities] of Vil’na, Kovna, Perm’, 
and Cheliaba will have been transformed into something almost like Par-
is or Berlin.”51
48 Vasilii Sidorov, Okol’noi dorogoi: Putevye zametki i vpechatleniia: Riga, Vil’no, Kiev, Odessa, Konstantino-
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Sidorov’s thoughts reveal his own inner bewilderment. Neither the city’s 
“Latin” past nor its Russian Orthodox present satisfied him. The former 
seemed too alien, while the latter appeared apocryphal and deceiving. In-
capable of discerning a connection between the different components of 
Vil’na’s identity, Sidorov sought refuge in his own imagination, which he 
deployed to compare the center of the Northwest Region to insignificant 
Russian provincial backwaters and relegate the city to the margins of his 
own reflections.
Other travellers transiting through the Lithuanian and Belorussian 
provinces expressed similar feelings of uncertainty and dissatisfaction.52 
Considering both the low number of visitors and the content of their trav-
elogues, it can be assumed that the image of the Northwest Region em-
braced by Russians was extremely contradictory, and thus hardly conducive 
to the promotion of any tourism-related activity. Indeed, ambiguity was en-
grained in the name of the administrative unit itself, which was devised to 
erase, along with the name Lithuania, any allusion to the historical sover-
eign European polity the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth that once ex-
isted on this edge of the Russian Empire. Although it denoted the “North 
West,” the toponym invented by Russian authorities essentially meant “the 
East” (i.e. Eastern Christendom), positioning the Lithuanian and Belorus-
sian provinces as the Western part of the Russian Orthodox world. And 
yet, the “Western” vector in the place-name made the Russian description 
of the region rather vulnerable, forcing the need to constantly prove the re-
gion’s geopolitical and cultural dependence.
The difficulties arising from attempts to describe the essence of this ad-
ministrative unit is evident from the failure to produce a single school text-
book reviewing all six of the border provinces or any Russian travel guide 
that promoted the region as a unified whole prior to World War I. Rath-
er, this task was undertaken not by some representative of official Russian 
culture, but by the Vil’na-based Polish journalist and theater critic Napo-
52 For a comparison, see Aleksandr Miliukov, Letnie poezdki po Rossii: Zapiski i putevye pis’ma (St. Peters-
burg: Izdanie F. Bazunova, 1874), 206−17; Nikolai Ostankovich, “Ekskursiia po Litve (Putevye zametki), 
Istoricheskii vestnik 107, no. 2 (1907): 586−612.
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leon Rouba (1860−1929). In 1908, Rouba invited the local Polish-speaking 
intellectuals to collaborate, and in a year’s time, with the assistance of some 
eighty respondents, he prepared and published an encyclopedic guide.53 
The book was titled A Guide to Lithuania and Belorussia, avoiding any ref-
erence to the name, “the Northwest Region.” Indeed, its title included two 
geographic names defining the territories of two different ethnic commu-
nities, which testified to the modern split that had taken place in this his-
torical area.
Historians emphasize that different imperial regions were given differ-
ent status within Russian nationalist discourse—some of them were per-
ceived as imperial borderlands and others as Russian “national territories.”54 
Finland, Estland, Livland, and Kurland belonged to the category of border-
lands. Sidorov had no doubt, for example, about Riga’s German character. 
Everything there was different than in Russia: the language, customs, do-
mestic conveniences, and rules governing trade. It was an unfamiliar land, 
almost foreign. Thus, even upon noticing the distaste local Germans had 
for Russians, he felt little personal discomfort.55 His encounter with Vil’na, 
on the other hand, troubled him: this city was part of “ancient Russian 
lands,” but its Russianness was difficult to discern. Failing to recognize the 
ideological phantom constructed by imperial policymakers, a large part of 
Russian society experienced similar complications. In their search to find a 
way out of the stalemate in which they found themselves, Russians adopted 
a strategy similar to that of Sidorov; that is, marginalizing the Northwest-
ern provinces on their own mental maps, and transforming them into an 
unappealing and insignificant peripheral area, a kind of transit zone, there-
by seemingly securing the right for themselves to ignore unresolvable geo-
political, cultural, and psychological problems.
53 On the initiation of this project, see “On the Publishing of a Travel Guide for Six Lithuanian and Belo-
russian Provinces, 1908,” LVIA, f. 378, ap. 116, b. 399. For the published guide, see Napoleon Rouba, ed., 
Przewodnik po Litwie i Białejrusi, (Vilnius: Wydawnictwo “Kurjera Litewskiego,” Nakład Edmunda No-
wickiego, [1909]).
54 See Alexei Miller, The Romanov Empire and Nationalism: Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research, 
trans. Serguei Dobrynin (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2008).
55 Sidorov, Okol’noi dorogoi, 12.
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Postscript
Guided by the approach outlined in a 1988 study by Gennadii Dolzhenko,56 
Russian scholars have associated early Russian tourism in their works with 
the needs of public education and recreation. Studies by historians in oth-
er countries, meanwhile, underscore the political aspect, distinguishing all 
types of Russian tourism from the modern culture of Western travel and its 
orientation toward recreation, consumerism, and entertainment.57 The po-
litical dimension is particularly evident in the organization of school trips, 
which became the main form of group excursions in the Northwest Region. 
It is noteworthy that political propaganda objectives in these borderlands 
began to be increasingly emphasized in 1910, after the formulation of a se-
ries of official directives. It was in this year that, in addition to the previous-
ly discussed effort to organize more frequent tours to distant destinations, 
the overseer of the Vil’na educational district issued a directive to encour-
age students’ participation in marine tours organized by the Navy League 
(Liga obnovleniia flota), as well as to devote greater attention to paramili-
tary expeditions and visits to Orthodox temples and monasteries.58 
Tours were meant to foster deeper patriotism among students, instilling 
a common imperial dimension in the consciousness of a new generation. 
Even as the tsarist authorities persistently sought to incorporate the popula-
tion of the Northwest Region into the larger imperial space, the integration 
of the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania into the mental Rus-
sian map proceeded at a sluggish pace. Although the Northwestern prov-
inces continued to be considered “native” Russian territories (first and fore-
most those areas with a predominantly Belorussian ethnic composition), 
such a depiction of these borderlands only functioned as intended on the 
official level. Even up to the outbreak of the Great War, the region’s place 
56 Dolzhenko, Istoriia turizma.
57 See Louise McReynolds, Russia at Play: Leisure Activities at the End of the Tsarist Era (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 2003); Marek Olkuśnik, Wyjechać z miasta…: Mieszkańcy Warszawy wobec podróży, 
turystyki i wypoczynku na przełomie XIX i XX wieku (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2015).
58 Shestov, ed., Opisanie ekskursii, 193–97.
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within the Russian world remained poorly defined and thoroughly contra-
dictory as evidenced by the lack of records of Russian travel through the 
Northwestern provinces59 and the small number of tour groups visiting the 
region from areas in the central part of the Russian Empire.
An analysis of the origin of mass tourism offers us an opportunity to fol-
low how the strategies for integrating and protecting the empire changed 
and how, within this field, compulsory political and administrative mea-
sures had become increasingly intertwined with cultural techniques fo-
cused on the modeling of a collective social experience for the Romanovs’ 
subjects. It is worth remembering that the start of organized educational 
tours coincided with the emergence of experimental pedagogy: it was pre-
cisely during this time that scholars began to explore students’ attention, 
memory, associative thinking, and imagination in laboratory conditions. 
New instructional and educational methods employed by promoters of 
school tourism emphasized the role played by the senses and emotions over 
the intellect. The rise of these approaches signified an essential moderniza-
tion of imperial strategies that opened qualitatively new opportunities to 
manipulate the consciousness of the masses.
Seeking to summarize the assertions made in this chapter, the ques-
tion arises as to the specific consequences that resulted from tour organi-
zation policies. Was this approach actually effective? How did it change 
the worldview of people living in the Northwest Region? Did new tech-
niques help create a modern, integrated imperial society? Unfortunately, 
the lack of historical data prohibits me from reaching a defined, unambig-
uous, and credible answer to these questions. There is no doubt that orga-
nized tourism was effective on a regional level. According to Plath, “[v]isit-
ing Heimat was a form of giving social networks… a spatial dimension and 
creating personal mental maps.”60 However, it seems that when extended to 
59 For a comparison of the statistics on travelogues, see Sergei Mintslov, ed., Obzor zapisok, dnevnikov, vospo-
minanii, pisem i puteshestvii, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii Rossii i napechatannykh na russkom iazyke. Vypuski 
IV i V: Vremena imperatorov Aleksandra II, Aleksandra III i Nikolaia II, (Novgorod: Gubernskaia tipo-
grafiia, 1912).
60 Plath, “Heimat: Rethinking Baltic German Spaces of Belonging,” 74.
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the country-wide educative method, group travel had a contradictory effect. 
 After an analysis of the expansion of the Russian imperial railway network, 
for example, Schenk perceived a certain duality. He claimed that improved 
transportation possibilities and the resulting increase in travel frequency 
not only deepened the integration of the imperial space, but also contrib-
uted to its fragmentation, by emphasizing the country’s regional differenc-
es.61  Willard Sunderland perceived a similar duality in the country’s devel-
opment. In his research on Russian colonization policies, he came to the 
conclusion that the late imperial period witnessed the emergence of oppo-
site processes of homogenization and differentiation because state power 
was used both for the unification of the empire and for the fostering of the 
country’s internal differences.62
The assertion itself, nevertheless, suggests that educational tours did, 
in the end, have a certain influence on the mentality of imperial Russia’s 
subjects. However, their impact upon the human psyche was neither di-
rect nor immediate or easily predictable. In this respect, we might recall 
Račkauskas’s account of his excursion to Kiev as an eloquent example of 
such a delayed effect. Beneath the ironic fabric of their narrative, these 
memoirs, written by an elderly man who had subsequent personal knowl-
edge of the first independent Republic of Lithuania and the reality of life 
under Soviet occupation, reveal a nostalgic admiration for youthful adven-
tures, which gave a young man the opportunity to see undiscovered lands 
and experience moving encounters with the unknown.
61 Schenk, Poezd v sovremennost’, 319, 329–30.
62 Willard Sunderland, “Ministerstvo aziatskoi Rossii: nikogda ne sushchestvovavshee, no imevshee dlia eto-
go vse shansy kolonial’noe vedomstvo,” in Imperium inter pares: Rol’ transferov v istorii Rossiiskoi imperii 
(1700–1917) (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010), 108–9.
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The Formation of Imperial Loyalty in the Education System 
in the Northwest Region in 1905–1915
O l g a  M a s t i a n i c a
Schools alone have been and always will be the best means of implanting 
a Russian foundation in the society of the region. Only with the assis-
tance of the education system can the future generation adopt an unbro-
ken bond between the northwest periphery and the Russian core.
—Kovna governor Petr Verevkin
The above affirmation by Kovna governor Petr Verevkin (1904–12) leads us 
to the conclusion that even after 1905, when discrimination against non-
Russian languages and cultures in the educational system of the Northwest 
Region declined, officials continued to consider a state school education one 
of the most suitable measures to form and secure non-dominant  national 
groups’ loyalty to the Russian Empire. These changes have drawn quite a 
bit of attention from researchers, and historians have sought to explain how 
and under what conditions the national (non-Russian) education system 
was created in the northwest provinces between 1905 and 1915, and how 
the elites from non-dominant ethnic groups carried out the nationalization 
of the masses by harnessing formal (private primary school) and informal 
(the periodical press, pupil and teacher societies) educational institutions.
Yet, there has been practically no analysis of how attempts were made 
to instill imperial loyalty via the state education system in the region af-
ter 1905, or how central and local governments reacted to non-dominant 
 The research for this study was funded by a grant (No S-LJB-17-3) from the Research Council of Lithuania. 
Epigraph source: Draft report by Kovna Governor Verevkin for 1908–1911, Lietuvos nacionalinės Martyno 
Mažvydo bibliotekos rankraščių skyrius (LNB RS), f. 19, b. 82, l. 16.
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 ethnic groups’ attempts to use education to form other (non-Russian) loyal-
ties among younger generations. In this study, just one aspect of the Russian 
Empire’s post-1905 education policy will be discussed. In order to trace this 
history, first this chapter will provide an analysis of how general subjects 
like history, geography, and Russian language and literature were taught, 
and what status the tsarist government assigned these branches of learning 
and disciplines in primary and secondary schools as a means of entrench-
ing imperial loyalty in the Northwest Region. After this discussion of for-
mal educational institutions, I shift my attention to various informal means 
of education, including educational excursions for pupils and teachers, stu-
dents’ participation in historical and state celebrations, and student societ-
ies to understand their role in cultivating imperial loyalties. Through this 
analysis, I show that regardless of the liberalization of educational policy af-
ter 1905, the imperial bureaucracy continued to consider the teaching of 
history, literature, and geography an important means of indoctrination. 
Furthermore, despite some changes, there was still an effort to uphold nar-
ratives formulated much earlier.
Teaching the History of the Northwest Region
After 1905, the teaching of general subjects like Russian history and geogra-
phy relied on the same curricula and used the same methods used in the in-
terior provinces of the Russian Empire. A constituent part of Russian histo-
ry curricula and textbooks was the history of the Northwest Region based 
on the concept of history created by Nikolai Ustrialov in the 1830s.1 The his-
tory of Russia written by Ustrialov used in secondary schools claimed that, 
in terms of its state structure and confessional and ethnic composition, the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania was as much a Russian state as the Duchy of 
Muscovy; the only difference was that the small Lithuanian nation also took 
part in its formation. Lithuanian dukes had adopted Russian culture and be-
1 For more about Ustrialov’s concept of history, see Darius Staliūnas, “Poland or Russia? Lithuania on 
the Russian Mental Map,” in Spatial Concepts of Lithuania in the Long Nineteenth Century, ed. Darius 
Staliūnas (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2016), 40–45.
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longed to the East Christian (Orthodox) Church, which made them the kin 
of the Russians in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The goal of establishing 
a union of the two Russian states had always thrived, but such a merger had 
been postponed “by accident,” that is, because of Lithuania’s union with Po-
land, which the latter needed much more than the former.
A similar conceptualization of the history of the Grand Duchy of Lith-
uania was continued to dominate school literature printed after 1905 be-
cause the imperial academic community was actively engaged in publish-
ing. Between 1905 and 1915, “new” Russian history textbooks written by 
Sergei Platonov, Sergei Ivanov, Ivan Kataeev, and Ivan Skvortsov were pub-
lished; in these new books, the material was divided thematically rather 
than chronologically, paying greater attention to the formation of Russian 
statehood, in addition to covering the Russian economy, and providing an 
overview of significant cultural phenomena and various kinds of illustra-
tive material.2 In the Russian history textbook published in 1909 by Pla-
tonov, a popular professor at St. Petersburg University, and widely used in 
secondary schools in the Vil’na educational district, the expansion of the 
Russian Empire was explained as the logical outcome of the Romanov dy-
nasty’s actions in strengthening and defending their state.3 Platonov called 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania the “Lithuanian-Russian state,” where “the 
Russian element was superior to the less cultured Lithuanian one”; for ex-
ample, in reference to the age of the Lithuanian Duke Mindaugas (1253–
63), Platonov argued that cities were being built based on the Russian exam-
ple, and stated that Russians commanded the duke’s warriors.4 Lithuanian 
2 Oleg Abramkin, “Problemy otechestvennoi istorii v shkol’noi literature XVIII-nachala XX v.,” Liberal 
Arts in Russia 4 (2015): 496–512; Mikhail Studenikin, Metodika prepodavania istorii v russkoi shkole XIX–
nachala XX v. (Moskow: Prometei, 2016), 46–57. 
3 Sergei Platonov, Uchebnik russkoi istorii dlia srednei shkoly: Kurs sistematicheskii v dvuch chastiach s 
prilozheniem vos’mi kart (St. Petersburg: sklad izdaniia I. Bashmakova, 1914), 58.
4 Russian geography textbooks used in state schools in the Northwest Region also tried to instill the idea that 
from the beginning, Lithuanians were under the civilizing influence of Russians. For example, Alexandr 
Baranov’s Russian geography textbook, which was one of the most popular secondary school texts in the 
Vil’na educational district, stated that “based on their origins, appearance, customs, and primal faith 
(pervonachal ’noe verovanie), Lithuanians are close to the Slavs. It was only due to the extended period of 
Polish influence that Lithuanians converted to Catholicism and practically forgot their true nationality 
(nastoiashchuiu narodnost’).” Aleksandr Baranov, Geografia Rossiiskoi imperii s geograficheskimi kartami 
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dukes did not engage in the capture of Russian lands, but there was a peace-
ful incorporation of Russian lands: “The inhabitants of the Russian lands 
themselves willingly agreed to be ruled over by the Russified Gediminid 
dynasty.” Much like Ustrialov, Platonov explained that the successful func-
tioning of the “Lithuanian-Russian state” was disrupted by the unions of 
Krewo (1385) and later Lublin (1569), after which Polish influence began to 
increase, as did Polish lords’ oppression of the Russian peasantry. Platonov 
reached the unambiguous conclusion that Catherine II had succeeded in 
implementing “historical justice,” “to recover our Russian lands from the 
Rzeczpospolita (Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth).”5
In the new history curriculum (until then, a history curriculum pre-
pared in 1902 applied in secondary schools across the Vil’na educational 
district), which the Ministry of Education prepared in 1913 to commemo-
rate the three hundredth anniversary of Romanov rule, the history of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania was also presented as the history of the “Lith-
uanian-Russian state.” The explanatory text for the system-wide Russian 
history course authorized by Mikhail Taube, the minister of education, on 
July 13, 1913, expressly demanded that “history teachers, when speaking 
about the formation of the Lithuanian-Russian state, explain in detail that 
both in terms of numbers and cultural influence, the Orthodox Russian el-
ement dominated in this state.”6 According to the education minister’s in-
structions, “a detailed presentation of the conquests of the first Lithuanian 
dukes had to be omitted,” thereby perpetuating the idea of the union of the 
two Russian states during the period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania pro-
moted in textbooks. The educational aim in the teaching of history was to 
“turn children’s attention to the finest and most idyllic moments in the his-
torical past, to instill love for their Fatherland (otechestvo), and to encour-
age devotion to the throne.” As such, the history teacher was an educator 
i risunkami v tekste. Kurs gorodskikh i uezdnykh uchilishch. Vtoroe izdanie (St. Petersburg: izdanie D.D. 
Polubariianova, 1887), 44. By Slavs he, first of all, meant Russians.
5 Platonov, Uchebnik russkoi istorii, 79.
6 “Obiasnitel’naia zapiska k sistematicheskomu kursu russkoi istorii,” Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo 
prosveshcheniia XLVI (1913): 112. 
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whose primary role was to “nurture patriotism and love for the Fatherland 
(otechestvo).”7
The administration of the Vil’na educational district understood the 
role of the teacher in the educational process perfectly. It is no wonder that 
on the instructions of Vasilii Popov, the overseer of the Vil’na educational 
district (1899–1906), state gymnasium teachers of history, geography, Rus-
sian language, and Russian literature were given the task of preparing an 
anthology of historical articles to commemorate the age of Catherine II 
(i.e., the period when the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
were incorporated into the Russian Empire) on the occasion of the unveil-
ing of a monument honoring the empress in Vil’na.8 In addition, the offi-
cial pedagogical publication Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom uchebnom 
okruge (Education in the Vil’na educational district), which was primarily 
oriented at teachers, included instructions on how history teachers could 
nurture patriotism, which were written by some of the most famous educa-
tors of the time.9 
 According to Konstantin El’nitskii, whose article “The Nurturing of 
Patriotic Feelings” was printed in the periodical in 1909, learning Russian 
history and geography, participation in commemorations of state holidays, 
learning patriotic songs, and reading suitable fictional literature would on-
ly produce results if and when history teachers were purposefully regulat-
ed, as “they have the easiest access to the pupil’s soul and can leave a distinct 
mark upon it.”10 Elnitskii’s ideas were supported by local teachers. Fedot 
 Kudrinskii (1867–1933), a Russian language and Russian literature  teacher 
at Nesvizh teacher training college (he later worked in state and private 
7 “Obiasnitel’naia zapiska k programme elementarnogo kursa otechestvenoi istorii,” Zhurnal Ministerstva 
narodnogo prosveshcheniia XLVI (1913): 106.
8 Imperatrica Ekaterina II. Sbornik istoricheskikh statei. Izdan po rasporiazheniiu gospodina popechitelia 
Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga V.A. Popova. Pod redaktsiei prepodavatelia Vilenskoi I gimnazii A. 
Turtsevicha (Vilnius: Tipografiia A.G. Syrkina, 1904). 
9 Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom uchebnom okruge was a supplement to the official pedagogical 
publication Tsirkuliar po upravleniiu Vilenskim uchebnym okrugom [Circular on the management of the 
Vil’na educational district], published in Vil’na between 1901 and 1915.
10 Konstantin El’nitskii, “Vospitanie patrioticheskogo chuvstva,” Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom 
uchebnom okruge 1 (1909): 569–75. For more about El’nitskii’s pedagogical views, see: Liudmila Smirnova, 
“El’nitskii Konstantin Vasil’evich (1846–1917),” Istoriko-pedagogicheskii zhurnal 3 (2011): 43–45.
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girls’ gymnasiums in Vil’na, and contributed to the anthology of articles 
in honor of Catherine II), was also convinced that lectures and excursions 
were an incorrect means of instilling patriotic feelings in children.11 “There 
is no better way to instill love for the Fatherland (otechestvo) than the ex-
ample of the history teacher, a son of the Fatherland, who himself embod-
ies that love,”12 he asserted in an article entitled “On National Upbringing,” 
published in Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom uchebnom okruge in 1909.
The local education administration also sought to control teachers’ pro-
fessional activities and their social activism. On the initiative of the Vil’na 
educational district, there was a congress of Russian language and histo-
ry teachers in Vil’na in March 1907, and in January 1908 there was an ad-
ditional congress for Russian language and literature teachers. In February 
and March 1908, a congress was held for teachers of the physical and nat-
ural sciences, and in April 1910, one was held for drawing, draughtsman-
ship, and craft teachers. At these congresses, teachers could only discuss 
questions that had already been formulated by the board of the Vil’na ed-
ucational district, while resolutions passed by teachers would have to gain 
the approval of the board chaired by the patron of the Vil’na educational 
district. During these conventions, during which the local education ad-
ministration sought to ensure teachers’ loyalty to the political regime, the 
idea was raised to devote more attention to knowledge about the Father-
land (rodinovedenie), a new way of teaching geography and history that was 
gaining popularity at the time in the Russian Empire.
At the congress of Russian language and history teachers held in Vil’na 
on March 7–11, 1907, Evstafii Orlovskii (1863–1913), who had a wealth 
of experience of teaching history and geography in Grodna state schools, 
11 Kudrinskii was born in the Volhynia province into the family of an Orthodox priest. In publications 
released in Vil’na, he promoted the pedagogical ideas of Pirogov and Tolstoi, prepared a new digest of 
Russian literature, and promoted the idea in historical works about how the Polish nobility oppressed the 
Russian peasantry after the Union of Lublin, and viewed the Union of Brest (1596) as a plan by Poles to 
bring peasants who professed the Orthodox faith under their influence. 
12 Bogdan Stepanec (Fedot Kudrinskii), “O natsional’nom vospitanii,” Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom 
uchebnom okruge 5 (1909): 206.  
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raised the issue.13 Orlovskii was a member of the Northwest Region branch 
of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, and was very familiar with 
the new landscape teaching concept (landshaftnaia kontseptsia), which was 
so popular across the Russian Empire at the time. Advocates of this concept 
wrote many textbooks devoted to different regions of the Russian Empire. 
The new landscape concept meant that learning had to begin with 
knowledge about the pupils’ closest surroundings, objects, and phenome-
na they were well-acquainted with, and only move on to lesser-known ob-
jects and phenomena that were further away. This meant that, for example, 
when learning geography, pupils first of all had to learn how to sketch their 
own class and school, and then to learn about their city and their “moth-
erland” (rodina). In this case, rodina was understood as the pupil’s native 
land, as opposed to the “great Fatherland” (otechestvo, otchizna), that is, the 
whole Russian Empire.14 
During the 1907 congress, Orlovskii also suggested considering the “fa-
therland” the province of the Russian Empire where the pupil lived. In his 
view, knowledge of the geography and history of the development of one 
province or another should make up the content for teaching “knowledge 
of the fatherland” (rodinovedenie).15 Orlovskii recommended introducing 
13 Orlovskii was born in Vil’na Province, in the Ashmiany district. His father was an Orthodox priest, 
and he pursued his education at the Lithuanian Religious Seminary and at the Institute of History and 
Philology in St. Petersburg. Orlovskii had significant teaching experience: he was a history teacher at the 
Grodna State Boys’ Gymnasium for twenty-eight years, and a geography teacher at the Grodna State Girls’ 
Gymnasium for ten years. Besides his pedagogical activities, he was also an active social figure: in 1907 he 
helped found the Grodna Pedagogical Society, in 1891–1913 he worked at the Grodna Public Library and 
was an honorary member of the Grodna Orthodox Brotherhood of St. Sophia. He collaborated actively 
with the editorial board of the Grodna Province News (Grodnenskie gubernskie vedomosti): in 1890 he was 
responsible for its review section on works written about the history of the Northwest Region, and in 
1892–94 he reviewed various historical periodical publications for the newspaper. He also prepared several 
research papers on the history of Grodna and a discussion of the events of 1812 in the Grodna province, 
and he researched the history of the Orthodox Church in Grodna and the Grodna province. 
14 Marina Loskutova, “S chego nachinaetsia rodina? Prepodavanie geografii v dorevoliutsionnoi shkole i 
regional’noe samosoznanie (XIX–nachalo XX v.),” Ab Imperio 3 (2003): 159–98. 
15 S’ezd prepodavatelei russkogo iazyka i istorii srednikh uchebnykh zavedenii Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga, 
proiskhodivshii v Vil ’ne v marte 1907 goda. Sektsia istoriia (Vilnius: Tipografiia A.G. Syrkina, 1907), 17. 
Note that during the congress of teachers of the physical and natural sciences in February and March 
1908, Orlovskii also spoke about the need to devote more attention to fostering knowledge about the 
geography of the Northwest Region, and to ensure the implementation of suitable teaching methods. S ’ezd 
prepodavatelei matematiki, fiziki, estetstvovedeniia i geografii srednikh uchebnykh zavedenii Vilenskogo 
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the history and geography of the Northwest Region as a separate subject, 
thus removing it from the general Russian history and Russian geography 
course as had been the case. He envisaged allocating only three or four les-
sons to the history and geography of the Northwest Region. Further, judg-
ing from the descriptions of the Vil’na and Grodna provinces Orlovskii had 
prepared earlier, his concept of the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithu-
ania was no different from that presented in Ustrialov’s, and later on, in 
Platonov’s textbook. The descriptions of the Vil’na and Grodna provinces, 
which were aimed primarily at school-age youths, also said that during the 
times of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, “Russian civilization and the Or-
thodox faith took on a leading role,” and the Russian language was the state 
language in which official documents and legal acts were written.16 The ma-
jority of the population of Vil’na, the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lith-
uania, was made up of Russians already during the reign of the Lithuanian 
grand duke Gediminas (1316–41), and the Lithuanian dukes willingly pro-
moted the Orthodox faith by building Orthodox churches in the city.17 The 
scholarly papers Orlovskii prepared also accentuated the positive impact of 
the incorporation of the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into the 
Russian Empire, which guaranteed more rapid economic and cultural de-
velopment in the region and ensured the population’s “return” to their true 
religion, Orthodoxy. That is why, despite recommending teaching the his-
tory and geography of the Northwest Region as a separate subject, Orlo-
vskii basically promoted the same conceptualization of the history of the 
Northwest Region that Ustrialov had created. 
Orlovskii was not the only one to suggest devoting more attention to the 
history and geography of the Northwest Region. At a congress of primary 
school headmasters and inspectors of the Vil’na educational district held 
in Vil’na in December 1907, discussions also turned to the fact that “dur-
uchebnogo okruga, proiskhodivshii v Vil ’ne s 25 fevralia po 2-e marta 1908 g.: sektsiia geografii (Vilnius: 
Tipografiia A.G. Syrkina, 1908), 47. 
16 Evstafii Orlovskii, Uchebnoe opisanie Vilenskoi gubernii (Vilnius: Gubernskaia tipografiia, 1904), 10; 
Evstafii Orlovskii, Uchebnoe opisanie Grodnenskoi gubernii (Grodna: Gubernskaia tipografiia, 1906), 8. 
17 Orlovskii, Uchebnoe opisanie Vilenskoi gubernii, 10.  
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ing lessons, pupils should be given more literature to read about the his-
tory of the Northwest Region.”18 In 1909, Aleksandr Pigulevskii, the dis-
trict inspector who participated in the Vil’na educational district executive 
commission’s meetings to improve pupils’ moral, intellectual, and physical 
development, spoke about how schoolchildren had to be encouraged to be-
come more familiar with the history and geography of the Northwest Re-
gion. Pigulevskii was convinced that this knowledge would benefit them 
in their future professional pursuits: “Our gymnasium and real (practical) 
school graduates are theoreticians. They have none of the knowledge that is 
necessary in practical life. They have no idea of their class plan, nor the dis-
tricts or roads in their province, or their city plan, yet they know all there is 
to know about America, Africa, and Australia.”19 
However, neither Pigulevskii nor Orlovskii received support from ei-
ther the local education administration or the teaching community. For 
example, Sergei Nikonov, a Russian language and history teacher at the 
First State Boys’ Gymnasium in Vil’na who participated in the commis-
sion’s meeting, was quick to express his concerns. He suggested taking in-
to account graduates’ future professional activities. He posed a rhetorical 
question to those who had gathered: “do we need to introduce knowledge 
of the fatherland? After all, later on, Vil’na will remain the fatherland for 
just half of our pupils. For gymnasium students who are studying in Vil’na, 
this city is their fatherland so long as their parents or relatives live here. 
After they complete their studies, many of them will never come back to 
Vil’na.”20 Most teachers who took part in the Russian language and history 
teachers’ congress in 1907 were also convinced that introducing the histo-
ry and geography of the Northwest Region as a separate subject could have 
some undesirable results. For example, Ivan Maksimov, a history and ge-
18 “Soveshchanie direktorov i inspektorov narodnykh uchilishch Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga, 
proiskhodivshee v Vil’ne 15-22 dekabria 1907 goda,” Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom uchebnom okruge 
2 (1908): 61. 
19 Protokoly zasedanii komissii pri upravlenii Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga po voprosu o merakh sodeistviia 
fizicheskomu, nravstvennomu i umstvennomu razvitiiu uchashchikhsia (Vilnius: Tipografiia A.G. Syrkina, 
1909), 87.
20 Ibid.,  89.
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ography teacher at the State Boys’ Gymnasium in Gomel’, was certain that 
“providing knowledge about one’s native land can prompt the formation of 
a misconceived understanding that one’s native land is something distinct 
or special when compared to other parts of the Russian Empire, and that 
it is not the same state.”21 Valentin Kotov, a history teacher at the Second 
State Boys’ Gymnasium in Vil’na, believed that the national groups living 
in the territory might not approve of a separate and detailed account of the 
history of the Northwest Region as it was presented in school literature.22 
It could be that Kotov had in mind first of all the Northwest Region histo-
ry teaching material prepared by Arsenii Turtsevich (1848–1915), which the 
parents of Polish pupils vehemently asked to be removed from the curric-
ulum, even appealing to Boris Vol’f, the overseer of the Vil’na  educational 
district (1906–08) on the matter in 1906.23 
Turtsevich, a history teacher at the First Boys’ Gymnasium in Vil’na, 
prepared some teaching materials on the history of “Western Russia” in 
the last decades of the nineteenth century.24 The introduction to his “West 
Russian history” digest, published in 1892, began with a clear declaration 
of the national-patriotic mission that schools had (by teaching history, lan-
guage, and literature), highlighting the fact that it was especially impor-
tant to learn the history of Russia’s western periphery because young people 
there were at risk of adopting a tendentious or distorted explanation of his-
torical facts from Polish history texts.25 In the editor’s view, the same kind 
of teaching material that had been used a quarter of a century earlier was 
21 S’ezd prepodavatelei russkogo iazyka i istorii, 18.
22 Ibid.
23 “Secret note from the overseer of the Vil’na educational district Vol’f to the education minister Schvarz, 
March 19,” 1908, LVIA, f. 567, ap. 26, b. 800a, l. 18.
24 Turtsevich was born in Minsk Province into the family of an Orthodox priest. He was a graduate of the 
University of St. Petersburg’s Faculty of History and Philology. In 1872, he began his pedagogical career 
at the Shavli Boys’ Gymnasium, later teaching at the First State Boys’ Gymnasium in Vil’na. As well as 
teaching material on the history of the Northwest Region, he also prepared and published a separate 
biography of the Vil’na governor-general Murav’ev, a document anthology on the administration of the 
lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the times of Catherine II, and in two separate papers, he 
presented a biography of Catherine II and the situation of the peasantry under the Polish–Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. 
25 Arsenii Turtsevich, Khrestomatiia po istorii Zapadnoi Rossii. Uchebnoe posobie dlia uchenikov starshikh 
uchebnykh zavedenii (Vilnius: Tipografiia A.G. Syrkina, 1892), IV. 
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necessary (Turtsevich recalled governor-general Murav’ev’s competition for 
writing a history textbook for the Northwest Region). Turtsevich’s Rus-
sian history textbook, compiled in 1894, was widely used in both secondary 
schools in the Vil’na educational district, as well as in professional educa-
tional institutions (for example, in teacher training colleges); it also con-
tinued Ustrialov’s concept of the history of the Northwest Region and fea-
tured a particularly strong anti-Polish discourse.26 Turtsevich stated quite 
unambiguously that after the Union of Lublin, Poles had started to forcibly 
impose a foreign, Catholic, faith in the “Russian lands,” along with a for-
eign culture, adding that the Polish nobility was engaging in the harsh op-
pression of Russian peasants.27 
In September 1906, some of the Polish intelligentsia together with Vil’na 
mayor Michał Węsławski (1905–16), who represented the interests of Polish 
political parties in the Second State Duma, appealed to Vol’f, the overseer of 
the Vil’na educational district, asking him to remove from the curriculum 
Turtsevich’s textbooks in which “the religious and national feelings of Pol-
ish pupils were being hurt.”28 However, the Overseers’ Board, led by Vol’f, 
discussed this request but, nevertheless, decided to retain Turtsevich’s text-
books because “they contained nothing that could insult the Poles.” 29 Inci-
dentally, the author of these textbooks, who was also invited to participate 
in the meeting of the Overseers’ Board, promised to “change some sentenc-
26 For more about the teaching of history in seminaries, see: Vilma Žaltauskaitė, “Pasaulietinių dalykų – 
rusų kalbos, literatūros, tėvynės istorijos ir geografijos – mokymas dvasininkų rengimo įstaigose (XIX 
amžiaus antroji pusė),” Archivum Lithuanicum 15 (2013): 293–330.
27 Note that Turtsevich further developed his ideas later on. In 1911, (to commemorate the fiftieth 
anniversary of the abolition of serfdom), he prepared a separate paper in which he sought to prove how 
harshly the Polish szlachta oppressed Russian peasants during the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. 
For more about the anti-Polish discourse in the Russian public and academic discourses, see: Aleksandr 
Filiushkin, “Vgliadyvaias’ v oskolki razbitogo zerkala: rossiiskii diskurs Velikogo Kniazhestva Litovskogo,” 
Ab Imperio 4 (2004): 566. 
28 “Secret note from the overseer of the Vil’na educational district Vol’f,” 18. Andrzej Brochocki, a pupil 
of the First State Gymnasium in Vil’na, wrote in his memoirs that some of the pupils from the Vilnius 
Governorate were studying history at home. Therefore, the students compared information learned at 
home and during Turcevich’s history lessons: “Obviously, none of the students dared to discuss with the 
teacher. However, after school, students of Polish descent broadly and with and outrage discussed the 
teacher’s false interpretation of events of Polish history.” See Andrzej Brochocki, Na przełomie dwóch 
epok. Zapiski obszarnika, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, Oddział Rękopisów, inv. nr. 9874 III, s. 53. 
29 “Secret note from the overseer of the Vil’na educational district Vol’f,” 18.
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es and expressions that could cause misunderstandings”30 in the next edi-
tion of the Russian history textbook, but there is no evidence he actually 
kept this promise. Turtsevich’s textbooks were published in several editions 
with no indication that any amendments were made, and they were used in 
state schools across the Vil’na educational district. 
The local authorities were obviously afraid of introducing changes into the 
history curriculum. At the congress of Russian language and history teachers 
held in March 1907, teachers suggested reorganizing Russian history teaching 
in the first through third grades at gymnasiums. Based on the history curricu-
lum in use at the time, the history of the east was taught in third grade; teach-
ers at the congress suggested teaching this in the fourth grade, and instead 
presenting a systematic history of Russia in the first three grades. According 
to Maximilian Kossakovskii, a history teacher at the Second Boys’ Gymnasi-
um in Vil’na, most pupils only attended three grades, so upon leaving school, 
they would have a more systemic knowledge of Russian history; other teach-
ers at the congress backed his opinion.31 However, the Overseers’ Board did 
not approve of even this suggestion, demanding strict adherence to the his-
tory curriculum confirmed by the Ministry of Education. It even considered 
that a stress on the Russian aspect of the history and geography of the North-
west Region could have the effect of inciting separatism. According to a circu-
lar distributed on September 28, 1907 by Vol’f as overseer of the Vil’na educa-
tional district, the history of the Northwest Region had to be taught “within 
the framework of the general Russian history course, abiding by strict princi-
ples of objectivity and science.”32 After 1905, the local education administra-
tion devoted more attention to teaching methodologies for this subject than 
to the conceptualization of the history of the Northwest Region, which had, 
in effect, remained unchanged since the 1830s. The administration paid par-
ticular attention to different visual instruments and their emotional impact.
30 Ibid. 
31 S’ezd prepodavatelei russkogo iazyka i istorii, 23. 
32 “Protokol zasedaniia popechitel’skogo soveta pri upravlenii Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga 28 sentiabria 
1907 goda: Po rezoliutsii popechitelia Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga,” in S’ezd prepodavatelei russkogo 
iazyka i istorii, 36.
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The Significance of Visual Tools and Their Emotional Impact  
The Vil’na educational district administration had paid attention to visual 
propaganda before. As Jolita Mulevičiūtė has noted, in 1885, Nikolai Ser-
giievskii, the overseer of the Vil’na educational district (1869–99), estab-
lished a commission, which was made up of the directors of Vil’na gymnasi-
ums, folk schools of the Vil’na province, and the Vil’na Teachers’ Institute; 
it was charged with organizing public readings with slides (glass plates 
with illustrations that were hand-drawn or printed using the decalcomania 
technique).33 These regular popular illustrated lectures, mostly on history 
and geography, were held in the sports hall of the Second Boys’ Gymna-
sium. Schoolteachers introduced listeners to the climate, nature, and cus-
toms of the lands on the empire’s peripheries (Central Asia, the Crimea, 
the Caucasus, Transcaucasia) and foreign countries (France, China, India). 
However, according to the commission’s activity reports, narratives about 
the tsars and their heroic deeds attracted the most interest. 
In 1909, Emelian Pravosudovich, the director of a private boys’ gymna-
sium in Vil’na who participated in the commission formed by the Vil’na ed-
ucational district to propose measures to improve the moral, intellectual, 
and physical development of pupils, argued the following: “the stronger and 
more vibrantly important historical events that demonstrate our national 
heroes’ chivalry and love of the Fatherland (otechestvo) are presented to stu-
dents, the easier it will be to have an impact on a young person’s heart. On 
hearing lively historical accounts about our national heroes (natsional’nyie 
geroi) who nobly served in the name of their Fatherland, a young boy will 
subconsciously orient his future activities in the same direction, even while 
still at his school desk.”34 This was why Pravosudovich, like most school 
headmasters and teachers from the Vil’na educational district who took 
part in this commission, suggested devoting particular attention to various 
visual methods for teaching history. On November 11, 1909, immediately 
33 See: Jolita Mulevičiūtė, “Kova dėl vaizduotės: vizualinė Rusijos imperijos propaganda Šiaurės vakarų 
krašte,” Lietuvių katalikų mokslo akademijos metraštis 38 (2014): 129–47.
34 Protokoly zasedanii komissii, 81. 
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after the end of the commission’s work, a separate museum of visual teach-
ing material was established under the Kovna Schools Directorate (Muzei 
nagliadnykh posobii grafa M.I. Platova pri Kovenskoi direkcii narodnykh 
uchilishch) at the initiative of the board of the Vil’na educational district. 
This collection included historical and geographical teaching material illus-
trating “the cultural life of the Russian nation” and “the richness of nature 
in the Russian Empire.”35
Between 1905 and 1915, the board of the Vil’na educational district as 
well as teachers who frequently participated in the congresses  previously 
mentioned in this chapter, suggested devoting more attention to integrat-
ing the subjects of history, geography, and Russian literature. It seems they 
hoped to use this interdisciplinarity to achieve better results.  Vissarion 
Alekseev, the overseer of the Vil’na educational district (1914–15), paid par-
ticular attention to the integration of history, geography, and Russian liter-
ature. He instructed state gymnasium teachers to prepare integrated histo-
ry and Russian language and history and geography curricula.36
At the congress of teachers of Russian language and literature held in 
Vil’na in 1908, teachers were encouraged to devote special attention not 
just to the historical-literary importance of works of Russian literature, 
but also to the ideological, aesthetic, historical-social, and especially na-
tional (natsional’naia) significance of works of fiction.37 In 1910 in the of-
ficial pedagogical publication Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom ucheb-
nom okruge, Adrian Krukovskii, a Russian language teacher at the First 
State Boys’ Gymnasium and the private V. M. Prozorova Girls’ Gymna-
sium, both in Vil’na, shared his experience on how to effectively use Rus-
35 By 1911, the museum already had 1,928 different kinds of visual material. It had collected historical 
maps and school atlases prepared by Dobriakov, descriptions of the nations of the Russian Empire by 
Ianchuk, and Russian geographical images by Borzov. The museum was not particularly popular with 
schoolchildren: only fifty-nine schoolchildren visited it in 1910, 129 in 1911, fifteen in 1912, ninety-nine in 
1913, and seventy-eight in 1914. For more information, see Katalog muzeia uchebnykh nagliadnykh posobii 
grafa M.I. Platova pri Kovenskoi direkcii narodnykh uchilishch (Kaunas: Gubernskaia tipografiia, 1911). 
36 See Materialy po organizacii shkol’nogo obucheniia na nachalakh nauchnoi pedagogiki (Vilnius: Tipografiia 
A.G. Syrkina, 1915). 
37 Protokoly zasedanii komissii prepodavatelei russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga, 
proiskhodivshikh 2–9 ianvaria 1908 goda v g. Vil’ne (Vilnius: Gubernskaia tipografiia, 1908), 15. 
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sian literature when teaching history. He suggested using works by Rus-
sian writers because “they are so good at presenting historical events, they 
become very close to the pupils’ hearts.” In this way, Krukovskii recom-
mended using works by Aleksandr Pushkin to cover the times of Peter I; 
the work of Alexei Tolstoi to illustrate the times of Ivan IV; and the poet-
ry of  Vasilii Zhukovskii and Mikhail Lermontov to explore the events of 
1812.38 He also suggested paying particular attention to the commemora-
tion of the anniversaries of the birth and death of Nikolai Gogol (1809–
52), the Russian national (natsional’nyi) writer who declared “national 
unity” based on common statehood (obshaia gosudarstvennost’) and used 
standard Russian (obshche-russkii iazyk) in his work.39 A separate resolu-
tion regarding the integration of history and geography was passed at the 
congress of teachers of the physical and natural sciences held in February 
and March 1908; it was approved by the Overseers’ Board under the board 
of the Vil’na educational district. 
Sergei Medvedev, a history and geography teacher at the Vil’na Teach-
ers’ Institute and the Vil’na Jewish Teachers’ Institute and one of the key 
participants in the meeting, stressed that a great deal of attention should be 
paid not just to Russian history, but to Russian geography as well, “so that 
the future son of the fatherland (otechestvo) is well aware of all the fields of 
modern life.”40 That is why Medvedev, whose opinion was supported by 
other teachers at the congress, suggested dividing the geography course into 
two parts: physical geography and political-economic geography, and plac-
ing geography in the history-philology faculties. However, congress attend-
ees insisted on devoting time to school excursions, a relatively new means of 
teaching history and geography.41
38 Adrian Krukovskii, “Otechestvennye pisateli v narodnoi shkole,” Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom 
uchebnom okruge 1 (1910): 22–23.
39 Adrian Krukovskii, “Gogol’ kak natsional’nyi russkii pisatel’,” Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom 
uchebnom okruge 5 (1908): 107–09.
40 S’ezd prepodavatelei matematiki, fiziki, estetstvovedeniia i geografii, 39.
41 For more about the excursions, see the chapter by Jolita Mulevičiūtė in this volume.
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School Excursions
In state schools in the Russian Empire starting in 1900–01, excursions be-
came an increasingly important pedagogical tool. At the time, the Minis-
try of Education published circulars on the organization of excursions. The 
board of the Vil’na educational district only started paying more attention 
to school excursions in 1910, when it put out its own separate publication 
providing information on how to organize school excursions.42
At the congress of teachers of the natural and physical sciences held in 
February and March 1908, another topic of discussion was how much at-
tention should be paid to “nearby” (blizhnie) versus “distant” (dal’nie) ex-
cursions, that is, those beyond the boundaries of the Northwest Region. 
Most teachers, including even Turtsevich, were in favor of excursions with-
in the financial reach of students, which meant trips to nearby destinations, 
such as museums and archives, Orthodox churches, castles, and other ar-
chitectural monuments in the Northwest Region. For example, in 1901, 
Turtsevich organized an excursion for the pupils of the First Boys’ Gymna-
sium in Vil’na to Troki. During the excursion, he explained that there were 
many Orthodox churches, and also that Catholicism only started becom-
ing more established during the seventeenth century in Troki. Until then, 
Russians had made up the majority of the population in the town, and Rus-
sian had been the state language. That is why he concluded that since its 
founding, Troki had “more Russian than Polish characteristics.”43
At this same congress, a resolution was passed requiring the Vil’na Ped-
agogical Museum (Vilenskii pedagogicheskii muzei) to prepare a sepa-
rate catalogue of local points of interest and commence with archaeolog-
ical excavation work.44 In 1909, at the initiative of the board of the Vil’na 
educational district, Evdokim Romanov, the chairman of the Northwest 
42 Opisanie ekskursii uchashchikhsia v Vilenskom uchebnom okruge za 1910 god. Po porucheniu upravleniia 
Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga (Vilnius: Tipografiia Iosifa Zavadzkogo, 1911).
43 Arsenii Turtsevich, Trokskii zamok (istoricheskii ocherk) (Vilnius: Tipografiia A.G. Syrkina, 1901), 19.
44 S’ezd prepodavatelei russkogo iazyka i istorii, 18; S’ezd prepodavatelei matematiki, fiziki, estetstvovedeniia 
i geografii, 56.
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Region’s branch of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, prepared 
separate recommendations to state secondary school teachers on how to or-
ganize archaeological digs in the Northwest Region.45 
Some of the teachers who worked in the Vil’na educational district and 
some of its board members, however, were more in favor of distant excur-
sions beyond the borders of the northwest provinces. Aleksandr  Vrutsevich 
was the first to express this kind of opinion at the congress. He was a geog-
raphy teacher at the Vil’na Real (Practical) School and a member of the Rus-
sian nationalist organization the Russian Borderland Union (Russkii okrain-
nyi soiuz).46 He stated that schoolchildren should visit distant parts of the 
Russian Empire, and called on the teachers organizing these kinds of excur-
sions to stress “how the situation of each corner of the empire changed once 
it became part of the Russian Empire, i.e., to illustrate the cultural mission 
that the imperial Russian government was performing in the land.”47 His 
opinion was supported by Semion Kovaliuk, the director of a private boys’ 
gymnasium in Vil’na and chairman of the Russian nationalist organization, 
the Peasant (Krest’ ianin), who participated in the commission to offer op-
portunities to accelerate the moral, intellectual, and physical development 
of students, which was formed by the board of the Vil’na educational dis-
trict. Kovaliuk was convinced that distant excursions “would give pupils the 
opportunity to test their knowledge of geography, history, archaeology, and 
ethnography acquired from books, and allow them to get a better sense of 
the grandeur and might of the whole Russian Empire.”48 That is why when 
45 “Kratkie ukazaniia dlia soversheniia arkheologicheskikh ekskursii srednimi uchebnymi zavedeniiami 
Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga. Zapiska chlena vremennoi komissii po ustroistvu i upravleniiu Vilenskoi 
publichnoi bibliotekoi i muzeem E. Romanova,” in Protokoly zasedanii komissii, 158.
46 Vrutsevich graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of St. Petersburg. Between 1905 and 1915, 
he was the editor of the periodical publication Krest’ ianin. In an article in 1907 devoted to the opening of 
the Vil’na branch of the Russian Borderland Union (Vilenskii okrainni soiiuz), Vrutsevich described the 
activity guidelines for the Russian population in the Northwest Region as follows: “State-wide matters are 
of secondary importance to us because with our weak local forces, we cannot expect to have any serious 
influence on one or another decision. We have a special task: to defend the state’s interests here, as it 
is in this way that we can serve state-wide (obshchegosudarstvennym) interests.” Aleksandr Vrutsevich, 
“Otkrytie Vilenskogo otdela ‘Russkogo okrainnogo soiuza’,” Krest’ ianin 13–14 (1907): 195. I am grateful 
to Vytautas Petronis for the reference to this periodical publication. 
47 S’ezd prepodavatelei matematiki, fiziki, estetstvovedeniia i geografii, 40. 
48 Protokoly zasedanii komissii, 8. Kovaliuk was a graduate of the Vil’na Teachers’ Institute. In 1912, he was 
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editing Zor’ ka (Morning Star, 1905–12), the only periodical publication in 
Russian for children, for the Vil’na educational district, Kovaliuk present-
ed visual material from the internal provinces of the Russian Empire alone.49 
Grigorii Levitskii, the overseer of the Vil’na educational district (1908–
12), also realized the importance of school excursions to distant locations. 
In 1910, he appealed to the directors of state boys’ secondary schools, urging 
them to organize excursions to Siberia and the Caucasus. Students’ parents 
paid for these excursions, and the Vil’na educational district helped nego-
tiate a discount for train tickets. Levitskii was certain that “by familiariz-
ing themselves with such far-off parts of the Russian Empire, their natural 
surroundings, the everyday life and customs of the local population, youths 
would be able to feel the whole majesty of the Fatherland (otechestvo), which 
would encourage them to love their fatherland even more, and work for the 
benefit of the Fatherland.”50 However, Levitskii’s proposed school excur-
sions to Vladivostok and Murmansk never took place due to a lack of partic-
ipation. On his orders, an excursion to Turkestan did eventually take place 
in 1911, thanks to the efforts of Sergei Medvedev, the director of the Kovna 
Boys’ Gymnasium, who managed to persuade only thirty-four pupils from 
the whole Vil’na educational district to go on the school trip.
It is difficult to say what influence this excursion and others like it actual-
ly had on students’ views of the Russian Empire. However, one participant of 
the Turkestan excursion, a seventh-grade student named Georgii  Archipovich 
from the Pinsk Real (Practical) School, shared these impressions: 
Before the trip, I had almost no understanding of what Turkestan, or the 
southeast part of the Russian Empire in general, was. Now I can imagine 
elected chairman of the Vil’na Russian Nationalist Union (Vilenskii russkii natsional’nyi soiuz). On April 
18, 1912, Kovaliuk and other members of Russian nationalist organizations were received by the education 
minister Kasso. During the meeting, Kovaliuk drew the minister’s attention to the fact that the Catholic 
clergy in the Northwest Region were seeking to teach religion in schools in Polish, thereby “polonizing” 
Belorussians, for whom religion had to be taught in Russian.
49 For example, the magazine Zor’ ka featured illustrations with captions such as: “View over Volga, Tver’, 
Kazan’.” 
50 Circular published by the overseer of the Vil’na educational district, Levitskii, to the directors of boys’ 
gymnasiums in the Vil’na educational district, November 19, 1910, LVIA, f. 567, ap. 1, b. 1856, l. 3. 
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just how large our great Fatherland (nashe otechestvo) actually is, how beau-
tiful the Volga and the Caucasus are, and how desolate the natural sur-
roundings of Turkestan are. Having visited all these parts of the Father-
land, my fatherland (moia rodina) has become especially dear to me.51 
While we cannot determine whether these thoughts authentically con-
veyed what he felt, we can say with some confidence that his impressions, 
printed in an official publication, complied with the narrative promoted by 
the officials behind these excursions. 
However, the Vil’na educational district administration had the goal of 
“correcting” the image of the “motherland” in a way that would better suit its 
needs. For example, this was done with Vil’na, where some of the students or 
their families originated. As Darius Staliūnas has noted, in the Russian dis-
course, Vil’na was undoubtedly treated as a Russian city early on: the origins 
of its name were Russian, Russians made up a significant percentage of the 
population since its very founding, and Eastern Christianity was established 
there first.52 That is why, when visiting Vil’na, the pupils at boys’ and girls’ 
gymnasiums and teacher training colleges had to visit the Monastery of the 
Holy Spirit, along with other Orthodox churches and the monuments erect-
ed in honor of Murav’ev and Catherine II.53 Visiting the Murav’ev museum 
was compulsory for students and future teachers, as was the tour of the 
Vil’na Public Library (Vilenskaia publichnaia biblioteka). It was at the library 
that students were shown legal documents from the period of the “Lithua-
nian-Russian state,” written in “Russian, not Polish,”54  giving further cre-
dence to the idea of Russian cultural domination in Vil’na and the general 
51 Opisanie ekskursii vospitannikov srednikh uchebnyckh zavedenii Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga v Turkestan 
letom 1911 goda (Kaunas: Gubernskaia tipografiia, 1911), 178. Sergei Medvedev, the director of the Kovna 
boys’ gymnasium, organized this excursion. Forty-three students from various boys’ schools in the Vil‘na 
educational district took part in this excursion. As in other cases, the authorities of the education district 
did not provide any financial support for it and only took care of discount for train ticket.
52 Staliūnas, “Poland and Russia?,” 77. 
53 For example, in 1910, forty-one school excursions were organized in the Vil’na educational district. Of 
these, twenty-eight named Vil’na as their destination. 
54 A publication on school excursions from 1910 featured a detailed plan of what sights should be visited in 
Vil’na and, accordingly, the “narrative” about these sights that should be presented. See Opisanie ekskursii 
uchashchikhsia v Vilenskom uchebnom okruge, 119–22. 
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 “Lithuanian–Russian state” promoted in history and geography textbooks. 
Thus, the local education administration, as well as teachers who organized 
“Russian” tours around Vil’na,55 sent the younger generation the message that 
the Northwest Region and Vil’na, “its capital,” was not just a part of the Rus-
sian Empire, but also a part of Russian national territory.
State Holidays and Commemorations
A “Russian” celebration to mark the birth of Nicholas II, son of Alexander II 
and the heir to the throne, was organized in 1868 at the initiative of Pompei 
Batiushkov, the overseer of the Vil’na educational district (1868–69). Pupils 
from Vil’na gymnasiums and rabbinical and folk schools (it is claimed that 
around a thousand schoolchildren participated) were  invited to  Antakalnis 
forest to celebrate with food and the singing of Russian songs.56 After 1905, 
seeking to nurture patriotic feelings and respect for the ruling dynasty, 
the local education administration also encouraged active participation by 
pupils in the tricentennial of the beginning of the Romanov dynasty and 
commemorations marking the events of 1812, the Battle of Poltava, and the 
abolition of serfdom. In order to encourage their participation in anniver-
saries and public commemorations, the board of the Vil’na educational dis-
trict sought to prepare local teachers ideologically by sending out separate 
instructions and encouraging teachers to organize suitable historical publi-
cations. In this way, at the initiative of the local education administration, 
the afore-mentioned teachers Orlovskii and  Kudrinskii both wrote about 
events during the 1812 war in Grodna Province and in Vil’na; Dmitrii Dov-
giallo, a history teacher in several state schools across Vil’na, wrote about 
the importance of the Battle of Poltava.57 
55 For example, Flavian Dobrianskii, who initially worked as a history and geography teacher at the Vil’na 
Teachers’ Institute and was later appointed director of the Vil’na Jewish Teachers’ Institute, prepared three 
“Russian” guides to Vil’na. In 1882, he compiled a separate account about the Manuscript Department at 
the Vil’na Public Library in Church Slavonic and Russian.
56 See Vytautas Petronis, “Vilnius ir vilniečiai: miesto ir bendruomenių kaitos bruožai XIX a. antrosios 
pusės oficialiojoje spaudoje,” Lietuvos istorijos metraštis 1 (2016): 43–44.
57 Evstafii Orlovskii, Grodnenskaia guberniia v 1812 godu (istoricheskii ocherk) (Grodna: Gubernskaia 
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In order to ensure the deeper emotional impact of participating in state 
holidays and at commemorations of historic events, local teachers organized 
thematic excursions and illustrated lectures, taught patriotic songs, and en-
couraged students to write historical poems, organize theatrical performanc-
es, and participate in military parades. For example, as part of the celebra-
tions marking the tricentennial of the Romanov dynasty, pupils at the First 
Boys’ Gymnasium in Vil’na prepared a theatrical performance called “Life 
for the Tsar.” At other state schools in the Vil’na educational district, six 
thematic lectures were organized using 176 slides, and a choir of three hun-
dred children from different state schools across Vil’na was formed and sang 
songs, such as Lord, Love the Tsar and Glory, Glory to the Tsar, set to mu-
sic by Mikhail Glinka. Pupils from the Keidany two-grade primary school 
wrote poems: “To Mark 21 February 1913” and “To Mark 300 Years of the 
Rule of the Romanov Dynasty.”58 Pupils from state schools in the Vil’na ed-
ucational district went to Moscow to commemorate the events of 1812. One 
of the participants, Boris Chrypov, an eighth-grade pupil from the Bobruisk 
Boys’ Gymnasium, shared his impressions: “During these days, I recalled the 
words of Karamzin: he who does not know Moscow, cannot know Russia. 
There are so many emotions linked to the Kremlin, its walls, and the Ortho-
dox churches; this is where the Russian state emerged, this is the treasury of 
the Russian nation’s historic treasures.”59 The feelings of this pupil, which 
were printed in Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom uchebnom okruge, also 
reflected the central and local administration goals regarding how students 
should feel when participating in commemorations. 
The speeches made by teachers marking these celebrations also had to 
echo the government’s intentions. Iosif Iashchinskii, a history teacher at 
the Vil’na Real (Practical) School, stated: “The year 1812 was a year of glo-
tipografiia, 1912); Fedot Kudrinskii, Vil ’na v 1812 godu: v pamiat’ stoletnei godovshchiny Otechestvennoi 
voiny (Vilnius: izdanie upravleniia Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga, 1912); Dmitrii Dovgiallo, Petr Velikii 
dlia Zapadnoi Rusi: na pamiat’ o 200-letii Poltavskoi pobedy (Vilnius: Russkii pochin, 1909). 
58 1613–1913: Iubileinye torzhestva v Vilenskom uchebnom okruge (Vilnius: Tipografiia Russkii pochin, 1913), 
15, 22, 377. 
59 “Vpechatleniia prisutsvovavshego na iubileinykh torzhestvakh v gorode Moskve v avguste 1912 goda,” 
Narodnoe obrazovanie v Vilenskom uchebnom okruge 1 (1913): 28.
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ry for Russia, while for Poles it was a year of failures and unfulfilled, empty 
dreams. During the War for the Fatherland, all Russians united, and this 
unity gave them the strong moral resolve to fight against foreign enemies 
who tried to suppress the Russian nation’s national feelings (natsional`noe 
chuvstvo russkogo naroda).”60 In marking the tricentennial of the Romanov 
dynasty, Makarii Sidorenko, a history and geography teacher at the boys’ 
gymnasium in Gomel’, declared forthrightly in his speech: “In the age of 
Catherine II, the borders of the Russian Empire finally reached their nat-
ural limits,” thereby again claiming that the expansion of the Russian Em-
pire was the logical outcome of the Romanov dynasty’s empowerment and 
defense of the Russian state.61 
Students also had to recognize that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was 
as much a Russian state as the Duchy of Muscovy, whose successful “con-
glomeration” with other parts of the Russian Empire was interrupted by 
the Poles; they did so by writing essays on appropriate themes. For exam-
ple, as part of the celebrations marking tricentennial, state school pupils 
from the Vil’na educational district wrote essays with titles such as “The 
Importance of the Russian Tsars in Liberating the Western Slavs,” “Rus-
sian and Polish Relations in the Times of Mikhail Fiodorovich and Aleksey 
Mikhailovich Romanov,” “Russian and Polish Relations during the Reigns 
of the First Romanovs,” “The Patriotic Reign of Elizabeth,” and “Alexander 
II: Tsar–Liberator and Tsar–Peacemaker.”62 In one school essay, Boleslav 
Zubritskii, an eighth-grade pupil from the Vil’na Real (Practical) School, 
claimed: “The addition of the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to 
the remainder of the Empire was a necessary step for the Russian govern-
ment, for ever since the Union of Lublin, the Poles repressed the Russians, 
the true inhabitants of these lands.”63 
60 “The Meaning of the Patriotic War of 1812: A lecture given by the Vil’na Realschule teacher I. Iashchinskii, 
October 22, 1912,” LVIA, f. 567, ap. 1, b. 1995, l. 21.
61 “A celebratory speech to mark three hundred years of Romanov rule made by the Gomel’ Boys’ Gymnasium 
history teacher, M. Sidorenko, February 21, 1913,” LVIA, f. 567, ap. 1, b. 2161, l. 5.
62 1613–1913: Iubileinye torzhestva, 30. 
63 “Russko–pol’skie otnoshenia pri pervykh Romanovykh (uchenik VIII klassa Vilenskogo real’nogo 
uchilishcha B. Zubritskii),” in 1613–1913: Iubileinye torzhestva, 287. 
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Schoolchildren’s Societies
After 1905, Polish, Lithuanian, and, to a certain extent, Belorussian, activ-
ists worked intensely with the younger generation and tried to create na-
tional education systems using teaching measures that could only be used 
in illegal schools or in educational society schools; promoting their respec-
tive versions of history, and organized societies of teachers and students.64 
The use of voluntary societies to influence students was also hastily adopted 
by local Russian nationalist organizations in cooperation with the board of 
the Vil’na educational district.
In 1910, when the Polish youth sports organization Sokół was officially 
closed,65 the Russian Social Organization (Russkoe obshchestvennoe sobra-
nie) founded its own youth sports organization: Russkii sokol (Russian Fal-
con). The board of the Vil’na educational district also devoted quite a lot of 
attention to this organization. On March 15, 1913, Alexei Ostroumov, the 
overseer of the Vil’na educational district (1912–15), participated in a public 
display of the organization’s military activities. There were also gymnastics ex-
ercises accompanied by Russian patriotic songs sung in the sports hall of the 
Second Boys’ Gymnasium in Vil’na. In 1913, this organization was chaired 
by Mikhail Pavlovskii, the founder of a private boys’ gymnasium in Vil’na.66
Based on the number of its members, which did not exceed a hundred, 
this youth sports organization lagged behind another school-age youth or-
ganization called Poteschnaia armiia (The Happy Army), whose activities 
demonstrated a visible link between sports and state ideology.67 This orga-
64 The memoirs of graduates of State Boys’ Gymnasiums of Vilna governorate often shows what students 
sought to resist the means of imperial loyalty by using various visual forms. Senior students used to 
damage their school uniforms that symbols of Russian imperial authority could not be seen on them. 
See A. Brochocki, Na przełomie epok, s. 49; Zygmunt Sielużycki, Garść moich wspomnień, Biblioteka 
Jagiellońska, Oddział Rękopisów, inv.nr.  9852 III, s. 35.
65 The Polish youth sports organization Sokół was founded in Vil’na on November 11, 1905. The organization’s 
board had a number of Polish National Democratic Party members. 
66 Otchiot Vilenskogo gimnasticheskogo obshchestva ‘Sokol v Vil ’ne’ za 1913 god (Vilnius: Tipografia I. Notesa i 
S. Shvailikha), 1914. 
67 Vladimir Ekse, Vilenskoe poteshnoe voisko ili gosudarevo delo, izlozhennoe voinskim iazykom zakonov i dai-
ushchee otvety na vse voprosy ustroistva i obucheniia voiska po angliiskoi sisteme, no v dukhe Rosiiskom ( Vilnius: 
Tipolitografiia T-va N. Matst, 1911). I am grateful to Vytautas Petronis for the reference to this text.
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nization had its own militaristic elements: uniforms, a flag, and a pin with 
the inscription: “Fight for the Tsar and the Fatherland” (Bor’ba za Tsaria 
i Otechestvo). Also, in 1912, this organization of primary school pupils was 
chaired by General Fiodor Martson of the Vil’na military district, and its 
members were invited to join in a military parade organized to mark the 
Battle of Borodino.68 According to the district inspector Aleksandr Pigu-
levskii, not only could this kind of youth element become “an accessory 
to the army,” but participation in the activities of such societies would en-
courage school children to “nurture love for the Fatherland and its ruler 
[Rodine i ee Derzhavnomu Gosudariu], on the foundations of a national 
education.”69
Conclusions 
After the revolution of 1905, neither the central government nor local edu-
cation officials searched for methods to instill and ensure loyalty to the em-
pire that were especially suited to the youth of the Northwest Region. Gen-
eral school subjects in the region such as history and geography were taught 
according to the same rules and employed the same teaching methods used 
in the internal provinces of the Russian Empire. For example, when teach-
ing the history of the Northwest Region after 1905, it was basically Ustri-
alov’s conceptualization of Russian history from the 1830s that was taught; 
according to this narrative, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was consid-
ered as much a Russian state as the Duchy of Muscovy in terms of its struc-
ture and confessional and ethnic composition. A deeper knowledge of the 
“great Fatherland” had to be fostered through excursions organized for pu-
pils and teachers, and the board of the Vil’na educational district orient-
ed these  educational trips more frequently toward St. Petersburg, Moscow, 
and more distant parts of the Russian Empire; “local” excursions also had 
68 Russkii [?], “Obozrenie sobytii i okrainnaia zhizn’. Vil’na,” Okrainny Rosii 18 (1912): 271–72. 
69 In 1913 and in the summer of 1914, special gymnastics courses were organized for state gymnasium teachers 
at the initiative of Pigulevskii. Aleksandr Pigulevskii, Fizicheskoe vospitaniie i zadachi kratkosrochnykh 
gimnastichekikh kursov dlia uchitelei (Vilnius: Tipografiia A.G. Syrkina, 1914), 5. 
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a purpose: “to demonstrate the Russian nation’s domination, cultural im-
portance, and influence,” for example, in Vil’na. Thus, children were given 
the message that the Northwest Region was not just a part of the Romanov 
Empire; it was actually a part of Russian “national territory.” 
During the events of 1905 and later, various non-dominant ethnic 
groups attracted the attention of members of the local education adminis-
tration as a result of what was, in their view, an incorrect interpretation of 
the Northwest Region’s history. However, as the discussion of Turtsevich’s 
textbook in 1906 illustrates, the Vil’na educational district administration 
could only “hear” the complaints from non-Russians but saw no need to 
make any changes, especially since, in most cases, the active assistants of 
the board of the Vil’na educational district were local teachers. Attempts by 
certain teachers to devote more attention to the history and geography of 
the Northwest Region were rare. Furthermore, any desire to deepen aware-
ness of the historical past and the natural resources of their surroundings 
had to be conveyed only as a stage in learning about the “great Fatherland.” 
However, in the view of the education administration, even accentuating 
the Russian history and geography of the region might appear to have sep-
aratist potential. 
There are almost no sources that would allow us to understand what the 
results of this indoctrination actually were. One thing that is clear, howev-
er, is that the means described in this chapter may very well have had the 
opposite effect. By devoting more attention to the Russian history and ge-
ography of the Northwest Region in his lessons at Nesvizh teacher train-
ing college, the aforementioned Kudrinskii encouraged his pupils to take 
an interest in Belorussian folklore and analyze Belorussians’ way of life and 
customs. In his view, these kinds of “ethnographic studies” were intend-
ed to convince future teachers that, in terms of their origins, “language,” 
and ethnography, Belorussians were simply a part of the Russian nation.70 
However, as Konstantin Mitskievich, a student at the Nesvizh teacher 
70 Kudrinskii published a paper in 1904 entitled “Belorussians: A Historic Outline,” where he explained 
that, based on their origins and way of life, Belorussians were part of the Russian nation. He viewed 
Belorussian as a dialect of the Russian language. 
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training college, wrote, collecting Belorussian songs and stories quite con-
versely inspired him to take an interest in the Belorussian language and re-
minded him that “Belorussian was precisely the language of my ancestors.”71 
Mitskievich (the future Jakub Kolas, 1882–1956) began to write poems and 
stories in Belorussian within the walls of this training college, and he soon 
became one of the most active figures in the Belorussian national move-
ment. Thus, employees in the imperial Russian education sector who op-
posed giving greater attention to the history and culture of the Northwest 
Region were at least partially right; this attention had a potential side-ef-
fect:  provoking non-Russian loyalties. 
71 Jakub Kolas, “Moia avtobiografia (1928 g.),” in Izbrannyie sochineniia (Minsk: Nauka, 1983), 10. 
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Right-Wing Russian Organizations in the City of Vil’na  
and the Northwestern Provinces, 1905–1915
V y t a u t a s  P e t r o n i s
Our age is a time of self-organization. The economic and socio-political 
relations of our times force people to organize. It is hard, even impossi-
ble, for a single individual to successfully struggle in the contemporary 
relations of societal life. Not just to struggle, but also to learn and go for-
ward is only possible with the help of an organization. Even in his own 
work, his craft, a man can perform more successfully and usefully for so-
ciety by joining some group in his profession, his comrades in craft.
—Excerpt from “Vilnius, 27 lapkričio,” Vilniaus žinios 204 (813) (1907).
Introduction
The revolution of 1905 in the Russian Empire brought significant chang-
es not only to the governance of the state, but more importantly, it was in-
strumental in activating deep structural and ideological transformations 
in society. One was the partial emancipation and legalization of national 
movements and nationalisms. As a consequence, some ethnic groups, and 
even nations, which until then did not have pronounced popular nation-
alisms, were forced to create them as a response to the growth and threat 
of other nationalisms. Paradoxically, the Russians, the dominant nation 
in the empire, whose nationalism rose during the years of the revolution, 
were latecomers. Until 1905, Russian state-nationalism was largely man-
aged and controlled by the imperial authorities. The surge of popular na-
tionalism and monarchism during the revolution, both of which supported 
  The research for this study was funded by a grant (No S-LJB-17-3) from the Research Council of Lithuania.
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the  imperial regime in one way or another, had to define relations between 
themselves and the state authorities.
Research into Russian monarchism and nationalism has grown during 
the last twenty-five years. A number of studies concerning different aspects 
of imperial, right-wing political parties and organizations, as well as col-
lections of documents, have been published by Russian historians.1 When 
looking at research into the western provinces, the largest body of work 
has been done on the southwest region—the Ukrainian-inhabited lands —
where radical right-wing Russian groups and nationalists were the stron-
gest.2 Investigations into the northwestern provinces have predominantly 
been carried out by Belorussian researchers.3 However, these works concen-
trate mostly on the five provinces of Mogilev, Vitebsk, Minsk, Grodna, and 
Vil’na.4 Almost no research has been done on the sixth province, Kovna, 
which was inhabited predominantly by Lithuanians, and where the Rus-
sian monarchist and nationalist movement was weakest. Therefore, to com-
plement this picture, in this chapter I have concentrated primarily on Rus-
sian right-wing organizations in the center of the northwestern provinces, 
1  See, for example, D. Pavlov, ed., Partiia ‘Soiuz 17-go oktiabria’: Protokoly s’ezdov, konferentsii, zasedanii TsK 
1905–1915, 2 volumes (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996, 2000); Iurii Kir’ianov, ed., Pravye partii: 1905–1917; Do-
kumenty i materialy, 2 volumes (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998); Daniil Kotsiubinskii, Russkii natsionalizm 
v nachale XX veka. Rozhdenie i gibel’ ideologii Vserossiiskogo natsional’nogo soiuza (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 
2001); Iurii Kir’ianov, Pravye partii v Rossii. 1911–1917 gg. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001); Iurii Kir’ianov, 
Russkoe sobranie 1900–1917 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003); A. Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia (Moscow: Eksmo, 
Iauza, 2005); S. San’kova, Russkaia partiia v Rossii: obrazovanie i deiatel’nost’ Vserossiiskogo natsional’nogo 
soiuza (1908–1917) (Orel: Izdatel‘stvo S.V. Zenina, 2006); A. Stepanov, A. Ivanov, and O. Platonov, eds., 
Chernaia sotnia. Istoricheskaia entsiklopediia 1900–1917 (Moscow: Institut Russkoi Tsivilizatsii, 2008); A. 
Ivanov, Pravye v russkom parlamente: ot krizisa k krakhu (1914–1917) (Moscow–St. Petersburg: Al‘ians-
Arkheo, 2013).
2  See, for example, the numerous studies by D. Kotsiubinskii, Iurii Kir‘ianov, I. Omel‘ianchuk, and others. 
Recent monographs by Faith Hillis, Children of Rus’: Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian 
Nation (Ithaca, NY–London: Cornell University Press, 2013) and Klimentii K. Fedevich and Klimentii.I. 
Fedevich, Za Viru, Tsaria i Kobzaria: Malorosiiiski monarkhisti i ukrainskii natsional‘nii rukh (1905–1917 
roki) (Kiev: Kritika, 2017) shed more light on different aspects of the topic.
3  See, for example, the following monographs: Konstantin M. Bondarenko and Dimitrii Lavrinovich, 
Russkie i belorusskie monarkhisty v nachale XX veka: monografiia (Mogilev: MGU im. A.A. Kuleshova, 
2003); Konstantin Bondarenko, Pravye partii i ikh organizatsii v Belarusi (1905–1917 gg.) (Mogilev: UO 
‘MGU im. A.A. Kuleshova’, 2012), as well as other studies by these and other authors, predominantly pub-
lished by Mogilev State A. Kuleshov University.
4  All the geographical names in this text are given in the form in which they were used during the period of 
analysis.
staulinas_book.indb   288 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:39
289
Right-Wing Russian Organizations in the City of Vil’na and the Northwestern Provinces, 1905–1915
the city of Vil’na, and also in the province of Kovna. During my research, 
several new archives of organizations were discovered, which will hopefully 
shed even more light on the history of the Russian monarchist and nation-
alist movement in the northwestern provinces.
Among the many questions discussed in this chapter, the main ones are: 
Who and what were the main right-wing organizations that operated in 
the center of the northwestern provinces? What were the relations between 
the northwest Russian monarchists and nationalists and the imperial au-
thorities? And when and why did right-wing organizations seek to coop-
erate with the imperial government? Through an analysis of the history of 
northwestern right-wing organizations, their interaction with each other, 
and with the local and central authorities, I argue that the region was not 
homogenous. Russian organizations in Vil’na and Kovna provinces differed 
to some extent from those in Belorussian-inhabited lands, and from the be-
ginning, they manifested themselves in a less radical and more moderate 
form of monarchism, while exhibiting pronounced nationalist tendencies.
Before beginning a detailed analysis, it is necessary to briefly examine the 
situation before 1905, that is, the first steps in the organization and activities 
of Russian imperial elites in Vil’na, the administrative center of the region.
The Appearance of the Northwestern Russian 
Societal and National Clubs
It is generally agreed upon that practical attempts to increase the unifor-
mity of the northwestern provinces and their population with the rest of 
the Empire peaked after the uprising of 1863. Governor-general Mikhail 
Murav’ev introduced a hard-line political direction, which promoted Rus-
sianness in a variety of forms, and attempted to integrate the borderlands 
into imperial socio-political structures. The authorities supported Russian 
culture and the Orthodox Church; they sent imperial employees from the 
internal provinces to the borderlands, thus replacing most of the former 
local and predominantly Polish bureaucracy; they suppressed the Catho-
lic Church and Polish cultural and social dominance, in addition to  other 
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measures. In time, these top-down processes created a tradition of state-
run “Russification,” or, in the eyes of the supporters of these policies, the 
“restoration” of historically inherent Russian rights in the provinces. Lat-
er, despite admitting that this strategy had largely failed, for many Rus-
sian conservatives, the Murav’ev period still represented the “golden age” of 
the state’s involvement in the protection and growth of Russianness in the 
western borderlands.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, this system had begun to 
be perceived as problematic: it slowed down the modernization of society 
and clashed with the new political ideologies and movements, chief among 
them socialism and nationalism. It was inevitable that the supporters of the 
monarchy and the old estate system had to adapt to the new trends. The 
first legal imperial monarchist organization, a club for the Russian elite, 
appeared at the turn of the century. The Russian Assembly (Russkoe So-
branie) was established at the end of 1900 in St. Petersburg. It included a 
number of senior imperial officials and members of the nobility and was 
primarily concerned with cultural activities, research, and the protection 
and promotion of Russianness, which to a great extent followed the ideol-
ogy of Slavophilism. During the revolution of 1905, the Russian Assembly 
reformed into a political party. However, having enjoyed little success in at-
tracting a greater following and influence on the political scene due to its 
elitist and conservative tendencies, by 1914 it had left politics and  reverted 
to cultural and educational activities.5
Being more of a Slavophile club than a political party, the early Rus-
sian Assembly did not strive to expand the organization into other parts of 
the empire. Nevertheless, several sections opened in the provinces before 
1905. One of the first was established in Vil’na in 1904.6 Having no polit-
ical aspirations (political parties and organizations were prohibited before 
the declaration of the October 17 Manifesto), this section was formed as a 
kind of national club by several high-ranking provincial officials, some of 
5  For more on this, see Kir’ianov, Russkoe sobranie.
6  V. Levitskii, “Pravye partii,” in Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale 20 veka, vol. 3, book 5, ed. L. 
Martov, P. Maslov, and A. Potresov (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia t-va ‘Obshchestvennaia pol’za’, 1914), 358.
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whom later became prominent imperial ministers and senators.7 Unfor-
tunately, because of very limited documentation, the history and activi-
ties of the pre-1905 Vil’na section remain obscure. We can presume that it 
was involved in cultural and social activities, but it is also possible that af-
ter its establishment, as was quite common at the time, the section  existed 
only on paper.
Parallel with the Russian Assembly, the northwest middle and high-
ranking imperial bureaucracy found it necessary to create a variety of social, 
charitable and leisure organizations. Russian social clubs were established 
in Minsk and Vil’na, which in essence resembled the national clubs that 
were popular in other European countries. One of the earliest such institu-
tions opened in Vil’na around 1904. It was called the Official Family (Slu-
zhebnaia Sem’ia) and included many high-ranking imperial employees sta-
tioned there, as well as other prominent members of the local Russian elite. 
The club was managed by a board of twenty elected elders who held meet-
ings twice a month, and, for the most part, looked after leisure activities for 
members of the club and their families. Family gatherings, literary and mu-
sical evenings, lunches, dinners, and lectures were the most popular events.8
The Official Family existed until the beginning of 1906, when it was re-
formed into an openly nationalist club. Besides changing its name to the 
Vil’na Russian Societal Assembly (Vilenskoe Russkoe Obshchestvennoe 
Sobranie), it also opened its doors to lower-ranking officials and the local 
Russian intelligentsia, predominantly state school teachers.9 The transfor-
7  The founders and heads of the Vil’na section were imperial officers stationed in the city. According 
to Senator Stepan Beletskii, who became head officer in the Vil’na governor-general chancellery de-
partment in 1904, he was one of the founders and a member of the Russian Assembly’s Vil’na section. 
At the beginning, it was headed by Alexei Kharuzin, a prominent ethnographer and anthropologist, 
and future senator, who at the time was in charge of the general-governor’s chancellery. Later, after 
leaving the post, his successor Andrei Stankevich, another future prominent imperial politician, re-
placed him as head of the chancellery and the section. “Protokol pokazanii S.P. Beletskogo ot 14 iu-
nia i 2 iulia 1917 g.,” in Soiuz Russkogo Naroda: Po materialam cherezvychainoi sledstvennoi kommissii 
vremennogo pravitel’stva 1917 g., ed. A. Chernovskii (Moscow–Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe izda-
tel‘stvo, 1929), 77. 
8  For an account of the Vil’na club, see “Official Family for the year 1904/1905,” Vilniaus Universiteto Bib-
lioteka Rankraščių Skyrius (Vilnius University Library Manuscript Department, VUB RS), F6-857, 19–20.
9  Id., “Vil’na,” Okrainy Rossii 10 (1910): 153. A prominent lawyer and statesman, member of the St. Peters-
burg Russian Gathering, and one of the founders of the St. Petersburg Russian Borderland Society (Russkoe 
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mation presumably occurred due to the ongoing revolution, and also be-
cause of new laws, which required the registration of all legally operating 
organizations.10 Similar Russian societal assemblies opened in other north-
western towns too.11
Starting in late 1905, the assemblies became places where local Rus-
sian state officials and supporters of the imperial authorities could meet 
and interact. Judging from the lists of members, these national clubs were 
predominantly frequented by people with right-wing political preferenc-
es. There is no information that liberals, like the Constitutional Demo-
crats (or the kadets), ever participated in the activities of the assemblies, 
although officially there were no restrictions based on political views. On-
ly minors, members of the military on active service, people with crimi-
nal convictions, and those whose memberships in similar organizations 
were revoked were not permitted to join.12 The popularity of these local 
elite organizations was reflected in their growing numbers: for example, 
the Vil’na Russian Societal Assembly had 340 members in 1908–09, and 
in 1910–11, it had 467 members.13
These Russian clubs were also instrumental in the emergence of other 
local right-wing organizations, such as the Circle of Russian Women (Kru-
zhok Russkikh Zhenshchin). The first Circle appeared in St. Petersburg in 
May 1907. It would seem that the northwestern organizations of women 
followed its principles, but they were not directly associated with the St. 
Petersburg branch.14 Despite being charitable and educational institutions, 
the Circles nonetheless belonged to the right-wing, sometimes even radi-
cal end of the political spectrum, and focused only on working with Or-
Okrainoe Obshchestvo), Nikolai Sergeevskii also described the Vil’na Russian Societal Gathering as a na-
tional club in the ethnically non-Russian city. Nikolai Sergeevskii, “Shest’ dnei v Vil’ne,” Okrainy Rossii 35–
36 (1908), 501.
10 “O vremennykh pravilakh ob Obshchestvakh i Soiuzakh,” in Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii. 
Sobranie tret’e. T. XXVI. 1906: Otdelenie I (St. Petersburg, 1909), 201–7.
11 For example, the Minsk Russian Societal Assembly was established in 1908. 
12 Ustav Russkogo Obshchestvennogo Sobraniia (Vilnius, 1908), 1.
13 Otchet [Vilenskogo] Russkogo Obshchestvennogo Sobraniia za 1908–9 god (Vilnius, s.a.), 1; Otchet Vilenskogo 
Russkogo Obshchestvennogo Sobraniia za 1910–11 god (Vilnius, s.a.), 1.
14 Chernaia sotnia. Istoricheskaia entsiklopediia 1900–1917, 502–3.
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thodox and Russian (including Belorussian and Ukrainian) people.15 They 
were usually headed by the most active and prominent women in local Rus-
sian society; for example, the leader of the Minsk Circle was the Minsk 
governor’s wife, Vera Erdeli.16 The Vil’na Circle was headed by Elena Do-
brianskaia, whose father Flavian Dobrianskii was a prominent teacher, a 
member of the Vil’na Archaeographical Commission and the northwest-
ern section of the Russian Imperial Geographical Society, as well as possibly 
being one of the founders of the Russian Assembly’s Vil’na section.17 Cir-
cles also tried to become more prominent and secure larger followings and 
greater financial support by electing women from society’s elite as honorary 
members. The Vil’na Circle indicated that the wives of the Vil’na governors 
 Dimitri Liubimov (1906–12) and Petr Verevkin (1912–16), as well as the 
widow of the former governor-general Konstantin Krshivitskii (1905–09), 
also belonged to the organization. Despite their political preferences, how-
ever, these women’s organizations excelled in charitable work: the Vil’na 
Circle supported war refugees and soldiers at the front until the German 
occupation of the city in the autumn of 1915.18
Some of the first northwest right-wing political organizations appeared 
in the midst of these Russian societal assemblies and/or national clubs after 
the proclamation of the October 17 Manifesto. However, this can only be 
said about the moderate ones, whose supporters came from among the mid-
dling and senior officials and the intelligentsia, and not about the radical 
organizations like the Union of Russian People (Soiuz Russkogo Naroda), 
which had a larger following among the lower classes and the peasantry. 
15 This was not something unusual because other national groups (Poles, Jews, Lithuanians) also established 
their own national charitable, educational, medical, and similar organizations, which worked primarily 
with members of their own nation. However, unless they were religious, Russian state organizations were 
more liberal in the sense that they provided assistance to non-Russians too. 
16 For more on the Minsk Circle of Russian Women, see Bondarenko and Lavrinovich, Russkie i belorusskie 
monarkhisty, 75–77; and Dimitrii Lavrinovich, “Russkie zhenskie kruzhki v obshchestvenno-politiches-
koi zhizni Vil’no i Minska v nachale XX veka,” in: Religia i obshchestvo 10 (conference proceedings), eds. 
V. Starostenko and O. D’iachenko (Mogilev: MGU im. A.A. Kuleshova, 2016), 49–52.
17 “Mestnaia khronika,” Vilenskii vestnik 1075 (Jan. 4, 1907).
18 Otchet vilenskogo kruzhka russkikh zhenshchin za 1909 god (Vilnius, 1910); “V ‘Kruzhke russkikh zhen-
shchin’,” Vilenskii vestnik 2887 (Jan. 30, 1913); Otchet vilenskogo kruzhka russkikh zhenshchin za 1914 god 
(Vilnius, 1915).
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This had an effect on the uneven distribution of right-wing organizations 
in the northwestern provinces. Whereas moderate and liberal monarchists, 
as well as nationalists, were stronger in the western parts of the region, es-
pecially in urban areas with the highest concentrations of Russians in their 
population, radical parties and organizations had a stronger following in 
the eastern parts, and especially in the countryside. The dividing line ran 
approximately where Catholics and Orthodox met, with the provinces of 
Kovna and Vil’na (Lithuanian) on one side, and the Minsk, Mogilev, and 
Vitebsk (Belorussian) provinces on the other. Grodna Province was split 
between the two. This relative division can be noticed when looking at the 
societal support and activities of right-wing parties, especially the radical 
Union of Russian People, which, due to its promotion of the monarchy, 
Russianness, and Orthodoxy, targeted very specific ethnic and confession-
al societal groups. In the territories dominated by or boasting high percent-
ages of non-Russians and Catholics, the support for radicals was low. Mod-
erate right-wing groups and nationalists were somewhat more successful 
there. A stronger Russian nationalist ideology presumably developed as a 
response to the potent and active non-Russian nationalisms, primarily Pol-
ish and Lithuanian. Despite this division, however, moderate monarchists 
and nationalists had followers in the Belorussian provinces too.
The Organization and Activities of the Radical Right: 
The Union of Russian People
Radical right-wing Russian political and societal organizations emerged 
in the northwest region during the revolution of 1905. At the beginning, 
they appeared as various self-organized groups that supported monar-
chism and aimed at combating the revolution. Most of them had a short 
life span: they either disappeared or joined the newly organized political 
party the Union of Russian People. Until the suppression of the revolution, 
the Union was the main radical right-wing organization in the empire. It 
was started in October 1905 by Aleksandr Dubrovin, and it quickly man-
aged to establish numerous sections, especially in Orthodox-dominated 
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parts of the western provinces.19 They were supported by the highest state 
authorities due to their strong counter-revolutionary attitudes and activi-
ties, as well as the promotion of absolute monarchy, Russianness, and Or-
thodoxy. To a great extent, the Union stood against any reform of imperial 
governance and perceived the Duma as an advisory institution that essen-
tially limited the power of the emperor.20 This radical attitude toward the 
October 17 Manifesto narrowed the party’s participation in politics even 
though it had a huge following, especially among the Orthodox, and to 
some extent among Old Believers too. The Union became infamous for 
the violence, pogroms, and terror it inflicted in the northern and especial-
ly the southwestern provinces.21
After the suppression of the revolution in 1907 and the stabilization of 
everyday social and political life, the troublesome radicals became a bur-
den for the imperial government. The internal power struggle between sev-
eral groups within the party led to its split, and in March 1908, the moder-
ate wing headed by Vladimir Purishkevich reorganized itself as the Russian 
National Union of the Archangel Michael (Russkii Narodnyi Soiuz Imeni 
Arkhangela Mikhaila). Later, in 1909–10, another break occurred in what 
remained of the Union of Russian People. In 1911, Dubrovin’s followers 
established the All-Russian Dubrovin Union of Russian People (Vserossi-
iskii Dubrovinskii Soiuz Russkogo Naroda), while the other, more moder-
ate (or centrist) part became known as the Union of Russian People (Re-
formed) (Soiuz Russkogo Naroda [Obnovlencheskii]). All these changes in 
the central party were also reflected in the provincial sections. There were 
splits and transformations, and changes of leadership and loyalties. Unfor-
19 See, for example, I. Omel’ianchuk, Chernosotennoe dvizhenie na territorii Ukrainy (1904–1914) (Kiev: 
NIURO, 2000); Bondarenko and Lavrinovich, Russkie i belorusskie monarkhisty, 41–56; for the spread of 
the right-wing parties and groups in the northwestern provinces (except Kovna), see: Bondarenko, Pravye 
partii, 108–27.
20 Despite the fact that the Duma was perceived only as a simple institutional connection between the em-
peror and the people, the Union of Russian People nevertheless envisioned itself actively participating in 
politics, and thus protecting the monarchy, the state, and the Russian nation. Ustav obshchestva pod naz-
vaniem ‘Soiuz Russkogo Naroda’ (St. Petersburg, 1906), 3–6.
21 Hans Rogger, “Was There a Russian Fascism? The Union of Russian People,” in Jewish Policies and Right-
Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (Oxford: Macmillan–St. Anthony’s College, 1986), 212–32.
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tunately, very limited archival material remains on these developments in 
the northwestern provinces; most of the information presented here comes 
from the periodical press and other scholarly research.
As was mentioned earlier, the radical wing drew its greatest support 
from the imperial authorities during the revolutionary years. In a famous 
quote from a telegram sent by Nicholas II to Dubrovin, the founder of the 
Union of Russian People, on June 5, 1907, the emperor greeted the party 
and thanked it for its support of the monarchy, calling them an example 
of “obedience to law and order.”22 Indeed, since its establishment and until 
the change of the election law on June 3, 1907, the Union received official 
and unofficial support from many high-ranking state authorities. Even af-
ter the decline in its popularity, some of the imperial authorities contin-
ued to help the party and its offshoots financially until the beginning of 
World War I.23
The first radical right-wing organizations appeared in the northwestern 
provinces in Belorussian-inhabited territories, such as the Mogilev Province 
Union of Russian People (Soiuz Russkikh Liudei), in October 1905. Sim-
ilar organizations with different names sprang up in other provinces too: 
the True Russian People (Orsha), the Society of Old Believers and Right-
ists (Vitebsk), For Faith, the Tsar, and Fatherland (Bobruisk), and others. 
Most of these were soon incorporated into the Union of Russian People.24
The Union was a very popular organization, boasting 2,124 sections all 
over the empire by 1908, when all the other right-wing parties barely had 
105.25 According to Iurii Kir’ianov, who based his calculations on data col-
lected by the Ministry of the Interior, it was claimed that at the peak of the 
movement around 1907–08, in Vil’na Province there were approximately 
22 Kir’ianov, ed., Pravye partii: Dokumenty i materialy, vol. 1, 341.
23 Vladimir Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo: Vospominaniia 1903–1919, vol. 2 (Paris: Izd. zhurnala “Illiustri-
rovannaia Rossia,” 1933), 9–13.
24 Bondarenko, Pravye partii, 109–110. For detailed numbers of members of right-wing organizations in 
the Belorussian provinces for the period 1907–1916, see: Konstanin Bondarenko, “Kolichestvo i chislen-
nost’ pravomonarkhicheskikh obrazovanii v Rossii i Belarusi v 1907–1916 gg.,” Vesnik Magileuskaga dzi-
arzhaunaga universiteta imia A. A. Kuliashova, Ser: A, Gumanitarnyia navuki (gistoryia, filasofiia, filalo-
giia) 2(46) 2015, 4–13.
25 Bondarenko, Pravye partii, 112.
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one thousand members (mostly members of the Union); in Kovna there 
were 6,450 members of the Union;26 in Grodna 897 members (502 [the 
Union] and 395 [other organizations]); and in Minsk there were 16,486 
members (3,770 [the Union] and 12,716 [other organizations]). Statistics 
for later years are not available, and only Minsk Province has approximate 
numbers for the year 1915–16, in total 450 members.27
Such high numbers for the earlier period, however, should be treated 
with caution. Close connections between the radicals and the Orthodox 
Church, Orthodox brotherhoods, Old Believers and Russian landlords 
might have had a strong albeit temporary mobilizing effect on the peasant-
ry. There were many reports about the artificially created Union’s provincial 
sections, where whole parishes registered by the politicized Orthodox cler-
gy. In some cases, people were tricked into joining radical monarchist or-
ganizations. For example, in Ponevezh (in Kovna Province), the local land-
lord Grigorii Gnatovskii, an active member of the Union’s Vil’na section 
and one of the monarchist delegates to Nicholas II (April 11, 1907),28 took 
the initiative in establishing a section in the center of the Ponevezh district. 
It should be noted that Gnatovskii had long and good relations with the 
Kovna governor Petr Verevkin and his family.29 Enjoying a privileged posi-
tion as the head of the assembly of the local nobility, he opened the section 
26 Kir’ianov’s numbers for Kovna Province are very inaccurate. The file on the Union of Russian People in the 
Kovna governor’s chancellery archive shows that during the entire period from 1905 until the beginning 
of the war, there were only three officially registered sections: in Novoaleksandrovsk (opened in 1906), in 
Ponevezh (1907), and in Kovna (1910). The registration of sections was done at the St. Petersburg city gov-
ernor’s office, and the Kovna governor was only informed about the fact (see, for example, the note on the 
registration of the Kovna section: Kauno Regioninis Valstybės Archyvas [Kaunas Regional State Archive; 
KRVA], I-53; 1, 51; 9). 
  Reports from the heads of the local district police to the Kovna governor’s chancellery reveal that in mid-
1907, the Novoaleksandrovsk section had 300, and Ponevezh 1,449 members, which officially made 1,749 
members of the Union in total (KRVA, I-59, 1, 51; 11, 27). These numbers were the peak of the party’s pop-
ularity. Membership of the Kovna section is not known, but it could not have been high, probably up to a 
hundred.
27 Kir’ianov, ed., Pravye partii v Rossii, 1911–1917, 79–80 (table).
28 “Mestnaia khronika,” Morskaia volna 4 (April 20, 1907).
29 Gnatovskii corresponded with Verevkin at least starting from the early 1890s.  Gnatovskii’s telegram 
to Verevkin’s family in St. Petersburg, dated 1892, Lietuvos Nacionalinė Martyno Mažvydo Bibliote-
ka Rankraščių Skyrius (Martynas Mažvydas National Library of Lithuania Manuscript Department, 
LNMMB RS), F19-475, 3. 
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on October 14, 1907. The highest Orthodox authority, Archbishop Nikan-
dr of Vil’na and Lithuania, participated in the festivities, which combined 
imperial and religious rituals; mass in the Ponevezh Orthodox church was 
followed by a blessing of the section’s flag and patriotic speeches given by 
the archbishop and other participants. Afterwards, a politicized religious 
procession went through the town to the Orthodox cemetery, where re-
spects were paid to the Russian soldiers who fell during the suppression of 
the 1863 uprising. The celebrations continued in  Gnatovskii’s house, where 
the archbishop, a number of high-ranking Orthodox priests, and members 
of the Vil’na and Ponevezh sections, composed a telegram expressing their 
loyalty to Nicholas II.30 
Arguably, this small example illustrates rather well the relations be-
tween the Union’s section and different imperial authorities. Many mem-
bers and heads of district sections were either Orthodox priests or Russian 
landlords. The Vil’na provincial section occupied a higher hierarchical po-
sition within the organization, where Archbishop Nikandr was an honor-
ary member and a strong spiritual authority. The direct or indirect partici-
pation of high-ranking members of the Orthodox Church in politics, and 
their support for conservative and even radical right-wing groups, provided 
the latter with a strong foothold in parishes and semi-secular conservative 
Orthodox brotherhoods, and allowed further political agitation through 
the churches. Also, at the end of 1907, some local authorities still expressed 
support for the Union of Russian People, and personal relationships with 
governors, such as the one between Gnatovskii and Verevkin, contributed 
greatly to the party’s strong position.31
Additionally, personal contacts could have been beneficial for political 
groups and the authorities. One example of such cooperation came from the 
Gnatovskii–Verevkin connection. In a letter to the governor,  Gnatovskii 
announced that on his trips through the province where he was promot-
30 Ochevidets, “Torzhestvo osviashcheniia znameni Ponevezhskogo otdela Sojuza Russkogo Naroda,” Mor-
skaia volna 21 (October 22, 1907).
31 An exchange of congratulations between the Ponevezh section and governor Verevkin (Jan. 1, 1908), 
LNMMB RS, F19-1081, 1–3.
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ing the Union’s candidates to the Third Duma, he had encountered leftist 
politicians, who, in his words, had carried out “anti-government agitation.” 
Therefore, he asked Verevkin to order the police in Ponevezh and other dis-
tricts to be ready to respond at Gnatovskii’s request in order to prevent po-
litical agitation by opposition parties. Interestingly enough, Verevkin found 
this suggestion useful; however, he pointed out that such assistance had to 
come at the initiative of the district policemen themselves and not by order 
from the Kovna governor. Despite that, a request (albeit unofficially) was is-
sued.32 Whether this had any effect is not clear.
As was mentioned earlier, statistics about the Union’s membership are 
problematic. Some Orthodox and Old Believer parishes were registered as 
provincial sections, quite possibly even without the consent of the people. 
This turned out to be the case with the Ponevezh section. As the Lithua-
nian press reported, supposedly even during the opening, heads of local state 
schools and commanders of the military garrison rejected the organizers’ in-
vitation to participate in a religious-monarchist procession.33 Only Old Be-
liever and Russian settlers attended because, as it was claimed in the press, 
Gnatovskii assured people that during the opening of the section, the arch-
bishop would announce an official manifesto about the new redistribution 
of land. (This might have been connected with ongoing discussions regard-
ing the introduction of zemstvos in the western provinces.) People came 
and probably joined the section to improve their chances of getting more 
land. But when nothing was announced, everyone became angry at Gna-
tovskii’s trick.34 Moreover, the section faced more trouble: a few months 
32 An official letter from the Ponevezh section of the Union of Russian People to the Kovna governor, July 
16, 1907, KRVA, I-59; 1, 51; 32, 45 and two following unnumbered pages.
33 It is important to note that at the end of 1905, active-service military were forbidden to participate in any 
political organizations, and because of this, many officers abandoned political groups and only reserve mil-
itary remained. Moreover, in the spring of 1906, the Ministry of the Interior issued a recommendation to 
all state employees to abstain from participation in political groups because, as it was explained, political 
activities distracted them from their primary duties. Later, in a circular from September 14, 1906, civil ser-
vants were prohibited from participating in anti-government revolutionary groups, which to some extent 
also included right-wing radicals who openly declared themselves to be against the changes introduced by 
the October 17 Manifesto. Finally, in October 1913, the Holy Synod passed a decision that forbade Or-
thodox priests from joining political movements and parties (Kir’ianov, Russkoe sobranie, 87–88).
34 Besparnis, “Panevėžio rusų sąjunga,” Vilniaus žinios vol. 203, no. 812 (1907).
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later, in July 1908, the administration of Kovna Province took Gnatovskii to 
court for embezzling money given by the state for orphans. The court found 
him guilty and sentenced him to prison.35 But with the help of the Union’s 
Vil’na section, Gnatovskii was released.36
Despite the generally negative attitude towards the Duma, the Union of 
Russian People was nonetheless quite successful on the new political scene, 
especially in the western borderlands. The change to the election law on June 
3, 1907 and the introduction of separate Russian electoral curia, opened up 
possibilities for Russians to send representatives to the parliament. At the 
same time, this law also introduced strong division among local right-wing 
followers. Earlier attempts at consolidation against non-Russians and left-
ists became an internal power struggle for seats in the Duma. This will be 
addressed later in this chapter, when looking at moderate right-wing orga-
nizations. But it should be mentioned here that the radicals were successful 
in winning several seats for their candidates in Vil’na Province in the elec-
tions to the Third (1907) and Fourth (1912) Dumas, when the infamous rad-
ical right-wing politician Gregorii Zamyslovskii won the majority of votes.37
Despite the initial support, the Union’s relations with the authorities 
gradually worsened. After the successful 1907 elections, the radicals became 
much more vocal in criticizing senior officials who, according to them, did 
not adhere to the principles of monarchy, Orthodoxy, and Russianness. In 
Vil’na, they were especially negative about the overseer of the Vil’na educa-
tional district, the Baltic German Baron Boris Vol’f, who was accused of 
supporting the Poles and other non-Russian ethnicities in schooling and 
refused to appoint the Union’s members as teachers.38 Later, the Vil’na sec-
tion reported other attempts to force local authorities to conform to their 
political agenda and appoint their candidates as teachers in state schools, 
employees at the Polesie railway company’s administration, and elsewhere. 
35 “Žinios. Iš Lietuvos. Panevėžys,” Lietuvos ūkininkas 30 (July 23 [August 5], 1908).
36 “Kratkii obzor deiatel’nosti Vilenskogo Gubernskogo Otdela Soiuza Russkogo Naroda za 1908 god,” Mor-
skaia volna 45 (March 9, 1909).
37 “Mestnaia khronika,” Morskaia volna 21 (October 22, 1907).
38 Morskaia volna, “V chem obviniaetsia g. popechitel’ Vilenskogo uchebnogo okruga baron Vol’f,” Morskaia 
volna 35 (June 7, 1908).
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They used personal contacts to secure Gnatovskii’s release from prison, 
wrote reports about the “improper” behavior of Jews and Poles, and so on.39
The Union of Russian People was much more successful in Belorussian 
rather than Lithuanian-inhabited lands. There, starting from 1906 up to 
the beginning of 1908, the radicals had at least sixty-four sections and sub-
sections, not including other similar, but not Union-run radical organiza-
tions.40 After splits in the party in 1908 and 1911, the provincial sections ei-
ther divided or became loyal to one of the offshoots, the Russian National 
Union of the Archangel Michael, the Union of Russian People (Reformed), 
or the All-Russian Dobrovin Union of Russian People.41
The Moderate Right and the Nationalists
The Northwestern Russian Veche
Generally, supporters of the October 17 Manifesto can be grouped un-
der the common label “the moderate right,” although this political trend 
evolved into a variety of organizations. Unlike the radical right, the mod-
erates (chief among were the main political parties, the Union of October 
17 [Soiuz 17 Oktiabria], or the Octobrists, and the All-Russian National 
Union [Vserossiiskii Natsional’nyi Soiuz]), supported the reformed monar-
chy and the unity of the empire. The first steps taken by the moderate right, 
however, were more cautious than those of the radicals.
39 “Kratkii obzor deiatel’nosti Vilenskogo Gubernskogo Otdela Soiuza Russkogo Naroda za 1908 god,” Mor-
skaia volna 45 (March 9, 1909).
40 See Bondarenko’s calculations for every northwestern province (except Kovna): Bondarenko, Pravye par-
tii, 112–18.
41 On the distribution of sections in five northwestern provinces (except for Kovna) for the period between 
1908 and 1914, see ibid., 118–24. Statistics on Kovno Province are very fragmented and require further 
investigation. In reports to the Ministry of the Interior about the province, governor Verevkin indicated 
that in 1908, besides the Sviato Nikol’skoe Petropavlovskoe Orthodox brotherhood, there were two Union 
of Russian People sections (in Poneviezh and Novoaleksandrovsk), with approximately 2,000 members, 
and the newly created, but barely functional section of the Union of the Archangel Michael in Onikshty, 
Vilkomir district. “Vsepoddaneishii otchet Kovenskogo gubernatora za 1908 god,” LNMMB RS, F19-76, 
3. The latter was established in May 1908 and was run by the local Orthodox priest Ioan (or Iakov) Budni-
kov. Just as with the registration of the sections of the Union of Russian People, the Onikshty chapter of 
the Union of the Archangel Michael was registered in St. Petersburg. “V Kovenskoe gubernskoe po delam 
ob obshchestvakh Prisutstvie,” KRVA, I-53, 1, 112, 1.
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One of the first moderate northwestern right-wing organizations was 
the Vil’na-based Northwestern Russian Veche (Severo-Zapadnaia Russkaia 
Veche). The word veche suggested a form of assembly or council of Russian 
society, which came from the medieval Slavic tradition and was indicative 
of the traditionalist and, to some extent, democratic approach to building 
the organization. The idea to establish an organization that would unite 
all northwest Russian right-wing supporters was first proposed on Octo-
ber 30, 1905 at a meeting at the Official Family club. The suggestion came 
from Aleksandr Beletskii, the assistant to the overseer of the Vil’na edu-
cational district. Receiving overwhelming support, the participants in the 
meeting formed a preparatory committee tasked with formulating a char-
ter for the new organization. It must be noted that the committee was com-
posed of prominent imperial officials and the local Russian intelligentsia, 
such as Stepan Beletskii, the head of the Vil’na governor-general’s chancel-
lery and future senator and vice-governor of Samara Province, and  Semion 
Kovaliuk, the owner and head of a private school in Vil’na. At the next 
meeting, members of the club were also joined by invited representatives 
from the local Old Believer community. The already-printed statute, how-
ever, caused some disagreement over the paragraph allowing all inhabit-
ants of the northwestern provinces to join the organization regardless of 
their faith or nationality. The paragraph was quickly removed, allowing on-
ly Russians (i.e. those with official Russian nationality, Belorussians, Rus-
sians, and Ukrainians) to become members. The opening of the Veche took 
place on December 26 that year.42 It was reported that the ceremony was at-
tended by over four hundred.
One of the most important tasks for the new organization was to create 
its own periodical. At same time, another newly established moderate right-
wing Vil’na organization, the Peasant Society (Obshchestvo ‘Krest’ianin’, 
its founder was the aforementioned Kovaliuk), was also preparing to pub-
lish its own journal. However, they were aiming at a very specific social 
42 Although the Veche’s January report showed that only 216 joined the organization “Journal No. 4 of the 
meeting of the Central Council of the Northwestern Russian Veche” (January 16, 1906), VUB RS, F4-
A754, 16.
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stratum, the Belorussian peasantry, and were primarily concerned with im-
proving their patriotic and economic standing. Therefore, this periodical 
did not fit the Veche’s plan for the unification of all the Russian inhabitants 
of the region. Moreover, the Vil’na section of the Union of October 17 was 
also looking forward to having its own periodical, but its members soon 
became preoccupied with political matters and cancelled the plan. Addi-
tionally, the Veche positioned itself as a non-political and more national(-
ist)-cultural organization, which made it difficult to cooperate with the 
Octobrists.43 With no suitable alternative, on February 19, 1906, they be-
gan publishing a newspaper entitled Belaia Rus’ (White Rus’), which ap-
peared weekly until the beginning of June, when it was closed due to finan-
cial problems.
The charter of the Veche opened with the slogan: “Total tolerance and 
respect for opinions” (Polnaia terpimost’ i uvazhenie k mneniiam). This 
was quite unusual for a right-wing Russian organization, especially bear-
ing in mind the ongoing revolution and the activity of the radical Union 
of Russian People. This could, in part, be explained from the perspective 
of “defensive nationalism,” which was quite prevalent among local moder-
ates: surrounded by strong non-Russian nationalisms, they did not want to 
escalate violence in the city or the region. On the other hand, comprised as 
it was of a number of middle and high-ranking imperial officials, taking a 
radical path was not favored by the local authorities, whose main goal was 
to maintain stability and order. It is no surprise then that the Veche aimed 
to find consensus between different nationalisms and establish their place 
among them. This conclusion can be made by looking at the first paragraph 
of its statute, which stated: “Acknowledging the right to individual cultural 
development for every nationality [narodnost’] of the region and based on 
the grounds of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, the Northwest Russian 
Veche has the goal of uniting Russian inhabitants of the northwest provinc-
es in the form of the protection of Russian national [narodnykh] interests 
43 “Protocol from the meeting of the Central Council of the Northwestern Russian Veche No. 1” (Decem-
ber 30, 1905), VUB RS, F4-A754, 1–6.
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in the sphere of socio-political life in all its manifestations, and at the same 
time striving to clarify common political and societal goals with the other 
nationalities [narodnosti] of the region.”44
It is important to point out that, unlike the radical right, the Veche’s 
charter did not mention religion as a criterion for national identification. 
By leaving this out, they probably expected to win the sympathy of Belo-
russian Catholics, who were usually identified (by others) as Poles. Com-
bining religious with national identification was much more important for 
radical groups and political parties, as well as conservative Orthodox orga-
nizations like the numerous northwestern brotherhoods. For them a “true 
Russian” was a person who not only belonged to the “official Russian” na-
tionality, but also adhered to either the Orthodox or (to some extent) Old 
Believer confession. No Catholic could be a “Russian,” unless he convert-
ed to Orthodoxy, and even then there was no guarantee. And no Jew could 
ever become a “Russian.” Another explanation for the absence of the reli-
gious criterion could be that the Veche included people adhering to differ-
ent Christian confessions, mainly Orthodoxy and Protestantism. A num-
ber of active moderate northwest Russian rightists were Lutherans such as, 
for example, the heads of the Vil’na and Minsk Octobrists, Nikolai Matson 
and Gustav Shmid.
Despite claiming to be a non-political organization, the Veche unoffi-
cially associated and partnered itself with the Union of October 17. Both 
regarded the October 17 Manifesto as their founding document; both pro-
claimed moderate rightist or even liberal conservative views; and they also 
shared members. As was stated in the Veche’s letter to the Vil’na  Octobrists, 
the implementation of the party’s political program and state reforms re-
quired patriotically motivated citizens. Educating them was one of the 
main goals of the Veche, which also meant raising new Octobrist support-
ers. Still, the Octobrists’ task was the political protection and practical re-
alization of state reform, while the Veche cared more about “national de-
fense” and the support of the local Russian population. It was “… not a 
44 Ustav soiuza ‘Severo-Zapadnoe Russkoe Veche’, VUB RS, F4-A754, 7.
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political organization, not a party, but a community, a brotherhood, if you 
wish; however, not a religious, but a spiritual one, which connects through 
common attitudes, interests and goals.” It could only have been called po-
litical because it urged people to be politically active, like, for example, par-
ticipating in elections to the Duma because, as was stated in the letter, re-
fusing to do so was a civic crime.45
Despite the big plans, high hopes, and rather liberal attitudes, the Veche 
faced serious problems, which hindered its activities from the very begin-
ning. The main challenge was financial. The publication of the newspaper 
proved to be extremely difficult. Moreover, many members did not both-
er paying membership fees, which put all the other plans on hold. Further-
more, the distribution of the newspaper met with strong resistance from 
Vil’na newspaper vendors (mostly of Jewish and Polish origin) who either 
boycotted Belaia Rus’ or physically attacked the hired distributors.46 
This situation forced the Veche’s Central Council to seek the gover-
nor’s assistance. Reaching him was presumably not very difficult because 
of the personal or professional connections of some of the members. There-
fore, instead of having their own publication, the Central Council thought 
of appropriating the semi-official newspaper of the northwest provinc-
es, Vilenskii Vestnik (The Vil’na Gazette). It would seem that its editor 
V. Tchiumi kov was not associated with the organization. However, con-
vincing the governor Dimitrii Liubimov (1906–12) to appoint one of the 
members of the Veche as the new editor of the newspaper was unsuccessful. 
Instead, Liu bimov agreed to compensate subscribers to the discontinued 
Belaia Rus’ with issues of Vilenskii Vestnik for the pre-paid period.47
By the beginning of 1907, the Veche had stopped all its activities. The 
initial excitement and declarations of support from high-ranking officials 
and the local Russian elite proved empty. The failure of the organization 
45 Congratulatory letter to the Vil’na section of the Union of October 17 (possibly early 1906), VUB RS, 
F52-425, 1.
46 Journal No 11 of the meeting of the Northwestern Russian Veche’s Central Council (February 23, 1906), 
VUB RS, F4-A754, 27–28.
47 A letter from the Vil’na governor-general’s chancellery to the head of the Northwestern Russian Veche 
Aristarkh Pimonov (no date; probably late September to early October 1906), VUB RS, F4-A754a, 69. 
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was primarily because its members did not show any great interest in spend-
ing their leisure time taking part in its activities. Financial support was al-
so a problem, despite the fact that some members were rather wealthy peo-
ple, like the head of the Veche, the successful merchant and board member 
of the Vil’na branch of the State bank and other organizations, Aristarkh 
Pimonov. Nevertheless, the Northwestern Russian Veche became the first 
attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to create a local moderate right-wing and na-
tionalist-oriented organization. 
It was officially closed on June 20, 1911.48 Even during the first half of 
1906, the slow demise of the organization was not a hard blow to the Vil’na 
and northwest moderate rightists and nationalists. Many of them had al-
ready moved on to other organizations, choosing the radical right or the 
Octobrists as alternatives. It was time for differentiation according to ide-
ology, nationality, and/or religion. The initial goal of the Veche to become 
a “universal” organization that would have united different branches of the 
northwest right-wing movement did not disappear. Soon it found its mis-
sion among local Octobrists, many of whom were instrumental in estab-
lishing the Veche in the first place. The idea of an umbrella organization 
to coordinate the activities of the monarchists materialized in the more 
articulated and political form of the Russian Borderland Union (Russkii 
Okrainyi Soiuz).
The Russian Borderland Union
The all-empire liberal monarchist party Union of October 17 was estab-
lished after the proclamation of the October 17 Manifesto, and its first sec-
tions appeared in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Besides supporting state re-
forms and the imperial government, it also aimed at introducing a form 
of constitutional monarchy. Contrary to the elitist Russian Assembly, the 
 Octobrists welcomed everyone who supported the state, the Duma, and 
the reforms. From the beginning, it started actively establishing provin-
cial sections, and preparing for the forthcoming elections to the First State 
48 Official document of the closure of all activities and bank accounts (June 20, 1911), VUB RS, F4-A754, 73.
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Duma. The northwestern sections opened at the end of 1905 and the be-
ginning of 1906.
For the better coordination of political and societal work and the elab-
oration of the party’s ideology, the first general meeting of Octobrists was 
held in Moscow on February 8–12, 1906. Before the meeting, some of the 
delegates joined several work groups, which discussed specific issues and 
problems and prepared resolutions in order to formulate the party’s po-
sition. One of the work groups was called the Borderland Commission 
most of which consisted of representatives from Poland and the northern, 
southwestern, and Baltic provinces. The resolution of the Commission had 
strong nationalistic undertones and claimed to protect Russian national in-
terests in the western borderlands. For this reason, it was suggested that the 
party’s Central Committee approach the highest authorities of the state in 
order to change the existing electoral law, which had just been introduced 
on December 11, 1905. According to the law, every citizen of the empire 
who was eligible to vote, regardless of his religion or nationality, could elect 
whomever he wanted. The Borderland Commission, however, was con-
cerned that in the provinces where Russians constituted an ethnic minority 
or where local elites were of non-Russian origin, Octobrist candidates could 
not compete. In their understanding, this situation eroded the position of 
Russians as the nation forming the state. Therefore, the Commission pro-
posed that imperial authorities should introduce a proportional electoral 
census according to nationality so that Russian voters could elect their own 
Duma representatives independently of others. Additionally, it suggested 
that at least one Russian member should be elected from every non-Rus-
sian dominated western and Baltic province, and two from every province 
in Poland. The same principle had to be applied in other ethnically mixed 
regions, like the Caucasus. Together with issues of electoral law, the Com-
mission  also touched on the use of the Russian language. They argued that 
Russian was the only inter-ethnic, all-empire language that allowed differ-
ent ethnic groups to communicate with each other, and therefore, it had to 
be taught in all state and private schools at all levels. The party’s Central 
Committee and congress agreed partially to the second part, stating that all 
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laws and regulations for different linguistic groups that applied at that time 
were a sign of cultural and political oppression. But this was a question that 
should have been resolved in the Duma.49
The first part of the resolution, however, provoked heated debates. Prince 
Petr Volkonskii, who also participated in the work of the Borderland Com-
mission, disagreed with it, noting that the laws of the empire had to be 
applied to everyone equally, and asking for privileges for one nationality 
would create a precedent for others; that is, non-Russian groups that lived 
in areas dominated by Russians would have a reason to ask for the same spe-
cial treatment. Also, he pointed out that no non-Russians from Poland, or 
the north- and southwestern and Baltic provinces took part in either the 
work of the Borderland Commission or the Octobrist congress. Finally, in 
his opinion, the demand for a special electoral census for Russians clashed 
with the party’s ideology because it was the party’s position that all imperi-
al subjects had to obey the laws of the state. The introduction of the census 
would result in inter-ethnic tensions. Besides, the demand for such privileg-
es pushed the Octobrists closer to the radical right parties, which declared 
that only Russians and Orthodox should be eligible to vote.  Volkonskii’s 
opinion was supported by the party’s leader Aleksandr Guchkov and most 
of the congress. The resolution of the Commission was changed according 
to the party’s ideology and the opinion of the majority.50
However, this outcome did not satisfy the borderland Octobrists. The 
strongest and most vocal supporters of the introduction of the nationality 
census were the Octobrists from the northwestern provinces: the head of the 
Minsk section, retired second-class navy captain Gustav Shmid and Niko-
lai Matson, the leader of the Vil’na Octobrists and engineer with the Pole-
sie Railway Company. They and other delegates from Poland and the Bal-
49 For the resolutions and reactions to them, see Pavlov, ed., Partiia ‘Soiuz 17-go oktiabria’, 137–38. It should 
be noted that in the collection of documents published in 1996, the text of the resolution of the Border-
land Commission differs slightly in formulation and wording from the one published just after the con-
gress. Therefore, I have followed the text published in Rezoliutsii, priniatye pervym s’ezdom delegatov otde-
lov ‘Soiuza 17-go oktiabria’ i partii, k nemu prisoedenivshikhsia (s.l., 1906), 4. 
50 Pavlov, ed., Partiia ‘Soiuz 17-go oktiabria’, 138–40; see also 1-ii vserossiiskii s’ezd delegatov ‘Soiuza 17go 
 oktiabria’. 8–12 fevralia 1906 g. g. Moskva (Moscow, 1906), 29–32.
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tic provinces argued that the Russians in the borderlands did not want any 
privileges, only equal rights to be represented in the Duma; otherwise, the 
future of the Russians in the non-Russian dominated provinces was unclear. 
Guchkov’s assurance that the issues raised by the Borderland Commission 
would be a priority for the party in the First Duma was not credible because 
at that time, nobody could guarantee that the Octobrists would win a ma-
jority of seats.51 And as the results of the elections to the First Duma showed, 
the borderland Octobrists were absolutely right to doubt these promises.52 
It was quite clear from the discussions at the congress that the border-
land Octobrists differed from the others in their strong nationalism. Po-
litically they constituted the right wing of the Union of October 17, but 
before the appearance of the All-Russian National Union (Vserossiiskii 
Natsional’nyi Soiuz) in 1908, and especially after the introduction of its 
new organizational charter in 1911, most of the borderland Octobrists re-
mained connected with the party in one way or another.
Meanwhile, after the unsuccessful attempts to secure the party’s sup-
port, they decided to take matters into their own hands. The northwestern 
sections in Minsk and Vil’na tried to bend the opinion of the highest impe-
rial authorities by writing personal and public letters; trying to secure the 
Vil’na governor-general’s help in contacting the government; sending dele-
gations to Nicholas II; and so on. They were supported and joined by the 
previously mentioned Northwestern Russian Veche as well as other local 
right-wing organizations.53 The fear of losing the forthcoming elections and 
the threat of declining Russian political superiority in the region, which 
before October 17, 1905 was, to a large extent, secured by the power of the 
51 Pavlov, ed., Partiia ‘Soiuz 17-go oktiabria’, 140–41; 1-ii vserossiiskii s’ezd delegatov ‘Soiuza 17go oktiabria’, 32.
52 For more about the introduction of Russian electoral curia, see Konstantin Bondarenko, “Bor’ba za Gos-
dumu: Ideologiia russkikh monarkhicheskikh partii i ikh belorusskikh predstavitel’stv v vybornykh kam-
paniiakh nachala XX veka,” Belarusskaia dumka 4 (2015): 89–93; Dimirii Lavrinovich, “Bor’ba za izmen-
enie sistemy vyborov Gosudarstvennogo Soveta v Zapadnykh guberniiakh Rosiiskoi imperii (1906–1911),” 
in Rosiiskie i slavianskie issledovaniia: sbornik nauchnykh trudov, ed. A. Sal’kov (Minsk: BGU, 2015), 82–
88; Dimirii Lavrinovich, “Bor’ba za izmenenie sistemy vyborov v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu na territorii 
zapadnykh gubernii Rosiiskoi imperii (1906–1907),” in Tavricheskie chteniia 2015 (conference proceed-
ings), ed. A. Nikolaev (St. Petersburg: OOO ElekSis, 2015), 55–63.
53 “Obozrenie sobytii i okrainaia zhizn’,” Okrainy Rossii 1 (1906), 13–15; see also: Okrainy Rossii 2 (1906), 37; 
Bondarenko and Lavrinovich, Russkie i belorusskie monarkhisty, 71–72.
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state authorities, all forced them to disregard the party’s cautious path. The 
heads of the Union of October 17 did not appreciate this contempt for dis-
cipline; however, it would seem that no stricter measures were taken against 
the borderland sections.54
A few days after the initial Octobrist congress, delegates from the west-
ern and Baltic provinces and the Kingdom of Poland held a separate meet-
ing in Vil’na on February 20, 1906. Among the many things discussed, they 
agreed unanimously to establish a new borderland organization, the pur-
pose of which was the unification of all right-wing political groups and the 
coordination of their efforts. At this early stage, however, they did not come 
to any particular decision, and the establishment of the organization was 
delayed for a year. Additionally, similar aims to unify northwestern right-
ist groups were declared by the Veche, although its main goal was more so-
cio-cultural than political.55
The Veche’s official distancing from politics and its loose organizational 
structure resulted in more theoretical and populist declarations than actual 
work. Therefore, the Octobrists took up the same ideas but improved them 
with a more concrete political outlook and organizational character. It is 
not surprising that one of the final acts of the Veche was the preparation 
of the foundation for the new organization, announcing another border-
land Octobrist gathering. The Veche officially invited the Warsaw, Minsk, 
Iur’ev (Tartu), and Riga Octobrists to attend a meeting in Vil’na on Octo-
ber 7–9, 1906.56 During the meeting, the Octobrists discussed the political 
pressure that Russian organizations felt from Poles and Jews. It was clear 
to them that no assistance could be expected from the imperial authori-
ties or their political partners in the internal provinces of Russia because, 
as it was said, the latter did not know the actual situation in the imperi-
al borderlands, while the former did not want to understand it or were un-
54 Ibid., 72–73.
55 Later, it was claimed that the idea to have such an umbrella organization appeared just after the announce-
ment of the October 17 Manifesto. D.B., “Vil’na,” Okrainy Rossii 6 (1907), 91. However, no discussion re-
garding this matter was found in the press or anywhere else.
56 “Iz Vil’ny,” Okrainy Rossii 32 (1906), 531.
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der the strong influence of non-Russians. Therefore, it was concluded that 
the Russian rightist intelligentsia had to organize and fight its opponents 
on its own. Questions about the electoral census and a change to election 
law were raised. They prepared an address to Prime Minister Petr Stolypin, 
which asked once again for the introduction of an electoral census and the 
appointment of permanent borderland Russian representatives on the State 
Council.57 Most importantly of all, it was decided unanimously to finally 
open the Borderland Union.58 
The Vil’na governor-general approved the statute of the Union on Jan-
uary 17, 1907. The organization’s headquarters were in Vil’na, the center 
of the northwestern provinces. It planned to have sub-sections in districts 
and parishes. The Union declared that it should become a link between the 
state and the Russians (i.e., the “official Russians,” Russians, Belorussians, 
and Ukrainians) in the region. For this reason, their goal was to unite the 
inhabitants of the Russian borderland on the basis of nationality, represent 
their interests and voice their needs in government institutions, as well as 
inform the rest of the empire about the true situation in the borderlands. 
Moreover, any Russian organization could join the Union as long as their 
programs did not contradict its ideology. The official declaration was signed 
by Vasilii Kurchinskii, a professor at Iur’ev (Tartu) University and dean of 
the Medical Faculty, Aleksandr Bezpalchev (Kovna), a civil engineer, Ivan 
Chigiriov, an official with the Minsk district court, and Octobrist leaders 
Shmid (Minsk) and Matson (Vil’na).59
Judging from the statute, the new organization resembled the Veche 
and did not have a strict organizational structure. Its main units were pro-
vincial committees (they were formed in Vil’na, Minsk, Grodna, Vitebsk, 
Iur’ev [Tartu], Kovna, and elsewhere before the official opening of the or-
ganization). There was no limit to membership either. Men and women 
were both allowed to participate. The only restrictions were on schoolchil-
57 Extracts from the address to the prime minister: “Khronika,” Okrainy Rossii 38 (1906), 647–48.
58 T., “Vil’na,” Okrainy Rossii 33 (1906), 548–49.
59 “Mestnaia khronika,” Vilenskii vestnik 1076 (January 5 [17], 1907); 1085 (January 17 [30], 1907); “Ustav 
Russkogo okrainogo soiuza,” in Bondarenko and Lavrinovich, Russkie i belorusskie monarkhisty, 198–200.
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dren, adolescents, and people with criminal convictions.60 It is worth not-
ing that the provincial committees did not follow the administrative divi-
sion of the state: they had to be opened “where Russian national awareness 
was strongest.” For this reason, for example, the Union’s center in the Baltic 
 provinces became Iur’ev (Tartu) instead of Riga.61
The opening ceremony took place on March 25, 1907, and it was  attended 
by around six hundred participants. Matson was elected head of the new 
organization, and his deputies were Aleksandr Vrutsevitch and Vladimir 
Kontor, both Vil’na state school teachers. Most of the speeches made dur-
ing the ceremony focused on the Belorussian question, stressing their “Rus-
sian” and not “Polish” ethno-cultural origins. As was usual with right-wing 
organizations, the meeting ended by dispatching telegrams to top state offi-
cials protesting Polish demands in the Duma to unite the northwest prov-
inces with Poland.62
At first the Borderland Union was quite successful in its work. It opened 
several new provincial sections and established good relations with other 
right-wing organizations across the ideological spectrum: moderate (the 
Vil’na “Peasant” Society), radical (the Union of Russian People), and re-
ligious (mostly with different Orthodox brotherhoods, like, for example, 
the Vil’na Brotherhood of the Holy Ghost [Vilenskoe Sviato-Dukhovskoe 
Bratstvo]). Its council organized meetings; discussed the possibilities of dis-
seminating their ideology among the Belorussian peasantry; and  reported 
on the results of the information campaigns which presented the situa-
tion in the region for Russians in the empire’s internal provinces, etc. Soon, 
however, the organization started to face the same financial difficulties as 
the Veche; it failed to start its own periodical publication. Even though 
Minskoe Slovo (The Word of Minsk), which was edited by Shmid, to some 
extent served as the organization’s newspaper, it could not completely meet 
the needs of the Borderland Union.
60 Elfi [L. Ivitskii], “Iz Vil’ny,” Okrainy Rossii 11 (March 17, 1907), 174–75; Bondarenko and Lavrinovich, 
Russkie i belorusskie monarkhisty, 74.
61 D.B., “Vil’na,” Okrainy Rossii 6 (1907), 91–92.
62 “Vil’na,” Okrainy Rossii 13 (March 21, 1907), 207–8.
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Parallel to this, there was another challenge: the lack of societal sup-
port. Apart from a few hundred northwestern intelligentsia in the urban 
areas (predominantly teachers from state schools), the propagation of right-
ist ideas in the Lithuanian provinces (Vil’na and Kovna) was not success-
ful, especially after the end of the revolution. Relatively greater support was 
found among the Belorussian Orthodox peasantry in the Minsk and Grod-
na provinces. Still, when it came to active participation, it would seem that 
meetings held by the organization’s Central Council were the only work in 
which the Borderland Union engaged.63
The most active period for this and other northwestern right-wing or-
ganizations was during the elections to the Duma, and major goal was the 
consolidation of Russian voters in order to win their votes. The introduc-
tion of the “Third-of-June” system in 1907, when, among other things, 
changes were made to the electoral law and the Russian curia was separat-
ed from the rest of voters, played a favorable role; at the same time, it be-
came a test for the Borderland Union. Before the change to the electoral 
law, right-wing parties had to compete with non-Russians and their politi-
cal opponents on the left. After the change, their only political opponents 
were Russian liberals and leftists, and, as it turned out, other right-wing 
parties. Moreover, on an official level, the change to the electoral law was, 
to some extent, a return to the old system based on the confessional identi-
fication of people, when religion once again became a more important fac-
tor than ethnicity. For example, the identification of the Russian curia in 
the Vil’na and Kovna provinces was done by looking only at confession. The 
curia was composed of Orthodox, Old Believers, and Protestants.64
In order to consolidate right-wing supporters, the Borderland Union 
called a meeting of all local right-wing organizations in Vil’na on June 14, 
1907. Matson urged delegates to begin propaganda campaigns. However, 
the Union refused to take the lead because many of its members complained 
of having no time due to their main work and responsibilities. Despite the 
63 Elfi [L. Ivitskii], “Vil’na,” Okrainy Rossii 21 (May 26, 1907), 329.
64 “O poriadke izbraniia chlenov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy ot russkogo naseleniia Vilenskoi i Kovenskoi 
 gubernii,” Krest’ ianin 22 (July 9, 1907), 344–47.
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importance of the upcoming elections, no one was willing to dedicate all 
their leisure time to this matter. Nonetheless, after long discussions, an elec-
toral committee was formed to rally Russian and Belorussian voters and re-
cruit suitable candidates as MPs who would be the best representatives of 
the northwest imperial Russian community. The committee consisted of 
radical and moderate representatives, Orthodox clergy, and other groups. 
Matson became the head of the electoral committee, and on June 22, they 
published an official address to Russian voters.65
Just after the meeting, however, another address to Russians appeared 
in Vilenskii vestnik (The Vil’na Gazette), signed by an unknown “non-par-
ty group” (the Russian Non-Party Electoral Committee /Russkii Vnepar-
tiinyi Izbiratel’nyi Komitet), which identified its political position as center-
right; supported moderate and liberal Russian nationalism and the reforms 
announced by the October 17 Manifesto; and declared the left and the rad-
ical right its political opponents.66
This unexpected appearance threw the fragile right-wing coalition into 
disarray. The open declaration of political animosity by a non-party group 
toward the radicals and other influential religious-conservative organiza-
tions, like the Vil’na Brotherhood of the Holy Ghost, fragmented the elec-
toral committee. In the end, instead of a unified group, three individual 
right-wing committees appeared: the “right,” led by the radical Union of 
Russian People, the “center,” led by the Borderland Union, and the “left” 
non-party. The newspapers predicted that because of the political apathy 
among the general population, victory belonged to the group that managed 
to mount the most active propaganda campaign, promising voters whatev-
er they wanted to hear.67
The next big meeting of Vil’na’s Russian voters was organized by the 
non-party group. Matson, many members of the Borderland Union, and 
65 “V obshchestvakh i sobraniiakh. Pervoe predvybornoe sobranie russkikh izbiratelei,” Vilenskii vestnik 
1210 (June 16, 1907); Vremennyi izbiratel’nyi komitet, “Russkie izbirateli!” Vilenskii vestnik 1215 (June 
22, 1907).
66 Russkii vnepartiinyi izbiratel’nyi komitet, “Russkie izbirateli!” Vilenskii vestnik 1209 (June 15, 1907); 
“Mestnaia khronika,” Vilenskii vestnik 1216 (June 23, 1907).
67 Avich’, “Kogo vybirat’,” Vilenskii vestnik 1222 (July 1, 1907).
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representatives of the radical right also participated. It turned out that the 
organizers, the non-party group, were rather young, mostly Belorussian-
born teachers and civil servants whose political views did not differ much 
from those of the Octobrists and the Borderland Union. The meeting was 
the final break-up of the coalition between the moderates and the radicals. 
In the end, the Borderland Union and the non-party electoral committees 
merged and formed a new unified group.68
Leaving the joint electoral committee and elections aside, it should 
be noted that the radicals were much more active in the 1907 elections in 
Vil’na and in other parts of the northwestern provinces. The promotion of 
their candidates was better organized and structured. They also received 
moderate support from local authorities, as was shown earlier in the case of 
the Ponevezh section of the Union of Russian People and the Gnatovskii–
Verevkin cooperation against agitation by left-wing parties. 
Contrary to the moderate and liberal right-wing groups, the Vil’na pro-
vincial section of the Union of Russian People had its own ideologically 
representative newspaper, Morskaia volna (The Wave of the Sea), which 
was probably the most radical and antisemitic periodical publication in the 
northwestern provinces.69 In it, they claimed to represent Realpolitik, pro-
tecting Orthodox peasants from the Polish gentry, fighting Jewish econom-
ic dominance, and so on. The radicals were especially successful in building 
economic organizations like artisan workshops, which unofficially received 
large contracts to produce clothing and underwear for the army that might 
have given them adequate income. 
Judging from the activities of the united electoral committee, their 
main work mostly revolved around organization and coordination activi-
ties with other provincial electoral committees. Surprisingly, they chose to 
follow more democratic principles for the 1907 elections by asking voters 
to propose the best Duma candidates from Vil’na province. In this respect, 
68 P.K., “Sobranie russkikh izbiratelei,” Vilenskii vestnik 1229 (July 10, 1907); P., “Vil’na,” Okrainy Rossii 27–
28 (August 8–11, 1907), 420–21; K., “Sobranie russkikh izbiratelei,” Vilenskii vestnik 1230 (August 12, 
1907).
69 It is hard to say whether the periodical was directly associated with the section. 
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the radicals were much more pragmatic: they appointed the candidates and 
told people to vote for them.70 In the end, the elections to the Third Du-
ma in the Vil’na Province Russian curia were won by two representatives 
of the radical right: the aforementioned Zamyslovskii, and the Orthodox 
priest Veraksin. The moderates and the centrists were somewhat more suc-
cessful in the Belorussian provinces.71 Overall, the elections to the Third 
Duma were a success, and the imperial parliament was dominated by right-
wing parties.
After the successful elections, most Russian organizations basically 
stopped their activities on the public scene and returned to irregular meet-
ings, organizing cultural events, leisure activities, public lectures, and so on. 
With the partial exception of the Union of Russian People, which contin-
ued its different economic endeavors, most right-wing organizations be-
came inert, hoping that perhaps with the right wing’s majority in the Third 
Duma, their active work was finished. Because of this, as some noted, ma-
ny monarchist and nationalist organizations came to exists only on paper.72
Soon, however, the newly established St. Petersburg Russian Border-
land Society (Russkoe Okrainoe Obshchestvo), which opened officially 
on February 17, 1908, began operating with the same ideology and aims 
as the northwestern Borderland Union. The Society evolved out of one 
of the branches of St. Petersburg’s Russian Assembly. Even before it ap-
peared, several of its founding members were publishing the rather influ-
ential, moderate, and to some extent, nationalistic journal Okrainy Ros-
sii (The Russian Borderlands).73 Among the founders of the periodical 
and the Society were persons from the northwestern provinces: Polikarp 
70 “Russkii vnepartiinyi izbiratel’nyi komitet,” Vilenskii vestnik 1276 (September 7, 1907).
71 Bondarenko and Lavrinovich, Russkie i belorusskie monarkhisty, 52–53.
72 As one of the correspondents of the journal Okrainy Rossii sarcastically noted about the right-wing orga-
nizations in Vil’na (which could probably be applied to the whole northwest region too): “The history of 
all local Russian societal endeavors was one and the same: at first, arduous organization, debates, tiresome 
waiting; then pompous openings with dinners, balls, speeches, telegrams; afterwards a few years of exis-
tence; and, finally slow death at the hands of the same founders.” Id., “Vil’na,” Okrainy Rossii 10 (March 6, 
1910), 152. 
73 For more, see Konstantin Bondarenko, “Russkoe okrainoe obshchestvo: vozniknovenie, politicheskie tse-
li i zadachi,” in Romanovskie chteniia: sbornik trudov Mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, Mogilev, 21 
oktiabria 2004 g., ed. O. D’iachenko (Mogilev: MGU im. A.A. Kuleshova, 2005), 27–34.
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Byval’kevich, the long-term school inspector of the Vil’na educational dis-
trict, editor of several Vil’na-based newspapers and journals, and publicist, 
and Platon Kulakovskii, who was a prominent scholar, Slavicist, and writ-
er. Byval’kevich was born in Vil’na, and Kulakovskii in Ponevezh (in Kov-
na Province).74 
The appearance of the Borderland Society, which claimed a number of 
prominent imperial politicians and members of the intelligentsia as mem-
bers, somewhat superseded the Vil’na Borderland Union as the coordinator 
of regional right-wing organizations. Therefore, after a slight adjustment 
to the charter, the Borderland Union and its sections joined the Society in 
May 1908, while at the same time preserving its semi-autonomous organi-
zational character. However, this did not prevent their gradual decline, and 
it seems that after 1909, the Union ceased to be active. Whether it contin-
ued to virtually exist, just like the Veche, or when was it closed is unclear. 
The initial high hopes for the Borderland Society were overrated too, be-
cause it did not, and could not, become an active player in the northwestern 
provinces. Basically, it remained in St. Petersburg, and continued collecting 
and publishing information on Russian national issues in the western prov-
inces, Finland, and elsewhere. After the elections to the Fourth Duma and 
the subsequent closure of Okrainy Rossii in 1912, some members of the So-
ciety, including Kulakovskii and Byval’kevich, as well as many of the north-
western Octobrists and members of the Borderland Union, joined the na-
tionalists and their party, the All-Russian National Union.
The All-Russian National Union
The disappearance of the Borderland Union and its sections resembled that 
of the Veche. Until the elections to the Fourth Duma in 1912, northwest-
ern Russian right-wing parties and organizations were barely functioning. 
As mentioned earlier, due to internal conflicts between the leaders of the 
radical Union of Russian People, the party split several times. The Vil’na 
74 Short biographical data on Byval’kevich may be found in the lists of people involved in the Russian White 
movement. See http://xn--90adhkb6ag0f.xn--p1ai/arhiv/uchastniki-grazhdanskoj-vojny/uchastniki-belo-
go-dvizheniya-v-rossii/uchastniki-belogo-dvizheniya-v-rossii-bsh-bya.html, accessed October 23, 2018.
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section ceased publishing its newspaper Morskaia volna in 1909. From then 
on, there is almost no information on the activities of the radicals in the 
provinces of Vil’na and Kovna.
From early on, the northwest moderate right wing was much more in-
clined towards modern Russian nationalism. During the revolution of 1905 
and the years after it, there was no proper all-empire Russian nationalist 
party or organization that could have satisfied their needs. Attempts to cre-
ate their own organizations failed, primarily due to a lack of commitment 
and the general political inertia of the population. Moreover, the aim to 
unite all northwest Russian right-wing organizations and their supporters 
could not have been achieved due to the great ideological discrepancy be-
tween radicals and the moderate right. Many local right-wing supporters 
belonged to the intelligentsia and the middle-class, which, due to the old 
social structures still in existence, hindered their attempts to establish a di-
alogue with the highest state authorities. 
Local authorities (although not all, of course) did not show any partic-
ular interest in the nationalists. There is no indication that the Vil’na gov-
ernors supported the nationalist cause; however, the Minsk governor, just 
like the Minsk Russian Societal Assembly (established in 1908), was more 
inclined to cooperate with the nationalists because they promoted “Russian 
state interests.”75 One explanation for the low level of support in the “Lith-
uanian provinces” could be the preservation of stability within society be-
cause open support for one right-wing group might have caused dissatis-
faction in another. The brief period of revolution-induced reforms lasting 
until mid-1907 was followed by the strengthening of imperial conserva-
tism. Nevertheless, Stolypin, who grew up on an estate near Keidany (in 
Kovna Province) and spent a lot of time there while he was Prime Minister, 
turned to the newly organizing Russian nationalist party after distancing 
himself from the Octobrists.76
75 Bondarenko and Lavrinovich, Russkie i belorusskie monarkhisty, 93.
76 For an in-depth analysis of the All-Russian Nationalist Party, see Kotsiubinskii, Russkii natsionalizm v 
nachale XX stoletiia; San’kova, Russkaia partiia v Rossii. On the evolution of the south and northwestern 
nationalists, see Bondarenko and Lavrinovich, Russkie i belorusskie monarkhisty, 92–100.
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The organization of the All-Russian National Union began in 1908; 
however, for a few years, they remained a small parliamentary faction with-
out attempting to build a stronger political party and create a network of 
provincial sections. The approaching elections to the Fourth Duma, and 
Stolypin’s turn towards nationalism, pushed for reorganization. The new 
statute of the party from 1911 envisaged the growth and opening of pro-
vincial sections. It is important to note that many nationalists came from 
the western provinces, primarily the southwest. Politicians from the Kiev 
Nationalist Club were instrumental in founding the National Union. Fur-
ther, there was sympathy for the ideology among the moderate right in the 
northwestern provinces too.
However, the organization of sections of the party in Vil’na Province be-
gan rather late, primarily as a result of the introduction of the new statute 
and the approaching elections in the autumn of 1912. Also, the murder of 
Stolypin in Kiev in 1911 increased respect for him and provided addition-
al impetus for consolidation among the nationalists.77 The Vil’na section, 
which was called the Vil’na Russian National Union (Vilenskii Russkii 
Natsional’nyi Soiuz), was opened by the same group of former Octobrists, 
members of the Veche, and the Borderland Union, together with moder-
ate rightists from the Peasant Society. The head of the latter, called Kovali-
uk, a teacher and the owner of a private school, together with his colleague 
Vrutsevich, also a teacher, became the most active promoters of nationalism. 
Kovaliuk was appointed to lead the Vil’na section. The Duma elections once 
again became a mobilizing event, and yet another attempt was made to uni-
fy and establish common ground between the Vil’na radical right, the na-
tionalists, and the conservative Orthodox Brotherhood of the Holy Ghost.
One of the first actions taken by the newly established section was their 
attempt to present themselves on the broader imperial scene and cultivate 
support in St. Petersburg. A delegation that included Kovaliuk, Vrutsevich, 
77 The Minsk section of the All-Russian National Union was opened in April 1911 by the Octobrist leader 
I. Chigirev, who closed the section and moved to the nationalists. By the end of the year, the new section 
had 193 members, 30 of whom were Orthodox priests (Bondarenko and Lavrinovich, Russkie i belorusskie 
monarkhisty, 92).
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and another teacher, historian Lukian Solonevich, arrived in the capital on 
April 17, 1912. They were joined by their old colleague Byval’kevich, who 
was officially a delegate of the Sofia Orthodox Brotherhood in Grodna, as 
well as MPs in the Third Duma from Minsk Province, Orthodox priest An-
drei  Iurashkevich and Iosif Pavlovich, both of whom were connected with 
the parliamentary nationalist faction.78 It is interesting to note that in the 
rightist press they were called “the Belorussian delegation,” which indicated 
not only their origins, but also their representation of the Belorussian pop-
ulation. They expressed concerns about the Polonization of Catholic Belo-
russians through schools to senior officials. According to them, the local ad-
ministration and Catholic priests either actively or passively supported the 
identification of Belorussians as “Poles,” which was based on the stereotypical 
belief that Catholicism was a Polish religion. In a memorandum presented to 
the authorities, the “Belorussian delegation” demanded that religion should 
be taught in the local language of the majority in the northwestern provinces, 
either in Lithuanian for Lithuanians or in Russian for Belorussians.79
They were granted audiences with the minister of the interior, the min-
ister of education, and other senior officials. They also received a warm wel-
come from the nationalists and monarchists and made presentations on the 
situation in the northwestern provinces, the dangers of creeping Poloniza-
tion, and other related topics.80 The trip was a success, and St. Petersburg’s 
right-wing politicians and senior officials appreciated the newly established 
Vil’na section and its goals and agenda. Still, it would seem that it was only 
moral support; in practice, however, they did not achieve much. Upon the 
delegation’s return, the Vil’na section began actively building a new coali-
tion for the approaching Duma elections.
On April 29, 1912, the first meeting of the Vil’na Russian right-wing 
voters took place. All major organizations were represented: the national-
ists, the radicals, and the moderates, as well as the Brotherhood of the Ho-
78 F.O., “Vil’na,” Okrainy Rossii 27–28 (July 7–14, 1912): 417–19.
79 P.K. [Platon Kulakovskii], “Priezd belorusskoi delegatsii,” Okrainy Rossii 16 (May 21, 1912), 233–36. For more 
on issues related to the education of Catholic Belorussians, see the chapter in this book by Darius Staliūnas. 
80 S.K., “Belorusskaia deputatsiia v Sankt Peterburge,” Okrainy Rossii 16 (May 21, 1912), 241.
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ly Ghost. A list of eighteen candidates was compiled for future discussions.81 
However, a few days later, in a Vilenskii vestnik interview with Kovaliuk 
and Vrutsevich (he was not named in the original article, but he was iden-
tified later), the latter expressed his reservations about the participation of 
Orthodox priests in politics, which he called an “erroneous practice.” More-
over, it was stated that a stronger coalition between the nationalists and the 
radicals was impossible in the future due to ideological differences. They 
supported each other and the right-wing candidates only during elections.82
The wish of the nationalists to become the leaders of all right-wing or-
ganizations and the denunciation of the Orthodox clergy’s participation in 
politics by some represented a new political direction in the Russian right 
wing. When looking at other northwestern provinces, we can see similar 
tendencies, whereby Russian nationalists formed separate electoral com-
mittees. Interestingly enough, in the Belorussian-inhabited territories, 
rather close cooperation was established between the radical right, the Or-
thodox brotherhoods, and in some cases, even the imperial authorities.83
This unexpected turn of events within the Vil’na right-wing camp esca-
lated further when, at the beginning of June, the Brotherhood of the Ho-
ly Ghost announced it was establishing a separate electoral committee and 
invited nationalists to join their leadership and support the Brotherhood’s 
candidates. Until the elections to the Fourth Duma, the Orthodox Brother-
hood and similar religious organizations exhibited relatively low-level polit-
ical activism. The elections, however, activated a semi-secular organization 
that became a consolidated political factor. The long-established hierarchi-
81 “Russkoe predvybornoe sobranie,” Vilenskii vestnik 2663 (May 1, 1912).
82 “Sredi vilenskikh izbiratelei,” Vilenskii vestnik 2667 (May 6, 1912).
83 Bondarenko, Pravye partii, 275. On the role of Orthodox brotherhoods in the monarchist movement in 
the Belorussian-inhabited provinces, see Konstantin Bondarenko, “O meste i roli pravoslavnykh bratstv 
v monarkhicheskom dvizhenii na territorii Belarusi v nachale XX veka,” in Religiia i obshchestvo 11 (con-
ference proceedings), eds. V. Starostenko and O. D’iachenko (Mogilev: MGU im. A.A. Kuleshova, 2017), 
97–99. The author states that in the 1912 elections, the role of the Orthodox brotherhoods in the Belorus-
sian provinces was generally insignificant. However, judging from the press and later developments in the 
northwestern right-wing camp, their connection with the radical parties and organizations was beneficial 
for both, and thus led to the partial politicization of the religious brotherhoods. Also, many of the north-
western radical right sections were either established or managed by Orthodox clergy, some of whom, as in 
the case of the Vil’na archbishop Nikandr, were leaders of local brotherhoods.
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cal structure, close connections with the Orthodox clergy, and provincial 
religious communities demonstrated that the Brotherhood could compete 
with political parties and organizations.84 Additionally, the Brotherhood 
was also assisted by other radical organizations like the Union of the Arch-
angel Michael, the Union of Russian People, and the like.85
The Vil’na Brotherhood and their followers were especially fierce in 
their criticism and even personal insults against Kovaliuk, Vrutsevich, 
and other nationalists through the newspaper Vilenskii Vestnik. They also 
 started another periodical just for the election campaign called Russkii iz-
biratel’ (The Russian Voter), which was edited by a man called Tikhmenev, 
a specially hired person from St. Petersburg, whose goal, according to the 
nationalist press, was to wage a campaign promoting Brotherhood candi-
dates and, at the same time, discredit the nationalists. In the end, this ri-
valry backfired, and the Russian voters in Vil’na refused to elect any right-
wing candidates. However, with the help of the Brotherhood, the radical 
right succeeded in sending two of their members from the Vil’na district to 
the Duma:  Zamyslovskii and the Orthodox priest Vladimir Iuz’viuk, both 
of whom were members of the Union of Russian People.86
After the unsuccessful elections, Kovaliuk gave up his leadership over 
the Vil’na nationalists. But the failure to elect a new head of the section 
forced him to continue chairing the organization officially until 1913. This 
election defeat also reflected the diminishing activity of the Vil’na nation-
alists. Some of them began supporting the Brotherhood, and some even 
joined the organization. Probably the last appearance of the Vil’na nation-
alist section was in the autumn of 1913, when their representatives travelled 
to Kiev to commemorate the anniversary of Stolypin’s murder.87
84 P.B-ch [P. Byval’kevich], “Predvybornoe vremia v Severo Zapadnom krae,” Okrainy Rossii 25 (June 23, 
1912), 377–79.
85 On the place of the Orthodox Church in radical right ideology, see K. Bondarenko, “Russkaia pravo-
slavnaia tserkov’ v ideologicheskoi doktrine pravykh partii i ikh belorusskikh formirovanii,” in Religiia i 
obshchestvo 9 (conference proceedings), ed. V. Starostenko and O. D’iachenko (Mogilev: MGU im. A.A. 
Kuleshova, 2015), 48–50.
86 “Mestnaia khronika,” Vilenskii vestnik 2804 (October 19, 1912).
87 “V Vilenskom russkom natsional’nom soiuze,” Vilenskii vestnik 3065 (September 1, 1913).
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Before the beginning of World War I, northwestern Russian right-wing 
organizations gradually shifted from more political to practical work, like, 
for example, improving agriculture and introducing cooperatives to Be-
lorussian peasants. Some nationalists took the lead in the Vil’na Russian 
Agricultural Society (Vilenskoe Russkoe Sel’sko Khoziaistvennoe Ob-
shchestvo), and many also joined other economic organizations like the 
all-empire Russian Grain (Russkoe Zerno).88 With the beginning of the 
war, political and societal activism by Russian nationalists and other right-
wing groups stopped. Many were called up or volunteered for the army; 
others, like Kovaliuk, were forced to move deeper into Russia with the ad-
vance of the Germans.
Conclusions
The history of the right-wing parties and organizations in the northwestern 
provinces and their central city Vil’na shows the complicated relationship 
between the newly born popular Russian monarchist and nationalist move-
ments and the imperial authorities. 
During the revolutionary period from 1905 to the end of 1907, radical 
and conservative religious groups like the Union of the Russian People and 
various Orthodox brotherhoods generally received stronger support and 
greater sympathy from both local and central imperial authorities. They 
stood for the traditional socio-political system in which monarchism, Or-
thodoxy, and the dominance of Russians were pillars of the empire. More-
over, these groups opposed the revolution and fought against it, which also 
made them a useful ally for the state authorities.
The moderates and the nationalists were more inclined to organize peo-
ple, stressing the importance of political participation, patriotic (imperial) 
education, nationalism, and so on. Many times, especially during elections 
to the Duma, the northwestern Octobrists, nationalists, and their organi-
88 “K organizatsii Vilenskogo Russkogo sel’sko-khoziaistvennogo obshchestva,” Vilenskii vestnik 3200 (Feb-
ruary 9, 1914).
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zations attempted to mobilize Russians and Belorussians by taking a some-
what more democratic approach, asking people to propose the best repre-
sentatives to the Duma, express their opinions, vote, etc. This, of course, 
was primarily for the educated population, but organizations like the Peas-
ant Society explored to some extent the opinions of the Belorussian peas-
antry and their needs. However, this approach proved to be less successful 
primarily because of the lack of such traditions and the general political in-
ertia within society. Therefore, the direct and authoritarian path taken by 
the radicals was, in a sense, more pragmatic and perhaps even more un-
derstandable for many, especially in rural areas where the Orthodox cler-
gy were sometimes the only moral authority and the only representatives of 
the intelligentsia. Arguably, this approach produced rather good short-term 
results, but it failed to raise the Russian patriotic and/or civic conscious-
ness, and thereby modernize society. Instead, it continued to reproduce and 
strengthen the old social structures and the lack of interest in change.
The revolution became a catalyst for organizing and increasing the ac-
tive participation of people in politics, the economy, and cultural life. How-
ever, the traditional gap between the imperial authorities and society (re-
gardless of ethnicity or confession) was not overcome during the period 
analyzed. Despite their concern about the threat of non-Russian nation-
alism and the Polonization of Catholic Belorussians, the nationalists were 
nonetheless a modernizing force given their goal of building a modern Rus-
sian nation. Most were civil servants, bureaucrats or school teachers, and 
educated people in white-collar jobs. In this sense, they were appreciated 
more by the central imperial government; however, local authorities were 
quite ambivalent when it came to showing support for the provincial mod-
erate right and nationalists by, for example, backing them in the 1912 Du-
ma elections or helping moderate right-wing organizations like the North-
western Russian Veche survive. Arguably, delegating more political power 
to the people was seen as a dangerous practice, just like the deeper reform of 
the state. The aggression that the radical right demonstrated tended to un-
balance the local social order and traditional relations, which was undesir-
able for the authorities whose task was to preserve stability.
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The distribution of right-wing groups according to ideology showed that 
the northwestern provinces were not a homogeneous territory. It would ap-
pear that Russian right-wing organizations in the Lithuanian-inhabited 
lands, notably regions with a Catholic Belorussian population and urban ar-
eas, tended to be somewhat more nationalistic than radical or conservative. 
Perhaps this could be explained by the higher civic consciousness in towns 
where larger numbers of civil servants and members of the intelligentsia 
were concentrated. The Orthodox clergy and, to some extent, Russian land-
lords had greater influence in rural settlements and parishes. Even though 
the statistics of the radical right did not represent their actual numbers, they 
were still favored by the more conservative, patriarchal, and religious com-
munities, to whom the “old ways” of being ordered were, perhaps, more legi-
ble than was the articulation of an informed and individual position.
The history of the northwestern and specifically Vil’na Russian right-
wing organizations reveals that one of the biggest hindrances to the forma-
tion of modern Russian nationalism was the absence of a clear ideology and 
strategy that would have encompassed other, non-Russian, nationalisms 
within the general framework of the empire. The radicals were the most 
consistent because they kept to the pre-1905 doctrines that preached ex-
clusive rights for the monarchy, the Russian nation, and the Orthodox re-
ligion, whereas most of the local imperial authorities either took on the po-
sition of a mediator, showing no particular preference for either side, or just 
ignored them altogether. Arguably, for the local authorities, the Russian 
popular right-wing movement was useful to have around and to maintain 
and deploy when necessary, but only as an instrument rather than a partner.
From around 1913, the Russian right-wing movement in the northwest-
ern provinces lost popularity and influence, especially in the Lithuanian-
inhabited parts and the city of Vil’na. After the unsuccessful elections of 
1912, many nationalists changed their activities from more political to so-
cio-economic, which was a field largely dominated by different Orthodox 
religious organizations and the radical right. However, the outbreak of the 
war halted the transformation and the further development of the north-
western Russian right-wing movement.
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Defending the Empire in the Baltic Provinces: Russian Nationalist 
Visions in the Aftermath of the First Russian Revolution
K a r s t e n  B r ü g g e m a n n
The report was alarming. The revolutionaries had burned down “almost all 
manors,” dissolved government institutions, and took portraits of the tsar off 
the walls in the offices of Hasenpoth (Latvian: Aizpute) district in the province 
of Kurland. In the north of the district, usurpers proclaimed a “Latvian Re-
public” and took weapons from a Finnish (!) ship. The anonymous author con-
cluded more than two years later that nobody could be certain in these days, 
that “our borderland” was still in Russian hands. Even in peacetime, he assert-
ed, there were only “inorodtsy i inovertsy” (different by their origin and/or faith) 
in state offices. Moreover, the Baltic barons were organizing the resettlement 
of German colonists to Kurland. It seemed as if the whole non-Russian bor-
derland along the Baltic Sea was uniting to eliminate Russian authority in the 
region, which was so close to the capital geographically. The author ended his 
small piece, published in the chauvinist paper Okrainy Rossii (Russia’s border-
lands) in early 1908, with the desperate assurance that every Russian who was 
not yet “Germanized, Latvianized, or Lutheranized” feels that they are “on en-
emy territory.” The empire in the Baltic littoral apparently was in great danger.1
In the historiography on the Baltic Provinces of the Russian Empire, 
which has traditionally been dominated by local scholars,2 many studies 
  This study was supported by the Estonian Research Council project IUT31-6.
1  N.N., “Iz Pribaltiiskogo kraia,” Okrainy Rossii, no. 5 (1908): 69–70. Partly published in Valentin S. 
Diakin, Nacional’nyi vopros vo vnutrennei politike tsarizma (XIX–nachalo XX vv.) (St. Petersburg: 
LISS, 1998), 242–43.
2  Karsten Brüggemann and Bradley D. Woodworth, “Entangled Pasts—Russia and the Baltic Region,” in Russ-
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have focused on the excesses of the local revolution in 1905. The littoral 
was indeed shaken by a wave of violence, especially in the countryside of 
the Livland and Estland provinces, where it was directed mostly against 
German landowners and clergy.3 During these months of extreme violence, 
the tiny group of Germans, whose elite had played a dominant role in the 
provinces for centuries, finally sensed how dependent they were on impe-
rial support. Only massive counter-violence exercised by the imperial army 
and German self-defense units allowed the old authorities to regain con-
trol. In the aftermath of the upheaval and using new freedoms granted by 
tsar Nicholas II, German associations in the provinces were established to 
address the needs of the community, offering some comfort and an ethnic 
consciousness which was hitherto quite foreign to the Germans of the lit-
toral.4 A far more important consequence of the nationalization process 
taking place in reaction to ethnic violence, was that any kind of political 
cooperation between Baltic Germans on the one hand, and Estonian and 
Latvian representatives on the other, eventually became extremely difficult 
to negotiate.5 It seems that, in the very sensitive Baltic borderland, the clash 
of ethnicities loomed large. How did the imperial government react?
land an der Ostsee: Imperiale Strategien der Macht und kulturelle Wahrnehmungsmuster (16. bis 20. Jahrhun-
dert)/Russia on the Baltic: Imperial Strategies of Power and Cultural Patterns of Perception (16th–20th Centu-
ries), ed. Karsten Brüggemann and Bradley D. Woodworth (Vienna–Cologne–Weimar: Böhlau, 2012), 3–26. 
3  Ernst Benz, Die Revolution von 1905 in den Ostseeprovinzen Rußlands: Ursachen und Verlauf der lettischen 
und estnischen Arbeiterbewegung im Rahmen der ersten russischen Revolution (Mainz: University of Mainz, 
1989); among other works in Estonian by the same author, see Toomas Karjahärm, “Gewalt in Estland im 
Jahr 1905: emotionale Anomalie oder ein Faktor der Modernisierung?” in Wandel und Anpassung in der 
Geschichte Estlands. 16.–20. Jahrhundert/Change and Adaptation in Estonian history: 16th–20th Century, 
ed. Karsten Brüggemann (Lüneburg: Nordost-Institut, 2014), 140–74.
4  It is important to note, however, that these associations blossomed only for a short period. See Karsten 
Brüggemann and Katja Wezel, “Nationally Indifferent or Ardent Nationalists? On the Options of Being 
German in Russia’s Baltic Provinces, 1905–1917,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 
20 (2019): 39–62; Jörg Hackmann, “Nachholende Modernisierung. Das kurze Leben der Deutschen Ver-
eine in den russländischen Ostseeprovinzen (1905–1914),” in Vereinskultur und Zivilgesellschaft in Nord-
osteuropa/Associational Culture and Civil Society in North Eastern Europe, ed. Jörg Hackmann (Vienna–
Cologne–Weimar: Böhlau, 2012), 387–418.
5  Still valuable for the richness of its sources is: Gert von Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik zwi-
schen Russifizierung und Revolution. Historische Studien zum Problem der politischen Selbsteinschät-
zung der deutschen Oberschicht in den Ostseeprovinzen Rußlands im Krisenjahr 1905 (Göttingen: Muster-
schmidt, 1978); Toomas Karjahärm, “Das estnisch-deutsche Verhältnis und die Russische Revolution von 
1905,” in Estland und seine Minderheiten: Esten, Deutsche und Russen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Kon-
rad Maier (Lüneburg: Institut Nordostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 1995), 431–51.
staulinas_book.indb   328 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:41
329
Defending the Empire in the Baltic Provinces
Historiography so far has neglected the repercussions of the Baltic rev-
olution in 1905–06 on the imperial scene.6 Though we understand local re-
actions quite well by now, far less is known about Russian perceptions of 
the clashes on the Baltic countryside. Of course, in general, the reactions of 
various Russian groups were quite diverse. While Lenin praised the revo-
lutionary activity of the Latvian proletariat,7 for the St. Petersburg govern-
ment, keeping the region quiet and loyal was the primary goal now more 
than ever. It comes as no surprise then that a confused and shaken center, in 
the face of the first signs of potential separatism from Estonians and Latvi-
ans, returned to a century-old strategy of aristocratic alliance with the Ger-
man nobilities of the littoral. At the same time, however, the center also had 
to look for ways to come to terms with demographic realities in terms of, for 
example, pragmatically cooperating with the Estonian-led city administra-
tion of Revel’ (in Estonian, Tallinn; in German, Reval).8
For Russian “popular nationalists,” who—according to Theodore R. 
Weeks—never came so close to the realm of “official nationalism” executed 
by the government as in the aftermath of 1905, everything had gone wrong 
in the strategically vital Baltic borderlands.9 In their eyes, Russia now had 
to pay the price for the complete failure of any kind of “Russification” in the 
6  This aspect is addressed only very generally in Edward C. Thaden, “The Russian Government,” in Rus-
sification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914, ed. Edward C. Thaden (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1981), 13–108, here 72–75; with a different focus, but valuable for the perspective 
of the government, see Natal’ia S. Andreeva, Pribaltiiskie nemtsy i rossiiskaia pravitel’stvennaia politika v 
nachale XX veka (St. Petersburg: Mir, 2008). On the Baltic Germans, see especially chapters 5 and 6 in An-
ders Henriksson, Vassals and Citizens: The Baltic Germans in Constitutional Russia, 1905–1914 (Marburg: 
Herder-Institut, 2009).
7  Vladimir I. Lenin [Rabochii], “Sovremennoe polozhenie Rossii i taktika rabochei partii,” in idem, Polnoe 
sobranie sochinenii, t. 12, 175–82, here: 181. (Originally published in Partiinye izvestiia, no. 1, February 7, 
1906); Vladimir I. Lenin [Rabochii], “Iubileinomu nomeru ‘Zihna’”, in idem, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, t. 
19, 305–09, here 305–306 (originally appeared in Zihna, no. 100 [July 1910]).
8  For the latter, see the letter of Estland’s governor Petr P. Bashilov to the Director of the Department of Po-
lice M.I. Trusevich, January 22, 1907, in Imperskaia politika Rossii v Pribaltike v nachale XX veka. Sbor-
nik dokumentov i materialov, ed. Toomas Kar’iakhiarm [Toomas Karjahärm] (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 
2000), 135–39. The Estonian city administration of Revel’ is discussed at length in the unpublished PhD 
dissertation by Bradley D. Woodworth, “Civil Society and Nationality in the Multiethnic Russian Em-
pire: Tallinn/Reval 1860–1914” (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2003).
9  For the term “popular nationalist,” see Theodore R. Weeks, “Official and Popular Nationalism: Impe-
rial Russia, 1863–1914,” in Nationalismus in Europa: West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich, ed. Ulrike von 
Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonhard (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001), 410–32.
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littoral where inorodtsy and inovertsy continued to dominate the local ad-
ministration even after 1905. Since the 1860s, demands to support “Russian 
principles” (russkie nachala) in the Baltic provinces had become popular in 
the press; but not even under Aleksandr III, during the period of so-called 
“Russification” that was much criticized by Baltic Germans and Estonians/
Latvians alike, did the situation change to such an extent that would have 
pleased Russian nationalist activists. As a matter of fact, concerning their 
visions for a Russian imperial future of the Baltic provinces, they remained 
disappointed with the government until the very end of the empire.
In this chapter, I will first briefly outline the perception of the Baltic 
past and present in imperial nationalist discourse since mid-nineteenth 
century, keeping in mind the precarious relationship between the catego-
ries of “empire” and “nation” concerning the allegedly “German”  provinces, 
which were commonly believed to be a kind of “European” periphery of 
the tsarist state. How was the project of the “imperial nation,” to use Ste-
fan Berger and Alexei Miller’s term,  conceived so as to influence (and ulti-
mately, possibly alter) the situation in the Baltic provinces?10 Second, I ask 
how the immediate influence of events during 1905–06 in the region affect-
ed the perceptions and visions of Russian popular nationalists.
In contrast to the government, which by and large for the sake of the 
empire continued to view the Baltic German nobilities as natural allies in 
the littoral, nationalists must have felt the complete isolation of their rad-
ical position. They virtually ran out of potential allies in the provinces. 
Heavily influenced by Nikolai Danilevskii’s teachings about the inevita-
ble clash between the Germanic and Slavic worlds, rallying behind the tra-
ditional estate-based alliance of aristocracies supported by the dynasty did 
not enter their minds. Moreover, after the revolutionary excesses commit-
ted by Estonians and Latvians, it was virtually impossible for them to con-
10 Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller, “Introduction: Building Nations in and with Empires—A Reassess-
ment,” in Nationalizing Empires, ed. Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest, New York: Central Eu-
ropean University Press, 2015), 1–30, here 4–5. Cf. the term “national empire” used by Mark Bassin, “Ge-
ographies of Imperial Identity,” in Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 2, Imperial Russia, 1689–1917, ed. 
Dominic Lieven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 45–63.
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ceive of anti-German cooperation with the demographic majorities in the 
provinces. Thus, they applied the very imprecise category of “Russianness” 
(russkost’) to conditions in the very un-Russian littoral in the vain hope of 
finding support in the imperial center, which should be, at least in their 
view, committed first and foremost to the representatives of the imperial 
nation in the borderlands. Yet the imperial government continued to view 
the provinces as “Russian” according to an imperial rather than a strictly 
nationalist definition.   
This study argues that, in Russian eyes, it was the emergence of Esto-
nians and Latvians as collectives with an independent agenda that ulti-
mately forced imperial authorities and Russian nationalists alike to change 
their attitude toward the provinces. Previously, both ethnicities were gen-
erally believed to be “ethnographic material” that sooner or later would as-
similate to the larger neighboring cultures, be it German or Russian.11 Af-
ter 1905–06, however, they were largely seen as socialists and potential 
separatists, and thus no longer as future objects of any kind of “Russifica-
tion.” In the early twentieth century, the imperial (and) nationalist dream 
that Estonians and Latvians would sooner or later become loyal citizens ac-
culturated—presumably by orthodoxy—to the world of the Rus’ obviously 
remained just that, a dream.
Finally, this contribution demonstrates that eventually solving the “Bal-
tic question” the way it was posed during the imperial period came close to 
squaring the circle. Robert Schweitzer has convincingly argued that St. Pe-
tersburg failed to create a “government party” in the provinces that would 
have provided local support for the central government’s aims, leaving this 
task primarily to the imperial government’s official representatives, the gov-
ernors.12 Of course, not being able to solve the national question did not 
11 On a document entitled “Baltiiskii vopros s pravitel’stvennoi tochki zreniia” (1870/71), see Sergei G. Isa-
kov, Ostzeiskii vopros v russkoi pechati 1860-kh godov (Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool, 1961), 178–83;  Juliia 
L. Michailova, “‘Baltiiskii vopros s pravitel’stvennoi tochki zreniia’: P. A. Valuev i ego rol’ v upravlenii Pri-
baltiiskim kraem v 1860-e gody,” in Rossiia i Baltiia, vyp. 4: Chelovek v istorii, ed. Aleksandr O. Chubar’ian 
et al. (Moscow: IVI RAN, 2006), 16–28.
12 Robert Schweitzer, “Quasikonstitutionelle Herrschaft ohne ‘Regierungspartei’: Das Dilemma der 
angemessenen Vertretung gesamtstaatlicher Interessen Russlands in den autonomen ‘Grenzmarken’ des 
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mean that the whole empire would immediately collapse; but neither prag-
matism (managing Baltic diversity as had been done over the past centuries) 
nor radical nationalism (the bet on russkost’ as general solution for the non-
Russian region) offered durable solutions that could keep the region qui-
et, loyal, and secure. In the final section, I will additionally argue that dur-
ing World War I, Russian imperial policy toward the littoral reached a dead 
end because the center had also run out of potential local allies.
Perception of a Non-Russian and Non-Orthodox Region 
during the Nineteenth Century
In the early 1870s, a governmental paper postulated that the “Baltic ques-
tion” had become one of the most urgent problems of imperial domestic pol-
icy.13 To put it another way, using the situation in the Baltic provinces in or-
der to criticize the government had become quite popular. In press debates 
concerning this question in the 1860s, criticizing local developments in the 
Baltic provinces was widely used as a tool to demand the government break 
German domination of and support everything Russian in the littoral.14 
This nationalizing approach to the empire was accompanied, moreover, 
by an illustrative change in topography. While traditionally, the Baltic prov-
inces were referred to as Ostzeiskii krai (Ostsee is German for “Baltic”), since 
the 1860s a telling neologism was used: Pribaltiiskii krai (“Baltic region”). 
Obviously invented, much like the similar Privislenskii krai,15 to reflect the 
Russischen Reichs,” in Russland an der Ostsee: Imperiale Strategien der Macht und kulturelle Wahrneh-
mungsmuster (16. bis 20. Jahrhundert)/Russia on the Baltic: Imperial Strategies of Power and Cultural Pat-
terns of Perception (16th–20th Centuries), ed. Karsten Brüggemann and Bradley D. Woodworth (Vienna–
Cologne–Weimar: Böhlau, 2012), 225–42; cf. on the role of the governors in the provinces, see Karsten 
Brüggemann, “Representing Empire, Performing Nation? Russian Officials in the Baltic Provinces (Late 
19th/Early 20th Centuries),” Ab imperio 15, no. 3 (2014): 231–66.
13 Isakov, Ostzeiskii vopros, 179.
14 See Isakov, Ostzeiskii vopros; Andreas Renner, Russischer Nationalismus und Öffentlichkeit im Zarenreich 
1855–1875 (Cologne–Weimar–Vienna: Böhlau, 2000), 293–374; Olga Majorova, “Die Schlüsselrolle der 
‘deutschen Frage’ in der russischen patriotischen Presse der 1860er Jahre,” in Deutsche und Deutschland 
aus russischer Sicht: 19./20. Jahrhundert; Von den Reformen Alexanders II. bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, ed. 
Dagmar Herrmann (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2006), 81–101.
15 On the process of “territorial Russification” related to the invention of the term Privislenskii krai for Poland, 
see: Raymond Pearson, “Privileges, Rights, and Russification,” in Civil Rights in Imperial Russia, ed. Olga 
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perspective of the empire towards the border region, this new term seman-
tically “Russified” Baltic topography. It also created new expectations: as 
ostzeiskii, the region was something far away, intrinsically foreign, some-
thing that might even be permitted to remain separate. As pribaltiiskii, 
in contrast, the region was meant to be a genuine part of the empire.16 In 
1907, the previously mentioned ultra-nationalist newspaper Okrainy Ros-
sii claimed that only Germans still used the old-fashioned term Ostzeiskii 
krai, while Russians were kindly asked to pay attention to geography and 
call it correctly Pribaltiiskii krai.17 After all, it was geography (among other 
factors) that made the region undoubtedly “Russian,” at least according to 
widespread discourse in late imperial Russia.
How “Russian” were the Baltic provinces?18 Until the mid-nineteenth 
century, they had been largely conceptualized as a German part of the em-
pire. During the reign of Nicholas I, it was not unusual for the region to be 
perceived as making Russia truly European, and thus a European empire in 
its own right.19 German dominance there, however, was perceived in terms 
of a “cosmopolitan monarchism” typical of the Nikolaevan era.20 Thus, it 
Crisp and Linda Edmonson (Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 85–102, here 97; Sviatoslav 
Kaspe, Imperiia i modernizatsiia: Obshchaia model’ i rossiiskaia spetsifika (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), 143.
16 One of the leading dictionaries published on behalf of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society as late 
as 1876 still only used the term Ostzeiskii krai. See Geograficheskii slovar’ Rossiiskoi imperii, ed. Petr P. 
 Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, t. 3 (St. Petersburg: Tip. V. Bezobrazova, 1867), 725. The Brokhaus and Efron en-
cyclopedia two decades later indicated the change in its lemma: А. Ia[novskii], “Pribaltiiskii (ostzejskii) 
krai,” in Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, Vol. XXV (49), ed. Fridrikh A. Brokgauz and Il’ia A. Efron (St. Peters-
burg: Tip.-Litografiia I.A. Efrona, 1898), 110–17. See, in general, Karsten Brüggemann, “The Baltic Prov-
inces and Russian Perceptions in Late Imperial Russia,” in Russland an der Ostsee: Imperiale Strategien der 
Macht und kulturelle Wahrnehmungsmuster (16. bis 20. Jahrhundert)/Russia on the Baltic: Imperial Strate-
gies of Power and Cultural Patterns of Perception (16th–20th Centuries), ed. Karsten Brüggemann and Brad-
ley D. Woodworth (Vienna–Cologne–Weimar: Böhlau, 2012), 111–41; Karsten Brüggemann, Licht und 
Luft des Imperiums: Legitimations- und Repräsentationsstrategien russischer Herrschaft in den Ostseeprovin-
zen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2018), 223–24.
17 Balt, “Pribaltijskii vopros,” Okrainy Rossii nos. 37–38 (1907): 537–38.
18 The following paragraphs are based on Brüggemann, “The Baltic Provinces.” 
19 In 1848, the eminent geographer Konstantin I. Arsen’ev wrote that though the empire’s provinces on 
the Baltic Sea coast were almost entirely foreign in terms of language, law, and, culture, they comprised 
the “most treasured possession of the Empire” not least because they made it “European.” Konstantin I. 
Arsen’ev, Statisticheskie ocherki Rossii (St. Petersburg: Tip. Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1848), 4. 
20 Paul Bushkovitch, “What Is Russia? Russian National Identity and the State, 1500–1917,” in Culture, Nation 
and Identity: The Ukrainian–Russian Encounter (1600–1945), ed. Andreas Kappeler, Zenon E. Kohut, and Frank 
E. Sysyn (Edmonton–Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2003), 144–61, here: 154.
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was a typical imperial territory in which loyalty was guaranteed by transna-
tional estate-based identities and solidarities—the alliance of aristocracies. 
Yet there was an uneasiness with the ethno-cultural conditions of the Baltic 
provinces, expressed, for example, in the accounts of Russian visitors to the 
littoral.21 Even if the Baltic Germans were still highly praised for their cul-
tured habits, they came to be chided for refusing to learn the language of the 
emperor, whom they claimed to honor so dearly, and they were criticized for 
their “provincial patriotism.”22 Yet this earlier criticism was not grounded in 
ethnic preconceptions. However, this began to change. While Russians vis-
iting the provinces in the 1820s and 1830s sought their “Europe” in the ro-
mantic landscape of medieval towns and castles, they later came to search for 
Russian symbols of the empire in this foreign environment. Revel’ was, thus, 
turned into an imperial lieux de memoire with a special regard for Peter I.23 
Apart from that, there was a growing sensibility for all of the missing 
elements of Russian imperial culture that would make even the ostensibly 
“Western” capital a Russian city. Still there were very few Russians on these 
shores. Russian was seldom heard spoken, and Orthodoxy was weak. There 
was political loyalty expressed by the Baltic Germans, but no cultural affin-
ity. There were virtually no cultural anchors for Russians in the region, and 
this only slightly changed when in the 1840s approximately 100,000 Es-
tonians and Latvians converted to Orthodoxy (which was, on the whole, 
a development in the countryside, where few Russians lived). In the long 
run, not even Russian religion turned these Baltic peasants into Russians, 
although many Russian (and, with a growing sense of fear, German) ob-
servers expected this to happen. If conversion was initially a form of social 
protest against economic conditions in the countryside— peasants adopt-
ed the faith of the Emperor in the vain hope of being granted good land—
21 Brüggemann, Licht und Luft, 181–207.
22 See, e.g., Faddei V. Bulgarin, Letniaia progulka po Finliandii i Shvetsii v 1838 g. (St. Petersburg: Tip. 
Ekspeditsii Zagotovleniia Gosudarstvennykh Bumag, 1839), 33 (quote), 38, 40–41, 68.
23 Brüggemann, Licht und Luft, 125–27; see also Karsten Briuggemann [Brüggemann], “Kak Estoniia sta-
la russkim mestom pamiati. Turisticheskie marshruty i istoricheskoe voobrazhenie v epokhu Nikolaia I, 
 Neprikosnovennyi Zapas 104, no. 6 (2015): 224–37. On Peter’s many visits to Revel’, see Sergei G. Isakov 
and Tat’iana K. Shor, Vlastiteli Rossiiskoi Imperii na estonskoi zemle (Tallin: aleksandra, 2009), 10–52.
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being Orthodox eventually provided a means for Estonians and Latvians to 
escape German cultural and economic domination.24 
In the long run, the conversion movement fundamentally altered the 
Russian perception of the Baltic provinces. Inspired by Western romantic 
nationalism, Russian intellectuals sensed that Russian imperial domination 
over non-Russian territories had to be justified anew. Instead of explaining 
Russian power simply by referencing autocratic rights, historical and cul-
tural arguments for continued imperial dominance were  elaborated. In this 
respect, the conversion to Orthodoxy was welcomed as a field  upon which 
the issue of German domination in the Baltic provinces could be reassessed. 
Of lasting influence were Iurii F. Samarin’s “Letters from  Riga,” written in 
1848. Here, the prominent Slavophile who had worked in Riga on behalf 
of the Interior Ministry in the mid-1840s clearly set out a program for the 
mental appropriation of the Baltic region by Russia as a precondition for 
its genuine “merger” (sliianie) with Russia proper. In demanding affirma-
tive action for the representatives of the imperial nation, this program chal-
lenged tsarist policy at the time. Samarin was arrested for a few days, and 
the “Letters” were never published during his lifetime.25 
Samarin maintained that the Great Russian Plain extended all the way 
to the Baltic Sea; it was only at the coast that the empire (and thus the im-
24 Daniel C. Ryan, “Religious Conversion and the Problem of Commitment in Livland Province, 1850s–
1860s,” Ajalooline ajakiri 121/122, no. 3–4 (2007): 369–92; Daniel C. Ryan, “The Tsar’s Faith: Conver-
sion, Religious Politics, and Peasant Protest in Imperial Russia’s Baltic Periphery, 1845–1870s” (PhD diss. 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2008). See also Aleksandr V. Gavrilin, Ocherki istorii Rizhskoi Epar-
khii. 19 vek (Riga: Filokaliia, 1999), 109–82; Hans Kruus, Talurahva käärimine Lõuna–Eestis XIX sajandi 
40-ndail aastail (Tartu: Eesti Kirjanduse Selts, 1930); Brüggemann, Licht und Luft des Imperiums, 187–99.
25 Iurii F. Samarin, “Pis’ma iz Rigi,” in Sochineniia Iu. F. Samarina, vol. 7: Pis’ma iz Rigi i Istoriia Rigi, ed. 
Dmitrii F. Samarin (Moscow: D. Samarin, 1889), 1–160, here XVI. See, in general, Kaspe, Imperiia i mod-
ernizatsiia, 127. On Samarin cf. Robert Stupperich, Jurij Samarin und die Anfänge der Bauernbefreiung 
in Rußland (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1969), 45–55; Edward C. Thaden, “Jurii Fedorovich Samarin and 
Baltic History,” Journal of Baltic Studies 17 (1986), 321–328; Edward C. Thaden, “Iurii Fedorovich Sama-
rin (1819–1876) as a Baltic Historian,” in Geisteswissenschaften und Publizistik im Baltikum des 19. und 
frühen 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Nobert Angermann, Wilhelm Lenz, and Konrad Maier (Berlin and Müns-
ter: LIT, 2011), 137–55; Iuliia L. Mikhailova, “Slavianofily i ostzeiskii vopros (40–60-e gody XIX v.),” Ote-
chestvennaia istoriia, no. 5 (2007): 49–61. The recent paper by Richard Pipes, “Iurii Samarin’s Baltic Esca-
pade,” Journal of Baltic Studies 42, no. 3 (2011): 315–27, is largely an English translation of the older but 
still relevant study  Boris E. Nol’de, Iurii Samarin i ego vremia (Paris: Impr. de Navarre, 1926). 
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perial nation) met its “natural” border.26 Translated into geopolitical terms, 
this argument turned into a strategic one that was well known since the 
times of Peter I, when Russian power in the Baltic provinces was seen as vi-
tal for defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and thus protecting 
the capital. In Samarin’s “Letters,” this geographic “naturalness” was under-
pinned with an argument taken from history, which asserted the “natural-
ness” of imperial Russian rule. Samarin reminded his readers of an ongoing 
process of submission on the part of the indigenous populations to peaceful 
Russian authority, which began as early as the time of Kievan Grand Prince 
Yaroslav the Wise in the eleventh century. 
In this narrative, the Germans played the part of brutal intruders who in-
terrupted a peaceful process of the integration and assimilation of lands and 
peoples into the Orthodox world of the Rus’. According to this thesis, Samarin 
claimed Russia’s right and “destiny” to “lead the Baltic region to civil and eccle-
siastical enlightenment,” a mission civilisatrice typical for an empire in the nine-
teenth century. Most of all, however, his argument that “the Germans took the 
Baltic region from the Russians, and Catholicism tore it from the bosom of 
Orthodoxy” resonated with his Russian readers.27 Therefore, German domi-
nance in the region was interpreted as unjust and even “unnatural.” Based on 
this idea, Estonians and Latvians had originally adopted Christianity as a re-
sult of a peaceful mission from the east.28 Equipped with this narrative, nation-
alists thereafter could depict the Baltic region as initially Orthodox and, thus, 
culturally and historically Russian territory.29
26 Samarin, “Pis’ma,” 18; Samarin’s argument was later used particularly by the Riga-based Russian histori-
ographer Evgraf V. Cheshikhin. See his Istoriia Livonii s drevneishikh vremen vol. 1 (Riga: Tip.-lit. A.I. 
Lipinskogo, 1884), III; Karsten Brüggemann, “Ein Russe in Riga: Evgraf Vasil’evič Češichin (1824–1888) 
als Journalist und Historiker im Dienst des Imperiums,” in Geisteswissenschaften und Publizistik im Balti-
kum des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Nobert Angermann, Wilhelm Lenz, and Konrad Maier (Ber-
lin and Münster: LIT, 2011), 157–91. 
27 Samarin, “Pis’ma,” 4–5, 18; cf. Anti Selart, “Vene ike ja muistne priius. Eesti–Vene suhete historiograafi-
ast”  Vikerkaar, nos. 8–9 (2000): 98–104, here: 99.
28 [Filaret,] “Otkuda korennye zhiteli Lifliandii pervonachal’no poluchili khristianstvo, s vostoka ili s zapada? 
Moskovitianin 4, no. 7 (1843): 85–102, here 96, 100.
29 Evfimii M. Kryzhanovskii, Ostzeiskii vopros i pravoslavie (St. Petersburg: s.n., 1884), 10–14; Boris V. 
Dobry shin, K istorii pravoslaviia v Pribaltiiskom krae. Ocherk s prilozheniem nekotorykh ofitsial’nykh do-
kumentov (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tip., 1911).
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What was important from the point of view of the empire was that the 
“natives” (tuzemtsy), as this colonial discourse tended to call Estonians and 
Latvians, were seen as victims of German aggression given that their fore-
fathers had previously been on the “right” path towards Orthodoxy and 
the Russian world. The conversion movement of the 1840s, thus, properly 
expressed their “natural” needs. In the 1860s, the Baltic “natives”, alleged-
ly under attack by a Germanizing Lutheran Church, were even depicted as 
martyrs to the “Russian cause.”30 This discursive environment was famous-
ly expressed in the well-known controversy between Samarin and the Pro-
fessor of History at Dorpat (Russian: Derpt/Iur’ev; Estonian: Tartu) Uni-
versity, Carl Schirren in 1869, in which the latter ferociously attacked the 
idea of a Russian mission civilisatrice.31 However, the framework established 
by Samarin was later used by Alexander III to carry out so-called “Russify-
ing” reforms in the Baltic provinces.32
The tone was set, however, for a more enduring kind of “Russification” 
than any kind of administrative or political reforms could offer: the “Rus-
sification” of the region in the minds of the Russian public. Of course, in 
contrast to predominantly Slavic-inhabited territories in the Western prov-
inces claimed by Russian nationalism as part of the national body, the Bal-
tic provinces were usually seen as Russian only in terms of history and cul-
ture. However, attempts to demonstrate that Latvians (and Lithuanians) 
were ethnically “half-brothers of the Slavs,”33 and the urgent demand made 
30 Isakov, Ostzeiskii vopros, 70.
31 Carl Schirren, Livländische Antwort an Herrn Juri Samarin (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1869), 103, 
104–05. Schirren attacked Samarin’s Okrainy Rossii: Seriia pervaia; Russkoe baltiiskoe pomor’e, vol. 1: Russ-
koe Baltiiskoe pomor’e v nastoiashchuiu minutu (kak vvedenie v pervuiu seriiu) (Prague: Tip. Dr. F. Skrei-
shovskogo, 1868). In turn, his attack was answered by Samarin’s former teacher, the historian Mikhail P. 
Pogodin, Ostzeiskii vopros: Pis’mo M. P. Pogodina k professoru Shirrenu (Moscow: Tip. “Russkogo”, 1869). 
On this debate, see Michael Haltzel, Der Abbau der ständischen Selbstverwaltung in den Ostseeprovinzen 
Russlands: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der russischen Unifizierungspolitik 1855–1905 (Marburg: Herder-In-
stitut, 1977), 27–40; Gert von Pistohlkors, “Ursprung und Entwicklung ethnischer Minderheiten in der 
baltischen Region im 19. und beginnenden 20. Jahrhundert,” in Staatliche Einheit und nationale Vielfalt 
im Baltikum: Festschrift für Prof. Dr. Michael Garleff zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Gert von Pistohlkors and 
Matthias Weber (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 13–34. 
32 On these reforms, see the concise analysis in Haltzel, Der Abbau, ch. III–IV; Thaden, “The Russian Gov-
ernment,” 54–75. 
33 Evgeniia L. Nazarova, “Russkii iazyk kak instrument rusifikatsii/obruseniia Ostzeiskogo kraia v politike 
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by historian Mikhail P. Pogodin already in 1869 to “Russify” (rusit’) the na-
tives of the Baltic provinces as soon as possible in order to make them in-
to “truly Orthodox Russians,”34 prove that there was fertile ground for the 
idea to make the provinces part of the national body, at least at some point 
in the future. Even if the Baltic provinces were not perceived as being ethni-
cally “Russian” right now, or in Miller’s words, they were “not included in-
to the image of the Russian national territory,”35 they were broadly regarded 
as a historically (and potentially) Orthodox region with a (peasant) popula-
tion culturally bound to the world of Russia, and thus predisposed to Rus-
sia’s cultural and political dominance.
Russian Nationalists and Baltic History
History mattered in the Russian perception of the Baltic provinces, because 
for those inspired by the vision of a national empire,36 Samarin’s thesis of a 
Russian pre-Catholic past in the littoral served as an essential legitimation of 
their claims. In the years after the revolution of 1905–1906, this thesis already 
had its own history. It was popularized in brochures introducing the Pribaltii-
skii krai to an increasingly literate public starting in the 1870s. One of the first 
examples of this type of literature published in 1870 repeated the claim, taken 
from Samarin’s teacher Pogodin, that “before the Germans, Poles, Swedes, and 
Danes, the Baltic littoral [Baltiiskoe pomor’e] belonged to Russia” because it 
used to be part of the principalities of the Rus’.37 Thus, from times immemori-
al, the region never lost its primordial Russian character. This construction of 
vlastei i predstavleniiakh obshchestvennosti Rossiiskoi imperii: XIX v.,” in Istoricheskii put’ litovskoi pis-
mennosti: Sbornik materialov konferentsii, ed. S. Temchin (Vilnius: Institut litovskogo iazyka, 2005), 260–
90, here 279.
34 Pogodin, Ostzeiskii vopros, 109, 111. 
35 Alexei Miller, “The Empire and the Nation in the Imagination of Russian Nationalism,” in Imperial Rule, 
ed. Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber (Budapest–New York: Central European University Press, 2004), 
9–26, here: 21; idem, Imperiia Romanovykh i natsionalizm: Esse po metodologii istoricheskogo issledovaniia 
(Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006), 162–63.
36 See the categorizations in Bassin, “Geographies of Imperial Identity,” and esp. 55–63 on “national empire.”
37 M. Nevzorov and V. Zabotin, Pribaltiiskii krai: Istoricheskii ocherk i opisanie gubernii Estliandskoi, Liv-
liandskoi i Kurliandskoi (St. Petersburg: Izdanie redaktsii narodnogo zhurnala “Mirskoj vestnik”, 1870), 6. 
This formulation comes from Pogodin, Ostzeiskii vopros, 11–12. 
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a specifically Russian history of the region was needed if one wanted to alter its 
conditions. In this context, it was not only “conquest” or “reconquest” in the 
name of the dynasty that counted: imperial possessions were justified through 
a tradition of the continuous peaceful impact of Russian culture on the terri-
tories and peoples of a borderland. Theodore Weeks has claimed that it is im-
possible to understand “Russian attitudes and ‘state interests’ as perceived by 
contemporaries . . . without an appreciation of the historical lessons lurking be-
hind Russians’ perceptions of their role in these lands” (meaning broadly the 
“western territories”).38 In the case of the Baltic provinces, in this process of re-
writing of history, the Russian mission civilisatrice of the late nineteenth centu-
ry received a mythical predecessor during the tenth and eleventh centuries in 
order to prove the long lasting (peaceful) dominance of “Russia” in the region.39 
Convinced that the Germans were only illegitimate intruders who came with 
“fire and sword,” this discourse eventually integrated the conflict with the Bal-
tic provinces into the story of the historical antagonism between the German-
ic and Slavic worlds.
It has to be stressed that in early twentieth century Russian-language lit-
erature related to the Baltic provinces, Samarin’s historical argument was 
firmly established. Russian publications issued on the occasion of the bicen-
tennial of the de facto incorporation of Estland and Livland into the Rus-
sian Empire in 1710 left no doubt about who the legitimate ruler in the lit-
toral was. Next to the traditional argument of imperial conquest in 1710, 
most of them also promoted the thesis that the strong, pre-Catholic Rus-
sian (-orthodox) influence on the littoral was interrupted by the Germans 
only in early thirteenth century. Consequently, the Russian state had a his-
torical right to rule in the littoral, which, due to its geographic situation, 
had to become part of this state sooner or later.40 The Estonian-born magis-
38 Theodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the West-
ern Frontier, 1863–1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 92–93.
39 In more detail, see Brüggemann, Licht und Luft des Imperiums, 271–88.
40 See, as an example: Pavel G. Pshenichnikov, Russkie v Pribaltiiskom krae (Istoricheskii ocherk) (Riga: 
Russkii natsional’nyi klub “Russkaia beseda”, 1910). Cf. Ivan I. Vysotskii, Ocherki po istorii ob’’edineniia 
Pribaltiki s Rossiei (1710-1910 g.g.), vyp. 1–4 (Riga: A. Nitavskii, 1910); Ivan I. Rogozinnikov, K dvukhsot-
letiiu prisoedineniia Estliandii k derzhave Rossiiskoi: Eestimaa Weneriigi Walitsuse alla saamise kahesaja-
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ter of the Ecclesiastical Academy in St. Petersburg, Ivan Iur’ens (Joann Jür-
gens), supported the nationalist Russian view on the local past, emphatical-
ly claiming that prior to the Catholic crusade, the littoral had reached an 
exceptionally high level of cultural development solely due to the early Rus-
sian mission civilisatrice.41
The following discussion of right-wing activists’ reactions to the rev-
olutionary events in 1905–1906, which were essentially a presentation of 
various models for a “Russian” future of the littoral, demonstrates that re-
gardless of the level of personal experience in the Baltic provinces, the pro-
tagonists of this debate created a utopian vision of the region in which ev-
erything was turned upside down. In many ways, the process of mental 
appropriation of the provinces as historically and culturally part of Russia 
had gone so far that many authors were ready to project the idealized situa-
tion in Russia proper onto the completely different realities that existed in 
the littoral. In contrast, it must be stressed that there was actually no dan-
ger in 1905–06 that the empire would lose its outlet to the Baltic Sea or that 
the German Reich would have been ready to take over the territory. It might 
even be argued that the region never was so integrated into the empire-wide 
structures as in the decade following the chaotic days of the revolution.42
  
Visions of the End of Empire at the Baltic Sea
In his speech at the St. Petersburg branch of the Slavianskoe Blagotvoritel’-
noe Obshchestvo on December 30, 1905, the former rector of the Universi-
ties of Warsaw and Iur’ev, Anton S. Budilovich, set the tone for the alarm-
aastaseks mälsetuse päewaks (Tallinn: Izdanie Osobogo Komiteta po sooruzheniiu pamiatnika Imperato-
ru Petru I v gor. Revele, 1910); Ivan A. Iur’ens, Pribaltiiskii krai pod russkoi vlast’ iu: K 200 letnemu iubileiu 
prisoedineniia Pribaltiiskogo kraia k Russkoi derzhave (4 iiulia 1710 – 4 iiulia 1910 g.) (Riga: Rizhskoe Pet-
ropavlovskoe Bratstvo, 1910).
41 Iur’ens, Pribaltiiskii krai, 6–10. Cf. the work of a Latvian author who despite supporting the legitimacy of 
Russian rule in the littoral demanded more rights for its inhabitants: Petr M. Tokarev (Pēteris Dreima-
nis), Baltiiskii vopros: Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk I (K 200 letiiu prisoedineniia Lifliandii i Estliandii k Ros-
sii 1710–1910) (Riga: A.A. Pavlov, [1910]). 
42 See, e.g., Ulrike von Hirschhausen, Die Grenzen der Gemeinsamkeit: Deutsche, Letten, Russen und Ju-
den in Riga, 1860–1914 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Hendriksson, Vassals and Citizens; 
Brüggemann and Wezel, “Nationally indifferent.”
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ist discourse of Russian nationalists that dominated the debate during and 
immediately following the revolutionary events. The well-known Slavist 
made it clear to his audience that if nothing happens, the “Northern Cap-
ital” might find itself very soon only 20 verst “from the enemy” (meaning 
the Finns in this paragraph). In the Baltic provinces, the situation was no 
less serious because the main centers were cut from the rest of the empire 
during the course of the revolution. The new governor of Livland province, 
Vasilii U. Sollogub, had to force his way from Dvinsk to Riga with weap-
on in hand. The region had been temporarily cut off from imperial con-
trol. In his speech, Budilovich also stressed the brutality with which Esto-
nians and Latvians allegedly massacred German nobles and pastors. This 
reminded him of the way they had fought the Catholic crusaders in the 
early thirteenth century.43 
Budilovich blamed the recent escalations on “foreign propagandists” 
(British, Japanese, Jews, the soiuz inodordtsev Rossii, professors, doctors, 
and engineers, as well as the soiuz soiuzov), but there was one party he crit-
icized the most for the ostzeishchina (a pejorativ term denouncing German 
rule in the Baltic Provinces), as he called it: the rulers of the empire. Since 
Peter I, they had always only thought about how to preserve local customs 
and traditions instead of “fostering the Russian (…) element” there.44 The 
Germans, he continued, now would say that everything happened because 
of the Russification policies of “Murav’ev, Manassein, and Bobrikov,” but in 
fact, the Germans just wanted to divert attention away from the real prob-
lem. In Budilovich’s eyes, the real problem was quite the opposite: there 
hadn’t been a Murav’ev, Manassein, or Bobrikov consistently present in the 
borderlands.45 What Budilovich expressed here was the well-known argu-
43 Anton S. Budilovich, O poslednikh dvizheniiakh v srede chudskikh i letskikh plemen Baltiiskogo poberezh’ ia. 
Rech’ v torzhestvennom sobranii Spb. Slavianskogo blagotvoritel’nogo obshchestva, 30 Dekabria 1905 g. (St. 
Petersburg: Tipografiia V.D. Smirnova, 1906), 7–8, 13. Interestingly enough, this braveness, which was 
usually seen as a positive aspect of the character of the tuzemtsy (as long as it was directed against the Ger-
mans), now turned against the Russians. On ethnographic stereotypes virulent in Russian perception of 
the Estonians and Latvians, see Brüggemann, Licht und Luft, 149–80.
44 Budilovich, O poslednykh dvizheniiakh, 18.
45 Ibid., 19. Budilovich here refers to three Russian governors resp. officials active in non-Russian regions: 
N. M. Murav’ev (Governor-General of Vilna 1863–65), N. A. Manasein (the later Minister of Justice who 
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ment used by advocates of full sliianie ever since the era of Peter I, when the 
Russian government continuously acted against “real” Russian interests in 
the Baltic borderland. He asserted that St. Petersburg governed the region 
politically, but failed to do so in the ethical and spiritual sense. As a result, 
Budilovich concluded, Russia’s power on the Baltic Sea coast was destined 
to end soon. In the final passages of his speech, he used the specter of the 
Germanization of the whole coastline from Lübeck to Torino to commu-
nicate the vulnerability of St. Petersburg itself.46
For Budilovich, the empire needed the littoral “like light and air” (kak 
svet i vozdukh) because it provided the only access to the Atlantic Ocean. 
Therefore, he rhetorically asked his audience, “do we really want to allow 
this access to the world to be cut off (…) by a system of alien autonomies”?47 
It is interesting that right-wing authors with a more liberal orientation like 
Oktobrist and expert in financial law Eduard N. Berendts came to a very 
similar conclusion about the situation; but the two men offered complete-
ly different solutions. In early 1906, Berendts argued that without the Bal-
tic borderlands, the empire could not make any use of its vast territory. He 
called it the “tragedy of Russia’s historical situation” that every time the 
government aims to foster “Russian statehood” in the okrainy, its adversar-
ies criticize its “national chauvinism.” For this reason, he called for more 
attention to be paid to the cultivation of local languages and more local 
autonomy; that is, “autonomy in the strict sense,” which would leave lo-
cal self-administration to local powers without jeopardizing “state unity.”48 
For Budilovich, in contrast, leaving local questions to local popula-
tions would spell political suicide. He advocated for a system modeled after 
the all-Russian zemstvo, where demographic majorities would be  shielded 
carried out a revision of Livland Province during 1882–83), and N. I. Bobrikov (Governor-General of Fin-
land 1898–1904), who in the eyes of popular nationalists, had become the (good) exceptions to the rule 
of too many liberal officials sent out by the center due to their “Russifying” policies in the borderlands.
46 Ibid., 24.
47 Ibid.
48 Eduard N. Berendts, “Ob avtonomii Baltiiskikh gubernii, Pol’shi i Finliandii” (Publichnye lektsii, chi-
tannye v Iaroslavle 27 ianvaria i 2 fevralia 1906 g.), in Koe-chto o sovremennykh voprosakh, ed. Eduard N. 
Berendts, 35–108 (St. Petersburg: Tip. M.M. Stasiulevicha, 1907), here 57–60.
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against the “grasps” (zakhvaty) of the “minority of newcomers” (prishloe 
men’shinstvo)—meaning Baltic Germans who had already been settled in 
the littoral for nearly seven centuries. In order to make this system work in 
the interest of the imperial nation, he proposed the large-scale migration of 
Russian peasants into the provinces.49 But, as we shall see, this was easier 
said than done. Yet, Budilovich in general agreed with Berendts on the is-
sue of local languages. If the reforms of the early 1890s introduced Russian 
as language of instruction in all schools—a measure abandoned, by the way, 
in 190550—Budilovich proposed an educational system for the Baltic prov-
inces “patterned after the Russian-alien schools of Il’minskii [po tipu russ-
ko-innorodcheskikh shkol Il’minskogo],” which (Budilovich most definitely 
intended) would provide a foundation for the integration of Estonians and 
Latvians into the Russian world.51 
In this context, it is interesting to note what exactly the Russian pub-
lic knew about Estonians and Latvians; that is, the potential secessionists 
whose own elites did not see independent states as a possibility in the near 
future of their communities. The uneasiness exhibited by many Russian 
observers toward these “natives” also has to do with the traditional image 
of peasant populations distributed in the aforementioned ethnographical 
writings that introduced the Baltic provinces to Russian readers. In this lit-
erature, the reader would rarely learn that, for example, Estonians and Lat-
vians were almost completely literate. Ethnographic information tended to 
come from Enlightenment writings and was, on the whole, hopelessly out-
dated. Why should anybody in the empire be concerned about the national 
49 According to the census of 1897, 5.4 percent of the population was composed of Russians in the three Bal-
tic provinces (including Belorussians and Ukrainians); Riga counted almost 17 percent of its population 
and Reval 10 percent as Russians. Brüggemann, Licht und Luft, 311–13.  
50 See Indrek Kiverik, “Baltisakslased ja vene riigivõim 19. saj. II poolel: vene keele kasutuselevõtmisest Balti 
kubermangude ametiasutustes ja koolides” [Baltic Germans and the Russian state in the second half of the 
19th century: Introduction of Russian in state offices and schools of the Baltic province], in Vene impeeri-
um ja Baltikum: venestus, rahvuslus ja moderniseerimine 19. sajandi teisel poolel ja 20. sajandi alguses, eds. 
Tõnu Tannberg and Bradley D. Woodworth, 11–68 (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, 2010).
51 Budilovich, O poslednikh dvizheniiakh, 21. On the “schools of Il’minskii” see Robert Geraci, Window on the 
East. National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 47–
85; Seppo Lallukka, “Kazan’ Teacher Seminary and the Awakening of the Finnic Peoples of the Volga-Ural 
Region,” Studia Slavica Finlandensia. Tomus IV (Helsinki: Neuvostoliittoinstituutti, 1987), 143–65.
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aspirations of peasants whose favorite entertainment was swinging (in the 
case of Estonians) and solving riddles (in the case of Latvians)?52 
However, something was going on in these provinces which were tra-
ditionally regarded as “German.” In his book Pribaltiiskaia Smuta (Baltic 
“Times of Troubles”), an allegory of the empire completely losing control 
already apparent in the title, author “Vega” (the pseudonym for V. V. Gei-
man, a journalist for the right-wing populist Novoe Vremia [New Times])53 
described a situation in which Estonians and Latvians could now be found 
in much higher levels of hierarchy than previously thanks to the tradition-
al sympathies of Russian bureaucrats toward oppressed nations.54 Eventual-
ly, the victories in local elections (presumably a hint to the Estonian victory 
in Revel’ in 1904) “made the heads [of these young nationalities] spin.” But 
even more alarming must have been his claim that both collectives now al-
so have national anthems that they would sing with unceasing emotion on 
every occasion.55 The real danger for Russia was not to be seen in peasant 
populations singing national melodies; in Vega’s eyes, it was that these peo-
ples would voluntarily join Germany and become proud parts of the Vater-
land sometime in the near future. The only way to prevent this development, 
according to Vega, was to bring the Russian administration in order, so it 
would no longer be paralyzed if it had to move beyond punishing poor peas-
ants. If nothing changed, Vega claimed boldly, Latvians, sooner rather than 
later, would call for the assistance of the German Reich themselves. From 
their point of view, Vega added emphatically, this would even be the right 
choice because Russia was paralyzed, when it came to realizing reforms: 
“seas of paper and ink” would never be enough to keep the provinces loyal.56
52 Karsten Brüggemann, “Fremde im eigenen Imperium. Russische ethnografische Beschreibungen finnisch-
er und baltischer Völker an der Ostsee im späten Zarenreich,” in Nation und Sprache in Nordosteuropa im 
19. Jahrhundert, ed. Konrad Maier (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012), 49–73.
53 Andreeva, Pribaltiiskie nemtsy, 52.
54 “Vega”, Pribaltiiskaia smuta (St. Petersburg, Russia: Izd. A.S. Suvorina, 1907), 25; cf. Bradley D. Woodworth, 
“Patterns of Civil Society in the Modernizing Multiethnic City: A German Town in the Russian Empire Be-
comes Estonian,” Ab Imperio 7, no. 2 (2006): 135–62. Toomas Karjahärm has convincingly argued that it was 
first and foremost the lower levels of local provincial administration that gradually became filled with Esto-
nians. See his Vene impeerium ja rahvuslus: Moderniseerimise strateegiad (Tallinn: ARGO, 2012), 153–62.
55 “Vega”, Pribaltiiskaia smuta, 25–26.
56 Ibid., 130.
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The German danger was a well-established rhetorical figure in Russian 
nationalist discourse at least since Danilevskii’s Rossiia i Evropa. The ques-
tion of how to improve the situation in the Baltic borderland led to anoth-
er characteristic element of these writings: the belief that the russkost’ of offi-
cials and even colonists was the key to a solution of the Baltic question that 
would be in the empire’s interests.57 This attitude was especially true for those 
Russian nationalists who actually lived in the Baltic provinces. It was in their 
writings first and foremost that we find quite imaginative solutions for the 
“Baltic question,” thereby revealing a mind-blowing tendency to completely 
ignore actual local conditions. This tiny segment of the Russian population 
in the region, however, quite effectively used the weekly Okrainy Rossii, estab-
lished in 1906 (and mentioned in the introduction of this chapter), to com-
municate its ideas to the capital.58 It was in their publications that the call for 
a thorough “Russification” (a term offering a wide array of interpretations) 
prevailed to such an extent that more neutral observers might have noticed 
the absence of any consideration as to how the realization of the proposed 
measures might affect the position of the empire in the littoral.
Mikhail Dolbilov has written about the “discursive trap” set by the 
rhetoric of the state that Russian officials often faced when they visited 
the Western borderlands. This was also true for officials visiting the Bal-
tic provinces. Born and raised in Russia proper, their ideas of the state they 
lived in were shaped by the “all-imperial context.” Realizing that quite a 
lot of the usual elements of the Russian environment—the cultural an-
chors Russian tourists had already looked for in the littoral during the era 
of Nicholas I—were not displayed in the same way and were less meaning-
ful in the “borderland context” was a shock.59 In the Baltic provinces, the 
57 Richard Wortman, “The ‘Integrity’ (Tselost’) of the State in Imperial Russian Representation,” Ab imperio 
12, no. 2 (2011): 20–45.
58 At least on one occasion (see the introduction to this chapter) we know that this chauvinist paper was 
read by His Majesty as well. Diakin, Natsional’nyi vopros, 242; Andreeva, Pribaltiiskie nemtsy, 104. See 
also Toomas Karjahärm, Ida ja Lääne vahel: Eesti–Vene suhted 1850–1917  (Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeedia-
kirjastus, 1998), 165–68. Yet it is hard to measure the actual influence of papers like “Okrainy Rossii.” See 
Weeks, “Official and Popular Nationalism,” 429.
59 Mikhail Dolbilov, “Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the Russian Empire’s Northwestern Re-
gion in the 1860s,” Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, no. 2 (2004): 245–71.
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situation was even worse because of the Lutheran and utterly non-Slav-
ic environment. Obviously, especially after the events of 1905, when Lat-
vian and Estonian revolutionaries challenged state authority locally, the 
only feasible solution seemed to be to finally make the foreign region as 
Russian as possible. One of the standard demands in this regard was the 
proposal of administratively merging the three Baltic provinces with the 
St. Petersburg or Pskov provinces, a demand that actually dates back to 
Pavel Pestel’s “Russkaia Pravda.” Such a reform, however, eventually would 
have only deepened the “discursive trap” in raising the expectations con-
cerning the russkost’ of the Baltic region. To some extent, this was exact-
ly what happened after the Alexander Nevskii Cathedral was opened on 
Revel’s Toompea hill, the traditional bastion of the Baltic German elite, 
in 1900. Just a few years before the turmoil of the first revolution, the 
Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik proudly declared that this church would finally 
confirm “the victory of Orthodoxy and the Russian State.”60  
Apparently, the most prolific exponent of this extreme right-wing Rus-
sian diaspora in the Baltic provinces was Ivan Vysotskii, the editor of the 
 Riga-based Russian newspaper Rizhskii vestnik (1903–13). If Weeks de-
scribed official politics in the Baltic provinces “as a combination of admin-
istrative centralization and the protection of minorities from an alien and 
hegemonic foreign culture,”61 then for people like Vysotskii, protecting mi-
norities meant first and foremost protecting the small number of Russians 
in the Baltic provinces. He never went so far as Budilovich in terms of his 
thinking regarding the defense of Estonians and Latvians against the Ger-
mans. In a memorandum sent to Provisional Governor-General Aleksandr 
Meller-Zakomel’skii in 1907, Vysotskii argued that Russians as the first and 
60 Quotation in Haltzel, Der Abbau, 104. See Richard S. Wortman, “The ‘Russian Style’ in Church Architec-
ture as Imperial Symbol after 1881,” in Architecture of Russian Identity: 1500 to the Present, ed. James Cracraft, 
Daniel Rowland, 101–116 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Karsten Brüggemann, “Wie der Revaler 
Domberg zum Moskauer Kreml wurde: Zur lokalen Repräsentation imperialer Herrschaft im späten Zaren-
reich,” in Imperiale Herrschaft in der Provinz: Repräsentationen politischer Macht im späten Zarenreich, ed. 
Jörg Baberowski, David Feest, and Christoph Gumb (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2008), 172–95.
61 Weeks, “Official and Popular Nationalism,” 424. On Vysotskii, see Hirschhausen, Die Grenzen der Ge-
meinsamkeit, 143–45. 
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oldest kulturtregery in the region were entitled to political representation 
despite their small share of the population of 5.4 percent in 1897. More-
over, of all inhabitants, only the Russians possessed a kind of supra-national 
quality as born go-betweens, whereas the other nationalities were not able 
to free themselves of their national prejudices.62 Resting on the authority of 
such figures as Fedor Dostoevskii and Vladimir Solov’ev, Vysotskii claimed 
that due to the “softness of the Slavonic nature,” Russian nationalism could 
never be aggressive or anti-human and would always only become active in 
terms of defending “the interests of the Russian nationality, the Russian re-
ligion, and Russian culture” against the aggressions of inovertsy and inoro-
dtsy.63 This was written in 1910, when Vysotskii had already left the Okto-
brists in order to join the Union of the Russian People.
How Vysotskii imagined this natural Russian conciliator to act in the 
Baltic provinces if, at the same time, it was the obligation of every Russian 
to preserve the possessions of the Emperor and take arms against the “anni-
hilators of the spiritual and material values of the Russian people” (mean-
ing virtually all inhabitants of the littoral) remains a secret. In order to 
bring local administration into conformity with Russia, he proposed the 
introduction of zemstva in the Baltic provinces with the caveat that at least 
one third of all representatives in each province should be Russians. On-
ly such a composition could serve the interests of the empire, meaning, of 
course, the interests of the ruling nationality, in order to lead to the com-
plete sliianie (merger) of the littoral with Russia.64
Much like in the case of Budilovich, it was an almost mythical belief 
in the qualities of the Russians that motivated people like Vysotskii.  Pavel 
Pshenichnikov, the author of a book on the Russians in the Baltic prov-
inces, firmly supported the view that only Russian officials were capable 
62 Trudy Osobogo Soveshchaniia pri Vr. Pribaltiiskom General-Gubernatore, uchrezhdennogo Vysochaishim 
Ukazom 28 noiabria 1905 g. (Revel’: A. Mikvits, 1907); “Zapiska predsedatelia Russko-Pribaltiiskogo So-
iuza 17 oktiabria I. I. Vysotskogo Osobomu soveshchaniiu pri vremennom pribaltiiskom general-guberna-
tore, 1907 g.,” in Imperskaia politika, 144–50, here 145, 147.
63 Ivan I. Vysotskii, Sushchnost’ i znachenie russkogo natsionalizma (Riga: “ASTRA”, 1910), 21–22.
64 “Zapiska, predsedatelia,” 149–50.
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of merging the region with Russia proper.65 However, Vysotskii knew how 
difficult it was to define this category: to be fluent in Russian and a Rus-
sian subject was not enough in his eyes to be “really” Russian.66 And in-
deed, what was the category of russkost’ worth if, during the campaigns for 
election to the State Duma in 1907, some Russians from Iur’ev openly sup-
ported German candidates, claiming that the share of Russian deputies in 
the Duma was sufficient for the preservation of Russian interests? A sharp 
protest from the Iur’ev Oktobrists, which was fully supported by the corre-
spondent of Okrainy Rossii (possibly Vysotskii himself), came to the con-
clusion that co-nationals who opted for the Germans apparently were not 
“real Russians.”67 Apparently, not even birth was enough for Vysotskii who, 
besides all obstacles, remained true to his principles when in 1908 he de-
manded that only “real Russians” (korennye russkie) be promoted to ser-
vice in the administration of the Baltic provinces. “Real Russians,” in his 
view, were only those who supported the ideals of Alexander III. In order to 
guarantee peace in the provinces, he suggested fixing this regulation with a 
tsarist ukaz.68 How the ideals of Alexander III, which were abhorred by old 
and new local elites alike, would guarantee peace in the littoral was a ques-
tion he obviously never asked. In 1910, he concluded, after all, that “hard 
work” was still to be done in the provinces.69
Actually, this demand appears in the most radical vision of Russifi-
cation in the Baltic provinces known to the author thus far. Written by 
Vysotskii and the Riga chief of police Nikolai Balabin,70 this document was 
titled “Measures for the Affirmation and Maintenance of Russian Influ-
ence in the Pribaltiiskii krai.”71 Most strikingly, the authors predicted that 
65 Pshenichnikov, Russkie, 26–27.
66 Vladislavs Volkovs, “Das Riga der Russen,” in Riga: Portrait einer Vielvölkerstadt am Rande des Zaren-
reiches 1857–1914, eds. Erwin Oberländer and Kristine Wohlfart (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004), 115–56, 
here 151. 
67 RUSSKII, “Iur’ev Lifl.,” Okrainy Rossii, no. 5 (1907): 79–80.
68 “Mery k utverzhdeniiu i podderzhaniiu russkogo vliianiia v Pribaltiiskom krae (1908),” in Imperskaia po-
litika, 336–42, here 339–40, 341–42.
69 Vysotskii, Ocherki po istorii. Vyp. 1, Russkaia gosudarstvennost’, 37–38.
70 Karjahärm, Ida ja Lääne vahel, 170. 
71 “Mery k utverzhdeniiu.”
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the “artificially bred (not without support from the government)” Esto-
nian and Latvian cultures are “doomed to die slowly”; these cultures had to 
be replaced with Russian culture, a process that might be accelerated with 
state interference. The number of Russian-born officials was to be increased 
and non-Russian cultural associations were to be strongly controlled by the 
government. In order to marginalize the non-Russian character of the re-
gion, the authors suggested creating two administrative units along ethno-
graphic borders Revel’skaia and Rizhskaia provinces. Thus, according to 
this plan, the traditional topography based on the traditions of German 
Ritterschaften (corporations of nobility) should be erased; terms like Eston-
skaia or Latyshskaia were, of course, out of the question since the “separat-
ists” were not to be encouraged topographically. 
Most important, the authors suggested demographic “Russification,” or 
in their words, Russian “colonization,” thus recalling Russia’s mission civil-
isatrice in the East, which was realized by peasant migration to Siberia. This 
had been suggested already in late 1905 by Budilovich, who dreamt of a broad 
colonization movement “like in the times of our veche-communities and old 
principalities,” evoking Russia’s assumed domination of the Baltic region 
 prior to the arrival of Catholic missionaries and colonization.72 Of course, 
this Russian colonization was to be supported by the state also in terms of 
large subsidies for cultural efforts aimed at raising the national consciousness 
of both old and new Russians in the provinces. As I have discussed elsewhere, 
Russian westward colonization to the Baltic Sea was debated officially in cor-
respondence between Prime Minister Stolypin and the Baltic Provisional 
Governor-General Aleksandr N. Meller-Zakomel’skii in 1908. It seems to me 
that the quoted memorandum by Vysotskii and Balabin (found in Stolypin’s 
papers) might have eventually convinced the Prime Minister that the risks 
and the costs of such a large-scale program would outweigh the benefits.73 
In this document, the authors made their goals clear first and fore-
most in terms of security: they suggested the settlement of Russian fisher-
72 Budilovich, O poslednykh dvizheniiakh, 23.
73 Brüggemann, “Representing Empire.” 
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men along the Baltic coastline in order to defend the state border. In their 
view, inorodtsy collectively were to be singled out as potential traitors, and 
the blurred category of russkost’ again was used as a single marker of loyal-
ty.74 In the context of these radical ideas, it is striking that after 1905, not 
even people like Vysotskii promoted the idea of making the Estonians and 
Latvians into Russians anymore. In this regard, the conversion movement 
of the 1840s and the decade of reforms under Alexander III were nostal-
gically recalled as wasted opportunities. The authors did not bother with 
the question of what to do with Estonian and Latvian fishermen; but, at 
the same time, the governor-general did, at least to some extent, because 
he had to guarantee peace and order in the provinces entrusted to him. 
Meller-Zakomel’skii was a nationally minded officer who was, by no means, 
a defender of the traditional conditions in the Baltic provinces, and he, of 
course, had no sympathy for the German nobility there. But when Prime 
Minister Petr A. Stolypin asked him to suggest effective measures to foster 
Russian statehood (gosudarstvennost’) and culture in the Baltic provinces 
in 1908, Meller-Zakomel’skii provocatively suggested that if the state real-
ly wants to support “Russian principles” in the littoral, the government had 
to organize Russian colonization on a mass scale; but it could not forget to 
compensate all those Estonians and Latvians who would be replaced by the 
newcomers with lands in Siberia and organize their resettlement.75 Quite 
naturally, a massive project like this was out of the question. 
In their project, Vysotskii and Balabin went so far as to demand that 
Russian peasants from the central provinces be settled along railway lines in 
order to protect those vital lines of imperial communication from “Latvian 
or Estonian bands.”76 In this way, they advocated an ethnic preponderance 
to preserve state integrity that actually did not fit the multicultural land-
scape of the borderland at all. The authors’ radical vision to rule lands and 
peoples in opposition to both the demographic majority and the old elites 
74 “Mery k utverzhdeniiu,” 339. 
75 Meller-Zakomel’skii to Stolypin, October 30, 1908, in Imperskaia politika, 313–14; see also Diakin, Nat-
sional’nyi vopros, 251.
76 “Mery k utverzhdeniiu,” 338–39.
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alike almost logically led the authors to create a warlike scenario in which 
the government would survive only with the help of extraordinary mea-
sures and, if necessary, the military.
A memorandum about the situation of the Russians in the Baltic prov-
inces produced in Meller-Zakomel’skii’s chancellery in Riga offered a dev-
astating picture.77 Compared with Estonians and Latvians, the littoral’s 
Russians’ rates of illiteracy (although on par with those in St. Petersburg 
and Moscow) were high, and their education standards low. The memoran-
dum suggested that any serious attempt to improve the economic situation 
of local Russians only (not to mention tens of thousands of future colonists) 
would have to involve at least 50,000 people in need of land. State land was 
partly rented out and, therefore, not immediately available. The text  only 
implicitly suggested that it would be extremely difficult to communicate 
this redistribution of land to the masses of landless inorodtsy. Concerning 
the colonization project, however, the author was even more skeptical, since 
Latvians and Estonians displayed more endurance in their work and were 
better educated in the rural economy compared to average Russian peas-
ants (not to mention the differences between Baltic sea fishing and Russian 
inland fishing). Thus, he doubted the competitiveness of Russian peasants 
from the internal provinces in the local environment without significant 
funds provided by the government and local authorities.
Finally, the author of the memorandum made clear that strengthen-
ing “Russian principles” in the Baltic provinces meant squaring the cir-
cle. Whereas he convincingly described the Estonians’ and Latvians’ 
strong ambitions toward the “self-determination of their tribes,” he ar-
gued in the same paragraph that the only way to improve “Russian princi-
ples” was to “attract” Estonians and Latvians “to Russian culture and Rus-
sian statehood.”78 But he offered no ideas about how this might ultimately 
be realized. In Vysotskii’s and Balabin’s mind, the state should establish 
and support local Russian theaters because “nothing conquers the sympa-
77 P. Koshkin, “Svedeniia o russkom naselenii v Pribaltiiskom krae, 1908,” in Imperskaia politika, 315–32.
78 Ibid., 332.
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thies of the inorodtsy for Russian culture so easily and imperceptibly as the 
admiration (obaianie) for Russian art.”79 At the time, however, Estonians 
and Latvians had already quite successfully created their own national cul-
tures with the establishment of their own theaters and operas. The obaianie 
for Russian culture was secured via translations into Latvian, just like one 
 Riga-born Russian sarcastically had predicted already in 1901. According 
to him, Latvians of all social strata loved their translated Dostoevskii and 
Tolstoi at a time when Russian peasants as a rule had still no clue as to who 
these writers were.80
Securing the Loyalty of the Baltic Provinces after the Revolution of 1905
A former governor of Livland province, Mikhail A. Zinov’ev, who resided 
in Riga from 1885 to 1895, stated in his first report to Alexander III that 
Riga was surely one of the “most valuable pearls in His Majesty’s crown.” 
According to him, however, it was rather “absurd” to turn this pearl into 
Smolensk or Tula because the empire could only learn from local institu-
tions.81 Two decades later, Meller-Zakomel’skii had learned during his time in 
Riga from 1906 to 1909 that transforming the Baltic provinces “into Smolensk 
and Tula” was not only “absurd”: it would potentially lead even to a revival of 
the civil war that had ravaged parts of the provinces in 1905 and 1906. Even-
tually, the provisional governor-general demonstrated that russkost’ as an in-
dicator of loyalty could be quite misleading. Like Zinov’ev, he pragmatical-
ly sensed the particular conditions in the Baltic provinces without trying to 
artificially impose onto the Baltic region criteria that were valid in the all-
imperial context.
Promoting russkost’ in the Baltic provinces as a means to defend the em-
pire eventually did not convince even a staunch monarchist and military 
79 “Mery k utverzhdeniiu,” 337.
80 Ch. Vetrinskii [Vasilii E. Cheshikhin], Sredi Latyshei. Ocherki (Moscow: Izdanie S. Dorovatovskogo i A. 
Charushnikova, 1901), 28.
81 Zinov’ev’s report on the year 1885, as quoted in Alexander von Tobien, Die Livländische Ritterschaft, vol. 
1. (Riga: Löffler, 1925), 156, 159; Ea Jansen, “Aleksander III venestusreformid ja eesti avalikkus”, Acta hi-
storica Tallinnensia, vol. 3 (Tallinn: Ajaloo instituut, 1999), 47–50.
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man like Meller-Zakomel’skii. In his position he had to pacify a region dis-
oriented and shattered by months of socially and ethnically motivated vi-
olence. Most interestingly, he actually supported Vysotskii’s idea of ethnic 
curiae for the Russians because they had more historical rights to be repre-
sented in the capital than did the Latvians. The general-governor also shared 
Vysotskii’s view of the Russians as born negotiators, and he suggested to St. 
Petersburg that the Baltic provinces might be well  represented in the State 
Duma solely by Russian deputies. Possibly to the dismay of Vysotskii, how-
ever, he favored the Riga Old Believers as potential representatives in Pe-
tersburg, thus choosing a segment of the population that, in many aspects, 
was better integrated into local society.82 In the long-term perspective, the 
advice Minister of the Interior Ivan N. Durnovo gave to the governor of Es-
tland province, Prince Sergei V. Shakhovskoi, in early 1894 to “manage af-
fairs in a routine manner” was the recipe of state officials in the Baltic prov-
inces for years to come.83  
After the excitement of the revolutionary period, the Russian nation-
alists in the littoral also reduced their alarmist rhetoric to a minimum. In 
the literature published on the occasion of the bicentennial of the incor-
poration of the provinces into the empire, an author like the teacher  Pavel 
 Pshenichnikov, whose text on the tragic fate of Russians as “foreigners” 
in the Baltic provinces was published by the Riga-based “Russian Nation-
al Club ‘Beseda’,” did not reproduce the apocalyptic vision of the Okrainy 
Rossii article cited at the beginning of this chapter. In contrast, he was sure 
that the littoral would become permanently and tightly connected “with 
great Russia,” even if he made the important reservation that this was pos-
sible only with the help of governmental reforms to be executed soon.84 
82 Meller-Zakomel’skii to Stolypin, October 14, 1908, in Imperskaia politika, 295–97, here 297. On the Old 
Believers in Riga, see Vasilii V. Rozanov, “Fedoseevtsy v Rige“, Novoe vremia, August 27, 1899 (and in Oko-
lo tserkovnykh sten. Sobranie sochinenii (Moscow: Respublika, 1995), 22–28; Hirschhausen, Die Grenzen, 
66–67.
83 L. [Nikolai A. Leisman], “Kniaz’ Sergei Vladimirovich Shakhovskoi,” in Iz arkhiva kniazia Sergeia Vladi-
mirovicha Shakhovskogo, t. 1 (St. Petersburg: V.M. Eriks, 1909, I–XL, here XXXV, XXXVII (quot.).
84 Pshenichnikov, Russkie, 27. Unfortunately for the author, the planned agrarian, zemstvo, and church re-
forms were never realized. See Andreeva, Pribaltiiskie nemtsy.
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Even Vysotskii was sure that the “unification process” was becoming ever 
more visible in the everyday life of the provinces, and that the “fundamen-
tal frame” for the “unification with Russia and the Russian people of the 
Baltic provinces and their multiethnic inhabitants (raznoplemennoe nase-
lenie)” already existed.85 By this “frame,” he obviously referred to the third 
State Duma, which, in his view, had the potential to revitalize the old Rus-
sian representative body of zemskii sobor.86 
In any case, concerning the antagonism between the interests of em-
pire and nation, Vysotskii was quite aware of in 1910, he was convinced that 
Russia was still far from “major conflicts” between these “contradictory in-
terests.” Neither the Finnish nor the Polish, the “German-Latvian” or the 
most serious of all, the Jewish question, in his view posed that kind of dan-
ger because Russia would solve all these problems in a “human-progressive, 
good-hearted direction” without any repressions against “national self-es-
teem” (natsional’noe samoliubie).87 
Vysotskii, therefore, provides a good example of the crystallizing effect 
the 1905 revolution had on the right-wing milieu of Russian nationalists, es-
pecially those who lived in the non-Russian borderlands. After the “Pribaltii-
skaia smuta,” any visions about a peaceful “Russification” of the Latvians and 
Estonians had become irrelevant. These were only consequential for nation-
alists who advocated a national empire to envision a large-scale Russian col-
onization of the littoral as the last resort of their expectations (not the least 
because the Germans, the other tiny demographic minority in the provinces, 
allegedly did the same). Voting as a form of legitimate representation was ac-
cepted also by Vysotskii and others, but in a nationalizing environment, small 
ethnic groups facing these new conditions had no chance. The demographic 
majorities in the littoral, the Estonians and Latvians, however, would not vol-
untarily leave their homeland (and one might wonder if resettlement or rath-
er deportation to Siberia of tens of thousands of local peasants would still fall 
under the category of respecting “national self-esteem”). 
85 Vysotskii, Ocherki po istorii. Vyp. 1, Russkaia gosudarstvennost’, 37.
86 Vysotskii, Sushchnost’, 15.
87 Ibid., 16–17.
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Finally, in hoping that the state would help realize their dreams of a tru-
ly Russian Baltic borderland, nationalists in the empire, like Budilovich, 
or in the provinces, like Vysotskii, bet on the wrong horse. The continua-
tion of the “coalition of aristocracies” with the Baltic nobilities, which was 
already much criticized at the time, not only provided no answer to the 
question of how to deal with the fact that, actually, the center increasing-
ly needed to maintain its ties with the political representatives of the Es-
tonians and Latvians (for example, as city leaders or Duma deputies). This 
traditional estate-based cooperation all of a sudden had no future because 
it came to an end, by and large, in August 1914 with the beginning of the 
Great War against Germany. When in late 1916 a project was presented to 
the Duma that aimed at the introduction of zemstva in the three provinc-
es (Kurland and southern Livland were occupied by the German army at 
the time), the government was obviously helpless, even if this project would 
have meant full administrative “Russification,” without, however, the nec-
essary numbers of Russians living in the littoral. Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs Sergei D. Sazonov put it bluntly in his comment: this project would 
create a “system of national self-administration” in the provinces that was 
not tolerable because “little tribal groups” in the borderland should not be 
empowered by imperial law. Of course, the Germans could not maintain 
their previously dominant position, but without a “carefully thought out 
system of curiae-elections,” no balance of “all elements of the inhabitants” 
could be established.88 
Thus, to keep the balance between the interests of the empire—to keep 
the provinces loyal and quiet—and those of the Russian nation—to estab-
lish firm Russian control in the provinces—was indeed to square the cir-
cle. In this political stalemate, any solution one might think of would meet 
with the protests of at least one of the parties involved. After August 1914, 
the demographic majorities whose delegates in the Duma constantly de-
manded more rights for their loyal war effort felt entitled to raise the price 
for their consent to reforms. Only when the Provisional Government in 
88 S. Sazonov’s statement, May 15, 1916, in Imperskaia politika, 392–93.
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1917 eventually revoked the alliance of aristocracies and agreed to give lo-
cal power to the demographic majorities was this stalemate broken. But by 
this point, the radical ethnic utopia of Vysotskii and Budilovich finally lost 
its relevance and, as one may argue, gave way to the nationalizing agendas 
of the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians.
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Russian Jews and the Russian Right: 
Why Were There No Jewish Right-Wing Politics  
in the Late Russian Empire?
V l a d i m i r  L e v i n
Several academic works have influenced research discourse more because of 
their impressive titles rather than their content, which is important in its 
own right.1 One of them is John D. Klier’s study, “Why were Russian Jews 
not Kaisertreu?” Klier asked why Jews were not loyal subjects of the Russian 
Empire, like they were in the neighboring German and Austro-Hungari-
an empires. To answer this question, Klier described how the tsarist regime 
equated Jews with its enemies, the Poles, and imposed anti-Jewish legislation 
starting in the 1860s and especially after 1881. Finally, he stated that “the ju-
deophobe mindset of the imperial government created conditions that ac-
tively encouraged the movement of Jews into political opposition. . . . It be-
came literally impossible for Jews to join the right-wing of Russian politics.”2 
To a large extent, Klier’s conclusion is correct and easily observable. 
However, in asking a question about Jewish political behavior, Klier was 
not actually speaking about the Jews, but about the approaches and mea-
sures implemented by another actor, the imperial government. In his con-
struction, the Jews are not the subject of politics but an object; their po-
I am grateful to Semion Goldin and Svetlana Natkovich, who read the first draft of this paper and made 
many valuable improvements.
1  For example, Mark Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law 
in the Germanies and Russia 1600–1800 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983); Ada Rapoport- 
Albert, “Hagiography with Footnotes: Edifying Tales and the Writing of History in Hasidism,” History 
and Theory: Essays in Jewish Historiography 27 (1988): 119–59.
2  John Doyle Klier, “Why Were Russian Jews Not Kaisertreu?,” Ab Imperio, no. 4 (2003): 41–58, quote on 
p. 57–58.
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litical choices are explained as a reaction, not as an action. The aim of this 
chapter, in contrast, is to examine the attitudes and approaches of Kai-
sertreu Jews as political actors in the Russian Empire. While the participa-
tion of Jews in the revolutionary movement has been a constant subject of 
discussion in historiography since the 1900s,3 and Jewish liberals were add-
ed to the discussion starting in the 1980s,4 Jews with a conservative and 
monarchist Weltanschauung have been ignored by scholars for a century.
For the sake of this research, I will employ a simplified depiction of the 
political map of pre-revolutionary Russia, dividing it into two broad catego-
ries, the left and the right, therefore disregarding the very significant differ-
ences within those camps. While the left sought drastic changes and was 
commonly defined as “the opposition,” the main prerequisite for belonging 
to the right was loyalty to the existing regime. The right, or conservative, 
camp included the extreme right, which believed in unlimited autocracy 
and opposed capitalism and parliamentarianism, the Russian Nationalists 
who sought to convert the empire into the national state of the Russian 
people, the liberal Union of October 17, who preferred constitutional mon-
3  See, among many others: Istoriia evreiskogo rabochego dvizheniia v Rossii i Pol’she (Geneva: Zagranichnyi 
komitet Bunda, 1901); Di geshikhte fun yidisher arbeter-bund (Vilnius: Bund, 1906); N. A. Bukhbinder, 
Istoriia evreiskogo rabochego dvizheniia v Rossii (Leningrad: Akademicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1925); Avrom 
Kirzhnits, Der yidisher arbeter: Khrestomatie tsu der geshichte fun der yidisher arbeter, revolutsionerer un 
sotsialistisher bavegung in rusland, 4 vols. (Moscow: Shul un bukh, 1925); Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie sredi 
evreev (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vsesoiuznogo obshchestva politkatorzhan i ssyl’no-poselentsev, 1930); Ezra 
Mendelsohn, Class Struggle in the Pale: The Formative Years of the Jewish Workers Movement in Tsarist Rus-
sia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Henry J. Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russia: From Its 
Origin to 1905 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); Matityahu Mintz, Ber borokhov: ha-ma’agal ha-
rishon, 1900–1906 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1977); Robert J. Brym, The Jewish Intelligentsia and Rus-
sian Marxism: A Sociological Study of Intellectual Radicalism and Ideological Divergence (London: Mac-
millan, 1978); Moshe Mishkinsky, Reshit tnu’at ha-poalim ha-yehudit be-rusiyah: megamot yesod (Tel Aviv: 
Ha-kibbutz Ha-me’uhad, 1981); Jonathan Frankel, Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the 
Russian Jews, 1862–1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Joshua D. Zimmerman, Poles, 
Jews and the Politics of Nationality: The Bund and the Polish Socialist Party in Late Tsarist Russia, 1892–1914 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); Vladimir Levin, Mi-mahapekhah le-milhamah: Ha-politi-
kah ha-yehudit be-rusiyah, 1907–1914 (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2016), 229–348.
4  See, for example: Robert M. Seltzer, “Jewish Liberalism in Late Tsarist Russia,” Contemporary Jewry 9 
(1987/88): 47–66; Alexander Orbach, “The Jewish People’s Group and the Jewish Politics, 1906–1914,” 
Modern Judaism 10 (1990): 1–15; Christoph Gassenschmidt, Jewish Liberal Politics in Tsarist Russia, 
1900–1914: The Modernization of Russian Jewry (New York: Macmillan, 1995); Levin, Mi-mahapekhah le- 
milhamah, 129–225.
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archy and sought further moderate reform, and a variety of different groups 
in-between. Loyalty to the tsar and his government and the rejection of rev-
olutionary changes was their common denominator.
Research on Kaisertreu Jews in Russia is not an easy task. Since any 
political activities were outlawed before the 1905 Revolution, those who 
wanted to change things—the revolutionaries—quite naturally produced 
much more written evidence of their ideas and actions than those who were 
pleased with the existing situation, that is, the loyalists. Thus, we have ma-
ny more sources, both primary and secondary, on the underground Peo-
ple’s Will (Narodnaia Volia), whose activists assassinated Alexander II in 
1881, than on the underground Holy Brotherhood (Sviashchennaia Dru-
zhina), which appeared in 1881 in order to prevent a future regicide.5 Bar-
on Horace (Goratsii) Gintsburg (Günzburg),6 a person who could right-
fully be called “the spokesman” of Russian Jewry, might have been one of 
the members of this Holy Brotherhood.7 Gintsburg was one of the rich-
est Jewish entrepreneurs of the period and one of the most prominent ex-
amples of a Kaisertreu Jew; as such, he will be discussed below. There is no 
doubt, however, that he was not alone. As the famous economic historian 
 Arcadius Kahan noted, the entrepreneurs would “better be thought to re-
store equilibrium and promote their own economic and social status that 
to destroy an order.”8 
It is hard to define the number of Jewish conservatives who were con-
tent with the existing order, but their presence is more than certain. If we 
5  On Sviashchennaia Druzhina, see Stephen Lukashevich, “The Holy Brotherhood: 1881–1883,” The Amer-
ican Slavic and East European Review 18 (1959): 491–509; Iu.A. Pelevin, “‘Sviashchennaia druzhina’ pro-
tiv narodovol’cheskoi emigratsii,” in “Budushchego net i ne mozhet byt’ bez nauk...” (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
Moskovskogo universiteta, 2005), 604–34.
6  On Gintsburg, see Ilia Vovshin, “Mishpahat gintzburg ve-yetzirat ha-plutokratiyah ha-yehudit ba-imperi-
yah ha-rusit” (PhD thesis, Haifa University, 2015). 
7  For the best discussion of Gintsburg’s participation in Sviashchennaia Druzhina, see Vovshin, “Mishpa-
hat gintzburg,” 190–91. See also Lukashevich, “The Holy Brotherhood,” 493; Hans Rogger, Jewish Poli-
cies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (London: Macmillan, 1986), 30; Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, The 
Tsars and the Jews: Reform, Reaction and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia, 1772–1917 (Chur: Harwood 
Academic Publishers, 1993), 57.
8  Arcadius Kahan, Essays in Jewish Social and Economic History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1986), 87.
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draw a parallel between one’s social-economic status and political views, we 
may assume that members of the higher status groups were more inclined to 
conservatism. Arcadius Kahan estimated the size of the Jewish bourgeoisie 
(defined as hereditary and personal nobility, honorary citizens, and guild 
merchants) in the Pale of Settlement in 1897 as 16,847 families.9 Since strict 
adherence to religion—as it will be demonstrated below—might also be 
considered a sign of conservatism, we may add those 19,127 Jews whom the 
1897 census registered as employed in “religious services” in the Pale.10 Ac-
cording to these criteria, approximately 36,000 Jews might have been con-
sidered conservatives according to their social status. This number, which is 
clearly an underestimation, is comparable with the combined membership 
of 78,000 in four Jewish revolutionary parties at the peak of their populari-
ty, which was obviously inflated for propagandistic reasons.11
The 1905 Revolution made political and societal activities more or less le-
gal; it created the major arena for political action, the elected State Duma; and 
it removed the majority of restrictions on mass media. The possibilities for 
the expression of political views multiplied from participation in the Duma 
elections, to subscribing to and reading various newspapers, and membership 
in political parties or quasi-political organizations. While left-wing political 
forces still could not operate freely, the government tolerated and support-
ed right-wing parties, organizations, and newspapers. This chapter examines 
the strategies conservative Jews employed to express their political views in 
the last decade of the Russian empire, when the public activities of right-wing 
forces became widespread. What options were open to them in Russian con-
servative politics? Which groups in right-wing political circles were willing to 
accept like-minded Jews? My main argument is that Jews with conservative 
political convictions attempted to find a common language with some right-
wing groups and to cooperate with them on tactical issues. At the same time, 
  9 Kahan, Essays, 18.
10 Ibid., 55.
11 The Bund claimed around 33,000 members; the Zionist Socialist Workers’ Party around 27,000; the Jew-
ish Socialist Workers’ Party ca. 12,000; and the Poalei Zion between 5,000 and 6,000 members. See Levin, 
Mi-mahapekhah le-milhamah, 232, 241, 247, 256.
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the total rejection of Jews by the right-wing politicians was beginning to show 
cracks after 1907, and especially during World War I.
Jews and the Right
The most obvious choice for Jews who identified themselves with the tsar-
ist regime and the values of the Russian Empire as the state of Russians was 
to convert to Russian Orthodox Christianity, which meant they stopped 
being Jews according to the imperial law. Indeed, there were several bap-
tized Jews who became active in Russian right-wing circles, for example 
Ilia  Gurland or Savelii Efron (Litvin).12 This strategy, however, was very 
personal and not many individuals were prepared to use it.13 Those Jews 
who remained true to the tenets of Judaism but shared conservative polit-
ical views and wished to participate in political activities had to look for 
other options. It is possible to speak about three strategies that, at least in 
theory, were open to conservative Jews after the 1905 Revolution and the 
emergence of public and parliamentary politics: (1) joining Russian right-
wing organizations; (2) establishing Jewish right-wing organizations; and 
(3)  cooperating with the Russian right.
Joining Russian right-wing organizations
The option to join right-wing organizations was almost nonexistent for 
Jews in Russia since all right-wing monarchist organizations explicitly pro-
hibited Jews and baptized Jews from entering their ranks.14 Those organi-
zations professed strong, sometimes mystical antisemitism, and according 
12 On Gurland, see A. Likhomanov, “I.Ia. Gurliand and evreiskii vopros v Rossii,” Vestnik Evreiskogo univer-
siteta v Moskve 4 (1993): 142–53; on Efron, see Svetlana Natkovich, “Savelii efron ve-ha-midrag ha-anti-
shemi: le-dyukano shel mashmitz,” Zion 83 (2018): 33–69.
13 On conversions in the Russian Empire, see Ellie Schainker, Confessions of the Shtetl: Converts from Juda-
ism in Imperial Russia, 1817–1906 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017).
14 See, e.g., the 1905 bylaws of the Union of the Russian People, А. Chernovskii, ed., Soiuz russkogo naro-
da: po materialam Chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo pravitel’stva, 1917 g. (Moscow–Len-
ingrad: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1929), 414. A useful introduction to Russian right-wing organiza-
tions in English is Don C. Rawson, Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
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to Semion Goldin, considered Jews to be “the Other” of the Russian state.15 
They were clearly not interested in mobilizing Jewish support. For exam-
ple, the head of the Union of the Russian People in Odessa, Count Alexei 
Konovnitsyn, published an appeal to Jews in August 1907, in which he de-
manded that Jews reject revolution and express repentance. He also  insisted 
that Jews unite in a union “under the banner of the Union of the Russian 
People.” This wording made it clear that Konovnitsyn did not want Jews 
in his Union of the Russian People, but he did encourage them to orga-
nize separately under the same slogans.16 Joining right-wing organizations 
or activities could be dangerous for Jews: Ilya Gerasimov described a case in 
 Kazan, when a Jew Kissin participated in the “patriotic” demonstration in 
October 1905, but ended up as a victim of the anti-Jewish pogrom.17
The only party on the loyalist part of the Russian political spectrum 
that attempted to attract Jewish followers was the Union of October 17 
(the Octobrists). In 1906, a “group of Jews-members” of the Union pub-
lished a brochure in which they called on “the Russian Jews” to join the par-
ty and to support it in the elections to the State Duma.18 Notably, the copy 
of the brochure in the National Library of Israel bears the ex libris of Ahad 
Ha’am (Asher Zvi Ginsberg), the ideologue of cultural Zionism whose gen-
eral political views were quite conservative.19 The moderate liberal Union of 
October 17 could hardly be called a genuine right-wing party.20  However, 
15 On antisemitism on the Russian right, see Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics; Löwe, The Tsars 
and the Jews. On Jews as “the Other” of the Russian Empire, see Semion Goldin, “Evrei kak poniatie v isto-
rii imperskoi Rossii,” in “Poniatiia o Rossii”: K istoricheskoi semantike imperskogo perioda, vol. 2 (Moscow: 
NLO, 2012), 374. Cf. a phrase of a historian of the Russian Right, Andrei Ivanov, that the notion of a Jew 
was “a kind of definition of concentration of the global evil” [opredelenie nekoego sosredocheniia mirovo–
go zla] – A.A. Ivanov, Pravye v russkom parlamente: ot krizisa k krakhu (1914–1917) (Moscow–St. Peters-
burg: Al’ians-Arkheo, 2013), 431.
16 Chernovskii, Soiuz russkogo naroda, 230.
17 Ilya Gerasimov, Plebeian Modernity: Social Practices, Illegality, and the Urban Poor in Russia, 1906–1916 
(Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2018), 69.
18 Vozzvanie k russkim evreiam ot gruppy chlenov-evreev partii “Soiuza 17-go oktiabria” (Moscow: Tip. Zabal-
dueva, 1906).
19 On Ahad Ha’am, see Steven J. Zipperstein, Elusive Prophet: Ahad Ha’am and the Origins of Zionism (Lon-
don: Peter Halban, 1993).
20 On the Union of October 17, see, for example, A.Ia. Avrekh, Stolypin i tret’ ia duma (Moscow: Nauka, 1968); 
Ben-Cion Pinchuk, The Octobrists in the Third Duma, 1907–1912 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1974); Valentin Diakin, Samoderzhavie, burzhuaziia i dvorianstvo v 1907–1911 gg. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1978).
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from the very beginning it supported the government, and its position re-
garding the Jewish question was ambiguous. The demand for equal rights 
for all appeared in its program, but the Octobrists in the Duma never even 
attempted to put it to a vote; moreover, they often voted for new restrictions 
on Jews.21 The prominent Russian-Jewish socialist Mark Ratner wrote in 
1912: “the tendencies to go hand in hand with the Octobrists that appeared 
in certain circles of bourgeois Jewry, were immediately suppressed when the 
genuine political mood of this party, [which was] not ready to do anything 
to establish the equality of nationalities and the removal of the Jewish lack 
of rights, became clear.”22 Indeed, the abovementioned brochure is the  only 
evidence that the Union of October 17 had any Jewish members.
Establishing Jewish right-wing organizations
While Jews could not join right-wing unions, they could, theoretically, es-
tablish their own right-wing organizations. However, we know about on-
ly one such organization, founded in Odessa in 1910–11. Its name was “The 
Society of Jews Praying for the Wellbeing of the Tsar and the Government” 
(Hevrat mitpalelim li-sheloma shel malkhut), and its aim was to dissemi-
nate among Jews “the importance of belief in God and of the devotion to 
the autocracy and government.” Odessa’s governor, Ivan Tolmachiov, one 
of the few high-ranking administrators who clearly distinguished between 
the loyal “Jewish masses” and the “harmful” Jewish intelligentsia, support-
ed this society.23 The bylaws of the “Society of Jews Praying for the Govern-
ment” were approved not at the provincial level, as could have been done ac-
cording to the 1906 law on public associations, but by the deputy minister 
of the interior, Sergei Kryzhanovskii. Newspapers, however, ridiculed the 
establishment of the society and described it as a trick by a certain melamed 
21 For an analysis of the Octobrists’ position on the “Jewish question,” see Löwe, The Tsars and the Jews, 263–
67. See also Levin, Mi-mahapekhah le-milhamah, 66–67.
22 M.B. Ratner, “Politicheskie dvizheniia,” Evreiskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 13, ed. A. Garkavi and L. Katsenel’son 
(St. Petersburg: Obshchestvo dlia nauchnykh evreiskikh izdanii and Brokgauz-Efron, 1912), 645.
23 On Tolmachiov’s attitude to Jewish religious Orthodoxy, see Vladimir Levin, “Orthodox Jewry and the 
Russian Government: An Attempt at Rapprochement, 1907–1914,” East European Jewish Affairs 39, no. 2 
(2009): 192–93.
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(a teacher in a private one-room Jewish religious school), Lev (or Moisei) 
Kenis, to get permission for opening a private synagogue in his apartment.24
It is not accidental that the only Jewish right-wing society was a reli-
gious one, “praying for the tsar,” and not, for example, one that promoted 
street demonstrations. Jewish monarchism was very often (but not always) 
closely connected to religion. Religious orthodoxy was the most conserva-
tive force on the “Jewish street,” and it always stressed that deep devotion 
to religious observance includes loyalty towards the existing regime and 
fierce opposition to revolutionary movements. Ilia Lurie has already point-
ed out the amazing similarity between the anti-modernist views of Rabbi 
 Sholom  Duber Schneersohn of Lubavitch and the conservative thinking 
of the highest Russian officials of the late nineteenth century, like, for in-
stance, Konstantin Pobedonostsev.25 
The opposition of orthodox rabbis to Jewish revolutionaries before 1905 
has been discussed by several scholars,26 and recently David Fishman re-
searched the Orthodox rabbis’ display of loyalty in 1901–04.27 The loyal-
ist and monarchist views of these rabbis were expressed in their speeches 
and writings on particular occasions, while attempts to found an organiza-
tion were unsuccessful. Some Orthodox leaders tried to create an organiza-
tion “Mahzikei Ha-Dat” in 1901–03, but their plans failed.28 Some leading 
rabbis might have been involved in discussions regarding the idea of a con-
24 See Hed ha-zman 37 (February 12, 1910): 1; Hed ha-zman 51 (March 1, 1911): 3; Evreiskii mir 9 (March 4, 
1911): 33–34; Evreiskii mir 12 (March 25, 1911): 26; Chernovskii, Soiuz russkogo naroda, 296–97.
25 Ilia Lurie, Milhamot liubavich: hasidut habad be-rusiyah ha-tsarit (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 
2018), 240–42.
26 Mendelsohn, Class Struggle in the Pale, 104–10; Eli Lederhendler, Jewish Responses to Modernity: New 
Voices in America and Eastern Europe (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 69–76; Gershon Ba-
con, “The Rabbinical Conference in Kraków (1903) and the Beginning of Organized Orthodox Jewry,” in 
“Let the Old Make Way for the New”: Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Eastern European Jewry 
Presented to Immanuel Etkes, ed. David Assaf and Ada Rapoport-Albert, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Zalman Sha-
zar Center, 2009), 215*–17*.
27 David Fishman, “‘The Kingdom on Earth Is Like the Kingdom in Heaven’: Orthodox Responses to the 
Rise of Jewish Radicalism in Russia,” in “Let the Old Make Way for the New”: Studies in the Social and Cul-
tural History of Eastern European Jewry Presented to Immanuel Etkes, ed. David Assaf and Ada Rapoport-
Albert, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2009), 227*–59*.
28 On Mahzikei Ha-Dat, see Vladimir Levin, “Knesset israel: ha-miflagah ha-politit ha-ortodoksit ha-risho-
nah ba-imperiyah ha-rusit,” Zion 76 (2011): 34–35.
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servative political party of orthodox Jews, formulated by Faivel Meir Gets, 
which apparently took place in 1903. The aim of the party was to oppose an-
tisemites on the one hand and the Jewish revolutionaries on the other. The 
existence of such a party would have been enough, according to Gets, to re-
move “the responsibility for rebels” from “all Jews of our country.” At the 
same time, notwithstanding his proclaimed conservatism and loyalty to the 
regime, Gets stressed that the party must strive for the full emancipation of 
Jews, but not through violence and rebellion.29 In other words, Jewish con-
servatives could support the existing regime but not in the issue of Jewish 
civil equality. 
Only after the subduing of the revolutionary turmoil did some prom-
inent orthodox leaders begin working on the creation of an orthodox po-
litical party. After several preparatory steps undertaken during 1907, the 
“Knesset Israel” society was officially announced in January 1908.30 The 
governor of Vil’na Dmitrii Liubimov approved the bylaws of the new orga-
nization, regarding it as having “a pure conservative character without anti-
governmental aims,” that aroused opposition from the “Jewish youth and 
progressive-minded Jews.”31 However, neither the bylaws of Knesset Israel 
nor its public charter written by Rabbi Haim Ozer Grodzensky included 
any reference to conservatism or loyalty to the regime. In fact, both doc-
uments contained direct references to the legal equality of Jews.32 The au-
thorities used this demand for emancipation in the bylaws to ban Knesset 
Israel in 1911.33 However, the activities of Knesset Israel had already ceased 
29 The text was published in Hebrew in 1907, Dr F. M-r [Faivel Meir Gets], Ad matai tahrishu! Kol kore le-
shlumei emunei israel (Vilna, 1907) and printed again as the last chapter of a Russian brochure, M.B. [Faiv-
el Meir Gets], V svete pravdy (Moscow, 1908). In the Russian brochure (p. 3), Gets claimed that the text was 
prepared in 1903. For the discussion of Gets’s plans, see Levin, “Knesset israel,” 38–39.
30 On Knesset Israel, see Levin, “Knesset israel”; Vladimir Levin and Ilia Lurie, “Formirovanie evreiskoi 
ortodoksal’noi politiki,” in Istoriia evreiskogo naroda v Rossii: ot razdelov Pol’shi do padeniia Rossiiskoi im-
perii, 1772–1917, ed. Ilia Lurie (Moscow and Jerusalem: Gesharim–Mosty Kul’tury, 2012), 387–88.
31 Russian State Historical Archives (RGIA), f. 821, op. 9, d. 63, l. 31–36.
32 Ustav obshchestva ‘Kneset Isroel’ (Vilna, 1908), 2; Sefer ha-takanot me-agudat knesset israel (Vilna, 1908), 
2; Aharon Surasky, Raban shel israel: prakim be-masekhet hayyav u-foalo shel ... rabbi haim ozer grodzen-
sky ... mi-vilna (Bnei Brak: Netzah, 1971), 40; Haim Ozer Grodzensky, Ahiezer: kovetz igrot, ed. Aharon 
Surasky vol. 1 (Bnei Brak: Netzah, 1970), 257–60, vol. 2, 626–27; Haim Ozer Grodzensky, Iggerot r. haim 
ozer, 2nd edition, vol. 2 (New York: Yeshiva u-Metivta Rabeinu Yaakov Yosef, 2001), 93–96.
33 Severo-zapadnyi golos 1573 (January 29, 1911): 3.
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two years earlier, in the winter of 1908–09, when its founders abandoned 
their attempts to create a viable organization and joined the discussion with 
German Orthodox rabbis over the establishment of Agudat Israel. On the 
one hand, the first attempt to establish an orthodox political organization 
failed since the traditional values Jewish orthodox leaders wished to pre-
serve did not include mass political activities. On the other hand, politics 
during the 1905 Revolution, which served as the reference point for the 
founders of Knesset Israel, were so anti-government that even the most con-
servative Jewish leaders refrained from expressing their conservatism. They 
did not dare using monarchist rhetoric in their public appeals, and many 
of them probably sincerely believed that the discrimination against Jews 
should be eliminated from Russian legal codes.
The first years after the end of the 1905 revolution were marked by the high 
hopes of Jewish orthodoxy to cooperate with the government. I have discussed 
this attempt at cooperation elsewhere;34 here I would like to stress only one as-
pect of Orthodox activity. In the years 1907–10, countless texts produced by 
leading rabbis reiterated the idea that the strict adherence to the values of Ju-
daism demanded loyalty to the tsar and the state. This was the main argument 
of Orthodoxy in its search for support from the government of Petr Stolypin. 
On several occasions, orthodox leaders adopted the mode of behavior specific 
to Russian monarchist unions.35 For example, the assembly of orthodox rab-
bis in Warsaw opened on December 30, 1908 with a prayer for the tsar, the 
singing of the Russian imperial anthem, and the sending of a telegram to the 
tsar through Stolypin. The next day, the rabbis cabled new year greetings to 
Stolypin, the Governor General of Poland, the Governor of Warsaw, and the 
governors of their provinces.36 The assembly of orthodox rabbis in Vil’na in 
April 1909 also prayed for the tsar and thanked the Ministry of Interior, the 
Governor General and the polizeimeister.37 Nonetheless, the efforts of Ortho-
34 Levin, “Orthodox Jewry and the Russian Government.”
35 On the rituals of right-wing organizations, see Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, “Political Symbols and Rituals of the 
Russian Radical Right, 1900–1914,” Slavonic and East European Review 76 (1998): 441–66.
36 Levin, “Orthodox Jewry and the Russian Government,” 193.
37 Ibid., 195.
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doxy in 1909–10 were fruitless and did not garner any flexibility in the gov-
ernment attitude toward their case. In subsequent years, the hopes for coop-
eration with the government disappeared and disillusioned orthodox leaders 
became less effusive in expressing their monarchism.38 
Cooperation with the Russian right
While those Jews who professed rightist and monarchist views could not 
join Russian organizations and did not succeed in establishing parallel Jew-
ish ones, they could try to cooperate with right-wing parties on tactical is-
sues. Since all right-wing organizations opposed the very idea of Jewish 
equality, the prerequisite for such cooperation was pushing the issue of full 
emancipation aside.
This was the politics conducted by one of the two Jewish members of the 
Third Duma, Lazar Nisselovich. Nisselovich believed that there were among 
the Octobrists and the rightists “honest, goodhearted people with a decent 
soul,” whose antisemitism was due to a lack of knowledge about the Jewish 
question. In November 1907, he told a Jewish newspaper that “we can—
in private talks and constant meetings—show them their error and prove 
their injustice toward and abuse of Jews in order to destroy [their] prejudice 
against us and turn their hearts to our good.”39 In April 1908, Nisselovich 
indeed spoke with the heads of the non-oppositional factions in the Duma 
about the introduction of a bill on Jewish emancipation. He received prom-
ises from the leader of the Right Faction Count Alexei  Bobrinskii, the head 
of the Moderate Right Faction Count Vladimir Bobrinskii, and the lead-
er of the Octobrists Aleksandr Guchkov that they would not oppose the 
transfer of the bill to the commission.40 This move, however, did not mate-
rialize, and from then on, Nisselovich no longer counted on the support of 
the moderate and extreme right. His most important initiative in the Du-
ma, the bill on the abolition of the Pale of Settlement, was introduced in 
38 Ibid., 196–98.
39 I. Solodukha, “Sihah im ha-deputat l.n. nisselovich,” Hed Hazman 61 (November 10, 1907): 1.
40 “Okolo Gosud. Dumy,” Rassvet 16 (April 26, 1908): 18–19; “O evreiskom predstavitel’stve v Dume,” Ras-
svet 16 (April 26, 1908): 1–4; L.N. Nisselovich, “Pravda prevyshe vsego I,” Rassvet 26 (June 29, 1912): 5.
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1910 with the signatures of 166 Octobrists (in addition to all oppositional 
Duma members). The Octobrists, however, also made sure that the bill was 
never discussed in the parliamentary commission, and that it “died” there.41 
Nisselovich’s attempts to cooperate with pro-government forces and 
even with antisemites were not fruitful. Nonetheless, similar tactics were 
proposed during the elections to the Fourth Duma in 1912.42 For exam-
ple, the crown rabbi of Pavlograd in Ekaterinoslav province, Elyakim 
Belen’kii, suggested that one half of Jewish voters should vote for the op-
position and the other half for right-wing parties.43 Genrikh Sliozberg, 
one of the most prominent Jewish activists, said in 1912 that there is a dif-
ference between the extreme right faction, which is “pointedly antisemit-
ic” and the Nationalist faction, “which has a political program, it stands on 
the basis of the Manifesto of 17 October, and deals not only with the Jew-
ish question but has other goals as well.” Sliozberg hoped it would be pos-
sible to make arrangements with the Nationalists since “they are our old 
acquaintances.”44 Indeed, the majority of the Nationalist faction leaders 
were gentry from the southwestern region—the traditional area of Jew-
ish settlement since the sixteenth century.45 The only immediate result of 
Sliozberg’s statement was that his political adversaries did not miss the op-
portunity to accuse him of shtadlanut—the traditional practice of lob-
bying for Jewish interests through personal intercession, which was con-
sidered to be self-humiliating by proponents of mass politics. Taking into 
account that the idea of making arrangements with the Nationalists was 
41 On the episode with the bill, see Levin, Mi-mahapekhah le-milhamah, 75–91.
42 On Jewish participation in the elections to the Fourth Duma, see Levin, Mi-mahapekhah le-milhamah, 
97–112.
43 Sh. [Leo Shternberg], “Po stopam g. Nisselovicha,” Novyi Voskhod 30 (July 26, 1912): 1; D.S. [Daniel Pas-
manik], “Nad kem smeiotes’?” Rassvet 32 (August 10, 1912): 5–7.
44 V.Gr. [Vladimir Grossman], “A geshprakh mit h. sliozberg,” Haint 125 (May 31, 1912): 2; Obozrevatel’, 
“Otkliki izbiratel’noi kampanii,” Rassvet 31 (August 3, 1912): 11–13.
45 On the Russian Nationalists, see Robert Edelman, Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: 
The Nationalist Party, 1907–1917 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980); Löwe, The Tsars 
and the Jews, 278–82; D.A. Kotsiubinskii, Russkii natsionalizm v nachale XX stoletiia: Rozhleniie i gibel’ 
ideologii Vserossiisskogo natsional’nogo soiuza (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001); Klimenti I. Fedevitch and Kli-
menti K. Fedevitch, Za Viru, Tsaria i Kobzaria: Malorosiis’ ki monarkhisty i ukrains’ kyi natsional’nyi rukh 
(1905–1917 roku) (Kiev: Krytyka, 2017).
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expressed in the framework of Sliozberg’s electoral campaign in Odessa, it 
is logical to suppose that he hoped to attract affluent Jews, who comprised 
45 percent of voters in the first curia in that city.46
All in all, attempts to cooperate with right-wing organizations did not 
bring about the expected results. The expectations of conservative Jews did 
not coincide with the attitudes of Russian right-wing politicians.
Jews on the Right
In his seminal work On Modern Jewish Politics, Ezra Mendelsohn  stated 
that “the Jewish right is more difficult to define than the Jewish left.”47 
Speaking about the interwar period, he singled out Agudat Israel and Revi-
sionist Zionism as the Jewish right. However, while this distinction works 
in the framework of Jewish politics, it does not translate well to the general 
political spectrum that existed in “the officially antisemitic empire.”48 The 
above description of attempts to find a common language with the Russian 
right mentions several Jewish activists who could be defined as potential-
ly Kaisertreu. The analysis of their Weltanschauung shows, however, a ma-
jor difference between them and their Russian loyalist counterparts, nota-
bly their demand for Jewish emancipation. 
It is hard to define the views of Lazar Nisselovich, which seem to be 
quite eclectic. He belonged to the faction of the Constitutional Democrat-
ic Party (Kadets) in the Third Duma, but severely criticized the faction and 
its leader Pavel Miliukov for their tactics regarding the Jewish question. 
His attempt to enlist the support of Rabbi Sholom Duber Schneersohn of 
Lubavitch in the electoral campaign for the Fourth Duma may testify to 
the closeness of his views with those of one of the most conservative Ortho-
dox leaders in the empire, but there is no way to confirm this assumption.49 
46 On the elections to the Fourth Duma in Odessa, see Levin, Mi-mahapekhah le-milhamah, 100–102.
47 Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 33.
48 Ibid., 60.
49 Levin, Mi-mahapekhah le-milhamah, 102–3. On Schneersohn, see Lurie, Milhamot liubavich.
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Genrikh Sliozberg, in contrast, was known for his conservative outlook.50 
In his memoirs, completed in Paris in 1933, he stressed that he did not join 
any party in 1905–06 although the majority of Jews supported the Kadets. 
According to Sliozberg, 
It was impossible for Jews to support the candidates of the extreme right-
wing parties and even Octobrists. . . . Not because the Jews were of a radi-
cal disposition in the general political sense and accepted all points of the 
Kadet program, including the autonomy of Poland (one of the major differ-
ences between the Kadets and the Octobrists), emancipation of women etc. 
But the Party of People’s Liberty [Kadets] was the only one besides the rev-
olutionary parties that openly included in its program the equalization of 
Jewish rights with those of other populations. The Octobrists did not dare 
to do this, in my mind, not because of antisemitism and not because of the 
lack of understanding of the necessity for equality of all citizens before the 
law in a constitutional state, but out of tactical considerations. In this re-
spect, they wanted to go hand in hand with the right and reactionary el-
ements and not to differ significantly from the mood of the government, 
whose support they sought.51
This description reveals a very positive approach to the Octobrists. Ac-
cording to Sliozberg, they were neither antisemites nor anti-constitutional-
ists, but their tactic was to follow the government, and therefore, they did 
not support Jews. 
In his other works written after the 1917 revolution, Sliozberg expressed 
even more right-wing views. For example, he wrote that the “granting of 
the constitution in 1905 was a little bit premature,” since the reforms pro-
claimed on December 12, 1904 “improved the regime and gradually in-
50 On Sliozberg’s Weltanschauung, see Brian Horowitz, “Genrikh Sliozberg: shtrikhi k politicheskomu por-
tretu,” Vestnik Evreiskogo universiteta v Moskve 2(15) (1997): 186–205, although the author does not dis-
cuss Sliozberg’s general political views.
51 Genrikh Sliozberg, Dela minuvshikh dnei: zapiski russkogo evreia, vol. 3 (Paris, 1934), 191–92.
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troduced the expansion of liberties.”52 He also clearly preferred the State 
Council to the State Duma since it had no extreme politicians on either the 
right or left.53 One may consider these views to be a result of the revolution 
and emigration, but it seems that Sliozberg was always a conservative who 
cooperated with the Kadets simply because of their position on the Jewish 
question. According to his memoirs, after the publication of the October 
Manifesto in 1905, he left a meeting of the Union of Unions with the words 
“the struggle for the change of the regime is accomplished.”54 Sliozberg even 
wrote that he was known as an “antirevolutionary conservative activist,”55 
and this was how others remembered him.56 It seems that if not for the Jew-
ish question, Sliozberg clearly could have been a member of the Octobrist 
party or even of the moderate wing of the Union of Russian Nationalists.
Sliozberg’s conservative political views found expression in his praise of 
the loyalty of Baron Horace Gintsburg, under whose auspices Sliozberg be-
gan his carrier as the defender of Jewish interests in the courts and govern-
mental agencies.57 As early as 1910, Sliozberg stressed that “the main in-
strument” of Gintsburg’s struggle for Jewish rights “was his absolute and 
complete loyalty.”58 In the 1930s, he wrote that Gintsburg’s “loyalty was 
preserved even after the revolutionary storm of 1905, notwithstanding the 
bad period of the pogroms that marked the victory of that revolution, and 
the sympathy of the tsar for the Union of the Russian People, which orga-
nized those pogroms.”59 In another place, Sliozberg mentioned “the deep 
loyalty [of Gintsburg] to the government and the dynasty.”60 
Baron Horace Gintsburg was not the only Jewish notable to remain 
loyal to the regime in all matters except for the issue of Jewish equality. It 
52 Genrikh Sliozberg, Dorevoliutsionnyi stroi Rossii (Paris, 1933), 120.
53 Ibid., 116–17.
54 Sliozberg, Dela minuvshikh dnei, 3: 175–76.
55 Ibid., 3: 176.
56 Ia. G. Frumkin, “Iz istorii russkogo evreistva (vospominaniia, materialy, dokumenty),” in Kniga o russkom 
evreistve ot 1860-kh godov do revoliutsii 1917 g. (New York: Soiuz russkikh evreev, 1960), 81.
57 On Sliozberg’s activities, see Benjamin Nathans, Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperi-
al Russia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 325–34.
58 Genrikh Sliozberg, “Baron G.O. Gintsburg i pravovoe polozheniie evreev,” Perezhitoe 2 (1910): 112.
59 Sliozberg, Dela minuvshikh dnei, 3: 187.
60 Genrikh Sliozberg, Baron G.O. Gintsburg. Ego zhizn’ i deiatel’nost’ (Paris: Pascal, 1933), 59.
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seems that all his sons, as well as other prominent families such as the Brod-
skii in Kiev and the Vysotskii in Moscow had a very conservative Weltan-
schauung.61 The Jewish nouveaux riche also followed suit. For example, Mo-
ses Ginsburg, who made a fortune from supplying the Russian Pacific Fleet 
and the Port Arthur fortress, and who virtually replaced the Gintsburgs as 
the main benefactor of the St. Petersburg Jewish community, was described 
by the emigrant antisemitic newspaper Chasovoi in 1936 as “a great Russian 
patriot,” who was “at the same time a devoted monarchist and pious Jew.”62
Pious Jews, like the Russian monarchists, used to quote a verse from Prov-
erbs 24:21, “My son, fear thou the Lord and the king, and meddle not with 
them that are given to change” as proof that Jewish Orthodoxy was devoted 
to the throne.63 David Fishman’s research of the Orthodox display of loyal-
ty in 1901–04 demonstrates that “some rabbis were ideological—even theo-
logical—monarchists; others believed that loyalty to the state was a religious 
duty; still others believed that the profession of loyalty and gratitude toward 
the tsar was prudent realpolitik for the vulnerable Jewish minority.”64 Some 
Orthodox Jews opposed the idea of emancipation. Thus, in December 1906, 
a certain Peretz Zilberberg asked the ministers of the Interior and Financ-
es not to grant Jews equal rights because it would be harmful for Jews and 
the state. Another anonymous petition stated that the “genuine Jews” do not 
need emancipation since their religion does not allow them to serve in the 
army and governmental offices.65 Such views characterized only extreme Or-
thodoxy, and only the most conservative rabbis could ignore the anti-Jewish 
politics of the Russian state. The mainstream of Orthodox leaders consid-
ered emancipation a legitimate political goal as the examples of Knesset Isra-
el and the party proposed by Faivel Meir Gets have shown.
61 On the political loyalty of the Gintsburg family, see Vovshin, “Mishpahat gintzburg,” 240.
62 Aleksandr Pilipenko, “Moisei Ginsburg – ‘blagodetel’ nashego Tikhookeanskogo flota’ (k istorii evreis-
kogo predprinimatel’stva v Rossii),” Vestnik Evreiskogo universiteta 2(20) (1999): 290 note 5. For a biogra-
phy of Ginsburg, see also:  M.A. Ginsburg: sa vie, son oeuvre (Paris: Pascal, 1933); Moses Ginsburg: His Life 
and Work (Paris, 1936); Sliozberg, Dela minuvshikh dnei, 3: 293–97.
63 Levin, “Orthodox Jewry and the Russian Government,” 194.
64 Fishman, “‘The Kingdom on Earth Is Like the Kingdom in Heaven’” 258*.
65 RGIA, f. 1284, op. 224, 1906, d. 131, l. 145–67.
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Faivel Meir Gets, who formulated the idea of the conservative party, was 
an interesting figure who belonged to several camps simultaneously and, 
therefore, has not attracted sufficient scholarly attention. He was a Tal-
mudic scholar who studied at the university (a fairly common occurrence) 
but did not abandon religious observance (not very common). He served 
as the learned Jew of the Vil’na educational district (i.e., he was a state of-
ficial) and, at the same time, maintained close ties to orthodox rabbini-
cal leaders, participated in the Russian and German Jewish press, and was 
a friend of the Russian philosopher Vladimir Solov’ev.66 As one of the last 
maskilim, Gets was at home in German-Jewish culture and probably was 
influenced by the example of German-Jewish conservative politicians like 
Gabriel Riesser, who combined German patriotism with the struggle for 
Jewish emancipation. Similarly, the conservative political views of Gets in-
cluded emancipation of the Jews, as seen in the program discussed above. 
In addition to notables and pious Jews, some Zionists might have shared 
conservative views, or at least understood the feelings of Russian nationalists, 
and been indifferent to the future of Russia. Indeed, the Zionist movement in 
Russia carefully avoided interference in Russian politics before the 1905 Rev-
olution; however, this was not a matter of principle but rather behavior that 
enabled its semi-legal existence and its avoidance of police repression. When 
the Zionists entered politics in 1905 and converted their organization into a 
political party at the Helsingfors Conference in November 1906, they adopt-
ed the demands of emancipation and national rights for Jews.67 This  clearly 
66 On Gets see I.Ch. [Ilia Cherikover], “Gets, Faivel Meer Bentzelovich,” Evreiskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 6 
(St. Petersburg, 1910), 467; Sliozberg, Dela minuvshikh dnei, 3: 256–57; Semion Dubnov, Kniga zhizni, 
vol. 1 (Riga, 1934), 160; vol. 2 (Riga, 1935), 13, 25; Yahadut lita, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Am Ha-Sefer and Iggud 
Yotzei Lita be-Israel, 1972), 142. On Solov’ev see Brian Horowitz, “Vladimir Solov’ev and the Jews: A View 
from Today,” in The Russian-Jewish Tradition: Intellectuals, Historians, Revolutionaries (Boston: Academ-
ic Studies Press, 2017), 198–214 and literature cited there.
67 On Zionists joining the political struggle, see Frankel, Prophecy and Politics, 134–69; on their transfor-
mation into a political party, see Alexander Orbach, “Zionism and the Russian Revolution of 1905: The 
Commitment to Participate in Domestic Political Life,” Bar-Ilan 24–25 (1989): 7–24; Matityahu Mintz, 
“Work for the Land of Israel and ‘Work in the Present’: A Concept of Unity, a Reality of Contradiction,” 
in Essential Papers on Zionism, ed. Jehuda Reinharz and Anita Shapira (New York and London: New York 
University Press, 1996), 161–70; Vladimir Levin, “Politics at the Crossroads—Jewish Parties and the Sec-
ond Duma Elections, 1907,” Leipziger Beiträge zur jüdischen Geschichte und Kultur 2 (2004): 129–46.
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placed them in the oppositional segment of Russian politics. An attempt by 
Zeev Jabotinsky, a young and charismatic Zionist leader, to conclude an elec-
toral agreement with right-wing landowners in the elections to the Second 
Duma in the province of Volhynia was driven not by ideological affinity but 
by rational calculation. Jabotinsky thought that such an agreement might 
bring about the election of several “progressive” members of the Duma, Jews 
among them.68 After the failure of this combination, the Zionists never again 
tried to cooperate with the Russian right. Some of them fiercely criticized the 
Kadets but did so from the position of Jewish civil and national equality.69 
Despite discrimination and the intensification of state anti-Jewish poli-
tics before 1914, the beginning of World War I caused an outburst of patri-
otic feelings among the empire’s Jews. Their expressions were very similar 
to those of other Russian subjects. In St. Petersburg for example, the fes-
tive prayer for the well-being of the imperial family and the victory of Rus-
sian arms was held in the Choral Synagogue, and a telegram expressing loy-
alty was sent to the tsar. Then a demonstration of Jews bearing portraits of 
the tsar and national flags marched to the office of the city governor and 
to the Winter Palace. At the Palace Square, the participants kneeled and 
sang the national anthem three times. They continued on to Anichkov Pal-
ace, the home of the dowager empress, and sang the anthem there too. On 
their way back to the synagogue, they again sang the anthem in front of the 
provincial governor’s office and the barracks of the military fleet.70 Simi-
lar prayers for the victory of Russian arms in synagogues were accompanied 
by street demonstrations that included displaying the tsar’s portrait, flying 
flags, and singing the national anthem in many Russian cities and towns, 
starting with Odessa and ending with small shtetls like Ovruch and Brich-
any.71 Some of those prayers took place on the birthday of the heir to the 
68 On this episode, see Vladimir Levin, “Russian Jewry and the Duma Elections, 1906–1907,” Jews and Slavs 
7 (2000): 242–43.
69 On the political activities of the Russian Zionists in 1907–1914, see Levin, Mi-mahapekhah le-milhamah, 
183–209.
70 Novyi Voskhod 29 (July 24, 1914): 11; Hatzfirah 177 (August 3 [16], 1914): 2.
71 For the description of the prayer in the Great Synagogue of Odessa, which was followed by a demonstra-
tion with the emperor’s portrait and for the prayer in the Brody Synagogue, see Hatzfirah 180 (August 6 
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Russian throne, Alexis, on 30 July/12 August, which strengthened the dis-
play of dynastic loyalty. We do not know who organized those demonstra-
tions or who participated in them, but their broad geographical spread and 
their similarity to spontaneous displays of non-Jews (and their typologi-
cal likeness to the usual behavior of the monarchists’ unions) enable us to 
speak about sincere expressions of loyalty.72 The demonstration of loyalty to 
the tsar was an accepted form for the expression of patriotism and loyalty to 
the country that did not involve the profession of monarchism or Russian 
nationalism. However, it is hard to imagine liberals or radicals kneeling in 
front of the emperor’s palace.73
Public expressions of Jewish loyalty to the tsarist regime became more 
common after the Revolutions of 1917 and the Civil War. Probably the best 
known figure was the prominent Zionist publicist Daniel Pasmanik who 
proclaimed his monarchism and Russian nationalism in the 1920s, as recent-
ly discussed by Taro Tsurumi.74 But he was not alone. For example, one of 
the participants of a Russian-Jewish meeting in Berlin in 1923 said that, “9 
out of 10 Jews miss the tsar.”75 There is no reason to suspect that such feel-
ings were not sincere. In contrast to the expressions of loyalty made while the 
regime was alive, there were no benefits to be derived from such statements 
in the 1920s. In fact, quite the opposite was true: Pasmanik was ostracized 
by the Zionist movement for his Russian nationalism. However, the views 
[19], 1914): 2. For the prayer and street demonstrations in Novgorod-Severskii and Ovruch, see Hatzfirah 
175 (July 31 [August 13], 1914): 1; Hatzfirah 183 (August 10 [23], 1914): 2. See also the prayer and demon-
stration with the emperor’s portrait in Bolgrad: Hatzfirah 180 (August 6 [19], 1914): 2; prayer and public 
demonstration in Kursk: Hatzfirah 181 (August 7 [20], 1914): 2; prayer followed by a telegram to the em-
peror in Grodno: Hatzfirah 182 (August 8 [21], 1914): 2; prayer and demonstration in Berdichev: Hatzfi-
rah 183 (August 10 [23], 1914): 2.
72 On ceremonies and demonstrations in August 1914, see Boris Kolonitskii, “Tragicheskaia erotika”: obrazy 
imperatorskoi sem’ i v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: NLO, 2010), 73–98.
73 For the discussion of Jewish soldiers’ patriotism and the desire to defend the Fatherland against the enemy, 
see Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, Jews in the Russian Army, 1827–1917: Drafted into Modernity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 259–64.
74 Taro Tsurumi, “Jewish Liberal, Russian Conservative: Daniel Pasmanik Between Zionism and the Anti-
Bolshevik White Movement,” Jewish Social Studies 21 (2015): 151–80. On Pasmanik’s shaking hands with 
Purishkevich in Crimea, see Oleg Budnitskii, Rossiiskie evrei mezhdu krasnymi i belymi (1917–1920) (Mos-
cow: ROSSPEN, 2005), 206.
75 Oleg Budnitskii and Alexandra Polian, Russko-evreiskii Berlin, 1920–1941 (Moscow: NLO, 2013), 182.
staulinas_book.indb   375 2021. 05. 04.   11:15:45
V l a d i m i r  L e v i n
376
expressed in the 1920s could have not reflected opinions from before the 
revolution. It is logical to suppose that the antisemitic tsarist regime might 
have looked less bad after the Bolshevik revolution, the Civil War, and emi-
gration. Nonetheless, it is not very common for people to completely change 
their political outlooks. Therefore, the sympathy expressed in the 1920s for 
the fallen tsarist regime is an indicator that such sympathy was—or could 
have been—in existence, in one form or another, before 1917. 
The Right and the Jews
Jews eager to cooperate with the right were usually antagonized by its an-
tisemitism, but the right was by no means homogeneous or static. Without 
delving deeply into the issue of the rightist Weltanschauung and its trans-
formation, I intend here to recall changes in attitudes towards Jews that 
might have permitted, in theory, the possibility of cooperation between 
conservative Jews and Russian monarchists and rightists.
While during the 1905 Revolution the hierarchy of hostile ethnic groups 
and nationalities was very clear for right-wing politicians, and the Jews were 
viewed as the major danger, the pacification of the country and routine po-
litical activities after 1907 made this hierarchy less unambiguous than be-
fore. If the attempts of Jewish politicians to find a common language with 
the right began in 1907, it took more time for the rightist politicians to 
change their views on the Jews. In 1911, Vladimir Krupenskii and his fol-
lowers left the Nationalist faction in the Duma and established a new fac-
tion of Independent Nationalists. The ideology behind the split was the 
differentiated view of non-Russians put forth by Krupenskii. He claimed 
that certain groups of inorodtsy—Germans, Tatars, Armenians, Greeks, 
and Moldovans (Krupenskii came from Bessarabia where Moldovans were 
the majority)—were capable of assimilation into the Russian people and 
therefore should be emancipated; however, Finns, Poles, and Jews could not 
be assimilated.76 In spite of his vision of Jews as incapable of assimilation, 
76 Kotsiubinskii, Russkii natsionalism, 41.
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 Krupenskii proposed an electoral agreement to the Jews of Bessarabia in 
1912. In exchange for the support of his party against the group of Vladi-
mir Purishkevich, he offered the Jews representation in the Duma in the 
form of one seat from the province of Bessarabia.77 In the context of Rus-
sian right-wing antisemitism, which viewed Jews as a mystical body primor-
dially hostile to Holy Russia, Krupenskii’s proposal was not simply a tech-
nical electoral alliance. It was a kind of legitimization of Jews, a redefinition 
of them in political terms, a recognition of their position as voters. In other 
words, Krupenskii did not become a philosemite, but he did begin to view 
the Jews as legitimate partners in Russian politics.
We can view as a similar statement the article about the Beilis Affair 
written by a prominent leader of the Russian Nationalist Party, Vasilii Shul-
gin and published in 1913. Contrary to all right-wing activists who fiercely 
supported the accusation of Mendel Beilis as guilty of ritual murder, Shul-
gin, claimed that there was no evidence of the ritual character of the mur-
der and Beilis’ guilt.78 As his long political career shows, Shulgin also did 
not become a philosemite, but he saw no need for artificially invented as-
saults on the humanity of Jews. Krupenskii and Shulgin could be described 
as “rationalistic” antisemites who did not invest Jews with “supernatural” 
qualities but treated them as one among many groups of Russian subjects.79 
The beginning of World War I intensified this tendency. Jewish news-
papers in August 1914 quoted the most prominent Russian antisemites, 
Vladi mir Purishkevich and Alexei Shmakov. The former said that the Jews 
are Russian citizens and ready to protect the country with their lives,80 and 
the latter welcomed the patriotism of Jews.81 The change in Purishkevich’s 
attitude toward the Jews and its numerous public expressions caused con-
77 Kh. Grinberg, “K vyboram v Bessarabii,” Rassvet 35 (August 29, 1912): 20–21; Yehudi pashut [Moshe 
Kleinman], “Be-tfutsot israel (hashkafah klalit),” Ha-shiloah 27, no. 2 (August 1912): 187.
78 The article is quoted in Shulgin’s memoirs, Gody (Moscow: Novosti, 1990), 148–51.
79 Cf. Sergei Podbolotov, “‘True-Russians’ Against the Jews: Right-Wing Anti-Semitism in the Last Years of 
the Russian Empire, 1905–1917,” Ab Imperio, no. 3 (2001): 201.
80 Hatzfirah 175 (July 31 [August 13], 1914): 1.
81 Hatzfirah 187 (August 14 [August 27], 1914): 2.
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fusion among extreme rightists.82 This sudden benevolence was an indica-
tor of a rearrangement of the hierarchy of enemies. Germans held the first 
place, thus making the others look less threatening. 
In spring 1915, one of the key monarchist activists in Moscow Vasilii 
 Orlov began to speak about abolition of the Pale of Settlement and even 
about civil equality for Jews.83 In June 1915, Orlov established a new right-
wing monarchist organization, the Motherland’s Patriotic Union (Otechest-
vennyi patrioticheskii soiuz), the bylaws of which did not include the clause 
prohibiting Jews from becoming members but did explicitly prohibit Ger-
mans from joining.84 The theoretical possibility that Jews might become 
members of the Union triggered loud protests and ostracism by other right-
wing organizations.85  
In August 1915, two other important developments took place. The first 
was the partial abolition of the Pale of Settlement by the Russian govern-
ment. This drastic step was taken under pressure from the Allies after the 
mass expulsions of Jews from the front areas by the Russian army,86 but it 
also shows that the conservative ministers assumed the Jewish danger to be 
less serious than before. The second development was the establishment of 
the Progressive Bloc in the Duma and State Council. The Bloc included the 
majority of factions in the Duma, among them Krupenskii’s Independent 
Nationalists and Shulgin’s Progressive Nationalists, who also split off from 
the Nationalist faction. The Bloc’s program demanded “an entrance to the 
path of abolishing restrictions on the rights of Jews.”87 While for the Ka-
82 Ivanov, Pravye v russkom parlamente, 337–41.
83 Iu. I. Kir’ianov, Pravye partii v Rossii, 1911–1917 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), 219–21. The leader of the 
“Right Group” in the State Council, Count Alexei Bobrinskii, also spoke in favor of the abolition of the 
Pale of Settlement. See Ivanov, Pravye v russkom parlamente, 175.
84 The founder of the Union, Vasilii Orlov, was not unambiguous about the matter and stated in a private let-
ter, “we just temporarily remained silent about them [the Jews], that’s all” and called it “necessary, reason-
able tactics.” See Chernovskii, Soiuz russkogo naroda, 188.
85 Kir’ianov, Pravye partii, 225.
86 Semion Goldin, Russkaia armia i evrei, 1914–1917 (Moscow and Jerusalem: Mosty Kul’tury, 2018), 354–
61. On the expulsions, see also Semion Goldin, “Deportation of Jews by the Russian Military Command, 
1914–1915,” Jews in Eastern Europe 1(41) (Spring 2000): 40–73; Eric Lohr, “The Russian Army and the 
Jews: Mass Deportation, Hostages and Violence during World War I,” Russian Review 60 (2001): 404–19. 
87 Michael F. Hamm, “Liberalism and the Jewish Question: The Progressive Bloc,” Russian Review 31 (1972): 
163–65; Rafail Ganeliln, “Gosudarstvennaia duma i antisemitskie tsirkuliary 1915–1916 godov,” Vestnik 
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dets such an ambiguous formula was a betrayal of their principle of equali-
ty for all, it satisfied Russian nationalists. Though it did not promise eman-
cipation, the program nonetheless recognized that the rights of Jews should 
be increased, contrary to the numerous statements of the Nationalists in 
previous years. 
All this demonstrates that the reading of the imperial Russian ethno-
political map by right-wing forces was changing. Starting in the 1870s and 
especially during the 1905 Revolution, the Jews were seen as the most dan-
gerous enemy Russia faced. As time passed, the Jewish danger was perceived 
as less threatening, and some right-wing politicians began to distinguish 
between individual Jews and the collective Jew. They began to view Jews as 
a national collective, hostile like the Polish nation, for example, but not a 
mystic entity striving to destroy Holy Russia. With the start of World War 
I, the Germans became the omnipotent mystical enemy.88 Even those who 
continued to persecute Jews blamed them for being German supporters, 
that is, not for being the archenemy of Russia, but for being collaborators. 
There were many common features of the older hatred of Jews and the 
newly developed hatred of Germans. Eric Lohr stated that “for extreme 
right-wing organizations … traditional anti-Semitic and anti-Polish themes 
merged seamlessly with new anti-German themes.”89 However, the appear-
ance of the German archenemy led to a reappraisal of the place of the Jews. 
According to Mikhail Lykosov, “German imperialism temporarily replaced 
the Kahal” in rightists’ rhetoric.90 The antisemitism of the right-wing by 
Evreiskogo universiteta v Moskve 3(10) (1995): 4–37; Goldin, Russkaia armia i evrei, 361–70. On the reac-
tion of the extreme right to the establishment of the Bloc, see Kir’ianov, Pravye partii, 240–41; A.A. Iva-
nov, Poslednie zashchitniki monarkhii: Fraktsiia pravykh IV Gosudarstvennoi dumy v gody Pervoi mirovoi 
voiny (1914–fevral’ 1917) (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2006), 63–75; Ivanov, Pravye v russkom parla-
mente, 142–201.
88 On politics relating to those Germans who were Russian subjects, see Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian 
Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universi-
ty Press, 2003); A.Yu. Bakhturina, Okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii: gosudarstvennoe upravlenie i natsional’naia 
politika v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914–1917 gg). (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004), 78–116.
89 Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire, 24.
90 Cited in: Ivanov, Pravye v russkom parlamente, 297. Cf. also the opinion of Aleksandr Repnikov: “World 
War I made the Jewish question less relevant in comparison with the question regarding ‘the German 
domination [zasil’e]’,” A.V. Repnikov, Konservativnye kontseptsii pereustroistva Rossii (Moscow: Academia, 
2007), 326. 
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no means disappeared, but the importance of Jews as a hostile group di-
minished.91 Thus, discussions about the abolition of the Pale of Settlement 
contained the idea that Russia could not fight with Germany and the Jews 
at the same time.92 Some right-wing leaders preferred to concentrate on 
the fight against Germany and reach a kind of “peace” or “truce” with the 
Jews. Instead of the complete exclusion professed earlier, they now adopted 
a policy of including the Jews in the ranks of those citizens fighting against 
Germany (but decidedly not of Jews’ integration into the Russian people). 
The Germans became “the Other” of Russian right-wing politicians during 
World War I. 
Conclusions
As the discussion above has demonstrated, there were groups among Rus-
sian Jewry who were loyal to the monarchy and professed conservatism in 
varying degrees. However, their acceptance of the existing order did not in-
clude discrimination against the Jews, and despite their conservative polit-
ical views, they strived to improve the situation of the Jews in Russia and 
to win full emancipation for them. Only very marginal groups voiced anti-
emancipation demands.
Notwithstanding the full endorsement of discriminatory politics by the 
right-wing politicians, there were Kaisertreu Jewish activists who attempt-
ed to find common ground with them. Many others, it might be supposed, 
were eager to do so, but were antagonized by the virulent antisemitism of 
the monarchists, Russian nationalists, and even right-wing liberals.
The antisemitism of the right, however, underwent changes after the 
end of the 1905 Revolution and especially after the outbreak of World 
War I. Had this change among some of the right-wing politicians been per-
sistent, it might have enabled right-wing Jews to take a more active stance 
in Russian conservative politics. The Bolshevik takeover in 1917 and the 
91 For similar statements, see Goldin, Russkaia armia i evrei, 361–62.
92 Ibid., 354, 358, 371–72.
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 Civil War that followed, however, reversed this tenuous trend in favor of 
the “normalization” of the perception of Jews in the eyes of the Russian 
right. The association between the Bolsheviks and the Jews intensified an-
tisemitism and once again, those Jews who were willing to fight the Bolshe-
viks were prevented from joining the White Russian armies.93 Thus, hatred 
of Jews barred any sort of genuine cooperation between Russian and Jew-
ish conservatives. 
93 On the Jews and the Jewish question during the revolution and the Civil War, see, e.g., Budnitskii, Rossi-
iskie evrei mezhdu krasnymi i belymi.
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Dilemmas of Nationalization 
in Russia’s Western 
Borderlands,
1905–1915
“The relationship between empire and nation was among the thorniest of questions in the late Russian Em-
pire, and the complications proved most acute in the country’s western regions. This volume assembles a 
truly international team of scholars to explore these matters in a range of different contexts, from education 
and religion to censorship, tourism, and right-wing political mobilization. The chapters reveal an exception-
al set of challenges that statesmen, reformers, and imperial subjects of diverse nationalities and confessions 
faced in conceptualizing and actualizing their projects in the context of new forms of association and al-
tered political frameworks. As the authors reveal, the greatest casualty for imperial policy was consistency. 
Full of new research and compelling insights, The Tsar, the Empire, and the Nation represents the latest 
word on this important problem in Russian and East European history.”
—Paul W. Werth, Professor of History, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
“By investigating western borderlands from the Baltic provinces in the north to Ukraine in the south, this 
volume creates a meso-level between the macro-perspective on the Russian empire as a whole and the mi-
cro-perspective on a single region, paving the ground for comparative insights into the empire’s responses 
to national questions. What I admire the most about this book is its very balanced discussion of national 
questions which still bear the potential to become politicized.”













This book addresses the challenge of modern nationalism to the tsarist Russian Empire that first ap-peared on the empire’s western periphery. It was most prevalent in the twelve provinces extending 
from the Ukrainian lands in the south to the Baltic provinces in the north, and in the Kingdom of Poland. 
Did the late Russian Empire enter World War I as a multiethnic state with many of its age-old mechanisms 
run by a multiethnic elite, or as a Russian state predominantly managed by ethnic Russians? The studies 
seek to answer this main question while covering diverse issues such as native language education, intercon-
fessional rivalry, the “Jewish question,” and the emergence of Russian nationalist attitudes in the aftermath 
of the first Russian revolution. The overall finding of the contributors is that although the imperial gov-
ernment did not really identify with popular Russian nationalism, it sometimes ended up implementing 
policies promoted by Russian nationalist proponents. 
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